

**Reinventing Governance:  
A Study of Transformations in the Ontario Provincial Police**

**Jennifer Wood**

**Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
Centre of Criminology at the University of Toronto.**

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## **Abstract**

### **Reinventing Governance:**

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Doctor of Philosophy, 2000

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Centre of Criminology,

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It is now widely accepted across academic and public policy circles that governance has been transformed in a variety of ways, and this is nowhere more apparent than in the area of security. A central component of this transformation process has been a profound re-thinking of the nature, roles and functions of the state. At the same time, non-state and/or quasi-state institutions and auspices have emerged as new governmental authorities, leading to an extensive pluralization of the governance of security in this province, this country and in other parts of the world.

This study examines the ways in which the state governance of security has been reinvented. It takes as its institutional site the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and more broadly, the Ontario Government. It examines particular strategic, institutional and managerial shifts in the OPP over the course of the last decade, and locates these shifts within a broader political and economic environment characterized by new governmental problems and imperatives. Of particular interest is the nature of the “new right” political agenda in this province and its effects on the organization of governance.

In contrast to traditional sociological accounts of public policing, this study is concerned with shifts in managerial discourse, and the ways in which managers have responded to a range of broad economic and political imperatives through various forms of organizational change. Methodologically, it draws from studies in “governmentality”, which have focused on shifts in “mentalities” of state governance, and the ways in which these mentalities have colonized and transformed particular governmental programs and practices. In particular, such studies have concluded that state governance has been transformed according to a new “neo-liberal” mentality. This study assesses the adequacy of the concepts and models within this literature for explaining shifts in governmental authority, the reinvention of public policing institutions and agents, and transformations in the governance of policing. The ultimate aim of this study is to contribute to this scholarship on governmentality and neo-liberalism by analyzing: (1) the time- and space-specific conditions which have led to the emergence of new mentalities; (2) the precise ways in which these mentalities have been appropriated and translated; and (3) the ultimate effects of these mentalities on the organization and distribution of policing across the public-private divide.



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## Chapter 1

### Reinventing Governance

*Every few hundred years throughout Western history, a sharp transformation has occurred. In a matter of decades, society altogether rearranges itself - its worldview, its basic values, its social and political structures, its arts, its key institutions. Fifty years later a new world exists. And the people born into that world cannot even imagine the world in which their grandparents lived and into which their own parents were born. Our age is such a period of transformation (Drucker, 1995: 75)*

It is commonly accepted across academic, public policy, as well as business circles that we are in the midst of a profound re-organization of governance in this province, this country and in other parts of the world. At a national level, there are many aspects to this re-organization, including a re-evaluation of the role of the state, the emergence of new governmental institutions and auspices, the reinvention of established institutions, the re-formation of governmental agents, and the establishment of new governance relationships<sup>1</sup> and networks. On a global scale, a variety of structural changes - mainly due to advances in information technology as well as the elimination of trade barriers - appear to be re-shaping the areas of economics, politics and culture, to the point where a dual process of “globalization” and “localization” is occurring (see Robertson, 1995 and Pieterse, 1995). Given that such transformations are indexed across sites (for example, health, education, security), as well as economic and political contexts, a variety of observers contend that governance is being reinvented (cf. Rose and Miller, 1992; Drucker, 1995; Elkins, 1995; Hirst, 1994; Giddens, 1998).

This broad shift is nowhere more apparent than in the area of security, and a range of scholars have endeavoured to examine particular ways in which governance within this site has been transformed. Such studies have served to enhance our understanding of how the

problem of "security" has been thought up - or more accurately, re-thought - in recent times. As well, this scholarship has allowed us to distill broader themes from the substantive area of security in order to provide a broader (and more theoretical) commentary on the changing face of governance today. Indeed, these scholars have, in their own ways, attempted to address the question of how governance has been, and continues to be, reinvented. The ways in which this question has been addressed, however, has varied considerably depending on the substantive and theoretical vantage point of each scholar or discipline.<sup>2</sup>

For example, some scholars – in the context of the declining hegemony of the state - have concerned themselves with understanding the ways in which the problem of security has been addressed *outside of state institutions*. Early manifestations of this scholarship included a charting of the growth of "non-state"<sup>3</sup> or "private" institutions of security, such as the "private security industry" and the proliferation of "target-hardening" products sold on the market (Shearing and Stenning, 1981; Johnston, 1992; for more recent examples, see Jones and Newburn, 1998; and De Waard, 1996). In this same vein, other scholars have attempted to understand the proliferation of "*hybrid*" institutions of security that occupy a space across the traditional public/private divide (Johnston, 1998; see Hoogenboom, 1991), while others have attempted to map the division of labour between various public, private and quasi-public institutions (Jones and Newburn, 1998; Johnston, 1992).

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<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Mariana Valverde for the term "governance relationships"

<sup>2</sup> Michael Kempa is gratefully acknowledged for his work on private policing (Kempa et al., 1999) which has contributed enormously to the organization of this chapter.

<sup>3</sup> The author recognizes that the use of the term "non-state" can be problematic, because it suggests a complete separation of state-directed forms of rule from other forms of rule. "Non-state" forms of governance indeed exist within a broader network of governmental forms including state forms. Therefore the term "non-state" is not to be taken too literally, but only to suggest forms of governance that distinguish their objectives and/or strategies and/or agents from state objectives and/or strategies and/or agents.

Apart from this focus on novel *institutions* of governance, some scholars have focussed more generally on the emergence of non-state *auspices*<sup>4</sup> of security, including "gated communities" (Shearing and Stenning, 1984; Sheptycki, 1998; Caldeira, 1996), Business Improvement Districts (Murphy, 1997; Green et al., 1995), and volunteer or "grass-roots" associations (Johnston, 1992 and 1998; Bayley, 1994; Turk, 1987). Having acknowledged the complex co-existence of state and non-state institutions and auspices devoted to the governance of security, Shearing's more recent work explores the notion of a "nodal network", comprised of a multiplicity of governmental forms (Bayley and Shearing, forthcoming; Kempa et al., 1999). Within this fluid network, various governance relationships are articulated and given effect on a continual basis (Bayley and Shearing, forthcoming).

Given the proliferation of new non-state and quasi-state institutions and auspices, certain scholars have examined the diverse ways in which "security" is being defined or "thought up". Shearing has reminded us that "governing through crime" (Simon, 1995) represents only one "logic" within which the problem of security is defined and acted upon (see Shearing, 1998b). For example, by examining "corporate" forms of governance that have accompanied the proliferation of "mass private property" (Shearing and Stenning, 1983), it has been observed that security is often defined as a "loss" to be prevented rather than a "crime" to be redeemed (Shearing, 1998b; see Wood and Shearing, 1998 on campus security). Thus, in addition to acknowledging the co-existence of various institutions and

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<sup>4</sup>The use of the term "auspices" is meant to imply forms of governance that are not associated with any formal "institution". This would refer to any form of governance directed by a collective that is bound by a set of interests, but which has no formal institutional affiliation. I am grateful to David Bayley for his thoughts on "institutions" and "auspices" (1999).

auspices, scholars have come to recognize the co-existence of various ways of thinking about, or constituting, the problem of security.

In the context of these broader, “non-state” developments, certain scholars have explored the particular ways in which the *state governance* of security has been reinvented. In particular, a large body of literature has been devoted to examining the emergence of “community policing” at both a discursive and practical level. Some scholars have provided a general conceptual discussion relating to the key themes of this shift (ex. Chacko and Nancoo, 1993; Friedmann, 1992), while some have explored the gap between the “rhetoric” and “reality” (see Greene and Mastrofski (eds), 1988; Zhao and Thurman, 1997; Leighton, 1991). Some have engaged in evaluation studies of particular community policing programs (see Dietz, 1997; Skogan and Harnett, 1997), while others have offered advice on how to implement community policing more effectively (see Reiss, 1985; Sunahara, 1991).

While this largely empirical work has been interesting for scholars concerned primarily with studies of the “police”, another body of literature – while relatively small – has located shifts in public policing in the context of broader shifts in state governance. This body of literature is grounded in Foucault’s notion of “governmentality” (1991), a notion which has inspired a change in analytical thought in such overlapping disciplines as politics, law, philosophy and sociology. This notion of “governmentality” embodies a shift away from the more traditional questions surrounding the “why” of established institutions of governance toward an emphasis on the “how” of governance broadly speaking. As such, analyses of governance institutions and practices are framed practically or pragmatically rather than, say philosophically. In this vein, *government* (as a practice rather than a noun) is defined as “the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end”



(Ibid., 93), or as Gordon explains, “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (in Stenson, 1996: 104).

Based on this interest in the “how” of governance, Foucault stressed that “liberalism” should be defined as a way of thinking about the *arts* of governing, rather than simply as a philosophical or political doctrine (Gordon, 1991: 14). Furthermore, the “arts of governing” are driven by particular “mentalities” (or “rationalities”) of governance (or “government”). “Rationality” is defined as “the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 197).

Grounded in this understanding of governance, neo-Foucaultian scholars have accordingly examined shifts in governance by examining shifts in broader governing mentalities. Specifically, they have examined the ways in which new strategies and practices of (state) governance have been articulated within a broad political rationality. This line of inquiry has been concerned with the ways in which the “how” of governance has been rationalized and articulated, and how governmental reform has been thought about and understood. Governmentality scholars have also examined the institutional forms, techniques and practices deployed to put political rationalities and abstract programs into effect (O’Malley et al., 1997: 501-513). In essence, this literature has focussed on changes in “the ‘governmental rationality’ of state power, through an historical elaboration of the emergence of contemporary state forms” (Valverde et al., 1999: 4).

Within this analytical tradition, some scholars have observed a shift to a new “rationality of state power” (Ibid) which they characterize as “neo liberalism” (see Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993). One of the effects of this rationality, according to Rose, is that the “social” “is no longer a key zone, target and objective” of governance strategies (1996a: 327). Specifically, that terrain of collective life associated with the nation state and a “single bounded national economy” (Ibid) has been displaced by a new “spatialization” of governance generally referred to as “community” (Ibid). This new vision of collective life represents a shift away from the established worldview that draws attention to uniformity over large spaces toward a new worldview that embraces diversity, fragmentation and local knowledge. Consequently, state institutions are becoming de-centred and “social” forms of expertise – based on a universal truth and social consensus – are losing their appeal (Wood and Shearing, 1999: 311).

In relation to the governance of security, the recent shift to “community policing” is regarded, by scholars such as O’Malley and Palmer (1996) and Stenson (1993, 1996), as a new neo-liberal program for governing “through” the knowledge and capacities of “communities”. In particular, members of these communities are constituted by the state as prudential and active (rather than passive and unknowledgeable) (O’Malley, 1992; O’Malley and Palmer, 1996). This new program is regarded as a form of governance “at a distance” (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose and Miller, 1992), where forms of self-governance in the citizenry and in non-state institutions are aligned with the broader objectives of the state (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996; Rose and Miller, 1992).

In this same analytical vein, scholars have also examined the ways in which state *institutions* of governance have been transformed. For example, O’Malley (1997) and De

Lint (1998) suggest that a neo-liberal or “new managerialist” mentality has served to transform public policing institutions from both a structural and managerial standpoint. For example, the public police (and many other state institutions of governance), have been reinvented along commercial and enterprise lines in order to address the failures of bureaucratic welfarism or “collective liberalism” (O’Malley, 1997: 367; O’Malley and Palmer, 1996). Such failures include: the cultivation of dependency among citizens due to paternalistic state practices (such as social assistance programs) (Rose and Miller, 1992: 198); the patronizing character of bureaucratic or “social” forms of expertise (Rose, 1996b: 52) and the inability to thrive economically within a capitalist system (Ibid., 51). In place of a welfarist rationality, institutions such as the public police have been transformed according the “rationality of the marketplace” (Osborne, 1993; O’Malley, 1997; O’Malley and Palmer, 1996) to the end of cultivating entrepreneurialism and enhanced efficiency within the population (O’Malley, 1996b).

In the context of these institutional shifts, De Lint (1998) has traced the impact of a neo-liberal or new managerial mentality on the constitution of state agents, and in particular, the police constable. In his examination of recent police training reforms in Canada, De Lint has observed the emergence of new programs and technologies aimed at the re-constitution of constable subjectivity. Constables are now to be more innovative and self-reflexive at the front-line level, and are “responsibilized” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996) to enhance their problem-solving and analytical skills in ways that are consistent with broader and ever-changing organizational objectives. In contrast to training and learning programs under a welfarist mentality, responsibility for learning has shifted from the organization to the learner (De Lint, 1998).

If one considers this broad spectrum of scholarship - ranging from the more concrete empirical studies described earlier to the theoretical studies of governmentality described above - one can conclude that there have been a variety of attempts made at understanding and explaining how governance has been reinvented. For the sake of simplicity, one could suggest that this literature, taken as a whole, has examined how the governance of security has been reinvented by asking the following three questions:

- What institutions and auspices other than the public police have emerged to promote security?
- What are the ways in which security is being defined and promoted within these other institutions and auspices?
- How are transformations in public policing strategies, programs, institutions, and agents related to transformations in broad mentalities of governance?

Obviously, the answers presently given to these questions have contributed enormously to our understanding of how governance is being reinvented. The purpose of this dissertation is to enhance this understanding by providing an original case study of particular shifts in the state governance of security – i.e. public policing. This case study is organized around four questions, all of which are aimed at enhancing our understanding of how governance is being reinvented.

The first question is: *How is governmental authority shifting?* While it is now well-known that the role of the state - and more specifically, the public police - in the governance of security has been re-evaluated and re-articulated, studies in the governance of security have not focused explicitly on the ways in which the governmental authority of the police has been contested and re-negotiated. An analysis of shifts in policing strategies provides

an empirical window through which one can trace how governmental authority has shifted to new institutions and auspices of security.

The second question is: *How are public policing institutions being reinvented?* Specifically, what are some of the new challenges or problems being faced by state institutions of security, and how have they responded to these problems organizationally? While the governmentality literature has depicted a new rationality within state institutions, it is useful to conduct a case study of how one institution was re-imagined and reinvented. By tracing the development of a new institutional identity and model, one can explore the complex relationships between new mentalities of governance and concrete institutional arrangements and practices.

The third question is: *How are public policing agents being reinvented?* In the context of a shift in governmental authority, accompanied by transformations in state institutions, another useful question relates to how it is that state agents (as both the “governors” as well as the “governed”) are being re-constituted or reinvented. In other words, how is it that agents are being re-thought and subsequently re-made? While the governmentality literature has explored the relationship between a new mentality of rule and the re-constitution of subjectivities within agents, it would be useful to conduct a site-specific analysis of those precise conditions that made it imperative to re-evaluate the role and capacities of agents. Such a case study would allow one to explore the complex relationships between new governmental objectives and the identity of the agent.

The fourth question is: *How is the governance (or regulation) of policing being reinvented?* This question is aimed at exploring the ways in which the police, as *objects* of governance, are being re-governed within a new regulatory regime characterized by new

governmental objectives. This regulatory regime consists of public, private, and quasi-public institutions or nodes whose purpose is to regulate – through legislation and other mechanisms – various aspects of public policing. By examining this question, one will be able to understand the ways in which public policing is being transformed outside of the institutional boundaries of the police.

Hence, this dissertation will explore the four questions above in order to contribute to the literature on contemporary transformations in governance. To reiterate, these questions are:

- How is governmental authority shifting?
- How are public policing institutions being reinvented?
- How are public policing agents being re-made?
- How is the governance of policing being reinvented?

By exploring these questions, this dissertation has three aims. The first aim is to contribute to the substantive question of how it is that the state governance of security is being reinvented. With this substantive knowledge, the second and most important aim of this dissertation is to assess, as well as extend, the analytical utility of the concepts and models offered in the governmentality literature. Finally, another intent of this study is to open up the theoretical space necessary to ponder normative and policy issues. In other words, having established an understanding of where we've been, and where we are, what kinds of normative questions are becoming most salient?

### **Methodology**

As Crawford (1997) has noted, a great deal of scholarship on public policing has tended to take an “uncritical reading” (Crawford, 1997: 4) of those trends in governance that

can be observed elsewhere in other “highly specified fields of inquiry” (Ibid). A main reason for this is that from an analytical standpoint, some scholarship is not based on the premise that policing is a form of governance. The underlying assumption of such scholarship is that if one wants to study how it is that governance is being reinvented, one must ask a political scientist, or go to parliament, or study shifts in party politics, etc... “Policing”, within this limited conceptual frame, is primarily equated with what the police do and how they do it, and as such, knowledge of the broader political and economic environment of policing is not relevant. Based on this premise, in order to comprehensively ascertain what it is that police do, this policing scholarship has been devoted to in-depth studies of police activity, behavior and culture at the front line level.

For example, some studies have focused on police behavior and decision-making (ex. Reiss, 1971; and Ericson, 1982), while others have focused more specifically on police deviancy (ex. Skolnick, 1966; Rubinstein, 1983; and Punch, 1979). Some studies have focused on the distinctive features of police sub-culture (ex. Wilson, 1968; Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983; and Manning, 1977), while others have focused on the exercise of force and authority (ex. Bordua, 1968; and Bittner, 1974). Such research is primarily ethnographic in nature, involving a set of techniques for observing front-line officers in their day-to-day activities. Such techniques include: riding in patrol cars, walking on beats, and passively observing officers in the setting of the police precinct or detachment (Manning, in Holdaway, 1977; Ericson, 1982). While this methodological approach has led to pioneering work in the sociology of policing, and remains considerably important, it would provide a limited vantage point through which broad shifts in governance could be analysed. While useful for understanding “canteen cop culture” (Reiner, 1991 in Seagrave, 1996: 165), it

does not provide insight into broad governmental trends because it closes off direct access to developments in police management and policy-making. By focusing on the front-line, events and trends at the upper echelons of the police organization remain a relative mystery (Cain, 1992: 6). Indeed, it is at the leadership and managerial levels where a “sense of purpose” for public policing is articulated and where the overall direction of policing organizations is determined (Seagrave, 1996: 166). As Hunt and Magenau (1993) emphasize, police leadership plays an important role in initiating strategic and organizational change (Seagrave, 1996: 166). There is a dearth of research on managerial transformations in policing (Seagrave, 1996: 166), notwithstanding the work of Seagrave (1996) - who studied the views of police executives regarding community policing – as well as the governmentality-based work including O’Malley (1992), O’Malley and Palmer (1996), Stenson (1993, 1996), Garland (1996) and De Lint (1998).<sup>5</sup>

This study represents an attempt to address this analytical gap by adopting as its “unit of analysis” (Cain, 1992: 6) police management. This study is based on the assumption that managerial discourse provides access to the broader political and economic environment of public policing. Managerial discourse represents a textual representation of the outside world, and reflects the ways in which managers constitute that world and act on it accordingly. It provides access to broad political and economic shifts in the outside world, and demonstrates the ways in which managers respond to these shifts in the form of strategic and organizational change. Most importantly, it is a vantage point through which

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<sup>5</sup> While many studies have examined managerial change in relation to the rise of community policing discourse, these studies (as indicated earlier) have been primarily aimed at evaluating community policing programs and/or assessing the inconsistencies between managerial discourse and operational practices (ex. Skogan and Harnett, 1997; Dietz, 1997; Greene and Mastrofski (eds), 1988).



the researcher can discern those broad governmental shifts that have profound implications for *all* institutions of governance, and not simply the public police.

The institutional site for this study is the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), which forms a key component of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services. There are two main reasons why this particular site was chosen. Firstly, the OPP has been engaged in a series of "reinvention" processes pertaining to its institutions, its agents and its relationships to other institutions and auspices of governance. Secondly, the provincial governmental, as a whole, has undergone particular transformations that have had both a direct and significant impact on the OPP. Thus, by examining these broader transformations at the provincial level, this study will also be able to trace the ways in which political agendas shape the formation of institutions, strategies and practices of governance.

The Ontario Provincial Police provides both "generalist" and "specialist" security services. The generalist services are provided throughout the province of Ontario to approximately 2.1 million people, and 2.7 million people during the summer months (OPP, 1997a: 6). The OPP's specific responsibilities are cited in the Police Services Act as follows:

- *Providing policing services in respect of the parts of Ontario that do not have municipal police forces other than municipal law enforcement officers.*
- *Providing police services in respect of all navigable bodies and courses of water in Ontario, except those that lie within municipalities designated by the Solicitor General.*
- *Maintaining a traffic Patrol on the King's Highway, except the parts designated by the Solicitor General.*
- *Maintaining a traffic patrol on the connecting links within the meaning of section 21 of the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act that are designated by the Solicitor General.*
- *Maintaining investigative services to assist municipal police forces on the Solicitor General's direction or at the Crown Attorney's request (in OPP, 1997a: 6)*

The OPP must also assist municipal police services in cases of emergencies and when requested or directed, and they have other duties such as: maintenance of a provincial firearms registration, a provincial weapons enforcement unit, a violent crimes linkage analysis system, a provincial auto theft unit, and an illegal gaming unit. They also provide protective services for Ontario government officials and visiting dignitaries (Ibid).

The Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services is responsible for overseeing the provision of safety and security services in the province. This ranges from the provision of policing services (through the OPP) to the provision of correctional as well as probation and parole services.<sup>6</sup> The Commissioner of the OPP is accountable to the Solicitor General for the “operations, administration and strategic direction of the Ontario Provincial Police” (MSGCS, 1998b). The Ministry, in concert with all other ministries, is to follow the “policies, processes and standards of operation” (Management Board Secretariat, 1999) established by Management Board Secretariat (MBS). This Secretariat is mandated to carry out the directions of Management Board of Cabinet (MBC), which is the Committee of Cabinet responsible for managing “the public service and the operations of government. MBC provides central leadership on the management of the government’s financial, human and physical resources, which support fiscal and policy priorities” (Management Board of Cabinet, 1999).

It is timely that we are presently witnessing the effects of a radically new set of fiscal and policy priorities in the Government of Ontario. Indeed, we have observed a political turn that, in many ways, is consistent with other political transformations occurring around

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<sup>6</sup> The institutions that fall within the ambit of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services are: the Ontario Provincial Police, the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, the Ontario Police Arbitration Commission, the Centre of Forensic Sciences, the Chief Coroner’s Office, the Forensic Pathology

the globe. If one were to characterize this new politics in a few words, it is adequate to highlight the electoral slogan of Mike Harris and his current Conservative government<sup>7</sup>, which was simply, "The Common Sense Revolution", or "Common Sense. For a Change". This "revolution" articulates a particular agenda relating to new governmental institutions and auspices, the shifting of governmental authority, and the establishment of new governance networks and relationships. This political shift to the "right" will therefore provide us with a rich empirical opportunity to explore the interaction between normative agendas and the workings of concrete institutions of governance, namely, the Ontario Provincial Police, and more broadly, the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services.

In contrast to the pursuit of a "God's eye view" (Valverde in Wood and Shearing, 1999: 318) of what is happening, this dissertation represents an attempt to map particular local and practical projects that are serving to reinvent governance. This is not to say that similar projects aren't occurring elsewhere. On the contrary, we are apt to discover that what we find happening in particular locales is indeed resonating with what is happening elsewhere (see Wood and Shearing, 1999: 318). For scholarship on transformations in governance, it is this "thematicity" (Hastrup, 1995: 131) across a range of local sites that can form the basis of "abstract reflection" that is practically relevant (Wood and Shearing, 1999: 318).

The analytical technique of this study consists of an examination of the particular ways in which new governmental problems and objectives have been constructed by

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Unit, the Office of the Fire Marshal, Emergency Measures Ontario, the Ontario Board of Parole and the Correctional Services Division (MSGCS, 1998b).

managers in certain time- and space-specific conditions. The term “managers” is to include not only managers within the OPP, but managers within the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services and other relevant institutions in the Ontario Public Service.<sup>8</sup> It should be noted that there is no attempt here to articulate what is *really going on*. In fact, in contrast to the old Enlightenment visions of scientific omnipotence and absolute truths, this study assumes that “truths” are constructions, and hence only partial. In other words, the focus has been on the “truths” that have been articulated by particular actors or by an organization as a whole. The methodology associated with “postmodern anthropology” assumes this position:

*Post-modernists do not try to represent reality in a correct way and no longer make a distinction between what is happening and its interpretation. There is no Real World with which different theories can be compared to find out if they are correct. In post-modernism, knowledge is construction... The conception of knowledge as construction presupposes an outside world and so interaction with this world becomes very important. Meanings are not fixed, they are made in the interactions between writer, text and reader...(Geuijen, 1995: x)*

In order to explore the “realities” that have been constructed within the empirical sites of this study, two sources of data were compiled: written texts and oral texts. The written texts consisted of internal OPP documents, including reports, different forms of internal correspondence, and newsletter/magazine articles. Some texts were produced by individuals within the Ontario Provincial Police, while others were produced from within the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services and Management Board Secretariat. Literature on the Harris government and its policies were collected primarily at the Eric Silk Library at OPP Headquarters. The “intranet” service available in this library also provided

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<sup>7</sup> The Harris government was elected on June 8th, 1995, succeeding Bob Rae and the New Democratic Party. Harris and his Conservatives acquired 82 out of 130 seats and forty-five per cent of the popular vote (Courchene and Telmer, 1998: 169).

access to internal documents that are normally only available to Government employees. Press releases have also proven to be valuable texts for examining the particular “messages” being sent out to the public.

The purpose of this data collection was to assemble a range of managerial and/or policy documents that were targeted for different audiences. While some texts were available for public consumption, others were targeted to specific audiences within the Ontario Public Service more generally, or the Ministry or the Ontario Provincial Police. The author had a formal research agreement with the Ontario Provincial Police through their Operational Policy and Support Bureau. This enabled the author to have access to internal documents under the terms of a confidentially agreement. A representative of the Operational Policy and Support Bureau facilitated this research.

In conjunction with these data, twenty-three face-to-face, semi-structured interviews<sup>9</sup> were held with representatives of the Ontario Provincial Police in 1998 (twenty-five people in total were interviewed). Particular individuals were approached for interviews due to their direct involvement in certain “reinvention” efforts and/or because they represented particular vantage points that were relevant to the topics in this study. Interviews were recorded and then transcribed at a later date. According to the terms of the Research Agreement, the interviewees shall remain anonymous, but will be identified by numbers (ex. #1, #2, etc...) throughout the dissertation.

The written and oral texts gleaned from these sources were “read” for what Foucault regards as “discursive formations”, or “the regularity of a discursive practice” (Hepworth

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<sup>8</sup> In relation to the OPP, the “managerial” level, for the purposes of this study, generally embodies all ranks ranging from “Sergeant” to “Commissioner” as well as civilians working in areas of middle-management or upwards.

and Turner, 1982: 82). By "discursive formations", Foucault refers to "the presence of one or more perspectives or modes of talking about things. These 'epistemes' form the basis of discourse about reality" (in Ibid; 86). Thus, these texts were examined for their discursive significance, that is, the ways in which the world was being made up and acted upon at the level of language and meaning. A similar approach – although couched in different analytical language - can be found in McMahon and Ericson's study of a police reform process in Toronto:

*The rhetoric of reform, indeed, can tell as much about the nature of the reform process as does an examination of what might be described as the material practice of reform...For the most part, such descriptions of reform tend to be more ideological than realistic. Ideologies, though, constitute a form of 'reality' in themselves (McMahon and Ericson, 1984: 10)<sup>10</sup>*

In this vein, the importance of semi-structured in-depth interviews with police executives is explained by Seagrave (1996: 167):

*Taped in-depth interviews provided examples of organizational 'jargon'...While it has been noted that rhetoric is not necessarily an accurate indicator of operational reality, it frequently justifies and proceeds organizational change. Although members of an organization adjust their language when talking to outsiders, it has been illustrated that strong agreement among organizational members about a few central norms and values defines an organizational culture*

The discursive analysis conducted on both the written and oral texts focussed in particular on the claims that were being made by their writers (this thesis assumes a definition of interviewees as "writers", rather than "authors" of texts). These claims came in a variety of forms, including claims about new governmental problems, claims about the failures of government, and claims about new governmental obligations. Each of these

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<sup>9</sup> Of the 23 interviews, 22 were held with one interviewee only, while 1 interview consisted of three interviewees at the same time.

<sup>10</sup> This author does not agree with the use of the terms "rhetoric" or "ideological", for they suggest a separation between discourses and material practices, or in the words of Tyler, a "separation of speech and world" (1987: 172).

claims, and related others, constitute what Foucault describes as the process of "problematization". As Rose and Miller explain, "[g]overnment is a problematizing activity: it poses the obligations of rulers in terms of the problems they seek to address" (1992: 181). As Foucault's states, the "history of problematizations" is "the history of the way in which things become a problem" (1996a: 414), and he adds:

*A problematization is always a kind of creation; but a creation in the sense that, given a certain situation, you cannot infer that this kind of problematization will follow. Given a certain problematization, you can only understand why this kind of answer appears as a reply to some concrete and specific aspect of the world. There is the relation of thought and reality in the process of problematization. And that is the reason why I think that it is possible to give an analysis of a specific problematization as the history of an answer – the original, specific, and singular answer of thought – to a certain situation (1988: 17)*

For Foucault, an analysis of "problematizations" enables one to describe "the history of thought". Foucault defines "thought" as "freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem" (1996b: 421). When actions enter the domain of thought, it is due to a series of factors which have rendered these actions uncertain, unfamiliar or difficult. These factors stem from social, economic or political processes (Ibid). The "specific work of thought" stems from "this development of a given into a question, this transformation of a group of obstacles and difficulties into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response" (1996b: 421).

The analytical approach of this dissertation draws upon this notion of "problematization". Specifically, the written and oral texts collected during this research were examined for the ways in which new problematics of government were articulated, as well as the solutions developed in response to these problematics. Indeed, each of the four empirical chapters describe how established ways of constituting and acting upon the world

were rendered uncertain and difficult due to the emergence of novel time- and space-specific conditions. In other words, each chapter discusses certain “points of problematization”, whereby certain ways of thinking which had been previously taken for granted have been rendered problematic. By exploring the series of responses to these problems, and the bodies of knowledge and ideas that inform these responses, one can provide both specific and general insight into how governance is being reinvented.

### **Organization of the Dissertation**

As indicated earlier, this dissertation will consist of four empirical chapters, aimed at examining a particular way in which governance is being reinvented. The chapters are organized as follows:

#### *Chapter 2: Shifting Governmental Authority: An Analysis of Waves in Community Policing*

Over the last decade and more, public policing institutions across the globe, including the Ontario Provincial Police, have appropriated the concept of “community policing” and have endeavoured to translate this concept into new security strategies, institutional arrangements and managerial programs. This relatively vacuous concept has been filled with different meanings across time and space and in response to particular problems and objectives. To be sure, different “waves” in community policing have occurred over the course of the last decade.

Upon closer inspection, each wave represents a particular “recalibration of responsibilities” (Crawford, 1997: 92) in the governance of security, which is associated with a re-negotiation of governmental authority. In particular, each wave represents a particular organizational response to critiques of police authority, both in terms of normative legitimacy and strategic effectiveness. Through an analysis of waves in community



policing, this chapter is aimed at extending and assessing certain analytical concepts and findings in the governmentality literature. Specifically, it will provide a more refined account of the ways in which the terrain of “community” has emerged, as well as its changing relationships to the “social”. This chapter will also highlight various strategies of “responsibilization”, and will also provide an empirical basis for examining the role of resistance in the formation of governmental programs.

### *Chapter 3: Reinventing the Institution*

The Ontario Provincial Police has not only been transformed from a strategic standpoint, but its institutional structures and processes have been transformed as well. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the particular ways in which the OPP has been reinvented, as well as the series of time- and space-specific problematics and objectives that led, and continually re-shaped, this reinvention. This chapter will examine the OPP’s restructuring program that took place from 1993 to 1998. With the election of the Harris government in 1995, further institutional transformations occurred throughout the Ontario Public Service. Accordingly, this chapter will also trace the ways in which the institution of the OPP was reinvented according to the “Common Sense” agenda. By tracing the ways in which a new institutional identity and model was formed within the OPP, this chapter can provide insight into how new mentalities of rule are appropriated and translated into new institutional structures and practices.

### *Chapter Four: Re-Making the Agent: Toward a “Learning Organization”*

In addition to institutions and strategies of policing, the *agent* of policing has been the subjective of reinvention as well. In Ontario policing circles, and within the OPP more specifically, the identity and capacities of the agent have been re-thought in response to the

emergence of new governmental problematics and objectives. This re-thinking has led to the appropriation of “continuous learning” or “organizational learning” discourse as a means of re-constituting the agent. However, since governmental problematics and objectives have shifted over the last several years, so too has the meaning and salience of “organizational learning” and its constituent technologies for re-making the agent. Accordingly, this chapter is aimed at contributing to the governmentality literature by enhancing our understanding of the effects of shifts in problematics on the nature of governmental programs and technologies.

*Chapter Five: Reinventing the Governance of Policing: The Legislative Effects of the “Common Sense Revolution”*

This chapter is aimed at examining more explicitly the relationship between political agendas and concrete forms and strategies of governance. Since the election of the Harris Conservatives with their “Common Sense” platform, the governance of policing in the province of Ontario has been transformed significantly. Having amended the *Police Services Act* in several aspects, the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional services has created a new regulatory environment within which the OPP are being governed. This chapter will examine the objectives behind these “Common Sense” reforms as well as the effects of this new regulatory environment. The intention of this chapter is to stretch the analytical boundaries of the governmentality approach by exploring both the intended and unintended effects of a new governmental program.

*Chapter Six: Implications for the Study and Renewal of Governance*

In this chapter, we return to our original question: *How is governance being reinvented?* This chapter will begin by synthesizing the empirical findings of the previous chapters. Secondly, it will highlight the ways in which the four chapters, taken together,

have served as a critique and extension of the governmentality approach. In other words, it will summarize the analytical issues that have been raised in this study, and discuss how future studies can produce a more comprehensive understanding of transformations in governance.

Following a discussion of these analytical implications, this chapter explores some normative and policy issues that can be gleaned from the findings of the study. For scholars interested in engaging normatively, studies such as this can be utilized for generating “actionable knowledge” (see Wood and Shearing, 1999: 318). Having responded to the question of how governance is being reinvented, we can begin to locate some conceptual and practical spaces within which meaningful and realistic normative engagement can occur.

## Chapter 2

### Shifting Governmental Authority: An Analysis of “Waves” in Community Policing

#### Introduction

This chapter is aimed at exploring the ways in which governmental authority in the area of security has been shifting, and it defines “governmental authority” as *the legitimate exercise of a set of governmental capacities*. These capacities have their basis in the form of a body of knowledge and “expertise” used to assign meaning to particular “problems” or objects of governance. Based on this particular knowledge, or this way of making up the world, a set of institutions/auspices, strategies and practices are established for governing in ways consistent with this knowledge. In relation to the police, their capacities have traditionally derived from their “social” expertise in relation to law and law enforcement. Accordingly, their authority has historically been valorized and reinforced through the unique legal powers accorded to them.<sup>11</sup>

Closely coupled with the legal powers of the police is their normative authority. In a system of representative democracy, the public police - as well as other state institutions of governance - have traditionally been granted the “consent” of the “public” because governmental authority has been delegated to them by elected representatives (see Leighton, 1991:489). According to the model of representative democracy, there is an implicit “social” contract between the governors and the governed that grants legitimacy to representatives of the state, such as the police.

In the governmentality tradition, scholars such as O’Malley (1992, 1996b, 1997; with Palmer (1996)), and Stenson (1996) have provided insight into the ways in which

the authority of public policing institutions has been re-figured, even though their central theoretical focus was not on shifts in authority per se. Rather, their analyses focused on the influence of neo-liberal rationalities in the new strategic orientations of police organizations. Nevertheless, their analysis, which draws on the work of other governmentality scholars such as Rose (1996a; Rose and Miller, 1992) provides readers with useful concepts that can be applied in an analysis of how governmental authority has been contested, re-negotiated and shifted.

To begin with, their contention that the imagined terrain of collective life has shifted from the “social” to “community” implies that it is no longer realistic to assume that there is, or will be, one single governmental authority. Indeed, the very notion of the “social” and the “social contract” is suggestive of one single authority embodying the interests of “all”. Hence, the fracturing of collective life, represented in the proliferation of discourses of “community”, *necessarily* involves a fracturing of governmental authority, since it is no longer conceivable to think about one unified set of collective interests. This fracturing of governmental terrain is therefore associated with a pluralization of ideas and norms, as well as governmental capacities. In essence, this shift from the “social” to “community” is highly suggestive of a trend toward multiple governing authorities.

The governmentality-based work on “government at a distance” (Rose and Miller, 1992; Miller and Rose 1990; Rose, 1993) as well as “responsibilization” (O’Malley, 1996; O’Malley and Palmer, 1996; Garland, 1996) also provides us with certain analytical concepts for understanding shifts in authority. In particular, O’Malley and Palmer’s work on state-based strategies of “responsibilization” is suggestive of a transfer

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<sup>11</sup> See Ericson and Shearing (1986) on “law as an agency of police legitimacy and power”.

of governmental authority from state institutions, like the public police, to citizens and communities (1996; see also Garland, 1996). In their work on community policing, they argue that citizens have been constituted by the police as “responsible” and “prudential” individuals who are to play a pivotal role in securing order in their respective communities (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996; O’Malley, 1996b). The police have mobilized communities in ways designed to cultivate within them a certain autonomy and form of self-governance in the area of security (for example, through such techniques as training programs and workshops) (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996). This strategy of responsabilization indexes a broader program of “government at a distance” (Rose and Miller, 1992; Miller and Rose, 1990), where “[p]olitical forces have sought to utilize, instrumentalise and mobilize techniques and agents other than those of ‘the state’” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 181; see also Miller and Rose, 1990). While this notion of “government at a distance” implies that the state has actually reinforced, or perhaps strengthened, its governmental authority (which is debatable), it nevertheless draws attention to a transfer of certain governmental functions to non-state institutions and auspices. This transfer of functions may open up both practical and discursive space for these non-state institutions and auspices to appropriate, or make claims to, governmental authority.

These two analytical contributions from the governmentality scholarship (i.e. the shift to “community”, and the shift to forms of “government at a distance”) provide us with a conceptual starting point for exploring the question of how it is that governmental authority is being shifted.

The purpose of this chapter is to extend and add to these concepts through an examination of the ways in which the authority of one public policing institution – i.e. the Ontario Provincial Police - has been contested over time, and the ways in which these different forms of contestation have been addressed. Specifically, it will argue that both the capacities of the public police, as well as their normative bases for legitimacy, have been contested in various ways and across certain time- and space-specific conditions. This argument will be formed through an empirical analysis of five “waves” of “community policing” which have emerged over the last decade. I use the term “waves” instead of “models” or “paradigms” in order to capture the fluidity of different policing forms, and to suggest that each wave takes up, and often extends, the characteristics of the waves before it. Each wave represents a particular way in which the authority of the police has been contested, re-negotiated and re-articulated.

This approach both complements and distinguishes itself from the approach of scholars like O'Malley and Palmer (1996), who – in the spirit of the governmentality tradition - frame their analysis of shifts in policing within the context of broader shifts in governing mentalities. While this “anatomization of rationalities and technologies” (Garland, 1996: 199) has been extremely useful in conceptualizing shifts in policing, it is also important, from Garland's perspective “to study the way that these knowledges and techniques are put to use, and the meanings they acquire in context” (Ibid). In this spirit, this chapter will trace the emergence of new ideas and practices, examine the “meanings they acquire” (Ibid) in the context of each wave, and determine their effects on the re-negotiation and re-distribution of governmental authority.

The ultimate aim of this chapter is to provide new insights in relation to the apparent shift from the “social” to “community” (see Rose, 1996a), and more broadly, to assess the utility of an analytical focus on shifts in mentalities. This chapter will also explore the constitutive role of different forms of “resistance” in the formation of community policing waves.

### **The First Wave: Community Policing within the Professional<sup>12</sup> Paradigm**

The language of “community policing” has become increasingly widespread in public policing discourse since the 1980’s, and in particular, over the course of the last ten years. It is suggested that community policing has become the “official morality” of policing in Canada (Clairmont, 1991 in Seagrave, 1996: 164) and the “new orthodoxy” in the United States (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994 in Maguire, 1997: 554). In 1989, the OPP stated that “community policing” would be the “essential operational philosophy” of the organization (OPP, 1989b).

This new discourse – espoused by their newly appointed Commissioner at the time – emerged in large part to address a new series of governmental problems associated with the increased demographic and cultural complexity of the province. The Commissioner had stated in his Annual Report of 1989 that police were “facing the most rapidly changing period in the history of policing” (OPP, 1989b: 2). Profound demographic changes in the population were becoming apparent while “minority” groups were claiming their rights to government representation. This was a trend that was

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<sup>12</sup> The OPP uses the term “traditional” to refer to the law enforcement, or bandit-catching paradigm, whereas the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for example, prefer to use the term “professional”. I use the term “professional” in this chapter in order to convey the historical image of the police as designated “professionals” who have traditionally made claims to a certain degree of “expertise” and authority in the governance of security.



equally observable in the United States (see Walker, 1977, 1992; Skogan and Hartnett, 1997; Crank, 1994). For the OPP, their new objective was to become more “sensitive” to the changing needs, characteristics and demands of the population while at the same time continuing on with their “traditional responsibilities of protection and law enforcement” (1989b: 2). From a strategic perspective then, the police were continuing to promote their “governing through crime” approach (i.e. governing through law enforcement (see Simon, 1995)) – but because the make-up of the “governed” was changing rapidly, the objective of the police was to re-think law enforcement in accordance with this newly defined population. Effectively, the police were re-confirming their status as the single governing authority for the “social” collective.

Underlying this new objective was a desire to ensure that the OPP were indeed policing “by consent”. Rather than working “in isolation” of an increasingly pluralistic population, the OPP would need to “reach out and mobilize the public” in the fight against increasing levels of crime, and more particularly, the “growing illicit drug trade” (OPP, 1989a; OPP, 1989b: 2). Put simply, the OPP wanted to align their (law enforcement) priorities with the interests of the public, or to use the Commissioner’s words, to “be *in harmony* with those of the people for whom we provide the *service*” (OPP, 1989a; italics added). Thus, it is clear that the OPP were still working within a “law enforcement” or “bandit catching” paradigm and were attempting to accommodate changes in collective life within this paradigm. What was being contested at this time was the ability of the police to *represent* the interests of a changing population – that is, the normative basis of their authority was being challenged. The general response of the OPP at the time was to make representative democracy, and the professional policing

paradigm it supported – work better. The increasing usage of terms like “service” and “sensitivity” reflected attempts at doing just that, even though they still thought of themselves as a police *force*.

The shift in OPP discourse to the term “service” is consistent with a broader linguistic shift across public policing institutions in Canada away from the term “police *force*” (Miller, 1996). The term “force” embodies a particular imagery of the police as instruments of sovereign power – that is, as bearers of legal and physical coercion. The term “service” was to reflect a different imagery, suggesting this sense of “harmony” between the police and citizens. Although the police continued to operate within the professional paradigm, and continued to stress their “use of force” capacities, the term “service” served as a linguistic device to draw attention away from an image of the police as a militaristic, force-bearing institution. In other words, the discursive shift away from “force” was a means of constituting a new relationship between the police and citizens. In place of a relationship of domination, the police would seek to re-gain the consent of citizens in their role as professional, law enforcement experts in the governance of security. In this vein, the actions of the police, including the exercise of force, would be done “in service” of communities, instead of against them.<sup>13</sup>

In 1990, the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police announced their formal support for a change in wording from “force” to “service” (OPP, 1990b). According to an internal OPP memo, “[t]he Association felt that the word “Service” was a better description of the manner in which the police interact with the public” (Ibid). These

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<sup>13</sup> As Miller states, “[t]he Police Department became a Police Force many years ago for a very specific and valid reason: to remove the impression, perhaps even the fact that the police of a given jurisdiction were merely an enforcement arm (or department) of that jurisdiction and could not act independent of political influence...Now the term “force” has fallen out of favour. It seemed that many provincial governments

seemingly contradictory notions of “force” and “service” were being rendered compatible within the contours of the professional paradigm, because the intent was not to undermine the professional paradigm. As we will see later on, however, the term “service” was ultimately re-deployed in ways that undermined the idea that the police were, and should be, the single authority in the governance of security.

The particular effort on the part of the OPP to (re-)gain the support of an increasingly pluralistic citizenry was to become “community-oriented”. In 1989, their mission was “to provide a sensitive, community-oriented service” (OPP, 1989a) by, firstly, “involving” citizens in the “identification” of crime and social order problems as well as in the identification of solutions to those problems (Ibid). The use of phrases such as “involving the community” served to reinforce the assumption that the police were still the experts, and although communities could help in the “identification” of problems and/or solutions, it would remain under the discretion of the police to determine and carry out particular strategic activities.

This “community-oriented” understanding of policing was associated with another objective, identified earlier, of providing services “that are consistent with the identified concerns, expectations and needs of the community” (Ibid). While it is obvious that the police were seeking to enhance their normative legitimacy by functioning in ways that were “consistent” with the needs and expectations of citizens, there is no suggestion that the *approval* or authorization of communities to carry out specific functions was either desired or necessary. So, an important distinction to be

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wanted to soften the image of the police by encouraging the public, and the police themselves, to think of the police organization as primarily devoted to “service” rather than to enforcing the law” (1996: 9).

made is that the police were *community-oriented*, but not *community-directed* – the police would maximize consultation but maintain direction.

Another objective was to work with “concerned agencies and interest groups to effectively address police and community concerns” (OPP, 1989a). In its quest to become a more “sensitive” police service, the police were most obviously concerned with gaining the compliance of these “concerned agencies and interest groups”. The OPP also stated that it would “promote public commitment and active involvement in the resolution of crime, traffic and social order problems” (Ibid). However, the ways in which they would “promote” this commitment would remain relatively superficial (as described below) and would not involve organization-wide change from a strategic, managerial or institutional perspective.

The desire of the OPP at the time to work within the professional paradigm is reflected in its attempts - in the late 1980's and early 1990's - to develop community policing *programs* or special activities. These programs were to be driven by newly assigned community policing *specialists*. For instance, in 1989 - when the OPP was organized around 16 Districts - it developed several programs in 4 of the districts, which included: developing educational programs to teach officers about the philosophy of community policing; developing planning links with the community, agencies and interest groups; providing more training in problem solving; and marketing community policing to the public (OPP, 1989a). These efforts were geared toward embedding the police in their communities in order to generate a form of *community-based* policing. A specific example of this was the establishment of an Extended Service Office in a Secondary School in the Kingston area. A Community Police Officer was assigned to

this office to address the concerns of staff and students. Another example was the assignment of two officers to the town of Bolton as Community Police officers. (Ibid., 20-21). By making police officers more visible and by linking them or identifying them with certain communities, the police hoped to reverse the perceived trend that they had become isolated from their communities.

Again, there was a clear effort to re-new the legitimacy of the police as “representatives” of the public, while at the same time enhancing the effectiveness of law enforcement strategies through a better understanding of the communities they policed. The police were attempting to treat all citizens equally, and while diversity was acknowledged as a reality, it would be accommodated within the imagined terrain of the “social”.

The OPP highlighted the importance of this rapidly changing external environment - and the organization’s response to it - by emphasizing their motto, which was “Times change, and we change with them”. This motto alludes to changes in the make-up and needs of the population they “served”. In order to “change” with these times, the OPP began talking about “partnerships”, which they defined as “involving the community in police work – in helping to both set and achieve common ends” (OPP, 1990a: 2; underline in original). The police were to serve communities “through the spirit of cooperation, *expert* assistance, and *community consensus*” (Ibid., italics added). It is suggested in this passage that the police were *the* single source of authority whose role it was to enforce the law with the support of the community. The OPP’s “new legitimating mandate” (Crank, 1994: 328), reflected the “pressing need to build

‘consensus policing’ around a much closer relationship between police and public in which contact is proactive and non-conflictual” (Crawford, 1997: 46).

So, we can see that at this point in the genesis of “community policing”, the “professional” paradigm remained hegemonic and the police remained the single authority in the governance of security. The very designation of community policing as a “specialist” set of activities served to reinforce the tenets of the old paradigm while leaving the “social” intact. To borrow a phrase from Bayley, one could argue that this first wave reflected an attempt to “put old wine into new bottles” (1988: 226) by engaging in “image management” (Maguire, 1997: 555).

This brand of community policing is similar to what O’Malley and Palmer refer to as Keynesian community policing, in that it retains the primacy of the “social”, including the “social” expertise of the police. To borrow from O’Malley and Palmer, the police, as “state-employed experts, were invested with authority...precisely because the determining role of the social was understood as vitiating individual autonomy and limiting the capacity of individuals to understand and intervene in the causes of their own problems” (1996: 14). So, although the notion of partnerships was introduced, the police were still linked with communities in a rather paternalistic capacity (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996; see Stenson, 1993). Accordingly, “‘the social’ and ‘the community’ were complementary aspects of the same broad rationality of rule. They were not, as they were to become in post-Keynesian discourses, *competing problematics of government*” (1996: 140).

The demographic pluralization of the province’s population was not only problematic for the OPP, but it posed a broader problematic for the Ontario government

as a whole. During the first half of the 1990's, the New Democratic Party, characterized by a "social" and leftist agenda, chose to respond to this problematic by initiating employment equity legislation.<sup>14</sup> The development of this legislation turned a relatively abstract issue (i.e. demographic pluralization) into a "real" and substantive problematic for the OPP. Now, the OPP would have to align its community policing agenda with the employment equity agenda. The OPP would now be required to engage in concrete efforts to treat visible minorities equitably. However, employment equity was a means of acknowledging diversity, but not a means of embracing it. Instead, visible minorities would be accorded the same rights and privileges as any other citizen within the figurative bonds of the "social contract".

Bound by this broader social democratic imperative, the OPP came to stress the importance of ensuring "equitable representation" of all members of society" (OPP, 1995f: 8). The idea of being "representative of the communities they serve" was identified as a pressing objective for the police (Ibid). This objective was also promoted by the Task Force on Race Relations and Policing that was established by the Ontario government in December of 1988 (Ibid., see Government of Ontario, 1989). Its mandate was to examine "the serious concerns of visible minorities respecting the interaction of [the] police community with their own" (in Ibid). Based on the findings of the Task

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<sup>14</sup> The Employment Equity legislation (Bill 79) was introduced by the NDP government in June of 1992 when both Ontario's tax rate and debt were extraordinarily high. Courchene and Telmer suggest that the NDP's agenda of promoting the rights and the privileges of the disadvantaged could only be achieved through a regulatory scheme such as employment equity, rather than increasing government expenditures or raising taxes. The intention of the legislation was to redress designated groups rather than disadvantaged individuals. In other words, certain groups were to be preferred in employment opportunities, regardless of the characteristics of the individuals within these groups. This legislation was a contentious issue, not only among private sector organizations, but even among union members (Courchene and Telmer, 1998: 144-145). The employment equity legislation was quickly struck down by the Harris government after they won the election (Ibid).

Force, a Race Relations and Policing Unit was established in the Ministry of the Solicitor General.<sup>15</sup>

The very creation of the Task Force on Race Relations and Policing served as a profound acknowledgement of the challenges being made to the police in its role as an institution of representative democracy. The normative basis of their authority, enjoyed by the police prior to a large amount of immigration, was now being threatened. The initiation of employment equity legislation on the part of the provincial government was one means of re-negotiating the authority of the police, in addition to other institutions of state governance.

Echoing this concern with re-capturing the principles of representative democracy was a change in Ontario police legislation that occurred in 1990. Bill 107, which was first read in December 1989, sought to incorporate the concept of "community policing" into the legislative mandates of all policing services throughout Ontario. With the passage of Bill 107 in 1990, the previous *Police Act* was replaced by the *Police Services Act*, which "quite laudably identifies community policing as one of the visionary principles governing policing in Ontario" (Chacko and Nancoo, 1993: 3). The findings of the Task Force on Race Relations and policing served to shape the development of this new *Act* (OPP, 1995f; 8). A particular conception of community policing was articulated in the new *Act's* Declaration of Principles, which encouraged close police-community relationships, sensitivity to demographic and cultural pluralism, and police services that were demographically representative of the populations they served (OPP, 1994c). The revised *Act* also indicated that the Solicitor General would be responsible for monitoring

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<sup>15</sup> Prior to 1993, the Ministry of the Solicitor General was separate from the Ministry of Correctional Services.



both the establishment and implementation of employment equity plans as well as developing and promoting community-oriented policing programs (Statutes of Ontario, 1990: 5).

The *Act's* Declaration stressed such notions as “safeguarding fundamental rights”; the “need for co-operation between the providers of police services and the communities they service”; “respect for victims of crime”; “the need for sensitivity to the pluralistic, multi-racial and multicultural character of Ontario society”; and “the need to ensure that police forces are representative of the communities they serve” (Ibid., 3). Once again, the model of representative democracy is re-confirmed and the primacy of the “social” is retained. Although police must be “representative” and “sensitive” to communities, implicit within these principles is a conception of citizens and communities as passive recipients of policing expertise and services. The police, as representatives of a democratically elected government, were re-claiming their right to govern with full authority. The particular stress on the notion of “community-oriented” reflects the emphasis, described earlier, on achieving policing “by consent”.

In 1991, the Ontario government established an employment equity regulation for police services through the Ministry of the Solicitor General’s Race Relations and Policing Unit. This regulation directed all Ontario police services to develop race relations policies (MSGCS, 1993: 2). In April of 1991, the Employment Equity Plans Regulation was incorporated into the *Police Services Act*. According to this regulation, all police services, including the OPP, were required to develop an Employment Equity Plan for eliminating discrimination and for promoting equality in hiring practices (OPP, 1991: 15; MSGCS, 1993: 3; ). The Ministry, and the OPP in particular, realized that they

would have to promote the kinds of cultural changes *within* their organization that would support their new emphasis on sensitive, community-oriented policing *outside* of the organization. In other words, they would have to align their internal form of governance with the external form of governance they were aspiring to. Specifically, if sexist and racist practices were taking place within the policing institution, their attempts to represent a pluralistic society in an equitable fashion would be compromised.<sup>16</sup>

The Peelian image of “the police are the public and the public are the police” was deployed by one OPP agent in relation to the employment equity initiative. He suggested that the affirmation of representative democracy embodied in the idea of employment equity was actually consistent with the principles of “modern policing”. Essentially, if the police wanted to operate democratically, they would have to mirror the face of collective life. When asked about the employment equity initiative, he stated,

*It's a peculiar thing in policing. People got excited about it, but in reality, I don't know why we got, and continue to be, so excited... If we look back, the foundation of modern policing comes from 1829. It was the theory that the police were the public and the public were the police. If you look back to 1829, most of the “movers” and “shakers” were male, white Protestant Anglo Saxon and the police force reflected the same – “we are you and you are us”. But, then the composition of the public changed, the*

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<sup>16</sup> The OPP established a Steering Committee on Employment Equity after training was provided by the Race Relations and Policing Unit. The Committee broke down into five subcommittees in order to address five issues within the overall Employment Equity Plan: employee profile database, strategies for civilian recruitment, strategies for uniform recruitment, promotional processes and communications and consultations (OPP, 1991: 15). The Employment Equity Plan was guided by the following principles:

- outreach recruitment;
- training, peer support and counseling;
- elimination of systemic barriers to employment and promotion;
- implementation of positive measures and policies to ensure equitable treatment and address workplace accommodation needs;
- reciprocal communications and consultations with community groups and employees alike;
- monitoring of programs and accountability of senior staff; and
- effective community policing (cited from OPP, 1991: 16)

During this same time period, the position of Workplace Discrimination and Harassment Coordinator was established and a Workplace Discrimination and Harassment policy was developed (OPP, 1992: 39).

Overall, the OPP pursued a variety of measures for eliminating barriers to the promotion of equity within the organization. For example, they developed policies to address, sex, race and disability stereotyping in the organization; they began to address various family issues of employees, such as child care and care of the elderly; and they dealt with accommodating the needs of the physically challenged (OPP, 1993a: 43).

*composition of the police did not change. The police is changing now, but it is changing slowly. This doesn't have to do with employment equity, it has to do with the theory of modern policing and policing ourselves. You have two choices – a force that is small... who will enforce the rules, or you use the armed forces... that does not listen to the community, only to the government. You see this in totalitarian communities and you see these huge armed forces, and if you step out of line, you get a “wack”. In a democracy, you are there due to the support of the public and therefore we don't need a huge group of people because we have the help of the public. That way though, the public has to see themselves in the police. So, employment equity – big deal or no big deal – [for] the police it really is the same... We have said that about our composition forever... We have not been successful in bringing in people (immigrants, women)... We need this to get the cooperation, or we'll be an army of occupation, or we'll have to be a reasonable match... We will reach out to other groups, because it is important to our survival as modern police forces to do that (#1)*

This interviewee is reinforcing the importance, at the time, of acquiring the “support” and “cooperation” of the public. Indeed, the use of this Peelian imagery is serving to locate police legitimacy in public acceptance rather than in law (Chackoo and Nancoo, 1993).

In 1993, while the issue of employment equity was still central, the Solicitor General and Minister of Correctional Services launched the Race Relations Policy for Ontario Police Services. The development of this policy stemmed from one of fifty-seven recommendations made by the Task Force on Race Relations and Policing (Government of Ontario, 1992). The Task Force contended that a race relations policy would serve to guide race relations initiatives in various police departments and to enhance community policing. The policy was to adhere to the following three key principles: to acquire credibility from all stakeholder groups; to explicitly oppose racism and discrimination; and to promote the idea of policing as a service (MSGCS, 1993: 2). Once again, an emphasis on “credibility” is similar to the notion of “support” or “cooperation”. In this context, the meaning of “service” is quite limited and is used for the purposes of normative re-legitimization.

The agenda of the New Democratic Party is apparent in the description of community policing found in both the Race Relations Policy and the new *Police Services Act*. In particular, the Policy stressed the importance of “trust and cooperation” between the police and the community (MSGCS, 1993: 1). “Both public policing and the principles of modern-day policing require policing in our province to be equally responsive to all Ontarians without regard to race or colour” (Ibid). In concert with the Task Force recommendations, the Ministry’s Race Relations Policy promoted the principles of “equity and fairness as articulated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Ontario Human Rights Code, and the Police Services Act” (Ibid). The Race Relations Policy consisted of three key components. First, services should be provided fairly and equitably to all members of the public, regardless of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour or ethnic origin. Secondly, police departments were to develop a co-operative relation with all communities while recognizing their racial, cultural and linguistic diversity. Third, the policing workplace should be free from discrimination and representative of the racial diversity of the community it provided a service to (MSGCS, 1993: 2).<sup>17</sup> Once again, “professional” policing and representative democracy are being made to work better.

In sum, this first wave of community policing consisted of attempts to reinforce the tenets of the professional paradigm, representative democracy and hence, the “social”. In response to their waning legitimacy in representing collective interests, the police began experimenting with new relationships of governance between themselves and the

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<sup>17</sup> In order to give this policy concrete expression in each police department, several specific objectives were identified within the policy. For example, police organizations were to ensure that racist or discriminatory behavior were met with disciplinary measures. Another objective was to implement community policing in the context of recognizing and working positively with racial and cultural diversity.

public. These relationships, however, remained paternalistic in character and continued to privilege a conception of the police as the singular authority in the governance of security.

While the police expressed a willingness to introduce new ideas within their professional paradigm, there were limitations as to what they could think about and what they could do. In other words, the “realm of possibilities” was quite limited because the range of alternative discourses available to them was limited. We can conclude therefore that the police were “resisting” in two senses: they were resisting elements of the paradigm within which they were operating, but they were also resisting alternative ways of thinking that were beyond the bounds of their worldview at the time. However, the introduction of “community” into their discourse did introduce a new tension within their professional paradigm that would ultimately serve to stretch, and break through its boundaries. We see this process more clearly in the next wave, where the “social”, as an “imaginary space of reference” (Rose, 1996a: 328), becomes profoundly challenged.

### **The Second Wave: Community Policing as a Paradigm Shift**

While the police were attempting to re-capture the consent of the public, they began experimenting with new security strategies that offered alternatives to the bandit-catching approach. This stemmed in large part from a growing awareness on the part of academics, as well as police managers, that the professional model was not associated with enhanced citizen safety or a reduction in crime. Over the course of the last thirty years, a considerable amount of scholarly research has indicated that traditional law enforcement strategies, and the policing structures which support them, have done little to

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A third objective was to establish a mechanism for addressing racial complaints presented either by

promote safety (see Crank and Langworthy, 1996; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Goldstein, 1979; Crawford, 1997). As such, the OPP began to take seriously this notion of "problem-solving" or "problem-oriented policing"<sup>18</sup> that had gained in popularity across public policing circles throughout the 1980's and into the 1990's. In 1992, OPP detachments became responsible for delivering policing services according to a "contemporary, problem-solving" approach. So, while efforts were being made to re-legitimize the police as an institution of representative democracy, the "expertise" of the police –embodied in their strategic orientation – became increasingly scrutinized. The appropriation of "problem-solving" language represented a threat to the authority of the police, because it would ultimately require the knowledge and capacities of other institutions and groups that were closer to the "root causes" of crime and insecurity. Hence, the idea of problem-solving was ironic for the OPP, because it threatened their "social" expertise as well as the "social" terrain upon which they located themselves.

One could argue that this irony was addressed through a discursive turn toward the notion of "generalist policing", which took place around 1993. An internal OPP document titled "Framework '93", released by the Commissioner, was significant in its detailed account of what community policing should mean and the specific ways in which it should be realized. In order to promote the "philosophy" of community policing, the "system" required would be one of "*generalist policing* supported by traffic management, crime prevention and detection, and administrative excellence" (OPP, 1993b: 5; italics added). By designating community policing as the essential operating

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members of the public or by employees within the police organization (MSGCS, 1993: 2).

<sup>18</sup> This "problem-oriented" approach can be traced to the work of Herman Goldstein in the late 1970's, who argued that police organizations must counter their strategic tendency toward "means over ends" (1979: see Peak and Glensor, 1996: 16-17)

philosophy of the organization (instead of an operational adjunct), the development of partnerships with communities as well as new security strategies were no longer considered as “specialist” activities. As one interviewee explained,

*[W]hen I look back at when we first started using the term community policing, it was kind of looked at as a specialist function – you had to designate somebody to go out and be a community police officer. It's evolving now. We're integrating the community policing philosophies into everybody's day-to-day [job], so you no longer have a specialist per se in every detachment or at the regional level (#2)*

This interviewee is making explicit the fact that they have assigned new meaning to the term “community policing”, and his suggestion that it has “evolved” confirms that in the previous wave, their strategic experiments remained at a superficial level. However, this experimentation presumably led the OPP to realize that they “cannot affect relationships between the citizenry and police personnel by bureaucratically specializing responsibility for them” (Reiss, 1985: 61-62).

In due course, the OPP began constituting all of its officers as “generalist community policing officers”. In order to do so, the OPP began providing community policing training as a structured component of the Provincial Police Academy in 1993. In addition, all field locations received a video training package prepared by the OPP titled “Community Policing - Shaping Our Future”. This video discussed their problem solving model, community consultation, detachment planning, and community profiling (OPP, 1993a: 24).

This training video was based on an extensive report prepared by the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services that detailed the ways in which community policing should be thought about and promoted throughout Ontario. The document was called *Community Policing: Shaping the Future* (1991; reprinted, 1994),

and it reflected an attempt to break policing organizations out of their old paradigm. Specifically, it was a manual that stressed the need to change "policing strategy, organizational structure and organizational culture" (MSGCS, 1991: 5). It provided a conceptual framework for organizations to engage in *fundamental* changes rather than programmatic tinkering. The Ministry argued that community policing ought not to be thought about as a "special program to be added to the way policing is conducted today and it is not a new crime prevention or community service project" (Ibid). Rather, community policing ought to be seen as "a transition from the traditional or "professional" mode of police services to a contemporary one" (Ibid). So, in contrast to the previous wave of community policing, the Ministry was calling for a complete *paradigm shift*.

For the Ministry, one means of promoting this shift was to re-conceptualize the police as more than just law enforcement agents. Specifically, they should be thought of as the "peacemakers" that Robert Peel once envisioned. As such, a meaningful partnership between the police and communities would be required. This broadening of the police role and identity would serve to re-affirm the authority of the police. According to the Ministry, police officers should be seen as "routinely – but not exclusively – responsible for the reduction and prevention of crime and the promotion of public order and individual safety" (MSGCS, 1991: 6). In *Shaping the Future*, the Ministry states that police must "maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historical tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police. The police being the only members of the public that are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of



community welfare and existence" (in MSGCS, 1991: 6; also in Normandeau and Leighton, 1993: 30).

In deploying this imagery, the Ministry's intention was to "reconfigure the Peelian legacy in order, somehow, to reconstitute physical and psychological relations between the police and public, to build trust, and to encourage greater public assistance in policing" (Crawford, 1997: 45). Crawford points out, however, that the "Peelian legacy embodied a contradictory logic" (1997: 20), in that Peel was actually advocating a shift *away* from "non-expert" or non-bureaucratic forms of knowledge. Indeed, this notion of "the police are the public and the public are the police" was not intended by Peel to be literal. Rather, police were the "experts", and the emphasis made in 1829 on their broad mandate was an exercise in external legitimation (Ibid). It appears as though the Ministry was engaged in a similar legitimization process.

Notwithstanding the Ministry's misguided understanding of the Peelian dream, it was promoting the idea that an exclusive law enforcement approach to policing could no longer be regarded as the panacea when it comes to promoting and maintaining security. So, in addition to this process of normative (re-)legitimation, the Ministry is also suggesting that the re-constitution of police officers as broad-based "peacemakers" would be more strategically effective. This is consistent with Crank and Langworthy's observation that community policing "has emerged as the articulation of a police reform movement that...re-thinks the issue of effectiveness of the police in crime control. Effectiveness is reconsidered in terms of a police function beyond law enforcement activity. Police seek to formalize order maintenance and crime prevention aspects of their work" (1996: 214).

The Ministry advocated a series of measures for ensuring that the paradigm shift to community policing took place.<sup>19</sup> For example, in order to initiate forms of community consultation, advisory or consultative committees were recommended. Because this paradigm shift necessitated a move beyond exclusive law enforcement strategies, police organizations were encouraged to adopt proactive approaches to the governance of security “by anticipating future problems through the identification of local and disorder problems” (MSGCS, 1991: 9). The Ministry stressed the importance of “addressing the underlying causes of crime” (Ibid). As such, the police should “broaden” their “strategic tool box” by getting involved in environmental design and social development activities. Such an approach would also require that the police link up with other service delivery agencies that have knowledge about the “underlying causes of crime” (Ibid). We see here that the Ministry is promoting a conception of governance as a networked affair. As well, it is profoundly challenging the “governing through crime” (Simon, 1995) approach by suggesting that the precursors to actual criminal events be the focus of greater attention. This necessarily involves the direct participation of individuals and groups other than law enforcement experts. Accordingly, a great deal of space has been opened up for re-thinking notions of “expertise”, and ultimately authority, in the governance of security.

Once again, the Ministry stressed the importance of “developing police officers as career generalists” (Ibid). In order for this to take effect, however, police departments must enhance “officer responsibility and autonomy by decentralizing police management and resource deployment” (Ibid). As well, service delivery should be organized around

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<sup>19</sup> These measures were drawn from Leighton’s work on the “sixteen subsidiary ingredients of “community policing” that summarize the conventional wisdom among many police leaders and academics” (1991).

neighbourhoods instead of shifts. This would ensure that officers become familiar with particular communities so that meaningful dialogue and cooperation can take place. The decentralization of police management would require that old the hierarchical, paramilitary structures be transformed into flatter organizational structures (Ibid). This organizational shift would help support a new ethos of responsibility and autonomy, particularly among constables.

Thus, given this thrust toward networked, preventative governance, the Ministry is now acknowledging that other aspects of police institutions, including their structural, cultural and managerial characteristic, must be transformed as well. In other words, it is acknowledging the contradiction that has emerged between this new strategic vision and the old organizational and managerial practices of the police.

Concomitant to structural and managerial change, the Ministry also stressed the importance of “enhancing accountability to communities by providing accounts of progress made on community priorities” (MSGCS, 1991: 9). In contrast to the previous wave, the police would have to move beyond the simple notion of “policing by consent”. Now they would have to be made *strategically accountable* to communities. The police would have to make this shift from community *consultation* to community *direction*.

In general, the principles articulated by the Ministry in its *Shaping the Future* document opened up a new set of possibilities and ways of thinking about both the formation of new governance relationships between the police and communities as well as new strategic approaches. There is an effort here to shift some responsibility, and hence authority, to communities by developing close partnerships through mechanisms such as community advisory committees. Coupled with an emphasis on “accountability”

to communities, the discourse being articulated by the Ministry reflects an attempt to shift some “steering” capacities to the community level. This contrasts with the first wave of community policing which consisted of attempts to engage communities in “rowing” functions while ensuring that ultimate authority rested with the police.

One can draw on O’Malley and Palmer’s work in suggesting that what we are witnessing is indexing a broad shift in political rationalities (1996). Specifically, the principles of Keynesian governance have been contested and contradicted, and while the “social” continues to assert itself (however thinly), the Ministry and the OPP are speaking more and more “in the name of community”, to paraphrase from Osborne and Rose (1997). This increasingly prevalent use of rhetorical devices such as “community consultation”, “community consultative committees”, “community accountability” suggests, according to Stenson, a broader and more “fundamental governmental shift” away from the language of the “social” (1996: 103-104).

On a general level, instead of a state monopoly of the governance of security, we are witnessing an attempt to band together many otherwise separate spheres in the name of crime control. This has now opened up space for the public to prioritize crime prevention as a key function of the police, which necessarily requires the active involvement of all citizens and social agencies in diverse capacities to make this strategy successful (see Sheerman, 1991: 197; see also Crawford, 1994). As Johnson stated, “[i]t will be for the police to activate the under-developed potential of a partnership approach to solving common problems” (1991: 213).

*The "Fiscal Crisis"*

In the context of this expanded emphasis on a proactive crime prevention orientation, and a concomitant re-figuring of police "expertise", a "fiscal crisis" across the provincial government had escalated to the point where the economic sustainability of provincial ministries was being threatened. Once again, the meaning of "community policing" would be re-constituted. According to an interviewee, there had been a "downturn in the economy" (#1) that began in the 1980's and continued into the 1990's. As this downturn became more and more severe, government institutions began thinking about how to deliver their services with the same, or even fewer, amount of resources. He explained that

*In the last ten years...the economic conditions [emerged] and the fact that the money was just not there to the degree that it had been before, and so the focus of attention was, "you've got to find ways to do it more efficiently, because we just do not have the money"...[T]he message was always delivered with the related comment, of course, [that] "we don't want to see the front line services deteriorating" – "so... you need first to look at your administrative structures and see that that's where you should be making your reductions, because under no circumstances...are we telling you to downgrade your delivery of service" (#1)*

Where once the largely hypothetical idea of organizational restructuring was articulated as a key method for shifting the police into a community policing paradigm, the new fiscal reality would make such an effort imperative. The OPP's commitment to community policing acquired a new significance, because it would now have to align their new economic rationale with their strategic rationale. Accordingly, community policing would now be conceptualized as a strategy for governing security that was *cost-effective*. As one interviewee put it, "the economy really caused the police to fine tune and make themselves efficient. Community policing was an impetus to make the police effective". This "fiscal crisis" was not unique to Ontario. In Edmonton, for example,

this same conception of community policing was being articulated by its Police Service, which stated that “[t]he traditional solution of adding more personnel to improve customer service was not an option given financial restraints...The implementation of community-based policing gave citizens a superior type of policing without any major burden on the tax system” (1996: 3). So, strategic effectiveness and cost-effectiveness were now regarded as the two main virtues of community policing. As Murphy observed, “[t]he possibility of shifting some policing responsibilities and costs back to the community, and reducing reliance on government-funded public policing, makes community policing a highly programmatic as well as politically appealing reform” (1986: 179). Due to the fiscal crisis, the OPP were told not only to be cost-effective, but to show *results*. The OPP were now obliged to address the “means over ends syndrome”, which Goldstein (1979) argued was characteristic of policing institutions within the professional paradigm. Specifically, the OPP would have to translate its discursive shift toward proactive policing into practical strategies for reducing crime. In the words of one interviewee, the government effectively told the OPP that

*“if we do spend money on you, we want to see that it is having some effect”, and so, it's just another way of saying, “we want you to be a little more accountable, we want to know what the results of these things are...The governing authorities, the governments, are getting it from the public, or at least they are interpreting that's what's coming from the public...and then they are in turn turning to us and saying, “we want to know how you're spending the money that we are giving”...[T]hey're saying... “recognize you can't waste money, recognize you need to consult in the community policing mode to produce good products”... [I]t's this business of, “we want to know what you're producing with the scarce resources that we're giving you” (#1)*

This passage implies that “safety” is now being regarded as a “product” – it is being re-constituted according to market-based imagery, and citizens are now being thought of as “consumers” who are demanding “value” for their dollar. This discursive shift echoes a

more general observation by Rose (1996b) in relation to the rise of a neo-liberal rationality . He argues that a key characteristic of neo-liberalism is the articulation of governmental subjects as “customers”, for example, “customers” of health services or “customers” of education (Ibid., 57; see also Lacey, 1994 and Cooper, 1993). This “customerization” of the citizen is serving to further displace the primacy of the “social”, and the welfarist conception of citizens as passive recipients of governmental services.

“Customer service” would now become the new buzzword for the OPP, and the following statement makes explicit the complex set of meanings associated with “community policing”:

*[W]e knew we wanted to move in a direction that said, community safety is more than the police, and that as times got tougher, tighter, from a financial perspective, you know you can't do it all by yourself anyway, and the more you separate yourselves from the community, the more you're going to be subject to criticism because you never let anybody in, so I mean it's all of those things....The drive to greater accountability I think is something that has helped bring it home, and the whole notion of customer service (#3)*

One can conclude from this that community policing is now thought of as a means of simultaneously addressing three governmental objectives: enhanced strategic effectiveness; enhanced cost-effectiveness; and enhanced normative legitimacy.

The coupling of a fiscal conception of accountability with the need to re-legitimize the police as a democratic institution is expressed here by another interviewee:

*[T]he police became almost alienated from the public...it became an “us” in here and “them” out there kind of thing. And then I think community policing probably came about as a result of a police awareness that we were removing ourselves from the public, as well as an increased demand on the part of the public for accountability. I think the public sort of sat back and said, “okay, we see the cops driving around in circles and doing whatever they do, is that the best use of resources? Are we getting a bang for our buck?” So, I think it was kind of a joint realization at some point... [B]oth sides of the equation woke up to the notion that they were dealing with one another (#4)*

This interviewee is affirming Kelling and Moore's observation that the "professional bureaucratic authority, especially that which tends to isolate police and insulate them from neighborhood influences" has been contested through the emergence of new forms of "community authorization" (1988: 19).

The public concern with the use of financial resources was associated with a broader observation, on the part of government, that citizens were demanding a more active role in governance. This issue was noted in an Environmental Scan that was conducted for the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada in 1992. It explained that the public was asking for "more involvement at all stages of the decision-making process (i.e., from problem identification to the development of solutions to the implementation and evaluation of solutions)" (Hann and Asbury, 1992: 21). Instead of simply presenting citizens with a "final product", "[t]here is a growing recognition that people must be involved from the onset if they are to "buy in" (Hann and Asbury, 1992: 21). The following interviewee explains why demand for citizen participation became a distinct issue for police organizations:

*[T]here is a perception that perhaps violence and crime is increasing – statistics wouldn't bear that out, but there is a perception that that's the case. So, along with the developing interest by members of the public in all things in relation to their government – and policing is something that they see right up front – that was a developing interest – "we should become more involved in this. We want to know how you are doing this. We think we have some advice to give you on how you might do things a little bit better". So, there was a tremendous increased interest on the part of the public. Why was this so? I think the media produced, I think, produced a greater interest by the public, as they revealed various things – "this is how it is" and the public read it or saw it on t.v. or listened on the radio, and I think that increased their interest, so I think the two run together – a very vigilant media causes the public to either be concerned or not, and when they are concerned, they start looking into these things. So, I think, the public, encouraged by the media, began to demand a greater role in how policing was done (#1)*



This enhanced scrutiny of the police on the part of the media is also observed by Stenson in the British context, and he notes that a consequence of this has been a blurring of the “old separation of policing and politics... perhaps calling into question the depoliticized concepts of law and crime which underpinned the claims of the police for a separate sphere of operations” (1993: 379-380). In this regard, the notion of state-community partnerships has become even more salient. Not only were such partnerships deemed to be more strategically as well as cost-effective, but it would be an essential means toward a normative (re-)legitimation for the police.

The introduction of market-based language in the second wave, in the context of a general fiscal crisis, served to open up new spaces for thinking about the distribution of authority in the governance of security. As we will see in the next wave, this space was quickly filled with a new conception of the OPP as a “business”. In the context of an “ascendancy of ‘consumer’ discourses” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996: 142), the term “community policing” is discarded in favour of the term “customized service delivery”. This gradual “customization” process signals a profound fracturing of the “social” and a distinct shift toward local knowledge, capacities and authority.

### **The Third Wave: Community Policing as a "Business"**

By 1994, the OPP believed that in order to make a paradigm shift out of the professional model and into a community policing model, it would have to transform its institutional structures and managerial practices (a transformation which, as we saw earlier, was advocated by the Ministry of the Solicitor General). Essentially, the OPP believed it was “hampered” by an institutional framework “that was more consistent with earlier generations of police service delivery models” (OPP, 1995b: 1). While Murphy

reminds us that “rhetoric is not necessarily an accurate indicator of operational reality” (1986: 183), the organization-wide shift to community policing has served to open up a new realm of possibilities for thinking about the implementation of organizational and managerial change within the OPP. Obviously, any significant organizational change would not have been thinkable within the discursive boundaries of the professional policing model (Murphy, 1986), but as new concepts and discourses began to fracture this model, new possibilities for change became thinkable.

In its attempt to resolve some of the tensions between its established way of doing things and its new worldview, the OPP sought to create a new organizational structure and an associated set of managerial practices. This would enable it to pursue its new strategic orientation. This desire to re-structure the organization is consistent with the observations of many commentators that the “systemic implementation” of community policing involves “not only increased police involvement with the public but a complete overhaul of police management and structure” (Seagrave, 1996: 163; see also Murphy, 1988). Seagrave also points out that one of the aims of such an organizational restructuring is to “alter an organizational culture” through the development of a “a new set of values or an alternative ‘management philosophy’” (Ibid., 165; see also Maguire, 1997).

As discussed earlier, the prevailing fiscal crisis of the Ontario government prompted the OPP, and the provincial government more generally, to begin thinking in business-like terms, and to extend its commitment to “customerization”. Accordingly, when it came to re-thinking its institutional structure and managerial practices (as we will see in the next chapter), the OPP began thinking in “corporate” terms, that is, as an

organization that was engaged in the “business of community policing”. In the spirit of fiscal prudence, the OPP sought to construct an organization that would enable it to conduct this “business” in ways that were optimally cost efficient and effective. As a technique for “market-oriented remodeling” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996: 141), the OPP initiated a “corporate reengineering” process.

In this third wave, the OPP was aspiring to the “highest level” of community policing, both strategically and institutionally. They defined this “highest level” as the third stage in a three-stage process of evolution. The three stages were: “community-based policing”, “problem-solving policing”, and “community policing”, respectively. As discussed in relation to the first wave, “community-based policing” was described as a stage in which “officers were more engaged in the community through programs designed to inform and direct community involvement in law enforcement” (OPP, 1995a: 3). In retrospect, the OPP recognized that this approach was more in line with the professional model of policing, even though “it provided the foundation for advancement to our goal of working in true partnership with the community” (Ibid).

The “problem-solving policing” stage relates significantly to the second wave and onwards with regard to an experimentation with crime prevention strategies and models. The emphasis on “crime prevention” represents an attempt to break out of its old strategic tool-box, and “involves the application of a problem-solving model which engages the community in the identification, analysis, strategic response and evaluation of crime problems” (OPP, 1995a: 3). This stage represents a valorization of Goldstein’s seminal work on “problem-oriented” policing, which emphasizes the idea that law enforcement is only one means to the broader end of solving safety and security problems. Accordingly,

it should be the job of the police to examine, in detail, the nature of community problems and to search for a broad range of possible solutions that may include the involvement of other institutions/resources (Goldstein, 1979). As mentioned before, this experimentation opened the figurative door for the development of security networks.

The third stage, “community policing”, is regarded by the OPP as “the highest end of the evolution” because it involves a “full partnership between the police and the community in what can be called the “co-production of public safety and security” (OPP, 1995a: 3). This stage implies a greater role on the part of communities as well as other agencies in crime prevention (Ibid). So, this third stage reflects both an extension as well as a coupling of stages one and two. Stage three constitutes the two essential components of a complete “community policing” paradigm shift: a relationship of “co-production” between police and communities, and an expansion of their strategic tool-box to *proactive*, as well as *reactive* security strategies (see Ericson on the “co-production of order” (1982; see also Wilson and Kelling, (1982); and Murphy and Muir (1984)). This stage is consistent with Leighton’s definition of community policing, whereby “crime and disorder problems are the *joint property* of the community as “client” as well as of the police as the local agency delivering public security services” (1998: 137; see Crawford (1994) on the “multi-agency approach to crime prevention” in Britain).

Skolnick and Bayley relate this notion of “co-production” to a shift from an “old” to a “new” police professionalism. In the “old professionalism”, police institutions and agents were not interested in consulting with, or being accountable to, members of the public, including members of minority groups. Due to the intensive training received in all areas of law enforcement and the Criminal Code, it wasn’t deemed necessary to

receive input from communities (1986: 495). In contrast, “[i]f the old professional leaned toward, perhaps exemplified, a “legalistic” style of policing, the new professional inclines toward and exemplifies a more service-oriented style” (Ibid). The kind of service orientation implied here is one where police are accountable to communities, and where the police actually learn from communities. Accordingly, the police are no longer regarded as a “force” delivering a “service”. Rather, the term “service” has been filled with a new, and more literal, meaning. As well, the idea of “reciprocity”, encompassing community feedback and participation, enables the police to more effectively target their resources to local needs (Ibid; see also Leighton, 1998). Effectively, this notion of “co-production” has created discursive space for governmental authority to be once again re-negotiated and re-distributed to the extent that it is shared by the police and communities.

In order to progress to this "highest level" of community policing, the OPP developed a "business strategy". The first component of the strategy was to enhance service at the front-line level, that is, the point at which the police come into direct contact with their "customers". As mentioned earlier, while the provincial government wanted the OPP to deliver services more efficiently, it did not want front-line service to be compromised. In the same spirit as any market-based institution, the objective of the OPP was to focus resources on their “product”, while streamlining and reducing those processes that did not produce “value”. The objective of the OPP was to promote a "more fully developed vision and application of community policing" by delivering more effective services through such mechanisms as:

- *front-line team policing,*
- *enhanced differential response capability and*

*- the application of investigative follow-up criteria and guidelines to focus effort where the probability of success is the highest (cited from OPP, 1995a: 4).*

Front-line team policing (discussed later on in this chapter and in the next chapter) refers to the strategy of assigning the same group of officers to a particular community who would work, as a team, in the resolution of security problems. By assigning the same people to a community, citizens are more apt to build a relationship of trust and cooperation with each member of the team. As well, each team member would be acquainted with what the other team members are doing, so that there is consistency across shifts in terms of knowledge of community issues. With an enhanced understanding of community characteristics, needs and priorities, the police can enhance their normative legitimacy and can better determine the allocation of financial and human resources. This enables the police to locate themselves on both the literal and figurative terrain of “community”. At the same time, it reinforces and extends a devaluation of bureaucratic, abstract knowledge while prioritizing and harnessing local knowledge.

An enhanced differential response capability refers to the practice of responding to police calls for assistance in ways that are more cost-effective. For example, rather than sending police officers to the source of every call, more minor cases are dealt with by telephone. This strategy has a similar logic to the one of developing investigative follow-up criteria, so that human resources can be devoted to cases with a higher rate of “solvability” (OPP, 1995g: 2). This overall strategy reflects a broader emphasis on attaining “results” (a shift highlighted earlier). In countering its “means over ends syndrome” (Goldstein, 1979), the OPP began developing new organizational processes that would enable them to achieve realistic “ends” with cost-effective “means”.

In concert with this business strategy, the OPP placed emphasis on transforming the OPP into a "learning organization", a cultural and epistemological shift deemed to be integral to doing the business of community policing effectively (see Chapter Four). There was a desire to transform the OPP into an institution "that is committed to continuous self-evaluation and improvement in all spheres of its activities." (OPP, 1994c). In the context of a devaluation of abstract knowledge, the new and locally-informed "expertise" of the police would be contingent on citizen needs and demands, and hence ever-changing. So, the ability of the OPP to continually learn and renew itself organizationally was considered to be an important human resource strategy for ensuring "the optimal delivery of efficient and effective policing services" (Ibid).

A key component of the OPP's attempt to institutionalize this shift to community policing and organizational learning was the creation of the Community Policing Development Centre. The creation of the Centre stemmed from one of the recommendations made during the Organizational Review Process (see Chapter Three). The Centre was established with the purpose of developing problem-solving frameworks, producing better methods of data collection and enhancing the exchange of information and research in the area of community policing (OPP, 1995a: 13). It "was given the responsibility for providing the OPP with the operational capability to incorporate community policing throughout the organization and evaluate its implementation within the province" (OPP, 1996a: 11). It would also "provide the necessary capacity for the O.P.P. to foster and maintain a learning organization, with an enhanced capacity for continuous self-evaluation and self-improvement" (Eamer, 1995: 1).

Hence, the Centre was established as a site for developing the strategies and processes, as well as those human capacities that would help give concrete effect to the "co-production" model of community policing. The Centre was identified as "a vital strategy to ensure community policing becomes firmly embedded in the OPP's front-line activities" (OPP, 1995a: 20). The Community Policing Development Centre (CPDC) was created "to provide [their] staff with the operational capacity to implement and evaluate our '*client-focused*' services" (OPP, 1997g; italics added) and to help transfer more governmental authority to the community level.

According to one interviewee, the kinds of institutional changes required to transform the OPP into a community policing organization could not be carried out on an individual or ad hoc basis:

*We've relied too strongly on the individual. They can't make some of the structural changes that are needed... The first 3 million dollars new re-investment of money out of [the Organizational Renewal] was the Community Policing Development Centre, so yes I support it, yes it's the way to go. It will in fact force us to look at the processes, the structures and the supports we have for the front line officers, because it will let the community explain what their needs are, as we start to seek out their information, and that'll be powerful information for us in perhaps influencing ministry policy and government policy and initiatives as to where they want to go (#5)*

This quote stresses the importance being placed by the OPP on aligning their "structures and supports" with the needs of communities. The CPDC would serve as the hub to drive processes of "co-production" and to promote the re-distribution of governmental authority.

#### *The Contemporary Policing Strategy*

A key technique developed by the CPDC for forging the strategic paradigm shift to the "highest evolution of community policing" was to develop a "contemporary" community policing model. The CPDC contrasts this new style of policing with



“traditional policing”, which they regard as “a reactive service that excludes proactive initiatives” (OPP, 1996a: 11). Instead of simply responding to calls for service, contemporary policing assumes that “the community is a stakeholder or has ownership in regard to community safety” (OPP, 1997b: 2:1). As such, the community and the police are to work together in the identification and resolution of security issues (Ibid). Contemporary policing still involves enforcement and reactive responses, even though “traditional strategies should always be considered as alternatives when considering solutions to the causes, as opposed to symptoms, of a community issue” (OPP, 1996a: 11; OPP, 1997b: 2:1).

This shift to a “contemporary” policing model reflects an attempt to re-articulate the authority of the police. First, the police are constituted as “co-owners” of security along with other groups and institutions in civil society. At the same time, the law enforcement expertise previously enjoyed by the police within the traditional model has now been assigned a new meaning. Specifically, reactive, after-the-fact responses to violations of security are deemed “alternatives”, or the “last resort”, being generally ineffective when it comes to addressing the root causes of disorderly behavior. Thus, within this new strategic orientation, crime control is emphasized “as an indirect result of or an equal partner to the other activities” (Kelling and Moore, 1986: 20). So, one can agree with Kelling and Moore’s suggestion that while the crime control function of the police remains important, it has taken on a different meaning (1986), and this meaning is captured here by the following interviewee:

*[T]he focus of community policing comes down to always a police issue, but it really isn't a police issue, it's a community and social services, education and health [issue]...[W]e're asking the police to do something that we don't have control over... Five causes of crime: single parent homes, home ownership, unemployment*

*education... We don't control those, and for years we've been measuring ourselves on things we don't control... We're tasking the police with something we don't have the skills to deal with (#6)*

This profound re-thinking of police expertise is conveyed in this quote. While the police can *respond* to incidents of crime, they are not making any claims to expertise in relation to those events and circumstances which lead up to, and surround, criminal events. This confirms Crawford's observation that increasingly, the police have come to recognize their "impossible mandate" (Manning, 1977) in the form of exclusive responsibility for the governance of security (Crawford, 1997: 25). "Where once the state was expected to hand down an authoritative answer for the problems and needs of society, now we are increasingly witnessing a situation in which those same problems and needs are rebounding back on society, so that society has become implicated in the task of resolving them" (Ibid). Ironically then, by shifting their focus beyond the governance of crime toward the governance of broader forms of disorder, the police are effectively contesting their own authority. Furthermore, scholars have observed that once the police actually find out what the priorities and concerns are in communities, they ultimately discover that the problems have less to do with "discrete and legally defined *incidents*" (Skogan and Harnett, 1997: 8) and more to do with "casual social disorder and the physical decay of their community" (Ibid; see Wilson and Kelling, 1982; see Kelling and Coles, 1996).

In this context, the new role for the police is articulated by the following interviewee:

*I see more the shift in policing more as an awareness that yes, our roles as far as policing probably aren't going to change in that we are still going to be reactive. You, as the public are still going to want us to do what we do best, and that's to investigate, to enforce the law. But, if we truly, as a community, a police, together, want to solve*

*problems, then the community has to take more responsibility for change in how we deal with problems. So really the police, I see we are being more of a catalyst to try to say to the community, "let's sit down at the table, let's identify what has been in the past purely policing problems" ... [W]e know that getting rid of the problems now in society is a lot different than it was years ago, that in fact problems are more complex these days...and so therefore, there is a requirement more on the community to be more involved with us in a solution (#7)*

In Australia, O'Malley and Palmer have observed this similar shift away from an "over-reliance on police and other law-enforcement and regulatory bodies in [an] attempt to control crime" (1996: 143). They note that there is a general sentiment in government that communities must now "meet this responsibility" (Ibid). Accordingly, the police and government have attempted to serve as a "catalyst" in the "responsibilization" (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996) of citizens. The police now have a "directly political role in mobilizing resources to assist in prevention strategies" (Stenson, 1993: 381).

While various discursive shifts have been made in the direction of "community", "partnerships" and "crime prevention", the preceding quote is also significant because it stresses that what the police still do best is law enforcement. This represents a re-confirmation of the "social". In particular, this interviewee is reinforcing the idea that the police remain a "social" institution, and that their "social" expertise and related capacities are still relevant. However, this statement does not reflect a return to the past. It simply represents a re-figuring of the bounds of their authority and a curtailment of their functions and responsibilities.

#### *The Contemporary Policing Team Model*

In order to support their "contemporary" policing strategy, the OPP set out to create a team structure according to a "Community Policing Team Model".<sup>20</sup> The Centre

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<sup>20</sup> Team Leader training, involving all Sergeant Team leaders and Detachment Commanders took place in 1996 and 1997 (OPP, 1996b: 2).

stated that “[t]he Community Policing Team model will be promoted as a method to achieve a more efficient and effective detachment commitment to community problem solving” (OPP, 1996b: 11). The Community Policing Team Model was developed in response to the perceived inadequacies of the traditional zone policing model. Zone policing consists of assigning officers in an ad hoc manner to zones which are delineated according to geographic characteristics such as concession numbers or rivers. In contrast, the Community Policing Team Model consists of assigning a team of officers to the same zone, and this team would cover a 24-hour period. Each team is then made accountable for problem-solving in that zone. As stated earlier, constables are now constituted as "generalists" within this team model, whereby each OPP officer is considered to be a "community policing officer".

Within this team model the governance relationship between sergeants and constables is re-figured. In place of a hierarchical, command-and-control relationship between these two ranks, sergeants are to act more as facilitators, as “team leaders” responsible for supporting the activities of a team, and for ensuring that all members, across shifts, are dedicated to the same goals and strategies. The sergeant is accountable for the activities of a team and its members, and is involved in assessing the success or failure of initiatives. At the same time, Sergeants do retain the responsibility for directing the delivery of traditional reactive services provided by those on his or her shift (Ibid., 7). This model is argued to increase strategic and cost-effectiveness because members of the teams will have a better understanding of their communities, will be able to plan with them, and will be able to follow-up on issues and be accountable for the development

and implementation of plans (OPP, 1996b: 7).<sup>21</sup> The use of the term “team” indexes the broader “partnership” approach that the OPP has been developing in relation to communities. Specifically, front-line officers are to work together in networks of shared authority that value local knowledge and co-production, in the same way that officers are to work with communities. So, the OPP is attempting to align their internal form of governance with the new form of external governance they are promoting.

During the first year of the Centre's existence, it created a provincial community policing management team, which consisted of community policing managers from each region, in addition to representatives of the First Nations Section, the Provincial Traffic and Marine Safety Bureau as well as community volunteers (OPP, 1996a: 11-12). The team was established to oversee the development of a variety of community policing processes. The team approved a three-year action plan consisting of eleven projects aimed at providing the police and communities the right "tools" to do community policing. Two such projects included the development of a "How To" Manual for doing community policing and a new Service Delivery Model (Ibid., 12).<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> In order to effectively manage this new team structure, team leaders are required to engage in what is commonly referred to as “remote management”. That is, since a sergeant is responsible for a zone, the constables who form the team for that zone will necessarily be working on different shifts to cover the 24-hour period of that zone. As such, the team leader/sergeant will require ways of managing those constables that are working during a different time period than him or herself. The leader will also be required to develop innovative strategies for assessing the performance of all team members. Technology will also be a key enabler in this process (OPP, 1996b: 8). By 1996, sergeants/team leaders had been training in team building and problem solving.

<sup>22</sup> The CPDC was also devoted to assisting the victims of crime and developed the Victims Crisis Assistance and Referral Service (VCARS). This service consists of a directory of all agencies that provide assistance to victims across the province. The Centre was also involved in anti-racism initiatives, such as providing workshops on the Workplace Discrimination and Harassment Prevention policy to team leaders, coach officers and detachment commanders in several regions. The CPDC also worked on changing the OPP's race relations position to an anti-racism position, and it studied the implications for the OPP of the recommendations of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (OPP, 1996a: 13).

### *The "How Do We Do It" Manual*

The "How To" Manual consists of a detailed set of practical techniques for doing contemporary policing. It embodies a three-pronged emphasis on contemporary policing, problem-solving and teams (OPP, 1996b: 9). It is essentially a self-help text for front-line officers as well as communities that addresses the most common and practical issues relating to the implementation of community policing. This "how to" approach reflects a critique of theoretical knowledge and a preference for practical knowledge production as a means of building new capacities. It was once stated in a discussion paper on community policing that "theoretical training should only be provided to management. "Nuts and bolts", the "how to's" should be the focus of training for line officers" (OPP, 1993c: 13). So, the "How To" Manual would serve as a medium for translating managerial directions into front-line operations.

In this vein, the Manual depicts a set of capacity-building activities designed to promote "a cultural and paradigm shift" (OPP, 1997b: 1.1). It provides very practical and simple information on such topics as: types of police-community partnerships and how to develop them; the recruitment of volunteers; the management of community policing committees; problem-solving techniques and the service-delivery process (OPP, 1996a: 12). As one interviewee put it, "it was the first document that we put together that tries to effectively identify to everybody - the police and community - what their roles are, what their responsibilities are, some tools on how we can work together". This Manual, therefore, is a practical tool for shifting responsibility for the governance of security, resulting in a re-distribution of governmental authority.

To the end of establishing new and practical relationships of “co-production” between the police and communities, the Manual describes different kinds of community policing committee models and the respective roles of the police and citizens within each model. The nature and structure of these community policing committees depends on the degree and kind of community issues and the level of interest on the part of citizens. The Manual suggests that a community profile be conducted in order to assess the opportunities for community involvement. In order to ensure that the establishment of committees is actually achievable within differing community contexts, three types of committees are suggested, based on the particular function of community members and the resources available within each community. These are consultative community policing committees, multifunctional community policing committees, and interagency community policing committees.

In a consultative community policing committee, as its title suggests, members are not directly involved in the development of strategies to deal with local problems. They act more as a resource, who will consult with individuals or groups to collect information relevant to community policing issues or activities. They act mainly as “information collectors” who do not involve community resources in the implementation of solutions (OPP, 1997b: 2.5). In short, this committee “acts as a link or liaison between the police and the community” (Ibid., 2.6). Obviously, such a committee is created in communities where a shifting of “steering” functions is less realistic due to a variety of factors within a given community. Within this committee structure, the community serves as a “junior partner” (Shearing and Stenning, 1983; Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1977) to the police.

The multifunctional community policing committee has a close working relationship with the police. They engage in problem solving with the police and participate in the development of strategies which include community resources. In essence, the community “owns” the process. The committee is accountable to both the police, as well as their community, and evaluates programs in conjunction with their police partner (Ibid). This committee structure supports the “co-production” model and serves to institutionalize governmental authority at the community level.

The interagency community policing committee involves members of agencies (ex. government, religious, business, health) as well as other community members who assist in the identification of issues and the development of solutions. This particular committee assesses all the resources in the community to determine who has both the responsibility and capacities to engage in certain solutions. This committee acts as a catalyst in bringing together various agencies in the resolution of community problems. All agencies are accountable to their partners in the development and implementation of plans. Together, these partners evaluate initiatives on a regular basis (Ibid., 2.8 to 2.10).<sup>23</sup> This committee structure also supports the “co-production” model, but places a more explicit emphasis on the development of a formal security network consisting of established community-based institutions.

Each of these committee structures serves as a mechanism for “responsibilizing” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996; Garland, 1996) resources outside of the police to engage more directly in the governance of security. These structures serve, in Garlands words, to

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<sup>23</sup> These three types of community policing committees are not to be confused with the Community Policing Advisory Committees that will be discussed in the Chapter Five. Stemming from recent revisions to the *Police Services Act*, the purpose of the Advisory Committees is to provide more formal advice in



“devolve responsibility for crime prevention on to agencies, organizations and individuals which are quite outside the state and to persuade them to act appropriately” (1996: 452; see Crawford, 1997). As O’Malley and Palmer add, “[i]mages of voluntary participation in contemporary police-community consultation groups...contrast with the imageries of a compulsory and patronizing state” (1996: 148).

In addition to outlining the functions of community policing committees, the “How To” Manual provides a conceptual framework, and a set of practical techniques, for engaging in “problem-solving” activities according to a “Service Delivery Process”. The market-based connotation of the term “service delivery” reflects the OPP’s self-image as a “business” that must cater to the needs and characteristics of “customers”.

#### *The New Service Delivery Model*

The new Service Delivery Model is another technique for driving the shift to the “co-production” paradigm, where governmental authority is shared between the police and their “customers”. According to one interviewee, the Service Delivery Model supports the notion that “communities are our customers and they are number one” (#8).

He explained that

*community policing is customized policing - you're customized to your customers, customer service. For the longest time policing was the only business that the customer's always wrong.....It's very accountable and it's very customer driven which is very important nowadays (#8)*

This interviewee is reflecting on the way in which the professional or bureaucratic expertise of the police previously took precedence over other forms of expertise. He is suggesting that now this basis of authority has changed, and that police expertise is contingent on the demands of their “customers”. This contractual imagery is observed by

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relation to the objectives and priorities of a police service within a particular municipality (see MSGCS,

O'Malley and Palmer in their depiction of community policing in the context of a broader neo-liberal rationality. In the quote above, "the rhetoric is one in which the consumer leads the way, shaping the nature of services to be provided. Conceptions of expertise still remain very much in place, but the rhetorical question of who is understood to be 'on top' becomes more open as the consumer/customer contractual imagery is extended" (1996: 141). This emphasis on "customization" also reflects a new conception of the "local", where it not only determines the "site of service delivery...but rather the nature and content of service delivery" (Ibid., 142).

In this regard, the Service Delivery Model is a means of cultivating a new ethos and set of habits across the policing organization in order to support the vision of community policing as "customized service delivery":

*Community policing is a concept, it's not a program, and that's why I say it's a way of doing business and that's what the service delivery process as far as supporting customized policing is the best example of. It should be our way of doing business...it's not a program. Programs can be born of it, in support of it, but it's not just something that's done and gone and if it's ever communicated [that way] – and sometimes it's misunderstood that way – it has to be clarified immediately, because people think it's just something that'll come and go...Communities are our customers and they are number one (#8)*

This linguistic emphasis made on terms such as "customers" and "customized service delivery" is closely coupled with an economic rationale. Indeed, one of the objectives of the OPP, and its Service Delivery Model, is to ensure that "there is value for every policing dollar spent" (OPP, circa 1998: 3). As one employee states, "Customizing services to meet the needs of our communities, demonstrating value and customer satisfaction is what the OPP is all about!" (Ibid: 5). This "'customerization' of policing" has been observed in other contexts by McLaughlin (1992), O'Malley (1997) and

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1997b). These committees constitute a new form of civilian governance.

Loader (1996). According to Loader, this figure of the “consumer” is “drawn from the world of economic liberalism, where he or she is understood as a bundle of preferences waiting to be satisfied” (1996: 20). We can see therefore that “community policing” is now heavily couched in market-based language, and this is clearly reflected in the following statement by one interviewee:

*[W]hat we really talk about now is customizing service delivery more than we talk about community policing, because, to be quite frank, people are sick and tired - you see people's eyes glaze over when you use the term community policing because we've been using it for ten years and no one has understood for ten years what it meant...I tend not to use the term anymore, because really what we mean when we talk about community policing is really about customer service and it's really about the customer, the community and the police working together to determine what the priorities are and then acting on them (#3)*

The above two quotes represent an acknowledgement on the part of the OPP that the term “community policing” has been deployed so often, in so many contexts, and in pursuit of different objectives, that for many, conceptual confusion has resulted. The expressed desire to move away from the term of “community policing” altogether suggests that perhaps as a management tool, a term such as “customized service delivery” mobilizes a clearer imagery according to which OPP personnel can understand the direction of the organization.

As a technique for “customization”, the Service Delivery Process consists of three steps, all aimed at ensuring that policing services are tailored to the particular characteristics, issues and resources of each community. At the same time, considerable stress is placed on local accountability and control (OPP, circa 1998: 1). The Service Delivery Model is also a technique for driving cultural change within the organization, to help create a new ethos among officers that is conducive to the development of partnerships between the police and citizens. One interviewee stated that

*we are working at the current challenge which is the police culture, getting our own resources aware of how we can work with the community, what a partnership really means, when we say developing strategies or helping to resolve an issue with the community, what does that mean in the context of what we are used to doing in policing. How do we move someone from the reactive component, which is still our responsibility to do, and now suddenly asking them to be more of a coordinator, a facilitator, a partner with the community. So, the challenge to us, first of all, is to try to get our own officers to understand that, our own structures to permit that, and that is why we have come out with the Service Delivery Process, and we really believe that the Service Delivery Process is what's required to drive this change (#7)*

We can conclude from this that the Service Delivery Model is a technology for instilling a new subjectivity in police officers. This subjectivity is one that will allow them to abdicate a certain degree of governmental authority to the community level. At the same time, however, this interviewee is still emphasizing the “social” identity and function of the police, and highlights the challenge of reinforcing this identity while at the same time harnessing the potential of “community”.

The first stage of the service delivery process is called “preparation”, and consists of four steps: Orientation, Profiling Your Community, Structure, and Training. The orientation process is aimed at ensuring that detachment staff and community stakeholders are informed as to what community policing means and that all components of the service delivery process are understood. The Detachment Commander is accountable for this step, since he/she is accountable for overall service delivery at the local level.

The second step of service delivery is called “profiling your community”, and is aimed at assessing the “special characteristics” of each community, such as demographics, community resources, economic and physical characteristics, and incident trends. This profile is used as a basis for customization (Ibid., 2; OPP, 1997b: 6.9. 6.11, 6.17).

The step referred to as “structure” is concerned with, “how should we structure our service delivery to meet the needs of the community” (OPP, 1997b: 6.18). Based on a comprehensive profile of each community, the community policing teams and committees should be structured in a way that they can work effectively. Specifically, the Detachment Commander determines the appropriate make-up of zones and committees, teams and team leaders. In partnership with the community, he/she determines the appropriate community policing committee or similar structure, as well as a mandate for the police-community partnership (Ibid., 6.18-6.19).

The fourth step during the preparation phase is “training”. Both the police and community representatives will be required to have an adequate understanding of:

- the philosophy, principles and process of community policing
- the O.P.P. organization, operating procedures and command structure
- the roles and responsibilities of everyone involved in the partnership
- planning and problem solving (including evaluation of strategies)
- team policing
- the application of technology (as appropriate) (cited directly from OPP, 1997b: 6.21)

In sum, the significance of this first stage is that it is a means of ensuring that all “partners” in the governance of security have been “responsibilized” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996) in particular ways and that the appropriate committee structure is in place for supporting a particular kind of partnership. As well, all partners become aware of the “strategic tool-box” required to address security issues. This first step is therefore aimed at ensuring that various resources and forms of expertise will be shared.

The second phase of the service delivery process, called “Operations”, consists of two steps: Define Action and Implementing Action. After the Preparation phase, the Operations phase involves the actual implementation of the problem solving and planning process. Similar to the first stage, this process involves identifying other stakeholders

who have the responsibility and the capacities to resolve the issue(s), and the identification of reactive and proactive strategies. The main role of the police is to identify their “enforcement responsibilities” and the resources required to meet them. Once again, their “social” role is reinforced while the potential of “community” is being harnessed. Community partnerships, as described earlier, would be developed by determining how to partner with communities, ensuring that the community takes part in strategy development, and determining appropriate roles for team members. Resource requirements must then be determined by matching the service delivery needs of the community with appropriate police and community resources (ex. human, financial, volunteer, equipment). Evaluation tools (discussed below) must then be determined in order to measure the outcomes of service delivery (Ibid., 6.23-6.30).

The determination of action plans occurs via the problem solving process, which is described separately in the "How To" Manual.

#### *Problem-Solving*

The “How To” Manual, in addition to other documents produced by the CPDC, describes the problem solving model by providing a detailed set of practical techniques that officers and committees can use in solving security issues. The problem-solving model is called P.A.R.E., the components of which are: problem identification, analysis, response, and evaluation. In determining what the problems are in each community (step one), the CPDC stresses the importance of soliciting and reflecting on individuals’ perceptions of the problem. Peoples’ perceptions are just as important as the “real” problems. However, officers are required to consider whether the problems identified are indicative of larger or different problems. In conjunction with the perceptions of

residents, officers will provide the community policing committee with information regarding the frequency of incidents according to location (OPP, 1997b: 7.6-7.7).

This emphasis on “perceptions” reflects a shift away from a previous preoccupation – associated with the “professional” model of policing – with crime rates or statistics, and hence, traditional police expertise. While such knowledge remains important, the expertise of the public is now deemed to be important, and this expertise often comes in the form of their perceptions, rather than their factual knowledge, of insecurity. Once again, a shift in governmental authority is being realized through this valuation of previously subjugated forms of knowledge.

The next step in problem solving is to analyze the identified problems by considering the “5 Ws”: Who, What, When, Where and Why. It is then important to gather as much information as possible regarding the victims, offenders and situation in terms of the problem(s) identified. There may be environmental factors such as lighting conditions or time and space-specific conditions that contribute to the problem. The problem should then be analyzed in terms of its impact, seriousness, complexity, and solvability. Specific questions should be asked, such as, Does the problem create other problems? Who is affected? Will it escalate in seriousness if it is not addressed? How deep rooted is the problem? Who has ownership of the problem? Who has the resources to deal with the problem or an aspect of it? Can the problem be adequately addressed by the community and the police? If not, what would need to be done? Based on such questions, the problems should be prioritized. For instance, if the problem is serious and affects many people, but is not very complicated and is easy to solve, then it should be designated a high priority for the police and the community policing committee. The

CPDC recommends that each of the four criteria (impact, seriousness, complexity, and solvability) be used to assign a numerical ranking (from 1 to 5) to issues in order to determine priorities (OPP, 1997b: 7.10-7.12).

Before developing strategies to address each problem, realistic goals should be established. Specifically, the community and police partners should determine whether it is feasible to eliminate the problem, to reduce the problem, or to simply reduce the harm of the problem to victims and the broader community (for example, victims' assistance initiatives) (Ibid., 7.13-7.14). Once again, we see a market-based logic being applied in the establishment of strategic priorities. In particular, if the chances of resolving the issue are small, and the expenditure of human resources would be excessive, then other, more "solvable" issues take precedence.

After the analysis stage, police and their community partners must decide on an "action plan". The "How To" Manual provides a framework for thinking "outside of the box" when determining which strategies are most appropriate for a given problem (Ibid., 7.15). The Manual suggests that the following types of strategies be considered:

*Enforcement Response/Investigation*

*Policy/Law/Regulations*

For example, establishing new by-laws or utilizing other laws/regulations such as health regulations or building codes

*Visibility*

Such as directed patrols

*Information/Education/Communication*

Such as public service announcements or holding information seminars

*Interagency/Stakeholder*

Networking with other agencies that have "ownership" of the problem. May involve a simple referral



*Crime Prevention*

Such as “neighbourhood watch” or “operation identification”

*Mediation*

Mediating community disputes relating to such common problems as noise complaints or disputes over fence lines

*Environmental Design*

Factors such as roadways, poorly lit areas or overgrown shrubs may contribute to a problem. Both short-term and long-term solutions (for example, designing a new bike path) should be considered

*Social Development*

Relating to such issues as parental neglect, poverty, lack of education, domestic violence. Programs aimed at alleviating the preponderance of such problems should be considered (Ibid., 7.18-7.19).

The above strategies (and possibly others) should be assessed as to whether they can *realistically* meet the strategic goals of the police and their community partners. After the appropriate strategies are determined, tasks should then be assigned. Evaluation and monitoring mechanisms must also be incorporated into the plan in order to measure the success of the strategy (Ibid., 7.19-7.23). Once again, we see the OPP articulating the importance of setting realistic “targets” and determining the best strategies for meeting these targets.

Subsequent to the distribution of the “How To” Manual, the CPDC produced a “Contemporary Planning Template” on the Microsoft Excel program. Each community policing plan is to be entered into this template at the detachment level, and can be accessed by the various partners, the community and police administrative levels (Ibid., 7.24). The purpose of the template is to provide the basis for developing an accessible database of community policing “best practices” (Ibid., 7.30-7.31; the significance of “best practices” will be discussed see below).

The final stage of the P.A.R.E. process, “evaluation”, may consist of quantitative and/or qualitative measures of whether plan objectives had been met. If, for example, vandalism was the problem, then it would be quite straightforward to determine whether, and how much, the rate of vandalism had gone down. On the other hand, if the goal was to reduce the harm of a particular behavior, then more qualitative measurements, such as victims’ surveys, would be required (Ibid., 7,28). After each individual strategy is evaluated, then the overall plan (in cases where there is more than one strategy) can be evaluated. The plan should be evaluated in terms of its process and its impact. In terms of the process, it is important to know whether certain strategies were easy to implement, or if there was any barriers to proper implementation. The impact evaluation assesses essentially whether or not the strategies worked (Ibid., 7.29-7.30). There is a clear emphasis here on the achievement of “results”, so that strategic plans are directly associated with the realization of concrete governmental objectives. Thus, the essential thrust is on harnessing community forms of expertise in ways that enable the police to counter their traditional “means over ends syndrome” (Goldstein, 1979).

### *Best Practices*

At the end of the whole process, the “How To” Manual stresses that “best practices” in community policing should be shared with other community policing teams and community policing committees via a “best practices database”. The development of a “best practices capability” is closely coupled with the OPP’s emphasis on customizing service delivery. As one OPP text explains:

*The intention is to create a means to collect and house information on the successes and limitations of the wide array of local initiatives tried in response to community problems. It must be recognized that there is no “one size fits all” solution; meaning that we need to maintain and foster a flexible problem solving approach (OPP, 1994d)*

One interviewee explained that the Community Policing Development Centre is essentially a "best practices centre". That is, once officers in a particular community meet with the appropriate Community Policing Committee and determine what the most important issues are for that community, the police are, in theory at least, supposed to access the CPDC best practices database to determine whether other communities have devised successful strategies for dealing with the same or similar problem. The best practices database promotes a "precedent based logic" (Shearing and Ericson, 1991) in the development of strategies, as it allows officers and/or communities to review strategies which have been deemed successful in addressing a specific community problem, and it also allows them to contact the developer and user directly to ensure its appropriate application (OPP, 1996b: 18). So, while there is an effort to create a general database of knowledge, the intention is for this knowledge to be tailored to community needs and characteristics. "Best practices" is a technology for the "crafting" of police work, that is, for promoting a shift away from bureaucratic, rule-based knowledge to practical, experiential knowledge (see Shearing and Ericson, 1991).

While the "best practices database" is a technique for doing customized service delivery, it is also said to promote "continuous learning". This is consistent with the OPP's new market-based orientation. Specifically, the "best practices database" is designed as a mechanism for circulating craft knowledge, that is, knowledge that is concrete, ever-changing and adaptable to particular sets of circumstances. It is a non-static form of knowledge that caters to the ever-changing needs and characteristics of their "customers". This database therefore supports the ongoing shift in governmental authority to communities in their capacities as "customers".

At the present time, all examples of “best practices” (in the form of completed action plans) are to be provided to the Community Policing Development Centre for entry into their “best practices” database (Ibid., 7.30-7.31).

*“Policing For Results”*

Stage three of the OPP’s service delivery process is “evaluation”. The emphasis on shifting authority to the community level is also made apparent in their efforts to comprehensively measure the success of their service delivery. In its efforts to cater to the needs and demands of customers, and to enhance their legitimacy with these customers, the Policing For Results tool is a comprehensive means of measuring the relationship between organizational inputs and outputs. The Survey is a component of a larger evaluation mechanism that they refer to as their “report card”. The OPP now pride themselves on working in partnership with communities, and being answerable to them, in the evaluation of their service delivery. In the past, and consistent with their old “professional” paradigm, the OPP (as well as most other public policing institutions) evaluated themselves on their *reactive* capabilities (i.e. closure of cases, response time, number of reported cases, etc...). At the same time, they did not consult members of the public during this evaluation process. “In today’s environment”, however, “the community has a direct relationship with its police agency...As a result, the police agency is much more accountable to the community for the policing service provided” (OPP, 1997b: 6: 31). So, the OPP’s evaluation effort is a means of rendering themselves more accountable to these newly constituted community *authorities*.

The CPDC defines their “report card” as “a management tool providing necessary information in order to make decisions about service delivery based upon performance,”

results, or impacts” (Ibid., 6.32). Their criteria for determining the success of service delivery is:

***Issue resolution***

Are we successfully identifying and resolving issues through problem solving & planning:

⇒ in our community policing teams?

⇒ with the community?

● ***Corporate direction***

Have we been able to meet our organization’s goals and objectives?

● ***Community satisfaction***

Is the community satisfied with our policing service?

● ***Victimization statistics***

Are our crime, traffic and incident statistics reflective of our efforts to prevent victimization through our service delivery? (cited directly from OPP, 1997b: 6.31).

The specific measurement tools that the CPDC advocates for assessing the above criteria are:

1. ***Statistics Collection***: This is referred to as the traditional form of measurement, which includes the following data collected at the detachment level:

- Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) statistics generated at the end of every month
- Comparative Crime Reports
- Motor Vehicle Accident Statistics
- Public Complaints Statistics

2. ***Community Policing Plans***: By recording action plans with the help of the planning template, plans can be tracked, results can be monitored and "best practices" can be identified.

3. *Community Surveys*: In order to assess actions plans as well as public perceptions of service delivery and fear of insecurity, their “Policing for Results” survey has been developed. Policing for Results is an annual survey conducted through randomized telephone calling<sup>24</sup> by community volunteers at the detachment level. The purpose is to “report on community satisfaction of services, perception of safety, programs provided, local special initiatives, actual rates of reported and “unreported” victimization by supplying valid and unbiased survey results” (OPP, circa 1998: 4).

The OPP describes this survey as a tool for doing “performance measurement”. The OPP’s economic rationale is apparent when it states that “many public and private institutions over the past decade have adopted performance indicators to gauge the productivity and effectiveness of the services they provide to their clients” (OPP, 1998b: 2). The OPP’s emphasis on terms like “productivity”, “services” and “clients” reinforces the market-based orientation of their community policing model. O’Malley and Palmer have observed this trend toward the use of local audits in Australia in order to measure community satisfaction with police performance. These audits have come in the form of “market-based performance indicators to assess the value that local communities get out of their police” (1996: 147; for examples of such audits in other countries see Osborne and Gaebler, (1993), Moore (1992), Stenson (1996)).

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<sup>24</sup> This particular approach to gaining public input was thought to be the most representative and statistically valid, in contrast to consulting various community groups or holding town hall meetings, where the opinion of certain residents or groups would dominate. Also, the random survey would be able to capture both the opinions of those who had come into contact with the OPP as well as those who had not. The latter group are referred to as the “silent consumers” of OPP services. The telephone survey was also advocated because it has a higher response rate than mail interviews, and data can be collected more quickly. Most importantly, the telephone interviews are conducted by community policing committee members or auxiliary policing staff, serving to enhance police legitimacy in the communities (OPP, 1998b: 13-15).

The OPP also argues that performance measurement has become necessary given certain economic and political changes in Ontario. As will be discussed in the next chapter, with the election of the Conservative Party in Ontario in June of 1995, the OPP must now manage the delivery of its services according to the logic of "business planning". According to one OPP text:

*The government very clearly expressed its desire to reduce governmental spending by evaluating and potentially eliminating programs that do not provide a competent level of service to the public. The public has repeatedly indicated its interest in being made aware of how and where their tax dollars are utilized. As a result of these initiatives, the government is moving towards a corporate business plan approach, where services provided to the public are measured in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency. Performance measures allow government to gauge whether its services add value and produce results which meet objectives (OPP, circa 1998: 4)*

While the OPP's "customer service" orientation began prior to the election of the Conservative Party, the market-based logic of this new government (and its leader, Mike Harris) served to deepen and extend the particular ways in which community policing was being thought about in the OPP. Specifically, it would serve to reinforce the conception that community policing was indeed a "business" and that it should be managed with the use of techniques like "business planning" (see Chapter Three for more detail).

The OPP's self-perception as a "business" is reflected in statements like "the survival of policing in this economy will be driven by a higher level of community accountability" (OPP, 1998b: 9,10). The Policing For Results Survey is a means to "provide information to both the Detachment commander and the local governing authority regarding perceptions of community safety, victimization and OPP service delivery" (OPP, 1998k: 4). Based on this information, "Detachment Commanders will be accountable to develop, implement, and report on results of initiatives to address the

issues identified in the PFR. Annual survey results will provide a benchmark against which progress can be measured” (Ibid). So, we see a combined emphasis being made on continuous improvement, cost-effectiveness and customer satisfaction, and this is most obvious in language such as “results”, “accountability” and “benchmark”. Also, the use of terms like “stakeholders” (see below) reflects this appropriation of market-based imagery - and an emphasis on local forms of knowledge. This re-distribution of governmental authority is best captured in the following, where the OPP outline the positive effects of their “report card” mechanism:

*The OPP and its local performance is accountable to all stakeholders, in each of our communities, demonstrating local control.*

*OPP measurements and evaluations are all inclusive, providing unbiased and statistically “supported” results as well as community perceptions of safety and satisfaction.*

*It establishes “value” for every dollar spent on local policing services (OPP, circa 1998: 5)*

In sum, during this third wave of community policing, governmental authority was shifted through the appropriation of market-based metaphors, language and imagery. While retaining its “social” identity, the OPP began conceiving of itself as a “business” that must “customize” its “services” according to the distinct needs of communities. Coterminous to the process was a thrust toward a “fiscal” notion of accountability where, for the first time, the police must show how and why tax dollars are being spent. In relation to this reinvention of accountability, O’Malley and Palmer have observed that “[t]he most striking departure from both traditional liberal policing and welfare professionalism has been the linking of accountability to the market mode, generating a ‘customerization’ of policing” (1996: 147; see Crawford, 1997). At the same time, there



has been a “marketization of the relations of expertise” (Ibid). That is, the police are now conceived of as “technical experts armed with abstract, decontextualized expertise” that must be catered to the specific needs and demands arising out of local forms of knowledge (Ibid). To use Stenson’s words, “[t]his strategy aims to harness local knowledge, with the police working with the grain of a variety of local subcultures, rather than standing apart as representatives of a sovereign jurisdiction” (1996: 111). Not only is this shift instrumentally more desirable for the police, but it also constitutes an exercise in normative re-legitimation.

With the election of the Harris government in 1995, this “customerization” process was deepened and extended. Most importantly, after the Review of Police Services in Ontario - conducted by the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services - the idea of “community policing” as a “business” became even more salient due to the introduction of market-based competition in policing. The next section will discuss the emergence of a fourth wave, whereby the traditional monopoly of the OPP becomes threatened and where the idea of treating communities like customers will become even more of a necessity.

### **The Fourth Wave: Community Policing Within a Market**

While the new “customer service” model of community policing was given effect through new programs and strategies in the OPP, this organization had to address a significant political and economic development in the province. Whereas the OPP traditionally had a monopoly on the provision of services in many municipal jurisdictions, this monopoly has begun to dissolve. As Chapter Five will describe in detail, Bill 105 - which led to a series of amendments to the Ontario *Police Services Act* -

implemented "equitable financing". This meant that the 576 municipalities who previously received OPP services for free would be required to pay out of municipal taxes as of January 1st, 1998. As a result, municipalities are now soliciting costing proposals from a range of policing services, both public and private, and determining which kinds of organizations would have the best service for the best price. Because the OPP are now one choice among several as a service provider, they have had to develop a plan to "compete" in this emergent market. In response to this emergent competitive environment, the OPP has extended its commitment to a business approach, which involves an even more profound re-thinking of the "professional expertise" that they had once taken for granted. This is reflected in the following statement by one interviewee:

*What's first and foremost now is our competitive environment and the OPP I think has never really had a business approach to delivering police services. We had a very prescriptive approach, we sort of looked at things and said, you know, "in our subject matter expertise this is what we should deliver", and we have had to learn very quickly to become a client-driven organization and that's a major paradigm shift for us, just totally in contravention with even the personalities that we hire (#9)*

This shift toward a "client-driven" organization is also highlighted by another interviewee, when she explained that "[i]f we have to *sell ourselves* to the public that means that we actually have to be speaking to them, and we can't be pretending that we're doing community policing and not even inviting them to all of our meetings. We really have to know what our community is" (# 10; italics added). Thus, this shift to greater accountability to local "authorities", spurred by the agenda of the Harris government, has now made it a material necessity for the OPP to equate community policing with "customer service". As the following interviewee states, while the police continue to maintain their "social" identity and function, they must at the same time re-

conceptualize themselves as a market-based institution that is oriented to local needs and knowledge. This particular coupling of the “social” and “community” are articulated here:

*Yes, we uphold the law and... we have legislated mandates, but on a community by community basis we're service providers and if we can't meet the communities' expectations from a customer service perspective, we know now, because we're now operating in a competitive climate, we won't be there anymore...We're only the police in that community as long as they continue to want us to be there (#3)*

What this quote highlights is that even law enforcement or “social” services have become subject to the rigours of the marketplace. Even though the OPP have a provincial mandate, they are now competing with other organizations for the provision of law enforcement services at the municipal level.

In anticipation of this new shift to a competitive environment, the OPP developed their “Vision 2000” (this will be discussed in more detail in the chapters to follow). The Vision is that,

*Into the year 2000, the OPP will be the **community police service of choice** outside of large urban areas and, building on that strength, the policing service responsible for public safety issues of provincial interest (OPP, 1997c; emphasis added)*

When asked about the importance of being the “community police service of choice”, one interviewee explained that in most municipalities, the “natural state of things” would be that they would have their own police service. As such, the OPP is seeking to be the “adopted child”. In order to do so, they must make themselves “attractive”. As he put it, “we want to be operating [according to] such an efficient and effective approach to things that as municipalities are looking at their options they will choose us...I guess that's the underlying principle...to be seen to be so good at our jobs that a lot of people, a lot of municipalities will choose us”. In pursuit of this broader objective, “Vision 2000”

consisted of a variety of projects aimed at enhancing the strategic and cost-effectiveness of the OPP.

There are two main reasons why it is important for the OPP to “win” contracts more than it “loses” them. The first reason is, if the OPP loses its contracts, its pool of people will diminish. If this happens, there will be less people to train for specialist positions in the future. According to an interviewee, a good specialist must first have a set of well developed skills from doing generalist duties. The second issue concerns the maintenance of a critical mass of people so that when a provincial emergency arises, the OPP will have the human resources to mobilize on a large scale. Simply put, if the OPP reduces its generalist/community policing services, the quality of its provincial services may decline. This highlights the fact that although the municipal contract situation has to a significant degree been “marketized”, the OPP still have the mandate to provide a range of *provincial services*. After all, the OPP, is *the* provincial police service. So, in contrast to purely “private sector” corporations, such as private security companies, the desire to become the “community police service of choice” does not simply stem from profit-making motives. While the OPP has adopted a market-based logic, it remains a “social” institution of democracy and of representative government. Once again, this tension between the “social” and “community” is highlighted. Ironically then, the OPP must operate successfully within a marketized environment in order to maintain the critical mass of people they need to uphold their “social” function. In effect, this particular shift to “community” poses a threat to the survival of the OPP.

In sum, we see that in this fourth wave, the shifting of some “steering” capacities to the local level is now normatively, strategically, economically *and* politically

necessary. The new governance relationships between the OPP and its “clients” – initiated in the third wave - are being extended through the introduction of market-based mechanisms of accountability (as we will discuss further in Chapter Five). A similar shift has been observed by Stenson in relation to initiatives undertaken by “conservative administrations” in the UK. He observes that “where public services cannot be privatized, they should in a range of ways be subjected to the less direct disciplines of the market and of management technologies developed in commercial corporations” (1993: 382). O’Malley and Palmer confirm this observation in the Australian context, where members of the public are being constructed as “active agents pursuing a localized, increasingly market-modeled service delivery” (1996: 145). As community policing continues to be re-shaped and expanded, more and more discursive and practical spaces are being opened up for re-thinking the identity and capacities of the police as well as the identities and capacities of various non-police institutions and agents.

The next section will introduce a possible fifth wave of community policing, which once again represents a re-negotiation of the authority of the police. This fifth wave consists of attempts to expand the “steering” *and* “rowing” functions, and hence the authority, of communities in the governance of security. In this wave, the term “community policing” is abandoned in favour of the broader term of “community justice”. Not only have we seen a shift in focus away from issues of “crime” to broader issues of “security”, we are seeing the potential for “security” to be replaced by a broader notion of “justice”. Hence, while issues of “security” have been shifting to community auspices, now broader issues of “justice” are being re-conceptualized outside the institutional boundaries of the criminal justice system.

### **The Next Wave: "Community Justice"?**

The OPP has begun to explore the model of "community justice". According to one interviewee, the community policing approach, as developed in the OPP and particularly its Community Policing Development Centre, represents only one step toward a form of security governance that is driven at the community level under a range of auspices. This person argued that the OPP currently has "tunnel vision in respect to what community policing is all about", and explains that the notion of "community justice" embodies "a more holistic approach, where we partner not only with the community but with other stakeholders, the health system...MAG"<sup>25</sup> (#10). This interviewee spoke about a broader movement involving the shifting of governmental authority away from criminal justice institutions such as the courts "into the hands of the people and involving the victims more". "I see a tremendous need for community policing as we see it today to be the first step towards community justice" (Ibid).

This person notes that front-line constables, in conjunction with community policing committees, have wanted to implement community justice initiatives, but the Community Policing Development Centre has not been supportive because the idea of community justice is beyond the realm of what is thinkable for them at this time. Another interviewee echoes this idea that there is "unconscious resistance"<sup>26</sup> within the OPP to a more holistic and community-driven governance model:

*Where we're at right now is that communities are actually ahead of us. They understand this process a little bit better. What you must remember is they do not want to just participate or have input, they want to have an impact on what we do, they're not there for window dressing, and that's something that our culture has to get used to. We're not here just to be nice to you and do more of the "cop" type of stuff - they want to start to have an impact, and yes, we have gone a long way in our partnerships and we've*

<sup>25</sup> MAG is an acronym for Ministry of the Attorney General.

<sup>26</sup> Personal communication from Clifford Shearing

*progressed nicely in how we do them, but on the other hand we've only just touched the surface. We see ourselves probably with the leadership role in many of those partnerships when in fact we should have a secondary to a minority role in many of the partnerships, which means we must learn to give up control (#5)*

The position reflected here is that the OPP should go beyond simply a “responsibilization” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996) mandate. Indeed, he is suggesting that the role of the police should actually be one of “junior partner” (Shearing and Stenning, 1983) *to the communities*, who should have ultimate authority over security issues.

In this regard, the community justice model involves an explicit attempt to move away from the “governing through crime” (Simon, 1995) approach. It represents a new understanding of the problem of security. Specifically, violations of security are not regarded simply as crimes or more general infractions of order, but rather as actions that damage community relationships (see Zehr, 1990). So, the concept of “insecurity” has been redefined in this wave – it now has a distinctly moral flavour.

The underlying rationale of community justice is that it is an *inclusive* way of “doing justice” (Long et al., 1999), where those who violate the security of communities must be made responsible and accountable for their actions to community auspices. Restorative justice is said to be compatible with the “core values of community policing: problem solving rather than blame fixing, shared responsibility with the community, concern with underlying problems and reintegration, the localization of initiatives and operations, and consensus building using mediation and communication rather than confrontation” (Shaw and Jane, 1998).

One can also see in this wave that “community” has been redefined. In place of a market-based conception of communities as “customers”, there appears to be a definition of “community” as the embodiment of shared moral values and interdependent

relationships. As Crawford puts it, “[t]he restorative priorities of mediation identify the importance of ongoing and future relations, the mainstay of ‘community’. Mediation seeks to give prominence to mutual responsibility, shared values, and interconnectedness” (1997: 180). The image of “community” being deployed here exudes a “‘profound emotional legitimacy’ (Anderson, 1983: 14), in that it holds out the idea of genuine human identity, connectedness, and reciprocity” (Crawford, 1997: 273).

This "new wave" of restorative justice has emerged in the context of several broader economic, political and legal developments (which were addressed earlier). For instance, the fiscal constraints associated with the administration of criminal justice have prompted the police, courts and corrections to operate more effectively and efficiently while seeking out alternatives in the form of diversion programs. At the same time, the general public has expressed concern over crime levels as well as dissatisfaction with the formal system of criminal justice (Shaw and Jane, 1998). Shaw and Jane add that the development of youth justice committees and diversion programs for both young and adult offenders "have all facilitated this movement, as has the enthusiasm generated by conferencing approaches" (Ibid).

Conferencing is being practiced in various voluntary and local sites, and both the federal and some provincial governments have explored the concept of restorative justice. In Ontario, the provincial government has delved into both formal and informal diversion projects, and has encouraged the development of community justice committees and conferencing at pre-charge and post-charge levels. Since 1993, a variety of conferences, sentencing circles, justice committees and mediation programs have taken place within OPP detachments and most particularly, within First Nations police services (Ibid).



In the fall of 1998, the OPP hosted a conference titled, *Police Conference on Community Justice: Strengthening Community Responsibility*. This title is overtly suggestive of an attempt to transfer more authority to the community level, and it implies that “spirit of community” that authors such as Etzioni, in the “communitarian tradition”, are strongly advocating (Etzioni, 1993; see Crawford, 1997). The conference consisted of 150 police officers from across the province, and its aim was to acquaint participants with the principles and practices of a wide range of community justice initiatives. Presenters included academics, police officers, professionals in dispute resolution, practitioners involved in youth justice, and persons who specialize in the area of family group conferencing (Long et al., 1999). Sessions in the conference included: community conferencing, aboriginal justice initiatives, pre- and post-charge diversion programs, and community justice circles for youth. In addition, there was a presentation by a member of the Aboriginal Policing Unit of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) on the ways in which the RCMP has implemented "restorative justice". This reparative approach involves the victims and their supporters, offenders and their supporters, the community and a facilitator in a joint initiative to repair the damage to the community caused by the breach of security and to prevent further occurrences (Long et al., 1999).

While the community justice approach is said to reinforce the general tenets of community policing, it represents a more profound transfer of governmental authority to a wide range of community auspices. It also involves a more profound re-examination of policing expertise, since violations of security are defined as more than just crimes or threats to order, but as events which damage community relationships. Within this model (and I use the term “model” very generally), the expertise of the police is once again re-

examined and re-negotiated. The “expertise” of the community, and its institutions, becomes more central, and the resolution of security issues at the community level becomes normatively more desirable, particularly from a communitarian perspective. In fact, even in situations of *criminal* violations, the restorative justice model assumes that the “governing through crime” (Simon, 1995) approach is often inappropriate, because it fails to address the broader objective of community healing (see Zehr, 1990). One could go so far as to suggest that the governmental authority of the police is most profoundly challenged in this wave, because it implies a general disregard for the “social” mandate of the police. While the police may be required to respond to severe criminal violations such as murder, there is the potential, within the restorative justice model, for governing crime according to an entirely non-legal and non-criminal justice logic. There is the potential then, for what Rose refers to as the “death of the social” (1996a).

At present, the OPP is in the exploratory phase of “community justice”, and whether or not it will “ride this new wave” will most likely depend on a range of time- and space-specific conditions, including levels of organizational resistance (“unconscious” or otherwise). Suffice it to say that community justice is perceived, at least by some in OPP, as the next step toward a more profound re-distribution of governmental authority.

## **Conclusions**

A variety of scholars have suggested that “community policing” is more “rhetoric” than “reality” (see Greene and Mastrofski (eds), 1988), and that the substance of the term is perpetually vague (see Wycoff, 1988; Chacko and Nancoo, 1993). Having examined these various “waves” in community policing, one can certainly see why this

conceptual “wooliness” (Crawford, 1997: 7) exists and why, perhaps, this is a good thing. If it weren’t for the loose parameters of this term, police managers, policy makers and academics would have little discursive and practical space for challenging previously held assumptions and expanding in new directions. As Lurigio and Rosenbaum put it, “[t]he nebulous nature of the concept allows people to read into it favorable attributes and unlimited possibilities for changes and reforms” (1997: 197). Thus, the focus on “waves” in this chapter was a purposeful attempt at capturing the fluidity of community policing forms, and the ways in which the tensions, ironies and contradictions internal to these forms have lead to transformative outcomes. In this regard, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt, as some scholars have suggested, to clarify the concepts, theoretical assumptions and practices associated with community policing (see Lurigio and Rosenbaum, 1997).

The focus on “waves” also served to challenge the rigid categorization of policing forms. An example within the established sociological literature is the sharp distinction made between “professional policing” and “community policing” (see Greene and Mastrofski (1988), and Kelling and Moore (1988) on “eras” in policing). While such categorization was not intended to be exhaustive, one can draw from Leighton’s suggestion that “[the] juxtaposition of “community policing” and “professional policing” is largely a heuristic device, or perhaps a pedagogical technique, that sharpens the contrast at the expense of rigour in the presentation of past and present policing practices” (1998: 138; see also Garland, 1997). This chapter attempted to address this comment by Leighton by demonstrating the ways in which the “professional” model was transformed, supplanted and also reaffirmed throughout different waves in community

policing. The intention of this chapter was not to depict a sharp break between two “eras”, but to demonstrate that even in the small span of a decade, there has been a continual re-shaping and re-coupling of policing forms, accompanied by a continual re-negotiation and re-distribution of governmental authority. As Stenson puts it, “community policing is something of a floating signifier, with different referents in competing discourses” (1993: 380).

This focus on “waves” has also served as a critique of O’Malley and Palmer’s typology of community policing according to two broad political rationalities (i.e. Keynesian and neo-Keynesian or neo-liberal). O’Malley and Palmer’s typology also serves as a useful heuristic device, even though it could be deployed by others in a misguided way, thus generating an ideal typical account of shifts in the governance of security. O’Malley and Palmer’s work suggests that there have been two major paradigms in policing – a Keynesian paradigm and a neo-liberal paradigm. While considerably useful, I would suggest that a “paradigm” effectively represents the “ideal type”, while the use of “waves” was a means of exploring some of those “messy actualities” associated with shifts in governance (O’Malley et al., 1997: 504; Barry et al., 1993; Garland, 1997).

Within their Keynesian/neo-liberal framework, a specific theoretical area in which O’Malley and Palmer (1996) and Stenson (1993; 1996) tend to generate an ideal typical account is this apparent shift from the “social” to “community”. As O’Malley and Palmer explain, “[i]f Keynesian and welfare rationalities sought to govern through the social, then perhaps the distinguishing feature of neo-liberalism is the idea of governing through individuals – as ‘customers’, ‘partners’, ‘responsible members of the community’

and ‘active citizens’” (1996: 148). As indicated in Chapter One, their position is inspired by Rose, who contends that a new “spatialization” of government has emerged – in the form of “community” (Rose, 1996a). While one can certainly discern this overall shift from a welfarist to a neo-liberal mentality across these different waves of community policing, one can see that within each wave, conceptions of the “social” and “community” were continually re-constituted, re-deployed and re-coupled. While configurations of “community” have become a central component of policing discourse, what this chapter highlighted was the various ways in which this term has been defined and appropriated in accordance with changing problematizations and objectives. Indeed, the police were less concerned with “abstract conceptions” of community, and more concerned with deploying particular images of “community” as a means of “giving voice to a certain set of problems and aspirations” (Osborne and Rose, 1997: 2). At the same time, this chapter sought to explore the ways in which these changing articulations of “community” have served to contradict or conversely, confirm, the “social”.

In addition, by studying the various “waves” in community policing, this chapter also provided an empirical basis for theorizing “resistance” and the ways in which it promoted, as well as delimited, shifts in governmental authority. O’Malley quite rightly points out that the governmentality literature tends to conceptualize resistance in *negative* and *external* terms, that is, as something which presents an obstacle to successful governmental programming (1996a). In his critique of this limited understanding of the term, O’Malley stresses that “[g]overnment and resistance articulate, mingle and hybridize, so that resistance cannot readily be thought of as external to rule” (1996a: 312). Accordingly, analysts should recognize the constitutive role of resistance in the

shaping of governmental forms and in the “systematic provision of alternatives” (O’Malley et al., 1997: 510). This kind of *postive* as well as *internal* form of resistance was manifested most clearly in each wave when the police were both contesting and re-affirming their own authority. In other words, while the police were contesting their previous ways of doing things, and consequently introducing new ideas, there were limits as to how far they would move in a new direction. These limits were set by the discursive and practical possibilities available to them at the time. However, the very introduction of new ways of thinking and acting as well as the emergence of new material conditions (such as the fiscal crisis) served to open up even more spaces for thinking and doing that had previously been closed off. Put simply, the police (and anyone else for that matter) were not expressing any *overt resistance* to new ideas or just saying “no” (see Foucault, 1997: 168) - hence the emphasis in this chapter on the idea of “unconscious resistance”. As Foucault explains, “to resist is not simply a negation but a creative process; to create and recreate, to change the situation, actually to be an active member of that process” (1997: 168).

In sum, this chapter – from the theoretical vantage point of shifts in governmental authority – has attempted to move beyond a typification of “community policing” and toward an examination of its different time- and space-specific manifestations. At the same time, however (and with the assistance of secondary literature) this chapter has confirmed that there is indeed a “family resemblance” across English speaking countries in the ways in which authority has shifted in the governance of security. Perhaps future studies can pay even greater attention to “sociological forms of analysis – to investigate

“how it really was” (O’Malley, 1996b: 312) in order to enrich our understanding of the complex relationships between broad mentalities and concrete governmental practices.

## Chapter 3

### Reinventing the Institution

#### Introduction

Having explored – from the vantage point of waves in community policing - the ways in which governmental authority has been shifting, this chapter is concerned with examining how public policing *institutions* are being reinvented. Obviously, these two broad questions intersect and this chapter will examine the relationships between institutional reinvention and shifts in governmental authority.

As outlined in Chapter One, there are two main analytical techniques in the governmentality literature which, taken together, provide useful tools for generating an account of how institutions are being reinvented. The first technique is to examine the influence of novel “discourses of rule” (O’Malley et al., 1997: 501) or what is commonly referred to as “political rationalities” (Rose and Miller, 1990). Such rationalities embody the ways in which “government is thought into being in programmatic form, [and] how the practitioners of rule ask themselves the question of how best to govern” (O’Malley et al., 1997: 502). According to O’Malley, Weir and Shearing (1997), this technique is to be distinguished from traditional sociological examinations that focus on ““what *actually* happened” (the historical detail of implementation) or of ‘what government is *really* about’ (the concealed interests or underlying mainsprings explaining governance)” (Ibid). In general, this technique has been deployed in the governmentality literature in order to generate a “genealogy of the rationalities of rule” (such as “Keynesianism or “Neo-liberalism”, as we saw in Chapter Two) and the programmatic schemes through which



such rationalities have been translated into practical governing strategies (O'Malley et al., 1997: 502; see Walters, 1994; Dean, 1991 and 1992; Gordon, 1991; and Burchell, 1991).

The second analytical technique focuses on the mundane practices or techniques of rule that give concrete effect to these more abstract rationalities and programs (O'Malley et al., 1997: 502; see Cruikshank, 1993; Greco, 1993; and Ewick, 1993). Such work has provided considerable insight into “the nexus between broad political rationalities and...micro-technologies of everyday life” (O'Malley et al., 1997: 502).

Within this analytical framework, scholars such as O'Malley (1997) and De Lint (1998) have explored the ways in which public policing institutions have been reinvented, particularly in relation to their changing managerial forms. Specifically, they have concluded that a neo-liberal rationality has been clearly manifested and translated within policing institutions through the introduction of “new managerial” techniques. As a “close bedfellow” of neo-liberalism (De Lint, 1998: 264), “new managerialism” has served to reinvent public sector institutions, such as the police, in profound ways.

De Lint argues, for example, that an “anti-bureaucratic ethos” has been cultivated within policing institutions that now privilege the “product producing organization – assumptively a corporate and for-profit organization – as the root unit in society” (1998: 263). The subjectivity of police employees is accordingly transformed within this new corporate logic (an issue we will address more specifically in the next chapter) (De Lint, 1998). O'Malley concurs that police management has been transformed according to a neo-liberal logic of cost-effectiveness and rationalization (1997: 374). “Such changes”, O'Malley writes, “are most clearly linked with, and take their character from, specific

neo-liberal and new managerial imperatives to apply market and strategic planning principles to police organizations and the delivery of police services” (Ibid., 375).

Some scholars in the area of public administration in Canada have provided a similar descriptive analysis to that of the governmentality scholarship. This literature, often describing a shift to a “new public management”, argues that government bureaucracies are emphasizing terms like “value”, “clients”, “responsiveness”, and “performance” (see Savoie, 1995: 113). According to Kernaghan, public management has changed dramatically from a “classical bureaucratic paradigm of public organization to a post-bureaucratic paradigm” (1993: 636).

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the analytical utility of this focus on “mentalities of rule” by adopting a site-specific and detailed analysis of the ways in which one public policing institution (the Ontario Provincial Police) has been reinvented. Specifically, it will trace the ways in which a new organizational and managerial model came to be formed in the OPP, and the particular events, problematics and contingencies that shaped its particular contours. In focusing our attention on the development of a new institutional *model* – a conceptual space somewhere between “mentalities” and “technologies” - the ultimate aim of this chapter is to further our understanding of the complex relationships between mentalities of rule and technologies of governance.

One of the specific theoretical issues of this chapter concerns the role of “agency” in governmental transformations. In particular, while acknowledging the ways in which broad mentalities of rule shape both organizational and individual subjectivities, this chapter will seek to explore whether or not one can address the problem of “discourse determinism” (O’Malley, 1996a) related to much governmentality-based work.

Specifically, it will examine the relationship between discourse and agency in the reinvention of governance. This chapter will also examine the ways in which contingent events determine and shape particular transformations.

### **Re-imagining Itself**

In September, 1993, Commissioner Tom O'Grady announced that the Ontario Provincial Police would engage in an "organizational renewal". Over the years, the OPP had made relatively minor institutional changes, but nothing that served to challenge their established worldview (as we saw analogously in relation to "wave one" of community policing"). By 1993, however, the OPP was getting prepared to embark "on the most significant reorganization initiative in its history" (OPP, 1998a: 6). This process was sparked by what OPP programmers identified as a series of economic and political changes affecting both "public" and "private" sectors alike:

*The O.P.P., like other organizations in the public and private sector, have recognized the need to change the way we provide our services and the way we are structured to provide these services. Current structures and the processes and technologies that support them are not sufficient to meet tomorrow's challenges (OPP, 1995b: 8)*

What this statement makes reference to is the emergence of a very broad mentality that spans the public-private divide. It also points to a tension between established institutional structures/process and the emergence of a new governmental "reality" in their broader institutional environment. As such, it is being suggested that an alignment must take place between (new) governmental objectives and institutional structures/process.

One of the specific problematics for the OPP was "increased financial pressures and public demand for greater effectiveness, efficiency and accountability in the delivery

of public services" (OPP, 1993a: 14). The OPP claimed that they would have to provide "better customer service at reduced levels of spending", while being less "bureaucratic, more flexible and responsive to the needs of the public" (OPP, 1995b: iv). The language of "customer service" had already begun to emerge as a central component in OPP discourse, as we saw in relation to community policing in the last chapter. The significance of this fiscal crisis is captured here in the following statement:

*The cost of policing and the bottom line have led many police organizations to look for more efficient and effective ways to deliver police services. Although this movement has quietly been developing momentum since the late 70's, the reality of today's budgetary crisis and the urgency to halt the Province's exponential deficit growth, has sharpened the O.P.P. focus on efficiency, cost-cutting and cost cutting. Re-engineering, efficiency, layering and reductions in the duplication of services are the buzzwords in the vortex of the whirlwind that is driving today's sweeping changes to police and service structure. The Ontario Provincial Police is certainly no exception (OPP, 1998c)*

The reference in this passage to the "whirlwind" makes explicit reference to a much broader governmental problem that spans sites and institutions, and has little, or nothing, to do with problems that have emerged in the specific area of security. Indeed, the OPP is associating itself with an emergent mentality of rule quite external to its institutional boundaries. Terms such as "customers", "cost-cutting", and the "bottom line" are making reference to this new mentality. The province's "exponential deficit growth" created the material conditions for this new mentality to take hold.

Coupled with this broader fiscal imperative, the OPP was attempting to fill the new spaces it had opened up - through its strategic initiatives - for re-thinking their institutional and managerial arrangements (see previous chapter). In particular, once they had made the strategic paradigm shift to community policing, and as governmental authority was beginning to shift in significant ways to the community level, they would have to create an institutional structure and set of processes that would support this re-

distribution of authority. In other words, the OPP would have to resolve the tension between the shifts in governmental authority that took place and its institutional structure/managerial processes. One OPP text reiterates that the institutional framework within which the OPP had traditionally operated was inconsistent with its new "service delivery model" (OPP, 1993a: 14). As such, the organization would have to forge a coherent identity for itself, an identity that would consist of mutually compatible strategic and institutional/managerial structures and processes.

While the OPP set out to reinvent itself in this way, the provincial ruling party (i.e. the New Democrats) had also responded to the fiscal crisis in a way that would significantly shape the contours of the OPP's institutional model. Specifically, the provincial government initiated its "Social Contract"<sup>27</sup> in 1994, which meant that for the next three years the OPP, primarily through unpaid leaves and reduced related benefits, would be assisting in reducing government debt (OPP, 1995b: iv, 9). The Social Contract between the OPP and the Ontario Government amounted to \$17.2 million, and a condition of this contract was that as of April of 1995, that dollar amount would be reduced from its direct operating expenses. The OPP's own desire to re-structure was increased exponentially given this new financial target. Specifically, it now became a material necessity for the OPP to make more than minor changes to the operational and administrative components of its institution (Ibid., 9).

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<sup>27</sup> By 1994, "the debt wall and the tax wall closed in on the NDP" (Courchene and Telmer, 1998: 141). Accordingly, the government began a series of dramatic cost-savings initiatives designed to keep the province at a deficit of \$10 billion dollars. One such initiative was the Social Contract, whereby government employers were required to cut an overall total of \$2 billion dollars in wage compensation. (Ibid., 141-142).

In essence, the Social Contract made it necessary for the OPP to strive for an economic target during its restructuring efforts. As one interviewee explained, “as we were starting to get into some significant work on our own re-organization, we had superimposed upon us a kind of a steamroller...insofar as the Social Contract that caused [us] to find a financial target”. One interviewee goes further in suggesting that the Social Contract made it imperative for the OPP to re-structure.

*Well, I suppose everyone associated with it would like to say, “oh no, we were going to do it anyway”. I don’t believe that for a minute. I believe there were 17 to 20 million reasons why we did [the Organizational Renewal] and they were all financial. Essentially what the NDP did was say, “ok...as of April 1, 1995 there will be 20 million dollars less in your budget...so you’ve got 18 months to figure out how you’re going to deal with that”...I think we then decided to make a virtue out of an evil... “Let’s make it look as a good thing, and if it’s a good thing then it must have been alright...We were going to do this anyway”, and I honestly don’t think that we would have so radically restructured had it not been the 20 million dollar pressure. So, maybe the 20 million dollar pressure was a good thing because it forced us to do more than just fiddle with the organizational chart (#4)*

Now, the OPP was not only required to align its structure and managerial processes with its new strategic orientation, but now it would have to align such changes with the parameters of the Social Contract. What is telling about the statement above, however, is the suggestion that OPP managers were trying to lend a coherence to their restructuring process by suggesting that the Social Contract did not affect their intentions or determine the magnitude of what they were about to embark on. What he points out, though, is that the Social Contract was a highly significant event that would have to be reconciled with – hence this idea of “making a virtue out of an evil”.

What is also significant about the Social Contract is that it represented a leftist or social democratic response to the fiscal issue. The NDP government did not tell the OPP *how* to cut 17 million dollars from their budget. Rather, their main intention, with a term

like “social contract”, was to suggest that this large cut in funding represented a “consensual” agreement between the government and members of the public. In other words, the NDP was trying to address the fiscal crisis in a manner that seemed consistent with their own social and non-market priorities. It is not surprising, therefore, that the NDP government did not espouse a “new managerialist” or corporate logic, given this effort to reaffirm the “social”.

While this Social Contract commitment played an important role in determining the timing, speed and financial target of managerial change within the OPP, so too did the vision of a key “champion” of a “new managerialist” approach within the organization – the Commissioner. The Commissioner appeared to be highly cognizant of broader shifts in managerial discourse, and represented an example of a police manager who had become inclined to manage his organization along “enterprise lines” (O’Malley, 1997: 374). O’Malley has observed that “police managers are encouraged, even required, to act increasingly in innovative ways, to be ‘change masters’ and ‘architects of social ‘change’” (Ibid., see also Reiner, 1992; McLaughlin and Murji, 1993; Etter, 1995; and Normandeau and Leighton, 1990). The following interviewee suggests that the Commissioner was indeed such a “change master”:

*The Social Contract I guess was really only a minor component of what drove it. It was a vision really, and I give Commissioner Tom O'Grady a lot of credit, because he could see that there were going to be changes coming. Our opportunity to drive those changes was to start making them before they were directed. They were going to come inevitably, so he took the proactive approach to it, “let's let us have the input, let's let us drive the changes rather than have them imposed on us”(#2)*

This quote suggests that considerable agency was exercised on the part of the Commissioner. While he had the foresight to know that substantive financial cutbacks

were inevitable, he wanted to start shaping their re-structuring process in ways that were consistent with other organizational and strategic objectives.

There were other events that made managerial change imperative in the OPP, such as a directive they received from Management Board of Cabinet. This particular directive was also driven by the fiscal crisis. Specifically, in 1992 the OPP made an agreement with Management Board that it would receive the funding to hire an additional complement of 241 officers on the condition that it would develop a set of “improved organizational efficiencies” (OPP, 1998a: 6). Management Board made it clear that they did not want the OPP asking for further resources unless there was a sound business case and justification. So, the OPP knew that it was no longer feasible to ask for more resources unless they could prove that they were operating as efficiently as they could. This directive from Management Board made it clear that the old tactic – within the bureaucratic and professional paradigm – of adding more resources to allegedly make the organization more effective was no longer conceivable in an era characterized by fiscal restraint.

Another condition which served as a catalyst for institutional change was a recognition on the part of the OPP that while criminal occurrences had been rising, staffing levels had not, and this was not going to change (OPP, 1998a: 6). The implications of this were similar to those that stemmed from the Management Board directive - the OPP would have to realize improved strategic effectiveness without adding just “more of the same”. While the OPP had come to realize – as we saw in the previous chapter – that their traditional strategic approach was proving to be largely ineffective in reducing crime rates, the fiscal restraint issue effectively forced them to re-think their



strategic approach. Similarly, one can suggest that while the idea of organizational restructuring had been attractive purely from an ideological point of view, the fiscal crisis now made it imperative that they actually engage in a concrete re-structuring process.

While there were several events or conditions which made it necessary for the OPP to make changes, managers also noted that they could take advantage of the fact that a significant number of employees (approximately one thousand) would be retiring in the near future and around the same general period of time (OPP, 1998a: 6). This created an opportunity for the OPP to introduce new ways of thinking and new capacities within an institution that was becoming significantly "younger".

In the context of these various conditions and events, the OPP articulated the following objectives of its Organizational Renewal: first, to create an organizational design that supports strategic plans and directions; second, to "institutionalize community policing" by creating appropriate service delivery mechanisms; third, to "improve efficiency and effectiveness and service to [their] clients at reduced levels of spending"; and fourth, to develop an "innovative organization" that would maximize the productivity of its people and attract highly skilled people (OPP, 1993a: 14-15). This list of objectives reflects the two main governmental imperatives described earlier: to reduce government debt by doing "more with less" and to create the structures and process required to "institutionalize community policing". What these objectives reflect is that while the imperative to make the organization more efficient was quite independent of the actual "business" of the organization, the OPP would have to align this new economic mentality with their policing function. In other words, managers would have to lend a certain

coherence to this dual emphasis on economics and community policing. It would now forge a new and coherent institutional identity.

One can draw parallels here with Osborne's observations of a similar "will to coherence" (Leman-Langlois, 1999) in the health area. He argues that physicians, under the influence of a neo-liberal mentality, have been constituted as administrators and economists of sorts in a new regime of medical government. He adds that neo-liberalism "seeks...to bring about an *alignment* between clinical decisions and administrative decisions" (1993: 354). In relation to the OPP, we could analogously suggest that managers have been constituted as administrators and economists of sorts in a new regime of security governance, and that neoliberalism seeks to bring about an alignment between strategic decisions and administrative decisions.

In forging this new coherent identity, the OPP was inspired by new kinds of organizational metaphors, and it used these metaphors as a means of constructing new ways of seeing and knowing itself. These metaphors, to use Shearing and Ericson's term, worked as a "figurative resource" (1991: 482) in constructing a new organizational sensibility for the OPP. In particular, these metaphors embodied a new logic, which would ultimately be translated into new institutional practices. These metaphors reflect "figurative forms that work through a...logic to promote a way of being in the world that produces a style of activity" (Shearing and Ericson, 1991: 497). Dunford and Palmer remind us that "metaphors matter, that is, that, far from being neutral and descriptive, they materially affect practice" (1996). We can similarly draw from Gareth Morgan's work by suggesting that the OPP had embarked on an "imaginization" process, where a new set of institutional practices began emerging from a new image of themselves

(Morgan, 1986). Morgan adds that “[i]mages and metaphors are not only interpretive constructs or ways of seeing, they also provide frameworks for action. Their use creates insights that often allow us to act in ways that we may not have thought possible before” (Ibid., 343).

In this regard, the OPP drew inspiration from the metaphors of the marketplace. While it was, and is, not the objective of the OPP to make a profit, managers decided that the use of market-based metaphors would serve to instill the kind of organizational and personal subjectivity, or new “root paradigm” (Shearing and Ericson, 1991) within which the OPP could respond to the provincial fiscal crisis. So, the choice of where to look for inspiration was obvious to the OPP – profit-making corporations have always strived to maximize organizational efficiency and cost-effectiveness and have had a history of doing this successfully. One manager explained that

*to be quite frank, the fiscal reality has been an important driver..[So], if one were not to look outside, one would not be very bright.....we do have things to learn... Sometimes you have to be a little more ingenious to see how you can make the translation from the private to the public, but a lot of it...makes a lot of common sense (#3)*

What this manager is saying is that private sector institutions, and the market-based metaphors that they embody, provide the right “cognitive sensibility” (ibid) for addressing the governmental problems being faced by the OPP.

The new organizational metaphors of the OPP became readily apparent when this author spoke with a variety of employees at the managerial level. The ways in which managers deployed particular kinds of imagery and language provided emblematic examples of how they have been doing the art of managing more generally. Their figurative construction of the organization reflected an active and ongoing attempt to

forge a new organizational identity. Consider the following statement by one interviewee:

*With this whole trend toward cutting costs, government has really started to see itself as more of a business than a public service. It is a public service, but it's probably more of a business now, and the trend has been to start operating like a business, operate like a private enterprise. I think the difference is though, that we're not out to make a profit, but we still are a business and see ourselves as one (#11)*

Another manager added that

*we...at the senior level, I mean I'd argue right down to the constable, if in fact he's [sic] interested in his future – would be looking at ways to compare to private industry knowing what they went through, to start looking at a business approach rather than just looking at, "well, this is a police force" or "this is police business, it's different from other business". It isn't, because all through this time... there's a perception by the public that...the public service (and we are a public service) are "fat cats" and have too many of these and too many of those (#12)*

This interviewee is making a distinction between the OPP's old worldview (i.e. that the police are qualitatively different from private sector businesses) and their new worldview (i.e. that they are no different from a private sector corporation). He is also indicating that a new subjectivity is not only being promoted at the managerial level, but at the front-line level as well. Specifically, he is stating that the OPP will only survive and be successful in the future if all employees cultivate a new ethos and set of capacities that are consistent with their new organizational image. Hence, individual subjectivities (even at the front-line level) must be aligned with the more general subjectivity of the institution.

While the art of managing involves the continual deployment of a particular kind of organizational metaphor, it also involves finding practical ways of translating this self-image into a concrete set of institutional structures and process. So, the intention of the OPP was not only to establish a new way of "being", but also establishing new ways of

acting. In other words, it would have to build a specific organizational *model* that would enable it to give concrete effect to its new identity. After having re-imagined themselves, the OPP was now looking for more specific guidance in the form of a blueprint.

*The Techniques of “Business Process Reengineering”*

In its quest to find practical techniques for reinventing itself, the OPP found that there were not very many examples of public sector institutions that had made such a profound structural transformation. Because of this, their quest to find an organizational blueprint led them to managerial models that were written with private sector corporations in mind. As one manager explained,

*there had not been sufficient experience...where anyone had taken a public sector service organization and restructured it to ensure that the business that you conduct is more effective and yet also allows you to focus on certain issues. And this, I guess, goes along with the thinking about community policing, because that is your focus, on your customer...So, I think that was the driver to look at the private sector, to look at big business, to look at industry to see what successes they've had, and much of what was written in relation to business process reengineering was focused on business, private enterprise. So, you had to look to their experience and now, how can we apply that in a policing model (#13)*

So, the intention of the OPP was to “borrow” a model for change from the contemporary private sector management literature and to tailor this model according to the characteristics and imperatives of a policing organization.

After searching for models, the OPP ultimately chose the “reengineering” blueprint developed by Micheal Hammer and James Champy in their book, *Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution* (1993). The reason that the OPP chose this blueprint was that it had been applied successfully in both public and private organizational settings and “has been recognized as a viable and valuable

methodology for organizational transformation” (OPP, 1995b; 16). One interviewee explained that in their efforts to find examples of restructuring initiatives in the public sector and in other police departments, the only example they could find was in the Ontario Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the OPP solicited the help of a representative from this Ministry to provide guidance in the reengineering of the OPP. Ultimately, some people in the OPP became “experts” themselves, and have assisted other government agencies in similar efforts.

Interestingly, Hammer and Champy’s “how to” book on reengineering represents only one text within a considerable array of texts devoted to reinventing governmental institutions. Books such as Peters’ Thriving on Chaos (1987) or Drucker’s Managing In a Time of Great Change (1995) represent only a small sample of texts calling for revolutionary change in private sector organizations and offering concrete advice on how to do so. What this points out is that there is a widespread movement across private *and* public sector institutions that is calling for a reinvention of institutions in order to address a series of challenges associated primarily with economic and cultural globalization. Hammer and Champy’s book is emblematic of an emergent mentality that is serving to shape the worldview of public and private sector institutions alike.

Managers in the OPP agreed with Hammer and Champy’s emphasis on “starting over”, and not simply “tinkering with what already exists or making incremental change that leave basic structures intact” (Hammer and Champy, 1993: 2; in OPP, 1995b: 16). According to Hammer and Champy, institutions would have to “reinvent themselves” in order to survive in a “new world” (Hammer and Champy, 1993: 1-2). This “new world” is one in which a “mass market model of industrial management and Adam Smith’s

notion of specialized labour” would no longer be relevant (Ibid., 2). Instead, companies are now finding themselves in a “postindustrial business age”, where previously segregated tasks must now be unified into “coherent business processes”. Hammer and Champy define “process” as “a set of activities that, taken together, produce a result of value to a customer” (1993: 3). They argue that businesses are living in a “crisis that will not go away” (1993: 7), and the prospect of thinly slicing work into meaningless tasks is no longer efficient. The biggest consequences of large, hierarchical bureaucracies is that they produced large numbers of middle managers, and senior managers who had become separated from their products and their customers (Hammer and Champy, 1993: 16).

This separation from the customer is problematic because of a broader shift in the nature of the relationship between service providers and customers. Specifically, customers now have the upper hand – they know what they want and how they want it. This access to more choice is driven by more access to information enabled by new communications technologies. This is dramatically different from a mass market mentality when customers were thought of by companies as generally alike, and where customers were happy with just acquiring a product, regardless of its quality or where it came from. Now, customers are demanding customized products that are tailored to their needs (1993: 15,18). “There is no longer any such notion as *the* customer; there is only *this* customer, the one with whom a seller is dealing at the moment and who now has the capacity to indulge his or her own personal tastes” (Ibid; italics in original).

In addition to the more active role of customers, competition has become intensified. Now, there are different bases of competition. Some competition is based on price, while some is based on selection or quality of service. Corporations must now

"stand shoulder to shoulder with the world's best" (Ibid). Thus, governmental authority, as we have seen in the previous chapter, has shifted considerably from the "producer" to the "consumer".

The re-engineering approach is also designed to prepare organizations to thrive in an environment where "change becomes constant". They attribute this in large part to the globalization of the economy, whereby the number of competitors has proliferated and where new products and services are continually being introduced. Companies can never under-estimate the nature and extent of change, and should never assume that they will foresee all changes in the future (Hammer and Champy, 1993: 23-24).

In order to meet these broader problematics, Hammer and Champy advocate a "fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed" (1993: 32). This is what constitutes their "reengineering approach". They stress that the first key word in this definition is "fundamental", which means that companies must ask very basic questions about *why* they do what they do and why they do it the *way* they do (1993: 32). They add that "[r]eengineering first determines *what* a company must do, then *how* to do it" (Ibid., 33). The second key word is "radical", which means that organizations must go well beyond superficial changes and to completely discard root structures and procedures (Ibid., 33). As they stress, "[r]eengineering is about business *reinvention* – not business improvement, business enhancement, or business modification" (Ibid; emphasis in original). Thirdly, reengineering should be "dramatic", that is, it should lead to "quantum leaps in



performance...[D]ramatic improvement demands blowing up the old and replacing it with something new” (Ibid., 33, 34).

Finally, the word “process” is a concept that gives organizations the most trouble, since most businesses are oriented around *tasks rather than processes*. To reiterate, they define “process” as “a collection of activities that takes one or more kinds of *inputs* and creates an *output* that is of value to the customer” (Ibid., 35). Instead of creating specialized jobs with specialized workers, the specialist must now be replaced by the “generalist”, a person who is able to follow through on a customer’s request from beginning to end. As a “generalist”, the worker is no longer constituted as someone with very basic skills who is to undertake a functionally distinct task (Ibid., 36, 38). Although everyone specializes to a certain degree, each is cognizant of the overall process. Thus, these “generalist” workers are engaged in multi-dimensional jobs. Their skill-set is now much broader and they must be continually thinking about the “bigger picture” (Ibid., 69-72). While we spoke of this notion of the “generalist” in the previous chapter, we can see that this re-constitution of the worker has not simply been taking place within policing organizations. Rather, the move from “specialist” to “generalist” reflects a much broader shift across sites of governance and across public and private institutions of governance.

These new generalist workers are now given the opportunity to make choices and decisions (Ibid., 65). Accordingly, reengineering embodies a move away from rule-based companies where employees are controlled to an environment where workers are empowered to make decisions and create rules themselves (Ibid., 69-72). Accordingly, the relationships between workers change. Managers become “coaches” rather than “supervisors” of their newly “responsibilized” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996) employees,

and rather than functional departments within an organization, work units are now organized into “process teams” (Hammer and Champy, 1993: 65). Hammer and Champy define a “process team” as “a unit that naturally falls together to complete a whole piece of work – a process” (Ibid., 66). Within a team setting, workers are “collectively responsible for process results rather than individually responsible for tasks” (Ibid., 68). This team unit should be *self-directing*.

In essence, Hammer and Champy are advocating a re-constitution of the worker in a way that he/she becomes responsible for ensuring that organizational “inputs” get translated into “outputs”. Performance measurement also changes from a system of compensating for the fulfillment of particular activities to compensation for results. In a reengineered business, the performance of employees can be measured for the *value* they create (Ibid., 72-73). Thus, the intention behind reengineering is to invest employees with a certain “ownership” in organizational processes (rather than tasks) in order to maximize the productivity of employees and that of the organization. By harnessing the “intellectual capital” (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997) of employees, the organization can maximize its monetary capital. This emphasis on “inputs” and “outputs” can be seen as a broader effort to address the “means over ends syndrome” that Goldstein (1979) associated more specifically with public policing institutions. Obviously, there is a broader effort across public and private sector institutions to make sure there is a direct relationship between organizational “means” and “ends”.

In the context of continuous change in the environment, reengineering involves a set of techniques for shifting away from training to *continuous education or learning*, since workers will never be able to “master” their job entirely. So, reengineering also

involves a re-figuring of “expertise”. In contrast to static and theoretical forms of knowledge, companies must continually renew their knowledge and capacities to respond to an ever-changing world (this theme will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter).

Hammer and Champy advocate another important shift in relation to the actual structure of institutions. Since the emphasis is now on “processes”, the hierarchical structure valued by traditional companies is no longer relevant. Since managers are becoming coaches and many process decisions are pushed down to the team level, the organization becomes flatter. Rather than supervising seven people, managers can coach thirty people (Ibid., 78-79), because “[c]ontrol is vested in the people performing the process” (Ibid., 78). Thus, a new institutional structure is also required to give effect to the new kinds of workers, and relationships between workers, that are being created. In other words, the institution must align itself organizationally with the new human arrangements it is advancing. Analogous to those shifts in authority discussed in the previous chapter, we can observe an attempt to redistribute governmental authority *within* organizations. In relation to those workers whose knowledge and capacities had been historically subjugated, these same workers would now have the authority to make certain decisions and to exercise autonomy and discretion. At the same time, re-engineering necessitates a change in the role of the executive. In a flatter organization, senior executives are moved closer to the both the people performing the value-added work and to the customer (Ibid., 79).

Having addressed the key problematics identified by Hammer and Champy and the ideas they advance for responding to these problematics, the following section will

describe the ways in which the OPP translated these ideas within its own institutional setting.

### **Reinventing the Institution**

For the OPP, a primary task was to translate this notion of “business processes” into something that was appropriate for a policing organization. Specifically, they re-defined various institutional activities in terms of “business processes”. This would require them to give serious consideration to the core purposes of the organization (OPP, 1998a: 8).

Ultimately, ten business processes were identified, and are as follows:

- Prevention of Victimization
- Occurrence Management
- Traffic/Waterways Management
- External Investigative/Security Service Provision
- Employee Selection and Competency Development
- Resources Planning, Management and Control
- First Nations and Contract Policing Services
- Firearms Acquisition and Control
- Policing Services and Employee Standards
- Detachment Administration (OPP, 1994a: 14)

For each business process, a sub-project team was created. These teams were trained in both the business reengineering approach and the community policing approach, and were to be the new “architects” of each process (OPP, 1994a: 14). The first phase of the Organizational Renewal consisted of a review of these ten business processes, followed by the development of recommendations, on the part of each sub-project team, aimed at their reengineering.<sup>28</sup>

The name of the first business process, the “prevention of victimization” is interesting due to its discursive shift away from the notion of “crime” and toward the real

or potential victim as the *customer* of policing services. This is consistent with our observation, in the last chapter, that the “governing through crime” approach (Simon, 1995) had been considerably re-thought by the OPP. Indeed, the stress on the language of “prevention” reflects the OPP’s critique of an exclusively “reactive” orientation on their part. At the same time, the Prevention of Victimization Sub-project Team emphasized the notion of policing *services*, suggesting that while the need to investigate and reactively respond to incidents is paramount, “the needs of victims should be addressed in a meaningful way” (1994a: 19).

In concert with Hammer and Champy’s idea of “generalist workers”, as well as the OPP focus on generalist constables, the sub-project team concluded that the prevention of crime and victimization should be the duty of *all* police officers rather than purely a specialist function (OPP, 1994b: 3). In other words, the prevention of victimization should be regarded as a team effort, and not simply the purpose of one functional task. The team also recommended the creation of a Community Policing Research Centre that would enable the OPP “to foster and maintain a learning organization, and allow for an enhanced capacity for continuous self-evaluation and self-improvement” (OPP, 1994b: 24). As the previous chapter explains, this recommendation did come to fruition in the form of the Community Policing Development Centre.

Hammer and Champy’s notion of minimizing inputs while maximizing outputs is exemplified in the work of the Occurrence Management sub-project team. With regard to the delivery of front-line occurrence response, this sub-project team sought to make recommendations aimed at maximizing the efficiency of human and financial inputs

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<sup>28</sup> The purpose of this section is not to provide an exhaustive overview of the work of each sub-project team, but to provide examples of how the techniques of “business process reengineering” were applied

while maximizing outputs. In particular, the sub-project team recommended that the OPP develop a “more effective, efficient and accountable service delivery mechanism”, and that such services be delivered according to the community policing approach (OPP, 1994b: 5). The team also recommended that existing service delivery mechanisms be streamlined and that front-line supervision be balanced with “quality service delivery” and “employee empowerment” (Ibid). This sub-project team’s efforts were therefore aimed at aligning a broader economic mentality with the delivery of community policing services.

After examining various aspects of the OPP’s current approach to occurrence management, the sub-project team came to a number of conclusions. One such conclusion was that an “excessive” number of hours were being devoted to generating and checking reports. They also found that a variety of reports are generated in relation to one single incident. At the same time they found that current shift scheduling policy was not conducive to the flexible delivery of services that were tailored to community needs. In addition, it was found that front-line supervisors had been over-burdened with administrative duties. As a consequence of this, supervisors had very little direct involvement with the actual delivery of services. Further, the team found that the current geographic boundaries that were used to organize service delivery were no longer consistent with the demographic distribution of the population (OPP, 1994b: 27)

In light of these findings (this represents only a sample of findings), the Occurrence Management sub-project team developed a series of recommendations aimed at streamlining these various aspects of the business process. For example, in terms of the excessive amount of human resources devoted to generating and checking reports, the

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within the institution of the OPP.

team recommended the elimination of those reports *that added no value* to front-line service delivery, and to ensure that constables become responsible for the accuracy of their reports. At the same time, front-line supervisors should cease checking the accuracy of reports, thereby freeing them up to do more *team leader* activities (Ibid., 27-28). The intention was to bring supervisors closer to their “customers”, thereby adding more “value” to front-line service delivery. In order to do so, the sub-project team recommended that administrative process be restructured in order to relieve the administrative burden traditionally placed on sergeants. At the same time, the team recommended that sergeants be re-constituted as “team leaders” instead of detachment administrators, and accordingly, should be taught how to foster the “team approach” to community policing (OPP, 1994b: 31-32).

In relation to the lack of consistency between detachment locations and customer demand, the team recommended that the pooling of resources and the grouping of supervisors had the potential to increase or create opportunities for 24-hour coverage of “on-duty operational supervision, coaching and training” (Ibid., 32-33). The team suggested that amalgamation or clustering<sup>29</sup> was the best way to enhance service delivery.

The inefficiencies associated with detachment administration were addressed specifically by the Detachment Administration sub-project team. This team determined that a substantial amount of resources were being devoted to administrative activities at the detachment level, thereby putting a strain on operational workload pressures (Ibid.,

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<sup>29</sup> The OPP defines “detachment amalgamation” as “the consolidation of human and physical resources of two or more detachments into one host location”. “Detachment clustering” is defined as “the administrative combination of two or more Detachments under one Detachment Commander. In a Detachment Clustering, each office maintain[s] its operational identity, however, the officers at all locations [are]

17). Although efforts to reduce administrative workload had begun prior to the Organizational Renewal, this team formalized this effort and developed a specific set of recommendations. The team argued that a large portion of administrative work adds “minimal value” to service delivery, and the manual collection of forms and reports in hard copy format does not make administration an efficient process, and at the same time, important information is not readily available to others. As well, the team found that important decisions were being made at those organizational levels that were removed from front-line service delivery. This team also echoed the finding of the Occurrence Management sub-project team that sergeants were largely devoted to paper-work rather than direct service delivery (OPP, 1994b: 129).

Various recommendations were proposed for streamlining detachment administration, such as capturing information only once and at the source through electronic means, ensuring that decisions are made at the most appropriate levels, and enabling civilians to perform most administrative tasks, thereby freeing up time for sergeants to engage in front-line operational duties (Ibid). So, the common thrust behind these recommendations was to maximize outputs at the front-line level – i.e. at the level of customer service – by reducing, streamlining or eliminating those inputs that do not directly “add value”.

The findings of the Employee Selection and Competency Development sub-team were interesting due to the emphasis made on *competencies* rather than task-oriented work (see next chapter). This business process consists of employee selection, performance evaluation, initial training and orientation, as well as the ongoing training,

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assigned to one common duty roster which provide[s] for a more effective and efficient utilization of personnel, thereby improving front-line service delivery” (OPP, 1998a: 29)



education and development of both uniform and civilian staff. The sub-project team found that this business process was considerably labour intensive with regards to the development of uniform staff and almost non-existent in terms of civilian staff (OPP, 1994b: 12). In particular, “the development of both uniformed and civilian employees was either not formalized or simply performed on an ad hoc basis” (Ibid). Also, there was no sign of *proactive* learning initiatives. The team stated that “principles of organizational learning or available and emerging technologies and techniques for distance delivery were seldom utilized” (Ibid).

With regard to the orientation and training of uniformed personnel, the team argued that highly structured lecture-style training provided by the OPP not only duplicated the training of recruits at the Ontario Police College, but it was not conducive to “individualized learning or self-directed study” (Ibid., 86). Furthermore, “if the first 12 months on the job are absolutely critical to member orientation, then our recruits must have reasonably developed learning skills to employ once they leave the Academy. The solution posited by the team was to orient their recruits to be *career learners*, beginning on the first day of their employment” (OPP, 1994b: 86; italics added). This emphasis on “career learning” speaks to a broader problematic, identified by Hammer and Champy, that the world is constantly changing, and as such, organizations must have the capacities to continually adapt to such changes. As Drucker put it, “every organization has to build the management of change into its very structure” (1995: 79).

In order to cultivate this capacity for continuous learning, the team suggested that the OPP move away from “structured and centralized training to more informal and localized learning methodologies” (OPP, 1994b: 86). This would engender in constables

the kind of applied knowledge that is required to adapt to local and ever-changing circumstances. This emphasis on localized learning methodologies serves to promote a conception of community policing as “customized service delivery” (as we saw in the previous chapter). In the interests of cost-effective learning strategies, the team also recommended the use of distance learning technologies. This would cut down on the amount of times that officers would have to travel to particular locales in order to attend learning programs. There was also an emphasis on self-directed learning and individualized instruction. This reflects the overall emphasis being made on the “responsibilization” of constables (De Lint, 1998) to determine the kind of competencies that need improvement. In addition, the team suggested that the OPP develop training partnerships with other institutions (OPP, 1994b: 86).

The idea of “adding value” to front-line service delivery was stressed as well in relation to the External Investigative and/or Security Service Provision process. It was found that certain OPP activities were considerably cost ineffective and did not add value to their service. For example, with regard to commercial crime investigations, the sub-project team found that over a quarter of the time spent by investigators was devoted to tasks unrelated to actual investigations (OPP, 1994b: 44-45). Due to investigative constraints imposed by court decisions such as Askov (relating to unreasonable trial delays) and Stinchcombe (relating to prosecutorial responsibility for full disclosure), a significant amount of time was required for trial preparation. Accordingly, the team recommended that some civilian staff be hired to perform clerical tasks in order to free up more time for anti-rackets investigators (Ibid).

The Traffic/Waterways Management sub-project team emphasized the importance of enhancing front-line service delivery in the forms of increased police visibility on roads and waterways. The team argued that communities were demanding more police presence and were asking to be more involved in promoting road and waterways safety (OPP, 1994b: 7). At the same time, “the police presence on Ontario roads and waterways has diminished due to ever increasing workload pressures on our front-line staff..The public are taking notice that traffic law enforcement activity has diminished in recent years” (Ibid., 6,7).

The objective of this sub-project team was to assist the organization in locating savings realized through *increased efficiencies* and reinvesting this money to enhance road and waterways enforcement activities (Ibid., 7). Recommendations included the use of technology (such as in-car video systems and in-car work stations); increasing visibility through targeted patrols and focusing human resources on serious traffic accidents; and referring minor cases to “collision reporting centres” (Ibid., 36-41). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an overview of what amounted to 100 reengineering recommendations made by the 10 sub-project teams. (These recommendations were approved by the Organizational Review Project Working Committee<sup>30</sup>). Suffice it to say however, that there was one common thread uniting this reengineering phase: having established its organizational mission (as indicated in the descriptions of these processes), and having determined a set of organizational outputs (based on these processes), the OPP set out to develop the appropriate systems and

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<sup>30</sup> This Committee provided leadership throughout the Organizational Renewal process and was involved in the development and implementation of the business processes (OPP, 1998a).

structures for maximizing these outputs while minimizing their human, material and financial inputs.

After the release of the reengineering recommendations, an Organizational Design Team (ODT) was created in order to develop a new institutional *structure* which would support the implementation of these recommendations (OPP, 1998a: 8). Prior to the Organizational Review, the OPP was structured into 3 Field Division Headquarters, 16 District Headquarters, and over 24 branches and special projects (Ibid). This “multi-tiered administrative bureaucracy” (OPP, 1998a: 10) was obviously consistent with the “professional model” of policing which was discussed in the previous chapter. In contrast, and in the context of their new approach to community policing, the new organizational structure would be aimed at the following objectives:

- *Optimal Number of Fundamental Layers;*
- *Ensure each level provides added value to delivery of policing services;*
- *Reduce administrative requirements to the optimal level;*
- *Restructure around front line service delivery;*
- *Ensure that GHQ serves as a centre of strategic leadership;*
- *Advance interactions among main business areas;*
- *Enhance the capacity for provincial operations;*
- *Enhance strategic capacity, and;*
- *Incorporate business process recommendations (Ibid)*

According to the Commissioner at the time, the OPP had recognized the value of empowering staff at the service delivery level, and since such personnel are already guided by various procedural and strategic guidelines, “the need for layer upon layer of supervisor and managers makes very little sense, and, cannot be logically defended” (OPP, 1995c). Although the Commissioner argued that management and executive levels were important, he said that what should be transformed is “the way management and leadership is delivered within the organization” (Ibid; italics added). This suggestion on

the part of the Commissioner that their current hierarchical structure made very little sense highlights the extent to which the worldview of the organization had changed. Not only was their organizational structure inconsistent with the strategic shifts that had taken place, but it was an inadequate structure for meeting the more global problematics flagged by Hammer and Champy.

In February, 1995, the “renewal” phase of the project began. With the business process recommendations in hand, along with a new structural design, the concrete process of reinvention would begin. There were 5 key change initiatives during the renewal phase:

- 1. The creation of front-line teams;*
- 2. Detachment right-sizing;*
- 3. The restructuring from a district/division model to a regional/bureau model of policing;*
- 4. The overall de-layering of the organization, and;*
- 5. Regional process review (OPP, 1998a: 26)*

#### *The Creation of Front-line Teams*

With this new emphasis on the language of “service delivery”, those who work at the front line level - that is, those who interact with “customers” on a daily basis – have been constituted as key to a more efficient and effective police service. As indicated earlier, the OPP claimed that there had been a gradual increase in the amount of administrative duties performed by front-line supervisors. Ultimately, sergeants and staff sergeants had been “driven indoors to the point where the “front line” of the O.P.P. is now most often considered to be the Constables” (1995d: 2). One interviewee reflects on the fundamental inconsistency between old managerial practices (and specifically, the management of the sergeant) and their new views on the role of the sergeant:

*[T]he OPP were responsible, and our whole management training in the 1980's was responsible for allowing them to become office managers, and if anybody felt threatened [during the Organizational Review], and I told them, "if any of you, if any group is threatened it's you people because not only the way that we've allowed this to happen, but you people have gotten so comfortable coming in in the morning or in the afternoon, taking your gun off, sitting in the office all day and at the end of day, really, what value did you add to anything we were doing? It didn't help you solve any crime, it didn't add visibility on the street, [or] to enhance front line service delivery (#12; bold added)*

This statement clearly reflects a market-based conception of the sergeant (as well as other ranks) as a *producer*, that is, a human resource that must be deployed in ways that will add optimal value to service delivery. Although the term “value” in this sense does not relate directly to monetary value, the “figurative logic” (Shearing and Ericson, 1991) of the marketplace is strong.

The need to get sergeants back into direct front line service delivery was also compounded by the fact that the number of constables with less than five years seniority was expected to reach up to sixty-six percent by 1996/1997. This was due to the significant number of senior officers who would be retiring around the same period of time (OPP, 1995d: 2). Accordingly, the new vision of the front line was one where sergeants and constables would work together as a *team*. This team would be regarded as the “first layer” of OPP service delivery. “The sergeant’s role will be re-defined as a Team Leader responsible to coach, train, assist, develop, and supervise constables in the delivery of policing services” (OPP, 1995d: 4-5). The following interviewee highlights the intention of the OPP to move away from a para-military tradition of management:

*In previous history, the OPP, being a para-military organization, followed a more or less military structure and military style - a top-down type style. That's been pretty much reversed over the last decade...We're more of a team oriented organization now, [even though] we still maintain some of the military traditions, for protocol purposes and I guess some emergent incidents as well when you need to work as an organization. We've certainly gotten away from the military top-down style. Everybody has input now,*

*everybody's expected to do their job pretty much independently, and when they need assistance, the supervisor is in place to help them out and steer them along (#2)*

This statement is suggestive of the “responsibilization” of front-line officers (De Lint, 1998) mentioned earlier. The desire to constitute officers as more “independent” workers stems from more than one purpose. First, it is obviously more cost-effective to have constables make certain decisions without having to get approval from higher ranking officers. Also, with sergeants being constituted as team leaders, constables will have the immediate support of higher ranking officers whose knowledge and expertise is less theoretical and more tailored to local circumstances. An underlying theme then (which we discussed in the previous chapter) is this preference for practical forms of constabulary knowledge which had previously been subordinate to the bureaucratic knowledge of higher ranking officials. Since it is the front-line officer who is closest to the “customer” it now seems logical for their localized knowledge to inform most decision-making processes. Even within the managerial levels (particularly at General Headquarters), there is a shift toward the “responsibilization” (De Lint, 1998) of lower ranking managers. In general then, there appears to be a trend toward a form of “rule at a distance” (Rose and Miller, 1992) within the organization itself.

#### *Detachment Right-sizing*

In addition to the new emphasis on “teams”, the OPP made some fundamental transformations in the detachment administration area. As stated earlier, when their business processes were being reviewed, the OPP had determined that many detachments were not meeting current policing demands due to inadequate staffing and/or inappropriate geographical location (OPP, 1994b: 27). Due to shifts in population density and increased demands for service, “some Detachments were finding it difficult

to provide an appropriate level of service” (OPP, 1998a: 29). In response to this, and in order to “reduce the inefficiencies of maintaining duplicate functions at several locations”, the OPP decided to engage in “detachment rightsizing” (Ibid). Detachment right-sizing is accomplished through one of two processes: detachment amalgamation and detachment clustering. Detachment amalgamation refers to “the consolidation of human and physical resources of two or more detachments into one host location” (OPP, 1998a: 29), and detachment clustering refers to “the administrative combination of two or more Detachments under one Detachment Commander” (Ibid). In terms of “clustering” each office maintains its “operational identity”, but officers from all detachments are organized according to one common duty roster. This centralization approach is said to provide for “a more effective and efficient utilization of personnel, thereby improving front-line service delivery” (Ibid).

Detachment right-sizing committees were established to conduct reviews of their regions “to identify opportunities that would provide a more efficient and effective operational and administrative police service” (OPP, 1998a: 30). The underlying rationale was that right-sized detachments would improve “the level of police service delivery to the public” (OPP, 1998a: 30). Before the renewal phase, the OPP consisted of 178 detachments, each serving as separate administrative entities. Early on in the renewal, it was argued that this situation “contributed to duplicity within our organization” (OPP, 1998a: 31). Following the right-sizing process there were 81 right-sized detachment centers (Ibid). “The focus of this change initiative was not to close detachments, but to make existing Right Sized Detachment centers more effective and



efficient”, and only “duplicate administrative processes” were removed” (OPP, 1998a: 31).

In speaking with interviewees, there was a clear tension between this centralization approach and the political demands being made on the OPP to continue to operate certain detachments, regardless of their cost-effectiveness. As one interviewee explained, “every community that we were in wanted us to stay, and there were political forces involved, and so some of the areas we’re perhaps in right now maybe we’re still there because there was so much political pressure to stay there, so it was difficult”. Another interviewee suggests that the economic rationale driving the Organizational Review has led to a situation where the OPP doesn’t have the continuous presence that it once had at detachments. With regards to the Organizational Review more generally, he comments:

*I think if I were to author a verdict on whether or not it was successful, from the financial point of view, I think we made it... From an operational, a policing point of view, I'm not convinced at all this was successful, as successful as I would have liked. I mean we're still here, we're still a viable organization. Are we giving the public the kind of policing that we should be? I'm not convinced of that – I'm not convinced that we are as available to the public as we once were...[W]e've tried to, in my view, scam the public, telling them that us not being here is actually better... “we're out on the road, we're out there”. But in the old days, you know when you could come into the office, and I'd meet you at the front desk and say, “yes ma'm what can I do for you, tell me your problems”, and I'd deal with them (#4)*

This statement points to the considerable tension between a market-based logic and the “social” function of the police. This interviewee is arguing that not all policing functions should be thought of primarily in terms of cost-effectiveness, because this would be undermining their ongoing responsibility as a reactive, emergency response service.

### *Restructuring From a District/Division Model to a Regional/Bureau Model of Policing*

The OPP concluded that a shift to a Regional/Bureau structure would be the best way to support its business processes. Consequently, the old structure, consisting of 16 districts, would be replaced by a new structure consisting of 6 regions. While these centralized regional structures were devoted to operational business processes, the bureaus were created to direct the "corporate" processes of the institution. The OPP would accordingly be divided into two components: Operations (directed by a Deputy Commissioner referred to as the Provincial Commander of Operations); and Corporate Support (directed by the other Deputy Commissioner known as the Provincial Commander, Corporate Support). Prior to this new structure, there had been three Deputy Commissioners devoted to Field Operations, Investigations, and Services, respectively (OPP, 1998a: 9-10). Once again, the centralist move to five regions instead of sixteen districts was a means to reduce administration and overlap, hence increasing organizational efficiencies.

### *The Overall De-layering of the Organization*

The final report of the Organizational Renewal states, "The de-layering of the organizational structure was the result of the OPP's position that *authority and responsibility be pushed downward*" (1998a: 40; italics added). As indicated earlier, this re-distribution of authority within the organization is a means of aligning the internal management of the organization with broader shifts in authority between the police and non-police institutions and auspices. In contrast to the more hierarchical structure of the OPP prior to the Organizational Review, the "new OPP" consists of the following four layers:

1. Service Delivery Teams (Constables and Sergeants)
2. Detachment Section Commanders (Staff Sergeants and Inspectors)
3. Regional and Bureau Commanders (Superintendents and Chief Superintendents), and
4. Provincial Commanders (Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners)

This flatter structure is meant to reduce administrative costs as well as enable the shift to teams and the general “responsibilization” of constables (De Lint, 1998). At the same time, however, it still constitutes the hierarchical structure that is required to support the traditional law enforcement activities of the police. As one interviewee explained, “[y]ou’ve got to remember that there’s a place for command and control in a police organization and mostly where that counts is in an emergency situation on the road, where you’re responsible for the safety of people. Other places it’s not so necessary and I think that a lot of people, a lot of senior managers have really come around to realizing that” (#11). In concert with this statement, the Commissioner adds that

*This approach to redesigning, or downsizing, the management layers within the OPP has been an attempt to find a proper balance between the need for effective, properly structured hierarchy within a police service, and the pressures for greater efficiency and economy that does not jeopardize the front line (OPP, 1995c)*

#### *Regional Process Review*

A Process Review Committee was established “to streamline the way we do business” (OPP, 1998a: 41). Specifically, the mandate of the committee was “to eliminate administrative activities that did not add value to the delivery of front-line service and, to the extent possible, centralize whatever administration remained. The intent was to reduce the impact of administration at all levels but particularly at the front-line” (Ibid). One OPP text adds that “[i]n order for an organizational change to have permanency it is necessary to also change the underlying processes that support the old

way of doing business” (Ibid). One interviewee comments on the importance of examining these processes:

*[W]e went through everything that they were doing, everything that the steno[graphers] were doing, everything that left the detachment and where did it go to, and if it came into this building, who read it, who acted upon it or did it just get filed, so you become a creature of habit over the years....[I]n fact we took people and [said] “okay, here's this requisition, now you go to every desk in this organization that this goes to for further notice or for your information or before it's even at somebody's desk and it's finally approved”, and there was over 240 of these processes and we've eliminated over 100 of them, so in fact we haven't downloaded this to anybody else in the organization....it's been eliminated because there's no value added to it, and at the same time, it then freed up the sergeants to get out on the road (#12)<sup>31</sup>*

We can see with regards to both the move to five regions as well as the Regional Process Review that there has been a dual tendency to centralize and localize (a theme that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five). In terms of administrative functions, the OPP has advocated a centralization approach, but in terms of direct front-line service delivery, an emphasis was made on local autonomy and decision-making. This centralization/localization approach constitute two coherent components of a drive for greater organizational efficiency.

In the context of these larger-scale changes, the renewal phase of the project was also concerned with implementing the specific business process reengineering recommendations as well as other structural changes. A Renewal Team was established and each recommendation was treated as a sub-project. In the end, 160 sub-projects had been determined, and at the time of the *Final Report* in the Spring of 1998, 114 had been implemented.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> According to the Final Report of the Organizational Renewal, 204 recommendations were made regarding processes changes, including the elimination of reporting requirements, the streamlining of form routing and the introduction of new business practices or habits. The report states that 150 of these recommendations have been implemented (OPP, 1998a: 41)

<sup>32</sup> The Renewal Team decided not to proceed with another 21 sub-projects, leaving 25 sub-projects to be completed (OPP, 1998a 49).

By the end of the Organizational Renewal process, the OPP had created a specific model for institutional reinvention. After having appropriated a new market-based institutional metaphor, it set out to translate Hammer and Champy's reengineering blueprint in ways that suited the institution's characteristics and objectives. While a "new managerialist" mentality guided the series of transformations in the OPP, this mentality was deployed and translated within the organization in the context of particular problematizations and site-specific political and strategic objectives.

Having met the financial constraints associated with the Social Contract, the OPP was then confronted with another contingent event: the election of Mike Harris and his Conservative Party to the Provincial Government. Once elected, Harris, in the spirit of his "Common Sense Revolution", set out to reinvent the institutions that constituted the Ontario Public Service. Because the OPP is institutionally located within the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services, it became directly involved in this reinvention process. So, after having created and translated its own new institutional model, the OPP would now have to align itself with the new institutional imperatives of the "common sense" government. Once again, a "new managerialist" mentality (see De Lint, 1998; O'Malley, 1997) is apparent, but it makes its way through the institution of the OPP in very specific ways.

### **The Institutional Effects of the "Common Sense Revolution"**

On June 8th, 1995, Mike Harris and his "Common Sense Revolution" came into power in the province of Ontario, replacing Bob Rae and the New Democratic Party. Harris and his Conservative colleagues won 82 out of 130 legislative seats and forty-five per cent of the popular vote (Courchene and Telmer, 1998: 169). In Courchene and

Telmer's interpretation of this election, they argue that "there can be no doubt that the CSR is a revolution" (Ibid). This is reflected in the variety of profound policy changes that the Conservatives implemented very early on in their mandate.

According to Laxer, at the root of their "common sense" mandate was an agenda to overthrow the "nonmarket values" (1996: 182) associated with the New Democrats. For example, Bill 40 and employment equity were immediately discarded, and the language of "welfare" was replaced with the language of "workfare" (Courchene and Telmer, 1998: 169-170). Courchene and Telmer argue that,

*[t]he emphasis on a social agenda is history, although some new social policy initiatives have been introduced. In clear ascendancy is an economic, job-creation agenda, buttressed by a much reduced role for government as well as projections for fiscal balance by the millenium (1998: 195)*

According to Courchene and Telmer, the "common sense" agenda represented an "institutional revolution". Since the Tories took office, various initiatives were devoted to reinventing the institutions of provincial Government. Examples include the re-organization and re-delivery of health care, the introduction of new financial arrangements between the province and the municipalities, the consolidation of school boards, and the amalgamation of municipalities, the most notable of which was the creation of the Toronto "megacity" (see Chapter Five). Across the entire public service, each Ministry was to become transformed in the spirit of the "common sense" agenda to reduce the role of government and to conduct its "business" with fiscal prudence.

Both O'Malley (1997) and Loader (1996) would regard this agenda as a version of neo-liberal politics, whereby the Harris Conservatives have "far more explicit concerns than their predecessors had about whether police are cost-effective and are achieving desired results" (O'Malley, 1997: 374). Loader describes a radical shift in Britain to a

“new right” or neo-liberal politics. This politics embodies a critique of governments that have evolved into “inefficient monopoly suppliers” and who are “exempt from the rigours of the market, unresponsive to public demand, riddled with vested interests and a burgeoning drain on government expenditure” (1996: 15). As an embodiment of this same kind of political critique, the “Common Sense Revolution” was aimed at initiating in the Ontario Public Service “the most significant change in decades and perhaps in its history” (Management Board Secretariat, 1997a: 1). The Harris government set out to engage in a “basic questioning and re-evaluation of what government does and how it does it” (Ibid).

The “Common Sense Revolution” constituted a precise and radical new vision of the Ontario Public Service, whereby the government would be reduced in size and would operate in an optimally cost-effective manner. In an internal public service document titled, “Building the OPS for the Future: A Framework for Action”, the government indicated that as of June, 1995, it had set out to “create a new kind of government organization” (Government of Ontario, 1997: 1):

*[T]he transformation that we are undergoing today is qualitatively different. We have moved beyond...an examination of programs to see how they can be made more effective and efficient to a fundamental rethinking of the role of government (Ibid)*

The reasons cited for this reinvention included pressures from citizens to become more customer-oriented, technological trends and financial constraints (Management Board Secretariat, 1997a). The justification for change was articulated in the following way:

*As with many other organizations in both the public and private sectors, the ways of organizing and doing business that were acceptable and affordable in the past, are now*

*being challenged. The OPS must re-think how it operates its various businesses and re-align its operations to meet the opportunities of the next century (Ibid)*<sup>33</sup>

This statement echoes the same mentality that we found in Hammer and Champy's book. Specifically, the Harris government argued that current institutional structures and processes are completely incompatible with new governmental problematics and objectives. However, Harris' strategies for meeting these "opportunities of the next century" are quite distinct from Hammer and Champy's blueprint.

Similar to the OPP prior to its Organizational Review process, the Conservative party was also engaged in a re-imaginization process, but it was promoting particular kinds of imagery. For example, a particularly strong image that was conveyed is captured in the following heading of an Ontario Public Service newspaper: "*OPS moves from 'rowing to steering the boat'*" (Management Board Secretariat, 1997b; italics added). The metaphors of "rowing" and "steering" has its origins in Osborne and Gaebler's Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (1993). Osborne and Gaebler's book, which has evolved into somewhat of a new managerial bible for government institutions in the United States is emblematic of the new neo-liberal mentality depicted in the governmentality literature (see O'Malley, 1997; De Lint, 1998). In particular, this metaphorical shift from "rowing" to "steering" embodies the program of "rule at a distance" identified by scholars such as Miller and Rose (1992), whereby government determines the "ends" and devises appropriate means for achieving these ends. These "means" can be found in institutions outside of the public service if it is determined that they produce governmental "results" in an efficient

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<sup>33</sup> An OPS Restructuring Secretariat was established in January, 1997 to guide and integrate the overall restructuring process. It worked in conjunction with the Secretary of Cabinet (Management Board Secretariat, 1997a; Management Board Secretariat, 1997d).



and effective manner. The role of government then becomes one of “broker” or “networker”. In this spirit, instead of being program-centred, the OPS would move toward a customer-centred orientation. As well, because of rapid advances in technology, the organization would be able to develop the capacities to “customize service delivery to fit the individual customer” (Management Board Secretariat, 1997b).

In pursuit of an enhanced “steering” role, the thrust of the “common sense” agenda was to determine the “core business” of government. The government defined “core business” as those services that would be required in the name of the “public interest”. Thus, while the OPS would come to function as if it were a “corporation”, its “core functions” would not be determined by profit-making imperatives but by the “social” obligations of government. For “non-core” services, the government stresses the importance of conducting a cost-benefit analysis of service delivery options, and to consider “the capacity of the private/not-for-profit sector to deliver” (Government of Ontario, 1997: 8).

Along with determining what was indeed the “business of government”, the restructuring of the OPS would consist of a radical re-tooling of those internal administrative services that do support business processes. Such services include human resources, finance and accounting, information technology and communications. These services would be streamlined and re-structured according to common standards across government (Management Board Secretariat, 1996).

The Harris government not only set out to create a smaller government that was focused on “core business”, but it also envisioned an OPS that was “flexible” (Ibid: 4). The desire to be a flexible organization is premised on the notion that the external

environment is constantly changing and that the future is uncertain. The *Framework for Action* states, "It has been said that the future cannot be predicted, it can only be created...One of the key strengths that we are working to enhance in the OPS is the ability to live with, and even thrive on, the inevitability of constant change" (Ibid: 3). Once again, this is a theme that is echoed by Hammer and Champy (1993), as well as other management gurus such as Drucker (1995) and Peters (1987). Hence, the mentality being articulated by the Harris government is not simply exclusive to public sector institutions, but has a more global character.

This rationalist imperative to "manage the business of government more efficiently and save money" (Management Board Secretariat, 1996) has been observed in other countries such as England by Loader (1996) and Australia by O'Malley (1997). These scholars, as well as others, have noted that this "new managerialism" involves the introduction of private-sector disciplines into public services (Loader, 1996; Crawford, 1997), and two such disciplines, introduced by the Harris government, are "business planning" and "performance measurement". These disciplines are a means of ensuring not only that services are measured by results, but those who deliver the services are continually assessed as well (Management Board Secretariat, 1996). This would "ensure continuous service improvement and accountability for results" (Ibid). The specific institutional blueprint devised by the Harris government consisted of the following components:

- a business planning process in every ministry that links to an overall OPS vision;
- a range of alternative service delivery options that has a focus on the customer, rather than on the provider of service;
- use of the latest technologies to link common service networks and improve access to government;

- major corporate initiatives to reengineer administrative processes across government; and
- performance measures that track how we are doing at the level of the individual, the program, the ministry and the whole organization (cited directly from Ibid)

An overall strategy of “rule at a distance” is apparent in these initiatives which serves to translate, in concrete ways, their new vision of a government that “steers” rather than “rows”. As indicated above, “business planning” is a technology for ensuring that all ministries are aligned with the overall vision of the Ontario government, even though each ministry has considerable latitude in terms of how they will meet this vision. Similarly, “performance measures” are a technology for rendering each ministry accountable to Management Board for the achievement of certain “ends”. In other words, each ministry must show that it has produced “results”. As well, the focus on “alternative service delivery options” reflects an intention to mete out certain “rowing” functions to non-governmental or quasi-governmental institutions who can carry out such functions in a cost-effective manner. In this contractual setting, the service provider is made accountable to government for successful performance and the realization of targets as determined by government.

Beginning in 1996, all sixteen Ministries were required to develop their first annual business plans and to submit them to Management Board (Ibid). The introduction of business plans constituted one of the first steps involved in the province-wide restructuring (Management Board Secretariat, 1997a). The purpose of the business plan was to "show how the ministry planned to implement government priorities and directions and meet fiscal targets" (Government of Ontario, 1997). More specifically,

*The Business Plans identified each ministry's mission, its core businesses, and how it proposed to move from its current state to meet its goals for the future. Integral to each Business Plan was a process to identify which programs and activities were part of the*

*ministry's core businesses. Through the business planning process, each ministry took a hard look at what it was doing that was serving a compelling public need and what it was doing that could be done as effectively outside government (Ibid)*

Ministries were required to consider alternative service delivery options, including service delivery by community agencies, other levels of government, or partnerships with private or not-for-profit institutions. In developing their business plans, ministries conducted customer surveys and focus groups in order to determine service gaps (Ibid).

In 1997, the OPS restructuring process focussed its energies on the development of Ministry performance measures within business plans, which would be aimed at improving the quality of government services (Ibid). Although the performance of institutions and individuals had been measured in various ways, through such activities as audits and informal evaluations, the language of "performance measurement" highlights the explicit emphasis the Ontario government has made on individual and institutional performance (Doob, 1996). Performance measures "serve as a productive means of getting people to address what the *fundamental goals and values of an organization* are or ought to be" (Ibid; italics added). Rose would contend that performance measures are an example of a neo-liberal auditing technique. Because audits focus mainly on institutional procedures and less so on substantive matters, performance measurement enables governments such as the Harris government to apply this technology across ministries (see Rose, 1996a, 1996b), hence realizing an effective program of "government at a distance". As Rose explains, "the mode of its operation – in terms of procedures rather than substantives, in terms of apparently stable and yet endlessly flexible criteria such as efficiency, appropriateness, effectiveness – renders it a versatile and highly transferable technology for governing at a distance" (1996b: 55-56). Osborne

has observed a similar trend toward auditing in the area of medicine. He argues that performance indicators, which measure processes, inputs and outputs, costs and benefits are highly suggestive of the “rationality of the market place” (1993: 345).

For the Harris government, performance measures should be used as a means of measuring variables that each ministry has the ability to control or influence. In other words, ministries must be able to realistically determine, in quantitative or qualitative terms, whether or not they achieved certain targets. Performance measures should also be used as a means of comparing past and present levels of performance with the ultimate end of improving ministry “products” or “services”. At the same time, these targets must be aligned with the “core businesses” of each ministry (Management Board Secretariat, 1997c).

As part of the Ministry of Solicitor General and Correctional Services, the Ontario Provincial Police was required to implement the technologies of business planning and performance measurement. Specifically, it would have to build these technologies into the institutional model that it created during the Organizational Review process. OPP managers would have to lend a coherence to their organizational objectives and processes and the new organizational objectives and processes identified by the Harris government. At the end of the Organizational Renewal process, the “strategic planning” component within the Commissioner’s office was phased out and replaced with a Business Planning Unit. When strategic planning existed, there was an Inspector appointed as the Strategic Planning Coordinator. He would conduct research on matters of interest or organizational issues, through consultation with the appropriate experts within the institution, and develop recommendations for eliminating certain problems or improving

certain areas. During the Organizational Renewal phase, there was a unit whose function was to steer and assist the organization through the change process (i.e. The Renewal Team). At the official termination of the Renewal phase (February, 1998), this unit became the Business Planning Unit.

In contrast to strategic planning, business planning denotes a very concrete measurement of whether organizational goals and objectives are realized. As one interviewee explains:

*Strategic planning...would be a more visionary approach to planning...[in terms of] where we'd like to see ourselves going in the next...three to five years. Business planning is the concrete, "How do we get there?" When we say we want to look like this, what does that look like? That looks like our crime rates are at this level and our clearance rates are at this level...those types of things....Business planning is a very purposeful, very methodical way of monitoring practical plans... It's done on a yearly basis (#9)*

This statement reflects the emphasis being made on *practical* knowledge production. In fact, the extent to which the OPP see themselves as a “business” in this regard is highlighted by the following interviewee:

*I just talked to a business person yesterday and they're not sitting there planning the next three years. The price of their product and the competition is so fierce that it's a day-to-day thing and I'm not against strategic planning or long-term planning, but so many things are changing (#12)*

For the OPP, and all other ministries, the main purpose of business planning is to establish a mechanism for ensuring that government service delivery is “accountable” to the public. As the OPP’s business plan of 1998-99 explains,

*the OPP has integrated a “business-like” planning process into its management practices... This business plan is our contract with the citizens of Ontario and responds directly to our communities’ identified needs and concerns... The Plan provides the organization with a blueprint for public safety and police service delivery. It assigns accountabilities to ensure that the public’s needs are met effectively, efficiently and economically (OPP, 1998e: 1)*

The contractual imagery in this passage highlights the degree to which a market-based conception of accountability has emerged, where the police are now being made directly accountable to communities as “customers” (see Chapter Five on this issue in more detail). The Business Plan prepared by the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services (1997-98) indicates that the OPP are to have “more direct local accountability” (MSGCS, 1998c). Therefore, it is clear that there has been an attempt, on the part of the Harris government, to reinvent accountability and to “marketize” governance relationships within the OPS and between the OPP and the citizenry.

The OPP’s first business plan was for 1998-1999. Apparently, there was not sufficient time in that year to develop a plan based on a comprehensive empirical knowledge and analysis of local issues, but subsequent plans would reflect a detailed process of community consultation. As one interviewee explains,

*The intention is that it be both top-down [and] bottom-up, and in fact [it's] very critical that it be both ways, because at the detachment level, they in fact are accountable, not only to the corporate hierarchy, but they are accountable to individual communities. So, the OPP cannot determine the local policing objectives – only the community who are our governing authorities at the local level. There has to be a meeting of the minds between our detachments and their communities as they're sorting through the individual community priorities...At the same time, there are provincial level issues, and we not only have a local policing mandate, but we have a provincial mandate as well (#3)*

This statement implies that the business planning process serves as a technology for aligning the objectives of different “governing authorities”. Specifically, once detachments determine their policing priorities in conjunction with their communities<sup>34</sup>, they feed this up to the regional level. Subsequent to that, a plan is developed to reflect the priorities of the particular region. Following that process, all five regions feed their individual plans to General Headquarters, which then creates an overall OPP business

plan. This plan is then submitted to the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services. The Ministry then considers the OPP's priorities in conjunction with other government priorities and then creates an overall Ministry business plan.

At the same time, business planning is a technology for enabling "government at a distance" (Rose and Miller, 1992) to occur. While local service delivery priorities are determined by the OPP, these priorities must be aligned with the service delivery priorities of the Ministry. Effectively, this allows the Ministry, and the provincial government more generally, to "steer" service delivery while leaving the "rowing" to the OPP.

As an example of the kinds of "organizational goals" that are listed in OPP business plans, consider the following excerpt from its 1998/99 plan:

- Goal 1: Quality Front Line Service Delivery – Meeting Community Public Safety Needs
- Goal 2: Efficient and Cost Effective Delivery of all Services
- Goal 3: Quality Delivery of Investigative Support Services – Meeting Community Public Safety Needs
- Goal 4: Quality Delivery of Provincial Services -Meeting Community Public Safety Needs
- Goal 5: Enhanced Public Safety through Emergency Response
- Goal 6: To Develop and Build on the Organization's Infrastructure Capacity to meet the Current and Future Service Delivery Demands
- Goal 7: The Right People in the Right Place, Appropriately Trained and Ready to meet our Current and Future Service Delivery Needs (OPP, 1998e: 3)

For each business planning goal, a series of measurable objectives are listed. Specific strategies are then indicated for each objective. The strategies indicated are subsequently broken down into specific initiatives at regional, bureau, detachment, section or unit levels (OPP, 1998d: 36). The purpose behind this process is to ensure that particular initiatives (organizational inputs) result in the achievement of broader organizational

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<sup>34</sup> The current means of acquiring input from communities is through various community groups and community policing committees.



objectives (outputs). The specific objectives associated with Goal 1, excerpted from the 1998-99 business plan are as follows:

- *Reduce the rate of property crime by 5%*
- *Maintain the OPP at or above the national property crime clearance rate*
- *Maintain the OPP at or above the national violent crime clearance rate*
- *Ontario's road fatalities in OPP jurisdiction be at or below the national fatality rate*
- *Maintain a high level of community satisfaction with OPP service delivery*
- *Increased use of OPP Auxiliary for community policing initiatives (excerpted from OPP, 1998e: 10)*

In sum, the initiation of business planning and performance measurement on the part of the Harris was a means of governing the OPP *as if it were a business*. When the OPP had undergone significant restructuring efforts, its main objective was to develop an institutional model that would support a new *internal* form of governance. Now, with the election of the Harris government, the OPP was now the *object* of an externally imposed form of market-based governance. It would now be “ruled at a distance” (see Rose and Miller, 1992) by a provincial government aimed at enhancing its steering capacities while fostering market-based or contractual relationships between the OPS and the citizenry. While a broad neo-liberal or new-managerial mentality can be discerned across the entire set of transformations depicted in this chapter, one can see that this mentality has been shaped and translated according to site-specific conditions, problematizations, and political agendas.

## **Conclusions**

One often sees a variety of specific transformations in governance being characterized under the over-arching sign of “neo-liberalism”, and the empirical story of this chapter is no exception. What this story reinforces, however, is the extent to which “neo-liberalism” is a rather imprecise “sign” as opposed to a tight analytic category.

Obviously, the governmentality-based focus on “neo-liberalism” as a broad “mentality” is able to draw attention to those broad shifts in governance that serve as a unifying sign for more site-specific transformations. In essence, a focus on mentalities allows one to piece together those “idealized schema for the ordering of social and economic life” (Miller and Rose, 1990, in O’Malley, 1996b: 149).

Notwithstanding the utility of this approach, the intention of this chapter was to begin an analysis of institutional reinvention from a different analytical starting point. Rather than beginning at the level of “mentalities” (or conversely, “technologies”), this study began with an analysis of how the institutional identity of one public policing organization came to be problematized, and the various processes of reinvention aimed at addressing these problematizations. In contrast to an idealized representation of the institution as it *now* exists, the intention of this chapter was to bring attention to the variety of processes associated with the construction of a new organizational identity. The intention was to demonstrate this “will to coherence” (Leman-Langlois, 1999), this continual effort on the part of managers to align new, ever-changing, and (largely) independent political, strategic, and economic priorities in the form of a new and coherent organizational and managerial structure. The art of managing is indeed an ongoing practical accomplishment driven by ingenuity and foresight. Therefore, by examining those processes associated with the (ongoing) creation of a new institutional model, we can begin to shed light on those “messy actualities” (Osborne, 1993; O’Malley and Palmer, 1996) that are largely neglected in a focus on mentalities.

In this vein, this study has served to highlight the importance of contingency in our analysis of how governmental forms are shaped. For example, the financial target

associated with the Social Contract shaped the degree to which the institution of the OPP was reinvented. The Social Contract also helped determine the timing and speed of the reinvention process, which may have taken longer were it not for this financial objective. Another contingency was the “institutional revolution” spearheaded by the Harris government. In contrast to the NDP government, this new government articulated a detailed institutional vision for the entire public sector, which was realized in practice through the development of certain forms of “rule at a distance” strategies. Each of these political events (the initiation of the Social Contract and the election of the Harris government) served to open up certain spaces or options for change while closing off others. This empirical study served to highlight the open-ended quality of governmental reinvention, where each specific institution or form is subject to a complex and unanticipated trajectory of change.

This chapter has also provided a basis for thinking about the interaction between discourse and agency. As discussed earlier, OPP managers were involved in an active and ongoing process of forging a coherent institutional identity through the alignment of diverse and largely independent sets of governmental objectives. The appropriation and translation of a new organizational metaphor was also an ongoing practical accomplishment of managers. OPP managers were not simply colonized by a new mentality of rule. Rather, in response to a new series of problematizations, OPP management chose from the range of discourses available to it in its attempt to translate a new “figurative logic” (Shearing and Ericson, 1991) into a new organizational and managerial structure. Agency was exercised considerably during this translation process. The OPP chose a particular blueprint for reinvention and tailored that blueprint in

particular ways and in concert with the new strategic vision of the organization. Hence, while one can still assume a non-humanist conception of agency (as Foucault did), one can still carve out that analytical space necessary for understanding the “freedom” of institutions and individuals to reinvent themselves. Foucault refers to this as a “politics of freedom”, defined as “an activity of self-constitution” (Dumm, 1996: 3).

If one were to draw one theme from this chapter it should be that processes of reinvention (and in this instance, institutional reinvention) are more “messy” than “ideal” and more “contingent” than “unilinear”. While an “idealized schema” or “mentality of rule” may be readily apparent to observers, one should supplement such an analysis with a detailed examination of that ongoing and practical work involved in the reinvention of governance.

## Chapter 4

### Re-making the Agent: Toward a "Learning Organization"

*"Organizational learning" – a less familiar term than education, training, or professional development – has only become a part of current learning theory, management theory, and management practice in the past 10 years. Using a holistic approach, this learning system is based upon the belief that in order to survive, every system, every organism, must continually renew itself. Although most organizations do this, their reactions are often far too slow to keep up with the pace of change in the surrounding environment...[M]embers of learning organizations are continuously learning, and the organizations are continually expanding their capacity to create their future through collective learning as well as through adaptive learning (Strategic Planning Committee on Police Training and Education, 1992, vol.13: 133-134).*

#### Introduction

While the previous chapter dealt with the question of how *institutions* are being reinvented, this chapter will address the question of how *agents* of governance are being reinvented. These two reinvention processes are not dissimilar, in the sense that agents (as well as institutions) must first be *re-imagined* through the use of new metaphors, imagery and language, and then *re-made* through particular techniques designed to translate these new ways of seeing into new ways of "acting upon".

The particular focus of this chapter is on the ways in which the policing agent is being re-constituted (and hence, re-governed) *through* a re-fashioning of his/her knowledge and capacities. As such, the themes of this chapter link directly with the themes of the previous chapters. To begin with, in the second chapter the notion of "governmental authority" was defined as the legitimate exercise of a particular set of capacities. Accordingly, having discussed the ways in which governmental authority is shifting, this current chapter will examine how governmental *capacities* have been re-thought and re-tooled in accordance with these shifts. At the same time, this examination must be linked with the themes that emerged out of Chapter Three, which focused on the

ways in which the OPP, as an *institution*, has been reinvented. In this chapter, we can examine the ways in which individual capacities are now being aligned with a newly formed institutional identity.

From a governmentality perspective, the re-constitution of individual subjectivity is an inevitable effect of a new mentality of rule and an associated set of new governmental objectives. For example, Cruikshank has examined programs for reconstituting subjectivities that are aimed at aligning individual wills and capacities with new governmental objectives (1994; see Cruikshank, 1996). In a similar vein, De Lint's work provides an analysis - through the window of Canadian police training reform - of the link between a neo-liberal or new managerialist mentality and the subjectivity of the constable. In his words, De Lint's work explores "the interrelationship between political rationalities and subjectivity", or "the technologies and subjectivities giving effect to rule" (1998: 261). His general findings were that agents have been "responsibilized" according to a "new managerialist ethic, as enterprising individuals who continuously adapt their competencies to changing demands in quickly saturated markets" (1998: 264). As enterprising subjects, agents are encouraged to produce "value" both through the development of particular "innate and learned competencies" as well as through their ability to engage in "'reflexive self-monitoring' on their progress" (Ibid., see du Gay, 1994: 673).

In the context of this observation, which supports the contention that there is a direct relationship between political rationalities and subjectivities, the purpose of this chapter is to focus on those precise "conditions of possibility" (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1997: 8) that have allowed new conceptions of the agent to enter into discourse. These

“conditions” are specifically those time- and space-specific “realities” and problematizations that have opened up new discursive and practical spaces for re-thinking the identity and role of the agent. Instead of beginning our analysis with an examination of new mentalities of rule and their effects on subjectivity formation, the intent of this chapter is to provide readers with a richer empirical and analytical understanding of that which makes it possible for new mentalities to emerge and take root.

In order to pursue this theoretical question, this chapter will focus empirically on the ways in which the idea of “continuous learning” has entered into public policing discourse in Ontario - and more particularly the Ontario Provincial Police - since the early 1990's. It will explore how this concept has emerged over time, and at different points during this time, as a means of re-fashioning the agent in accordance with new problematizations. It will also trace the changing articulations of “continuous learning” in the context of changing governmental problematizations.

By examining those “conditions of possibility” that have led to new conceptions of the agent, this chapter is aimed at extending and adding richness to the analytical frame of governmentality scholarship. Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter will highlight the importance of conducting site-specific analyses of how and when new mentalities become salient.

### **The 1974 Task Force on Policing in Ontario**

As early as 1974, when the Task Force Report on Policing in Ontario was published, the particular capacities and identities of police agents were criticized. The specific focus in this report was on the governance of constables and the ways in which

they were “motivated” to do their job. In essence, it argued that the militaristic institutional structure of the police was strategically out of alignment with the ways in which constables should be governed. It states,

*During the first half of this century, policing in Ontario came to be heavily influenced by military personalities and military structures. Ranks and disciplinary systems were styled on the military model, and the concept of **command** was adopted as the administrative style for most forces. This approach lay behind many of the improvements in Ontario policing introduced during that time. It brought about a uniformity of policing and improved standards and forced objectivity on the part of police officers. It gave forces the ability to deploy men swiftly and efficiently to meet crisis situations. But there are new requirements today. The command structure implies that the important decisions are taken at senior levels, and that officers in the field follow orders – that is inconsistent with modern requirements for role (Task Force on Policing in Ontario, 1974: 20; emphasis in original)*

The “modern requirements” of policing that the Task Force spoke of were two-fold. The first one was urbanization, which was expected to produce changes in culture and norms, as well as intensify social conflict and increase the alienation of individual citizens. The complexity of collective life would therefore serve to complicate the decision-making processes of constables. The second factor that the Report referred to was economics (Ibid: 11). Specifically, it predicted that public policing was becoming more and more expensive, and that “current methods and approaches to police service cannot be afforded in the decade ahead” (Ibid., 11). The report concluded that “these two factors indicate the need for a clarification of police role and changes in administration and methods” (Ibid., 12).

In contrast to a military style of governance, the Task Force advocated a model of “constable-centred management” (Ibid., 20). Rather than being passive recipients of commands from higher ranks in the organizations, constables should develop the skills and knowledge required for making more informed judgements at the front-line level. In



the same vein, officers should have a clear sense of purpose in the communities they policed by playing an important role in the determination of policing objectives and strategies. This constable-centred model would ensure that the field experience and practical knowledge of constables had an impact on the policies and strategies determined by the organization as a whole (Ibid., 21). In a rather prophetic manner, the Task Force adds that this model

*implies flattened hierarchies, greater delegation, group problem-solving, shortened communication channels to bring problems and solutions upward, and places the onus on constable teams to bring forward recommendations for policy change. This approach to police management draws upon a more complete concept of motivation. Instead of reliance on sanctions, it recognizes officers' needs for involvement with their peers, for approval of their colleagues and relies on their need for achievement in their professional role (Ibid., 21)*

This constable-centred management approach was touted as the solution to both the problems of urbanization and economics, which, according to the Task Force, had the potential of reaching crisis proportions in Ontario. It would foster innovation and sensitivity in constables and “has the potential for focusing police efforts on the highest priority community needs... This, we believe, is a key to higher real productivity” (Ibid., 21).

At the higher ranking roles within the policing organization, this new constable-centred approach would entail a new conception of the police leader. Rather than a command and control style of management, leaders should foster more dialogue in relation to organizational objectives and methods. Incident-oriented policing would give way to team-oriented policing, and coaching and problem-solving methods should come to replace disciplinary techniques. The Task Force describes this overall approach as “management-by-objectives” (Ibid., 22).

This new image of the agent that the Task Force was portraying was not given any significant concrete effect in the aftermath of their Report. This comes as no surprise, given that the two issues of “urbanization” and “economics” were, for police departments, more abstract than “real” and more of a future potentiality than an immediate concern. As we’ve seen in the previous chapters however, both of these issues ultimately became very “real” for the OPP, both from a strategic as well as an institutional perspective. Specifically, we saw in Chapter Two how the very real problematic of demographic pluralization opened up space for a new community policing orientation to emerge. Secondly, we saw the ways in which the “fiscal crisis” came to have immediate consequences for the OPP’s established organizational and managerial structure. One could argue that the Task Force’s recommendations were made twenty years too early, and without the right “conditions of possibility” that would enable them to be more than just abstract reflections. As we will see, the various ideas conveyed by the Task Force emerged approximately twenty years later as a response to a new set of realities and problematics for policing organizations in Ontario. It wasn’t until the early 1990’s, and the work of the Strategic Planning Committee on Police Training and Education, that similar problematics to those raised by the Task Force - affecting the identity and role of policing agents - re-surfaced.

### **The Strategic Planning Committee on Police Training and Education: A Police Learning System for Ontario**

In December 1990, the Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General set out to develop a ten-year strategic plan for an Ontario police “learning system”. An important catalyst for this initiative was the new philosophical direction embodied in the legislative

shift to the *Police Services Act* of 1990. As explained in Chapter 2, the transition from the *Police Act* to the *Police Services Act* marked a shift in strategic orientation for police services in Ontario. The new *Act* was intended “to strengthen the links between the police and their surrounding communities” (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, vol.13: 30). As such, the *Act* provided particular directives regarding the development of police/community partnerships and the “service” orientation of police. This was reflected in particular in the directives relating to employment equity and the requirement of chiefs or detachment commanders to provide “community-oriented” forms of policing (Ibid). Given the ways in which the governmental authority of the police was being re-articulated at this time (see Chapter Two’s discussion on “wave one” of community policing), it would follow that the capacities of policing agents would also have to be re-thought. In essence, an effect of the shift to forms of community policing - which occurred for a variety of reasons that were addressed in Chapter Two - was that there would now be a tension between the strategic objectives of Ontario police departments and the individual competencies of policing agents. Accordingly, a re-alignment between individual wills and competencies and governmental objectives would have to take place.

In this context, the Strategic Planning Committee on Police Training and Education was established in order to address, in a systemic fashion, long-term issues relating to police training. (1992, vol. 13: 5). The Committee’s mission was to “develop a comprehensive strategic plan for training, education and development of police personnel in Ontario for the next decade”. This strategic plan would reinforce the broad emphasis on the “needs of the community”, while at the same time ensuring that current forms of training are designed and delivered in a “cost-efficient and cost-effective

manner” (Strategic Planning Committee on Police Training and Education, 1992, vol. 13: 6). Interestingly, this dual emphasis on community policing and cost-effectiveness that buttressed the work of the Strategic Planning Committee served as an acknowledgement of those problematics identified by the 1974 Task Force. Specifically, the intention of the Strategic Planning Committee to promote close community-police relations and to consider the financial implications of police training were consistent with the twenty-year-old recommendations of the Task Force.

Obviously, those “modern requirements” of policing (i.e. the financing of public policing as well as demographic pluralization) that were flagged by the Task Force emerged as a pressing “reality” in the early 1990’s for the Ministry of the Solicitor General and its newly established Strategic Planning Committee. After having assessed existing training and development methods in the context of emergent trends in the external environment of the province, the Committee concluded that “Ontario is currently entering a phase in its history unequalled in *rapidity of change*” (1992, vol.9: 15; italics added).<sup>35</sup> One of the trends they identified was the emergence of a new *dual* system of

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<sup>35</sup> This *training* in the skills of *law enforcement* (i.e. within the professional paradigm) consists of the following components:

1. Pre- Ontario Police College (OPC): Recruits receive self-study packages prepared by the O.P.C., and for the larger police services, this would be followed by one to three weeks of formal training by the police service which hired them.
2. Ontario Police College: A 47-day course devoted to the development of specific skills in areas such as powers of arrest, provincial statutes, the *Criminal Code*, search and seizure, etc...
3. Post-Ontario Police College: This involves training at the “home” police service. This can include a combination of classroom training and field training under the supervision of a coach officer.
4. Intermediate: This is a two-week course at OPC designed to update officers on federal and provincial statutes.
5. Application: On-the-job learning while working for one’s police service. Can be combined with period training courses provided either in-house or at O.P.C (Strategic Planning Committee: 1992, vol.13: 39-40).

The training Academy at the Ontario Provincial Police provides general and specific courses relating to skills at the field level (OPP, 1998g: 4). For instance, it offers an in-house training program consisting of such courses as: recruit orientation, patrol training for supervisors, criminal investigations, and highway drug interdiction (OPP, 1998f). The Academy also sends candidates to the Ontario Police College in Aylmer and the Canadian Police College in Ottawa (O.P.P., 1998g: 4).

accountability (i.e. ethical *and* financial). The traditional notion of police accountability, that is, being able to account for the actions of officers (i.e. ethical accountability) has become particularly significant in light of the various formal and informal oversight bodies, established through legislation or the political process, to oversee police behavior. At the same time, a second form of accountability has become more central, and refers to those mechanisms which serve to justify “the means, policies and procedures which characterise the operational environment of policing and for the establishment of priorities for allocation of resources” (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, vol. 9: 6,8).

This re-conceptualization of accountability emerged as a response to the increasingly limited financial resources in the public sector, and this was discussed in the two previous chapters in relation to the “fiscal crisis” in Ontario. According to the Strategic Planning Committee, public police organizations, in addition to their other counterparts in the public service, were being faced with an “increasingly constrained fiscal environment” (1992, vol. 9: 6). This shift was driven in part by an increasing lack of confidence on the part of the public in the ability of government to manage their financial resources wisely (also discussed previously). According to the Committee, the traditional tactic of increasing taxes to offset public demand was no longer politically feasible (Ibid., 9). This theme can be traced to Chapter Two, where criticisms of the strategic effectiveness of the police (under the professional model) was compounded by the provincial fiscal crisis (a trend which the 1974 Task Force had forecasted).

Another trend identified by the Committee (and again, which was forecasted by the 1974 Task Force) was the increasing diversity of communities and interests that the

police were now facing. A variety of demographic changes were projected to intensify over the decade, resulting in shifts in the nature of police calls and the social/cultural contexts within which responses to these calls would be interpreted.<sup>36</sup> Due to such changes, the Committee argued that the police would necessarily have increased contact with vulnerable populations. The ways in which the police responded to such groups would also come under increased scrutiny by third parties such as interest groups. (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, Vol. 9: 11). Again, this problematic relating to race relations – and the development of a subsequent brand of community policing - was discussed in Chapter Two.

According to the Strategic Planning Committee, the race relations issue was coupled with the need for police departments to become more *service-oriented*, and we saw the ways in which this notion of “service” was taken up by the OPP in Chapter Two. Specifically, the Committee argued that the quality of police contacts with the public would be of primary importance in the 1990’s. They stated that “a quality experience results from the adequacy of the fit between the service provided and the expectations formed of that service in the course of the *service contract*” (Ibid., 12; italics added). The Committee concluded that “[p]olice must begin by putting into place interactive and valid processes to establish some consensus with their communities as to their needs and the essential role and mandate of police” (1992, vol.9: 12). Similar to the OPP’s approach to community policing in “wave one” and onwards, the Strategic Planning Committee was placing an emphasis on gaining the “consensus” of communities in the delivery of

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<sup>36</sup> A major demographic change has been the larger flow of immigrants with culturally diverse backgrounds, particularly in urban areas. Poverty rates among young and single parent families were projected to increase as well. Also, with a higher proportion of physically and psychologically disabled living in the community, the pressure on social service agencies were projected to increase (Ibid., 10-11).

policing services. At the same time, however, it was deploying the market-based imagery of “contracts” and emphasizing the need to tailor services, or to find a “fit” between the services that are provided and the services that are expected.

These new trends, which amounted to new problematics for Ontario policing (i.e. accountability, resources, demographics, and service delivery) were argued to have major implications for the education, training, and development of police employees at all levels (Ibid., 12). First and foremost, the Committee argued that police organizations should develop an “*internal readiness for change*”. Techniques such as environmental scanning and program evaluation (discussed in the previous chapter) would become essential. Community consultation is another skill that police would have to develop. This involves a continual process of developing a consensus in each community with regard to the mandate of the police and their priorities. A tighter focus on police resources and a possible delimitation of their activities would also require that police coordinate their activities with other organizations through mechanisms such as purchase of service agreements or contracts. Police would also be required to network with other organizations and share information (Ibid., 13).

The focus of the Committee was therefore on those *capacities* that needed to be created in order to respond to an external environment characterized by rapidity of change. As it stood, the Committee was observing a tension between new governmental objectives and old governmental capacities. In order to resolve this tension at the level of the agent, the Strategic Planning Committee contended that the police would have to make significant changes in both the areas of *what* they learn and *how* they learn. Specifically, the Committee argued that one core capacity would need to be developed,

and this was the capacity to be *flexible and adaptable*. The best means of creating this capacity, according to the Committee, was to focus on *hands-on learning*. Specifically, there should be a shift away from classroom learning toward *continuous life-long learning* (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, Vol. 9: 14). This, of course, paralleled Hammer and Champy's emphasis on the importance of continuous learning (1993; see Chapter Three).

In their efforts to create a learning model that would be tailored to the exigencies of policing, the Committee looked elsewhere for examples of blueprints. Specifically, it conducted research on learning systems in other sectors, including the private sector, the teaching and nursing professions, and the Ontario and Federal governments. Their quest to look for models elsewhere was based on an assumption that institutions within both the public *and* private sectors faced the same external environment. They stated that,

*From a broad perspective, it is the environment that drives an organization, not the organization itself. Police organizations are no different. Policing must be able to determine the environmental forces that will affect how it will function in the future, particularly in terms of developing its human resources (1992, vol. 13: 65)*

With this in mind, the Committee examined those cutting-edge approaches in other sectors which challenged traditional conceptions of learning and which emphasized the notion of "learning" rather than "training" (Ibid., 66). What the Committee found was that "continuous learning" practices were being developed in a variety of institutions as a means toward enhanced organizational *competitiveness*. Even public sector bureaucracies had appropriated the market-based metaphor of "competition" as a "figurative logic" (Shearing and Ericson, 1991) for thriving in a period of fiscal restraint and rapidity of change. The Committee concluded that "[e]ffective training and labour force development systems are now known to be one of the fundamental elements of a



nation's ability to compete internationally and to ensure economic prosperity...No segment of the economy, and least of all the public sector, can afford to trail behind in this effort" (Ibid., 14). In other words, the Committee recognized that the development of a particular kind of human agent was a means toward the broader end of organizational productivity and efficiency. This kind of agent was described as the "lifelong learner" (Ibid., 65).

Similar to what the OPP had done in its quest for a new organizational model (discussed in Chapter Three), the Strategic Planning Committee examined organizational learning models that were found in the private sector. In the Committee's report on "Private Sector Learning Initiatives", there was a detailed overview of the various shifts occurring in the private sector. Particular corporations were examined which had a "progressive reputation in terms of learning, education and development initiatives" (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, vol. 5: 3). According to the Committee, it was essential to examine new developments in private sector learning strategies because they would necessarily be cost-effective, and of course a cost-effective learning strategy was one of the primary objectives of the Committee. This research led the Committee to conclude that particular corporations were in the process of driving a "culture shift among their employees with the belief that employee personal development is a prerequisite to business success in the 1990's" (*Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, vol. 5: 8*). In essence, the corporations the Committee studied were attempting to reinvent their agents by embedding a new *ethos* throughout the organization.

The Committee examined such companies as the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, IMB Canada, Molson Breweries and General Electric (1992, vol. 13), and

found that there were a series of common technologies across these institutions in their efforts to reinvent the agent (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, vol.5: 34-35). The first technology was organizational *delaying*, a structural shift that was described in the previous chapter. In the context of the previous chapter, delaying was a technology for reducing administrative burden and overlap in the organization, hence increasing cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Since a large number of middle managers were deemed to be a source of cost-ineffectiveness, the OPP eliminated certain middle management functions. At the same time, however, delaying is also a technology for re-constituting the worker. Specifically, the flattening of an organizational structure serves to bring workers closer to their “customers” and their needs. Organizational delaying is a means of shortening the literal and figurative distance between organizational inputs and organizational outputs, which renders the agent more cognizant of those processes that link means with ends or results. This is a technology for changing the identity of the worker from one who is task-oriented or means-oriented to one who is product-oriented.

The Committee also observed that private corporations have shifted from the idea of “training” to the idea of “learning”. Some corporations have now focused on “self-directed learning” programs which replace the class/lecture format of learning by practical or applied learning strategies. Such strategies are buttressed by a critique of theoretical forms of knowledge and a preference for practical forms of knowledge. In harnessing their practical, local and experiential knowledge through self-directed learning, workers are building the capacity to be flexible and adaptable to changing internal and external circumstances.

Another technology associated with current private sector learning programs involves “team building” exercises. As we saw in the context of community policing, the formation of “teams” was deemed to be an effective means of acquiring consistent knowledge of community needs as well as fostering the desire to satisfy community needs. Thus, team building strategies are aimed at generating employee commitment to the achievement of certain results. In contrast to a hierarchical structure associated with the professional paradigm, the horizontal arrangement of team policing fosters responsibility and enterprise within each agent. By fostering innovation among agents, money is saved through the elimination of certain command and control structures. The emphasis on results-oriented teams is associated with a shift away from the task-oriented, or means-centred worker, as agents are reconceived as “producers” who represent “added value” to the organization.

The Committee also observed that some corporations were promoting horizontal mobility within their organizations. Instead of a quest to rise up through the organizational hierarchy, upward mobility is now based on one’s experience in various business divisions within the organization. Having gained a well-rounded set of competencies, such an agent will have a better understanding of the broader objectives of the organization. This worker will also have a better understanding of various organizational inputs and their relationship to various organizational outputs. This provides the worker with the capacity to flag sources of inefficiency, duplication and overlap. In this regard, the Committee noted that corporations were focusing on *multi-skilling*. Since the success of organizations in the 1990’s is based on their ability to be *lean and effective*, multi-skilling is being promoted. Once again, in place of the task-

oriented worker, the re-constituted worker is one with a variety of skills (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, vol.5: 34-35). The current emphasis on the “generalist” constable, as depicted in Chapter Two, can be said to parallel this broader shift toward the new agent as one who can address a range of customer needs with a range of skills.

The Strategic Planning Committee endorsed these technologies for the re-constitution of the agent because they were cost-effective, and the Committee went so far as to suggest that this organizational learning approach would be the “key to survival in the 1990’s” (1992, vol. 13: 73). Not only were the police required to be fiscally prudent with regard to their strategic initiatives (as we saw in the previous two chapters), but the Committee stressed the need for the police to be optimally cost-effective in the development of their employees. This new governmental objective is articulated here by the Committee.

*[P]olice organizations will be required to alter their methods to maximize cost-effectiveness in providing learning opportunities. Businesses are incorporating a hands-on approach, emphasizing learning on the job. This process decreases the actual cost of training and increases the relevancy of the material being taught. The police will be required to adopt similar methods, to meet their needs as well as those of the public (1992, vol.13: 100)*

What the Committee is implying in this statement is that organizational needs as well as the needs of the public can be simultaneously met through the adoption of cost-effective learning strategies. We saw this kind of alignment between different objectives in Chapter Two when we discussed how a market-based conception of community policing emerged as a strategy for simultaneously addressing community needs as well as the fiscal imperatives of the policing organization. It is most likely that had the fiscal crisis not occurred in this province, less space would have been opened up for developing

either a market-based conception of community policing or a market-based conception of the agent.

Having re-imaged the agent as a “producer” for policing institutions, the Strategic Planning Committee advocated an approach to learning that would maximize the level of productivity of the agent. Interestingly, the Committee repeatedly stressed that individual capacities and knowledge must represent “added value” for the organization. This was imperative, they say, due to an increasingly *competitive* global environment which threatened the sustainability of private *and* public institutions, such as the police. The Committee states:

*This study is motivated by the present world context of competition and recession, in which education must be perceived as adding value to the organization. The research focuses on methods to assess the direct and tangible effect of education on employee motivation and productivity by examining “best practices” in the literature and within five selected organizations...Learning within organizations needs to have a direct and tangible impact on employee motivation and productivity (1992, vol. 7: 1,3)*

In a similar vein to the OPP’s quest (examined in the previous chapter) to find a blueprint for successful organizational change, we see that the Strategic Planning Committee, in its quest for a new learning model, sought out examples of “best practices” – that is, examples of learning strategies that have proven, in practice, to be successful. The Committee was not simply interested in acquiring or developing a new learning “theory”, but wanted to make sure that certain programs actually “worked”. This supports the observation made earlier that there is a general trend toward the privileging of practical, rather than theoretical, forms of knowledge.

The “continuous learning” approach is aimed at ensuring that individual and organizational mistakes are not repeated, and the Committee argued that traditional training programs did not encourage individuals and organizations to be reflective about

mistakes that were being made (Ibid., 3). The ability to “self audit”, or as De Lint observed, the ability to engage in “reflexive self-monitoring” (1998: 264; from du Gay, 1994: 673), was a capacity that would enable individuals to examine new methods of satisfying the public. This continual satisfaction of the public was touted as a key to organizational success. The Committee argued that “a professional organization is one that continually audits its methods and practices to maintain continuous improvement. We as policing professionals must adopt this culture to maintain the public respect that we now enjoy” (1992, vol. 5: 38). So, the Committee was arguing that a new ethos needed to be cultivated within policing institutions in order to re-gain or enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of their “customers”. In other words, policing institutions would be more legitimate if they were flexible, continually adaptable, and always “on top” of customer demand.

The Committee therefore came to the general conclusion that policing institutions should make a shift away from a “training” organization to a “learning organization” (1992, vol.5: 38). The use of market-based metaphors is apparent in the Committee’s emphasis on “competition” and in their contention that both private *and* public institutions would have to find effective ways of being competitive. “Organizational learning” was a technology for being successfully competitive in a world plagued by constant change. We can see here how these new “realities” identified by the Committee echo those same “realities” that were identified by Hammer and Champy, and ultimately, the OPP.

The Committee was influenced by the work of Peter Senge, an organizational learning advocate, in the same way that the OPP had been influenced by the work of

Hammer and Champy. This fact serves to highlight the degree to which a much broader mentality has emerged across private sector and public sector circles as well as the particular ways in which this mentality is finding its way into the area of public policing. Senge's influence on the Strategic Planning Committee is reflected in the following passage:

*Today, the concept of developing "organizational learning" capacity is becoming recognized as a key factor in maintaining the "only sustainable competitive advantage" (Senge, 1990: 4). Survival, whether in the not-for-profit or private sectors, is increasingly being viewed as directly related to an organization's ability to encourage, enhance and utilize learning at all levels. The extent to which an organization is not only able to provide such opportunities, but also to assess the impact of this learning on day to day operations, will be a major determinant of success in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, vol. 7: 3)*

Having advocated a general "organizational learning" approach, the committee argued specifically that agents at all levels of police organizations must begin to think about their roles differently (1992, vol.13: 125). Specifically, it stated that "organizations around the world are discovering that remaining competitive within a rapidly changing environment entails supporting and implementing the idea that employees at all levels are partners in attaining the organization's goals and objectives" (Ibid). This statement supports De Lint's observation that leading edge organizations are now exploring ways of ensuring that workers "manifest pro-organizational values" (1998: 264). In order to ensure this alignment between individual competencies and values and organizational competencies and values, organizational learning programs place the responsibility for learning at three levels: individual, team and group.

At the individual level, each agent must be engaged in "purposeful learning", that is, learning which is aligned with the needs of the organization (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, vol.13: 134). In other words, each individual is required to learn "on

behalf of the organization” (cited in Ibid). At the team or group level, individuals are to work in small collectives in order to share their learning and their insights, as well as reflect upon ways in which to enhance their own effectiveness and hence, that of the organization (Ibid., 134-135). The “team” structure serves to promote a sense of connectivity between individual tasks and group outcomes. As De Lint comments, “[i]n contrast to the foundational exclusions and subjectivity splitting of the bureaucratic worker, the worker in a new managerialist organization is made whole again through the work-based participatory technologies such as work teams...” (1998: 265).

At the organizational level, the institution as a whole must articulate a common purpose or vision that is understood and “owned” by all employees. Learning strategies must then be systematically linked with the achievement of organizational objectives. Mechanisms must also be created which apprise all employees of organizational performance (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, vol.13: 134).

According to the Committee, organizational learning is also premised on a different conception of “expertise”. Rather than deferring problems to either bureaucratic or outside “experts”, the actual people involved in particular issues are to engage in an “active research” approach to problem-solving. Once again, there is an emphasis made on practical forms of knowledge and a de-privileging of theoretical forms of knowledge that used to be associated with “expertise”. All components of the organization, in its day-to-day operations are to become responsible for learning. No longer is learning the exclusive domain of training sections or police academies (1992, Vol. 13: Ibid., 136). This contention that the responsibility for learning should be embedded throughout the organization, rather than just under the purview of the police academy, reflects a



“responsibilization” approach, where agents are to be made responsible for harnessing their knowledge and capacities, as well as determining which capacities they need to develop (see De Lint, 1998).

Having identified the need to develop a “holistic learning system”, the Committee put forward a specific set of Learning System principles.<sup>37</sup> To begin with, the Committee argued that because organizations and individuals must have the capacity for flexibility, learning programs should not always be developed retrospectively. Since the environment within which the police operate will be a continual “moving target”, personnel must be able to prepare themselves for future policing requirements (Ibid., 160). A police organization must “continuously anticipate new challenges and adjust itself in preparation to meet them” (Ibid). The second principle links up with the first one. A mechanism should be established which would allow for the continual examination of societal trends and future policing issues. Such information must then be translated into learning programs in order to prepare personnel for the future (Ibid., 161).

The accountability of the Learning System was emphasized as well, in terms of assessing the value of the learning experience for the workplace setting. The emphasis on in-class evaluations would be reduced in favour of acquiring direct feedback from

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<sup>37</sup> The Strategic Planning Committee outlined eight principles which would support the Mission of the Police Learning System:

- (a) The Learning System will be flexible, relevant, and will anticipate the challenges it must face.
- (b) The Learning System will base its decisions on rigorous research on societal trends, current and future policing issues, and the resulting learning requirements.
- (c) The Learning System will be fair and accessible, geographically and financially.
- (d) The Learning System will be accountable and open to continuous evaluation.
- (e) The Learning System will achieve results in a cost-effective manner.
- (f) The Learning System will ensure co-ordination of police learning opportunities among police services and with the learning opportunities of other appropriate public- and private-sector personnel.
- (g) The Learning System will provide for community involvement in its design, delivery, and evaluation.
- (h) The Learning System will be innovative and creative, and will reflect the best approaches to adult learning (cited directly from Strategic Planning Committee, 1992: Vol. 13: 159).

learners and managers regarding the impact that the learning experience had on their workplace performance (Ibid., 163).

The Committee also specified the kinds of capacities that police agents should have. For example, they should primarily have “soft” skills rather than “hard” skills, which refers to the ability of agents to be service-oriented as opposed to being “impersonal, objective, dispassionate, and detached”, a trait which De Lint associated with the “bureaucratic” organizational paradigm ( De Lint, 1998: 265). As the Committee indicated, police organizations should be “less bureaucratic or detached and more concerned with community involvement; in short, police organizations are predicted to be more outward-looking” (*Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, Vol. 13: 181*)

The final chapter of the Strategic Planning Committee’s final report is devoted to suggesting some concrete ways in which the concept of organizational learning can be translated in a policing environment. The Committee defined a “learning organization” as

*an organization capable of continuously thinking and learning...[one which] consciously and methodically looks upwards and outwards to its environment and its political and social relationships so that it can integrate these into its offerings to its consumers, yet also looks downwards to its internal productivity and efficiencies, and is capable of integrating the whole through a learning/planning process within an elegant organizational design (cited in 1992, vol.13: 252)*

There are two key components to this definition: a focus on customer satisfaction and a focus on a “holistic” organization. This notion of holism is associated with a “systems-thinking” ethos, whereby individual decision-making is based on a broad understanding of the organization’s practices (Ibid., 254). The direct linkage being forged between

individual identities and capacities and institutional identities and capacities is reflected in the following passage from the Committee's report:

*Organizational learning refers to learning at the system level rather than the individual level. Organizations are created because the task is too large or complex for one individual. To accomplish this greater task, each individual within the organization must have a level of competence; likewise the organization as a whole must have a competence (Ibid., also cited in De Lint, 1998: 273)*

In order to develop a holistic understanding of the organization, the Committee recommended various initiatives, including lateral transfers and secondments, creating mission statements and values, and the creation of cross-functional teams who coordinate the work of various departmental units (Strategic Planning Committee, 1992, Vol. 13: 254-255).

The Committee also stressed the importance of "unlearning" organizational memory, whereby organizations must stop rewarding practices which are no longer deemed relevant to organizational success (Ibid., 258-259). In order for this to occur, employees must question the operating assumptions of their organizations, and in some cases, they may determine that such assumptions are outdated (Ibid., 261).

Since policing organizations should "apply the principles of organizational learning to the maximum extent possible" (Ibid., 263), the Committee recommended that the concept of organizational learning be incorporated as an essential element of the curriculum at different levels, and that middle managers, being "the point of greatest leverage in any organization", should become champions of this new approach. (Ibid).

According to De Lint, the Ontario Police College (OPC) has established a Police Learning System Unit designed to facilitate the implementation of the Strategic Planning Committee's proposed Learning System. As well, the OPC hired a Deputy Director to

serve as a liaison to an Advisory Committee that was established to assist in the System's implementation. Learning equivalencies were being established and the Executive Development Institute, designed to provide management training to executives, was under development. Manager and executive courses were being developed, and computer-based training modules were being piloted. In addition, a Research and Evaluation Unit was being established (De Lint, 1997: 251; De Lint, 1998).

The Strategic Planning Committee recommended the establishment of a Police Learning System Board that would direct learning requirements beginning with "police foundations", (involving two years of college or university), and ending with the Executive Development Institute. To the end of developing their "soft skills", future police officers would be required, within the PLS, to take a two-semester course in social sciences, referred to as "police foundations". This foundational learning would be a requirement for hire within Ontario police organizations. The candidates would then be required to attend the Ontario Police College in order to acquire training on police procedures. Upon completion of this training, officers would then train at their home agency in order to gain an understanding of the organization and its operations. Within 24 months of attending the Ontario Police College, recruits would return to the academy for a 10-day course tailored to their individual needs (De Lint, 1998: 272).

De Lint explains that the "PLS's oversight encompasses the formal and informal learning of police trainees or learners, and conceives the learning jurisdiction as including the workplace, the community and educational institutions" (Ibid). This oversight structure represents a shift away from the police academy as the exclusive hub for learning toward a broader network of institutions and auspices engaged in developing

learning strategies/programs. As De Lint explains, "the PLS recasts training as 'lifelong learning' and utilizes not only existing educational facilities and teachers in this learning provision (through equivalency), but also co-workers, supervisors and managers as adjuncts to the OPC and in-service trainers" (Ibid).

In order to cultivate an organizational holism, and to forge the linkage between individual capacities and institutional capacities, the PLS promotes activities such as lateral transfers and secondments, the creation of mission statements, and the development of cross-functional teams. It also encourages police departments to bring in "outsiders" to participate in research and development, presumably because such people would serve to introduce new ideas and perhaps worldviews, and may perhaps encourage "insiders" to question some of their operating assumptions. In the spirit of continuous improvement, the PLS also promotes the use of benchmarking and planned policy and procedural reviews (De Lint, 1998: 273).

Given the thrust of the Police Learning System, one could conclude that it is most significant for the ways in which it has re-imagined, in De Lint's words, the "landscape of police training and learning" (1998: 273). Having re-located the responsibility for learning beyond the institutional boundaries of the police academy, the PLS is serving as a sustained critique of the theoretical, static and impersonalized forms of expertise associated with the bureaucratic and professional policing paradigm. Having re-imagined "knowledge" as a value-adding commodity, the PLS reflects an attempt to harness different forms of knowledge that can be harnessed to the end of enhanced customer satisfaction as well as continuous improvement. The discursive shift away from

“training” to “learning” is a means of responding to an environment characterized by rapidity of change as well as diverse and shifting customer expectations.

While the Strategic Planning Committee had deployed market-based imagery in depicting a series of new problematics, including that of “competition”, the PLS represents a rather limited appropriation of “continuous learning” discourse. The main characteristic of the PLS is that it places more of an emphasis on “soft skills” and places less of an emphasis on the academy as the sole hub of training. In essence, it is a system for promoting the cost-effective development of community policing skills. As De Lint puts it, “the PLS offers an amalgamation of new managerialist and community policing discourses in the concept of “organizational learning”” (1998: 272). This most likely stems from the fact that among the range of new governmental problematics identified by the Strategic Planning Committee, some were more “real” than others from the perspective of individual police organizations. For example, we saw in Chapter Two that for the OPP in the early 1990’s the issue of demographic pluralization had very real consequences for their strategic approach. At the same time, the fiscal crisis was beginning to emerge, so the OPP knew it would have to do more with less. It is not surprising, therefore, that the PLS promotes a shift away from an exclusive focus on *law enforcement training* toward cost-effective learning opportunities.

It is most likely the case that the Strategic Planning Committee’s emphasis on “organizational learning” as a means of also being *competitive* represented a more abstract objective for policing organizations at the time. Accordingly, the market-based conception of “organizational learning” deployed by the Committee was only taken up to a certain extent. As we will see, however, the need to become *competitive* ultimately did

emerge as a very real objective for the Ontario Provincial Police, and the broader Ontario policing community as a whole. Accordingly, the concept of “organizational learning” acquired a new and acute significance. This would have new implications for the ways in which “organizational learning” discourse was appropriated and translated.

As the OPP began seeing itself as a community policing *business* (as discussed in the previous two chapters), the idea of “organizational learning” became particularly relevant for them. While “organizational learning” had been accepted as an effective approach to the cultivation of capacities for doing community policing, it increasingly came to be recognized as a strategy for re-making the agent in the OPP’s new self-image as a *market-based organization*. This next section will demonstrate how the concept of the “continuous learner” became increasingly extended according to the metaphors, imagery and language of the market.

### **Re-imagining the Agent in the OPP**

In a 1993 Directional Statement, the Commissioner of the OPP voiced his support for the recommendations of the Strategic Planning Committee on Police Training and Education, as well as his desire to implement those recommendations within the OPP. While noting that these recommendations served to reinforce the principles of the *Police Services Act*, Commissioner O’Grady highlighted the fact that the Police Learning System “anticipates, responds to and integrates the evolving needs and priorities of the community”, and “fosters the confidence and support of the community and addresses the needs and aspirations of recruits, supervisors, and mid and senior managers” (OPP, 1993b: 8). Therefore, the Commissioner stressed how important the PLS was for

building those individual and organizational capacities needed to do community policing effectively.

Of the various problematics identified by the Strategic Planning Committee, the Commissioner made a particular emphasis on the need for the OPP to respond to a continuously changing external environment. The Commissioner stated that the OPP must develop the capacities to "focus on the future" and to ensure that its institution was accountable and responsive to members of the public (OPP, 1993b). However, in order for this shift in focus to occur, it would be essential to alter the "attitudes, behaviour, knowledge, and motivation of each employee, civilian and uniformed" (Ibid., 3). Accordingly, the organization would have to support the *continuous development* of each employee (1994c; italics added). He argued that the OPP "must pursue creative strategies to deal with...how we prepare our employees for the future by focusing on their continuous improvement" (Ibid). This overall problematic informed the work of the Employee Selection and Competency Development Sub-Project Team<sup>38</sup> which was established during the OPP's Organizational Review and Renewal Process (depicted in Chapter 3). As discussed in the previous chapter, the Organizational Review reflected an attempt to reinvent the institution of the OPP in the image of a market-based institution involved in the business of community policing. The Employee Selection and Competency Development Sub-Project Team was established in order to assess current learning programs in the OPP, and to determine whether these programs were serving to cultivate the kinds of individual capacities now required for doing the business of community policing effectively.

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<sup>38</sup> As indicated in Chapter 2, Employee Selection and Competency Development was identified as one of ten "business process" that were to be "reengineered" during the Organizational Renewal.



*The Employee Selection and Competency Development Sub-Project Team: Findings on Learning*

The mandate of the Employee Selection and Competency Development Sub-Project Team was to examine all areas of education, training and development ranging from employee selection to performance evaluation. The team discovered that for both civilian and uniform employees, such processes were sporadic, inefficient and ineffective in certain areas. In general, they found that there was a pre-occupation with mandated training needs based on a “reactive” conception of learning (OPP, 1994b: 12). This “reactive” approach was therefore in tension with the Commissioner’s notion of “focusing on the future”. In particular, the sub-project team found that “principles of organizational learning or available and emerging technologies and techniques for distance delivery were seldom utilized” (Ibid).

In terms of uniform recruits, the team found that there was a focus on formal training programs, both at the Ontario Police College and at the Provincial Police Academy, but with very little focus on orienting their recruits to become “career learners” (1994b: 86). As such, the team recommended that the OPP, including its Academy, rethink its role in the development of workers. The team recommended, for example, that the OPP “seek the assistance of experts outside the OPP to garner their knowledge”. In particular, the team suggested that the OPP develop partnerships with other Ministries and learning institutions in the development of learning strategies. They also recommended that the OPP “make better use of trainers in the field, such that a shift can occur from existing structured and centralized training to more informal and localized learning methodologies”. As well, they stressed that “while classroom learning may be appropriate under some circumstances, there are times when individualized or self-

directed learning can be more effective (i.e., to allow our people to learn when they are in the frame or mind to learn)". In place of centralized forms of learning, they advocated the use of "distance learning delivery systems", both inside and outside of the training academy. More generally, there should be a shift toward "self-directed learning and individualized instruction". As well, the OPP should ascertain "best practices" from their recruit training system (OPP, 1994b: 86).

All of these ideas for change had been recommended previously by the Strategic Planning Committee, and now the OPP was recognizing the value that such strategies had as a means of aligning individual capacities with its new corporate image. As such, senior management agreed with the thrust of the team's recommendations, and placed a particular emphasis on the need for individuals to identify with the organization as a whole (Ibid). In other words, individuals should see themselves as part of a larger and integrated whole. In effect, senior management was promoting a holistic image of the organization, which was an image deployed by the Strategic Planning Committee as well as by authors such as Hammer and Champy (1993).

In the context of the team's recommendations relating to the initial orientation and training of recruits, they also highlighted a fundamental inadequacy with regard to the ongoing training and education of both uniformed and civilian employees (Ibid., 87). They argued that the organization had a "cookie cutter" approach to ongoing training and education, based on relatively ad hoc organizational needs rather than on a systematic balance between identified organizational needs and relevant individual learning needs" (Ibid., 87). Once again, the team was projecting an image of the agent as someone who should be an integral part of the whole, and as such, must have the capacities required to

achieve organizational objectives. In other words, individual capacities were observed to be out of alignment with new organizational problematics.

Similar to the recruit training programs, the team highlighted the importance of getting away from those “quick fix” approaches to civilian employee development that emphasized mandated training needs. As well, there were no efforts to network with other training or learning programs outside of the OPP, and as such, there was no awareness of alternative methods of training delivery (Ibid., 87-88).

On a general level, the team found that the tenets of organizational learning were not reflected in the practices associated with training, education and development in the OPP. There was a general lack of integration between formal and informal processes that would enhance individual, team and organizational learning opportunities. On a structural level then, the OPP was not designed to capitalize on organizational learning (Ibid). Accordingly, the team’s recommendations pertaining to organizational learning were threefold: “to enhance the development of our people; to harness informal and formal modes of continuous learning; and to facilitate learning partnerships with the OPP and other organizations” (Ibid).

In effect, the team made recommendations that would enable the OPP to create somewhat of a mini-Police Learning System within their own institution. In fact, their recommendations reflected the main principles of the Ontario Police Learning System, which were reiterated by another Organizational Review sub-project team, this time the Prevention of Victimization sub-project team:

*Measurements of a learning organization will include such things as: the use of internal and external employee development exchange opportunities, involvement of our personnel in internal and external education programs, the quality of potential employees*

*we are attracting, examples of innovative problem solving and how quickly and easily the organization reacts to change (in OPP, 1994b: 91)*

Suffice it to say that at the time of the Organizational Renewal, the intention of the OPP was to align itself with the principles of the Ontario Police Learning System. The problematics identified by the OPP, and in particular the Commissioner, were similar to those articulated by the Strategic Planning Committee. Once again, however, the Strategic Planning Committee's emphasis on organizational learning as a strategy for being *competitive* was not taken up by the OPP. Even though the OPP increasingly came to see itself as a "business", this alleged new world of "competition" was not something that was real to this organization at the time. Consequently, a comprehensive re-constitution of the agent according to market-based imagery was only partially necessary at the time – that is, the agent was constituted as someone who could do cost-effective community policing. Nevertheless, the findings of the Employee Selection and Competency Development sub-project team did spur the creation of a Learning Strategy Team, whose task it was to develop an organizational learning strategy for the OPP.

### **The Birth of a Learning Strategy**

By 1995, the OPP had concluded that "becoming a learning organization is the best method to achieve its mission and strategic objectives" (OPP, 1995e:4). Based on this premise, the Learning Strategy Team initially set out to explore the structural and systemic changes that would need to be made to support a learning system within the OPP. During its research, the team visited two learning centres at the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Leadership Centre and the Bank of Montreal Learning Centre (Ibid). The team argued that an organizational learning strategy would be an essential

mechanism for encouraging teamwork, promoting a shared vision, fostering innovation, promoting risk-taking, and employing systems thinking. It was also a means of constituting managers as facilitators, coaches and mentors, and “responsibilizing” workers to be innovative (De Lint, 1998; OPP, 1995e).

Having highlighted the utility and appropriateness of an organizational learning approach, the team placed an enormous emphasis on the idea of *teams* being a central element of any learning organization. From a “learning perspective”, by working together and sharing ideas, “synergy” is created, which is defined as “a learning situation where the sum of the team’s effort is greater than the sum of individual efforts” (OPP, 1995e: 6). Inevitably, team learning results in organizational learning (Ibid). As such, “[w]hile there is no substitute for individual learning and commitment, a key point in moving to a learning organization is the formation of teams” (Ibid). In this context, the Learning Strategy Team advocated a “learning while doing” approach, which once again reinforces this overall shift to practical forms of knowledge.

In its initial stages, the team thought that a Learning Centre, an idea suggested during the Organizational Renewal, would be a pivotal structural element to bring the notion of a learning organization to life. Team members discovered that “learning centres” or “leadership centres” had been created in other organizations, such as the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Montreal mentioned above (Ibid., 6-7). It was argued that the main benefit of an OPP Learning Centre would be its capacity to form “a necessary, stronger link between the Academy, Human Resources Branch and field operations. It will ensure that the entire ‘learning strategy’ of the O.P.P. is coordinated and owned by all of the major areas that can make it work” (OPP, 1995e:

7). However, according to one interviewee, the idea of a learning centre was questioned because it would not serve to *embed* an organizational learning ethos throughout the organization, or alternatively, to “responsibilize” (De Lint, 1998) individual agents and departments to harness their own learning potential. We shall return to this issue a bit later on.

As described in the previous chapter, the OPP - during its Organizational Renewal process - developed a particular model for translating its new self-image and “figurative logic” (Shearing and Ericson, 1991) into a new institutional structure. This model was premised on the blueprint put forward by Hammer and Champy in their book, Reinventing the Corporation. Similarly, in their attempt to build a new learning model that would be tailored to the OPP, the Learning Strategy Team apprised themselves of various cutting-edge organizational learning blueprints. Ultimately, the Learning Strategy Team drew inspiration from the work of management theorist Peter Senge, and in particular his book titled The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, published in 1990 (see Juschka, 1996: 7, 18)<sup>39</sup>.

The Team studied Senge's conceptual model, and in particular the “component technologies” that he argues are essential to creating and sustaining an effective learning organization (1990: 6). These component technologies are: Personal Mastery; Mental Models; Building Shared Vision; Team Learning; and Systems Thinking.

*Personal Mastery* is the “spiritual foundation” of a learning organization, and reflects “the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively” (Ibid).

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<sup>39</sup> Senge has been regarded as somewhat of a guru of organizational learning, and continues to publish articles and books on the topic.

Individuals with personal mastery are dedicated to *lifelong learning* and continuously focused on achieving the results that are most important to them (Ibid).

The second component, *Mental Models*, refers to those “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action” (Senge, 1990: 8). Because these deeply held images directly influence our actions, we must “bring them to the surface and hold them rigorously to scrutiny” (Ibid., 9).

Senge also argues that a learning organization has a *Shared Vision*. All individuals within the organization should work toward a common purpose, bounded by a common identity:

*The practice of shared vision involves the skills of unearthing shared “pictures of the future” that foster genuine commitment and enrollment rather than compliance. In mastering this discipline, leaders learn the counterproductiveness of trying to dictate a vision, no matter how heartfelt (Senge, 1990: 9)*

Fourthly, *Team Learning* holds the potential for producing outstanding organizational results as well as tremendous individual growth. An effective team will consist of individuals who are willing to discard their assumptions and enter into a genuine dialogue with other team members. The objective is to generate insights that would not have been attainable on an individual basis. Individual team members must not act in a defensive manner, as defensiveness is a barrier to meaningful learning. Senge argues that teams are the “fundamental learning unit in modern organizations”, and accordingly, if teams cannot learn, neither will the organization as a whole (Ibid., 10).

For Senge, *Systems Thinking* is the “fifth discipline”. Systems thinking refers to the view that individuals and their world of business constitute “systems”. Individual actions are

*bound by invisible fabrics of interrelated actions, which often take years to fully play out their effects on each other. Since we are part of that lacework ourselves, it's doubly hard to see the whole pattern of change. Instead, we tend to focus on snapshots of isolated parts of the system, and wonder why our deepest problems never seem to get solved. Systems thinking is a conceptual framework, a body of knowledge and tools that has been developed over the past fifty years, to make the full patterns clearer, and to help us see how to change them effectively (Ibid., 7)*

At the heart of Senge's work has been the observation, discussed previously, that the world has become characterized by "interdependence and change" (Kofman and Senge, 1995: 15). Accordingly, one must develop a vision of a holistic organization, which necessarily involves "*a new way of thinking, feeling, and being*" (Ibid: 16; italics added). In essence, individuals within an organization must create a "memory of the whole" (Ibid). Kofman and Senge explain that our institutions are dysfunctional because they are characterized by "fragmentation, competition, and reactivity" (Ibid), an issue that Hammer and Champy also strongly stressed. In order to rid ourselves of this dysfunction, we must "dissolve" such patterns of thought (Ibid), and "move from the primacy of the pieces to the primacy of the whole" (Ibid., 17).

Senge states:

*I call systems thinking the fifth discipline because it is the conceptual cornerstone that underlies all of the five learning disciplines...All are concerned with a shift of mind from seeing parts to seeing wholes, from seeing people as helpless reactors to seeing them as active participants in shaping their reality, from reacting to the present to creating the future. Without systems thinking, there is neither the incentive nor the means to integrate the learning disciplines once they have come into practice. In the fifth discipline, systems thinking is the cornerstone of how learning organizations think about their world (Senge, 1990: 69)*

Similar to what we saw in Chapter Three when the OPP appropriated a new set of metaphors, imagery and language in reinventing themselves, Senge's five "component technologies" constitute a new "root paradigm" (Shearing and Ericson, 1991) to be mobilized in the reinvention of the agent. In contrast to the imagery of the isolated,



impersonal agent who is “ontologically under-identified with the public missions of the organization” (De Lint, 1998: 265), Senge is conveying an image of the agent as one who has a personal, and perhaps even spiritual, attachment to the organization.

This deployment of Senge’s “organic” institutional imagery has taken place in the Calgary Police Service. The OPP was inspired by the ways in which this police service translated organizational learning concepts and practices. Consider the following excerpt a Calgary Police Report titled “New Age Thinking for the Calgary Police Service: A Matrix of Organizational Learning”, which, similar to what we saw in Chapter Three, draws on a new organizational metaphor:

*A very contemporary approach is to conceive...of an **Ecological Organization**, an organization as living organism, one that is responsive to its environment while at the same time striving to balance all the various subsystems within it – strategic, managerial, structural, technological and human/cultural – so as to maintain a level of organizational health. Taking this a step further, we can even conceive of an **Organization as Brain**, one system within the organism which integrates all subsystems, scans and senses its environment, compares the information against operating norms, questions assumptions, devises creative solutions, and then initiates the appropriate action....It makes sense, then, that the management philosophy that accompanies such a view of organization is necessarily system and knowledge-based, its evaluation measures consistent with skills, creativity and core competencies that can be demonstrated....From this perspective, the organization is the individual insofar as the organization can only think, learn and be creative as much as can the individual members comprising it (Juschka, 1996: 14; emphasis in original)*

Having been inspired by this new set of imagery for re-imagining the agent, the Learning Strategy Team of 1995 had developed a fairly comprehensive blueprint for a Learning Centre in 1995. However, due to the considerable efforts by the OPP to implement the wide range of recommendations stemming from the Organizational Review, the learning project was put on hold until 1997 (OPP, 1997d: 4). Once the bulk of organizational re-structuring had been completed however, efforts focussed once again on how to give concrete effect to organizational learning throughout the institution. It is

clear, therefore, that while a shift toward an organizational learning approach in the OPP was desirable, the particular “need” to follow through with these ideas was not pressing at the time. The OPP was most immediately focused on meeting those fiscal objectives associated with the Social Contract, while making sure that their organizational structure would be supporting its new strategic approach. With regard to the OPP’s strategic approach, however, the idea of “organizational learning” did make its way into community policing discourse at the time. Indeed, the two concepts of “organizational learning” and “community policing” were coupled through the establishment of the Community Policing Development Centre.

*Continuous Learning Through “Best Practices”*

Although the Learning Strategy of 1995 was temporarily on hold, the Community Policing Development Centre (as discussed in Chapter Two) was established in large part to promote organizational learning through the cultivation of *best practices* through their “best practices database”<sup>40</sup> and their “Policing For Results Survey” (which focuses more broadly on performance measurement) (see OPP, 1997a: 3) As one OPP representative put it, “the....Community Policing Development Centre would provide the necessary capacity for the O.P.P. to foster and maintain a learning organization, with an enhanced capacity for continuous self-evaluation and self-improvement” (Eamer, 1995). As discussed in Chapter Two, organizational learning was touted as the best strategy for achieving “the optimal delivery of efficient and effective policing services” (1994c; emphasis in original):

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<sup>40</sup> The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is establishing a “National Best Practices Directory”. According to their 1998 Directional Statement, “[i]t is important that we identify quality, promote it and reward it, in all aspects of our work. If you see something done right, encourage it, make an example of it and share it with others....[Q]uality doesn’t just happen – it must be fostered” (RCMP, 1998)

*The success of Community Policing hinges on our ability to provide the appropriate learning and facilitate the opportunity for continuous learning at the executive, managerial and front-line levels. We will implement the required procedures to ensure we learn from our experiences (1995a: 4)*

As discussed earlier, the appropriation of organizational learning discourse was coupled at the time with new strategic objectives. In other words, an organizational learning approach was seen as a key strategy for doing the business of community policing effectively and in a cost-effective manner.

The emphasis on “best practices” (and the concomitant emphasis on the Community Policing Development Centre as a “best practices center”) reflects a shift from theoretical knowledge production to practical knowledge production. To be sure, if the organization wants to thrive in a continuously changing environment, it seems logical that abstract and static forms of knowledge would be of little utility. Instead, what is now important is what works in practice – hence the term “best practices”. The idea of “best practices” is commonly discussed and promoted in the literature on organizational learning, and it refers to a strategy for disseminating knowledge, in the form of successful or unsuccessful practices, throughout an organization (Gephart et al., 1996: 39). As one OPP text explains, “[b]est practices” inventories are key elements in learning organizations because they give employees the opportunity of learning from others and the past” (OPP, 1997a: 28-29). This strategy serves to increase the payoff of an innovative practice by “tapping into the hidden asset of the knowledge base arising from having multiple units in operation under a single corporate banner” (Parry et al., 1998: 1). The propagation of best practices is therefore a means of enhancing organizational efficiency by diminishing those costs associated with “reinventing the wheel” (OPP, 1997a: 28-29).

Thus, not only was “best practices” a technology for cultivating a continuous learning ethos in the OPP, it also served as a technology for doing “customized service delivery”. Specifically, best practices are meant to offer practical solutions that are tailored to local needs, but at the same time they can be re-produced in other local contexts. The production of best practices reflects a shift away from a “one size fits all” approach (see OPP, 1994d) to service delivery that characterized “social” policing. So, one can conclude that the Community Policing Development Centre had begun to embed a continuous learning ethos throughout the OPP, at least at the level of front-line service delivery.<sup>41</sup>

#### *The Emergence of “Competition” as a New Problematic*

By 1997, the idea of organizational learning had become even more salient due to a particular set of “realities” that were beginning to emerge in the broader provincial policing environment. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, a series of amendments were made to the *Police Services Act*. These amendments stemmed from the “Review of Police Services in Ontario” initiated by the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services in 1996.

One of the key issues on the agenda of the Ministry was to implement “equitable financing” of policing across the province. The implementation of equitable financing was a means of responding to a particular problematic that had been identified by the Task Force of 1974 (see Chapter Five), but which was not taken seriously as a real issue for the province until the election of Mike Harris and the Conservative Party. This problematic was the fact that historically, some municipalities were required to pay for

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<sup>41</sup> It should be noted that a “best practices” database was also being developed in the OPP’s Office of Emergency Management (OPP, 1997a: 29)

their municipal police services while others received the services of the Ontario Provincial Police at no cost. Specifically, there were 576 municipalities, located mainly in rural and northern parts of the province, whose policing was being fully subsidized by the province (MSGCS, 1996a: 4).

In the spirit of the "common sense" vision of a "modern, smaller, more effective justice system" (MSGCS, 1996a: 3-4), the Ministry argued that these 576 municipalities should pay and be responsible for their policing services "regardless of the type of arrangement for police services" (1996a: 6). This would ensure not only that the "free rider" problem is eliminated, but it would also ensure that municipalities would be able to explore the options listed in the *Police Services Act* (which were slightly altered in Bill 105) regarding the type and structure of police service delivery (MSGCS, 1996a: 6). In brief, these service delivery options were: to have their own municipal service; to share policing services; to amalgamate policing services; to have an adjoining municipality provide their services; and to contract with the OPP (MSGCS, 1997a: 2-3; MSGCS, 1997b).

This strategy of equitable financing, which ultimately took effect on January 1, 1998, generated a new series of governmental problems for the OPP, an organization which had previously enjoyed a monopoly in rural Ontario. Most importantly, the OPP would now be plunged into a "competitive" policing environment, because it would no longer be considered the exclusive supplier of policing services. Since these 576 municipalities would now have to pay for security service delivery directly, they would ultimately "shop around" for a service that was not only tailored to their needs, but also competitive from a financial point of view. As one interviewee succinctly put it,

“[w]e’ve never had to market ourselves the same way that we’re going to have to market ourselves now”. Because of this new reality, one of the specific problematics for the OPP related to how to re-fashion *all* of its agents in ways that optimized its *competitiveness* as an organization.

In addressing this problematic (and others related to it), the Commissioner of the OPP spearheaded an initiative called Vision 2000, which is summarized here:

*Into the year 2000, the OPP will be the community police service of choice outside of large urban areas and, building on that strength, the policing service responsible for public safety issues of provincial interest (OPP, 1997c)*

While the notion of community policing as a “business” had emerged as a new discourse within the OPP, they would now be required, quite literally, to provide “highly efficient and responsive municipal police services” (OPP, 1997a: 16). In its efforts to realize this vision, the GPP established a new Learning Strategy Project Team in February of 1997 under the guidance of the Commander of the Organizational Development Bureau<sup>42</sup>. The team's mandate was to “design and implement an integrated learning strategy that supports the vision of the OPP” (OPP, 1997e: 17). The learning strategy was argued to be an essential element in ensuring that the OPP becomes the “community police service of choice” by preparing employees to become *continuous learners* (Ibid). Now, the problematic of “competition”, previously articulated by the Strategic Planning Committee on Police Training and Education, had shifted from the level of the abstract to the level of the “real”. Accordingly, the conception of “organizational learning” would involve more than just the cultivation of front-line “best practices” through their Community Policing

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<sup>42</sup> The Organizational Development Bureau “provides corporate administrative support services including human resources, audit, and training development delivery. The goal of the bureau is to introduce and maintain organizational development programs throughout the OPP that will assist senior management to achieve planned organizational change” (OPP., 1997f: 12).

Development Centre. Now, “organizational learning” would be re-articulated as a key mechanism for optimizing the competitiveness of the OPP and its agents. As one interviewee commented:

*[T]he policing climate in the province has changed and we have a desire to remain a competitive policing organization. We think...that learning is the way to do that, that learning to grow as an organization, we'll remain competitive and efficient and capable as an organization (#17)*

In this spirit, the OPP, through the new Learning Strategy Team, intended to develop a plan aimed at making the OPP a leader in customized service delivery. The development of a “continuous learning” ethos was argued to be a necessary vehicle for embedding the “figurative logic” (Shearing and Ericson, 1991) of the marketplace at both the organizational and individual levels. The new Learning Strategy was premised on the assumption that “[t]he ability of the OPP to be a leader in learning will impact on our effectiveness and competitiveness in policing” (OPP, 1998h: 5).

The new learning strategy would involve plans for encouraging organizational commitment to learning, acquiring information regarding current forms of information technology, developing various forums for learning and formulating learning plans that are tailored to the needs of employees (OPP, 1997e: 17). Although the previous Learning Strategy Team had apprised itself of Peter Senge’s blueprint for organizational learning, the new Learning Strategy Team conducted an extensive review of the literature that had come out in the last five years relating to organizational learning theory and practice. In addition to examining organizational learning in the context of public bureaucracies and policing organizations, they examined strategies in the private sector

(OPP, 1997e: 4).<sup>43</sup> The team drew much inspiration from initiatives that were taking place in the private sector, and one interviewee explains why:

*[B]ecause the private sector tends to be profit-driven, it has to be competitive to survive. I think the differences between the private and public sector are really becoming blurred...Certainly the policing climate in Ontario is in a big state of flux, so, in looking to the private sector to see what strategies they've used to deal with similar challenges in the past is helpful (#15)*

This statement echoes Hayek's position that "[c]oncern for profit is just what makes possible the more effective use of resources" (1988: 104), and it was in this spirit that the OPP re-imaged itself and its agents in market-based terms. One interviewee argued quite strongly that

*if our organization isn't at the front end, what's best, whether it be how to do front line policing work, or the support systems that provide them to do the things that they need, we'll just lose our competitiveness in the market, and clearly we are in a market... Anyone who thinks that because we are a public sector organization and we can sit back on our laurels and we'll be here 20 or 30 years from now, are really not in 1998 (#14)*

Based on this rationale, the Learning Strategy Project Team set out to develop a plan for constructing a new organization which would "capitalize upon individual, team, and organizational strengths and learning opportunities" (OPP, 1997a: 28).

In the OPP's Annual Report of 1997, the Commissioner announced that the OPP had "adopted a continuous learning philosophy" (OPP, 1997a: 3). In the following statement, it is clear that the OPP was associating itself with a much broader mentality concerning the new ways in which human resources must be managed. The knowledge and capacities of the worker/agent are now thought of in market-based terms, and as such, "organizational learning" is thought about as a conceptual framework for

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<sup>43</sup> The Learning Strategy Project Team also engaged in a "Stakeholder Analysis". They interviewed senior managers, individuals involved in learning and development in the OPP, and individuals from private sector organizations and learning agencies (OPP, 1998m)



harnessing the maximum “intellectual capital” (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997) of the agent in order to achieve organizational ends. The OPP’s Annual Report of 1997 stated:

*The need to place an increased emphasis on “learning” as a way of doing business had been growing in organizations around the globe over the last few years, as employers begin to realize the knowledge employees have and how they use it is a key to business success (OPP, 1997a: 28)*

During their research, the Learning Strategy Project Team determined that there were many good practices occurring in the areas of learning and development within the OPP, but that these practices were not disseminated throughout the organization (OPP, 1998i). The team stated that:

*There are many excellent operational policing practices, learning and education practices, and administrative support practices taking place in every region of the O.P.P.! When this information is consistently documented and shared with others who can use it, build on it, and/or learn from it – then we can say that organizational learning is part of ‘how we do business in the O.P.P.’ (OPP, 1998i)*

This passage expresses the intention of the Learning Strategy Team to develop a plan for building a network within the organization that will enable the dissemination of “best practices” in learning. Such a network would also enable individual agents to expose themselves to new ideas and to question their prevailing assumptions. It is a means of harnessing knowledge that already exists, which is also a very cost-effective approach.

In its research on current programs that were promoting organizational learning, the team noted that the OPP had acquired a computer software program called the Police Legal Access System (PLAS), which is a CD-ROM product developed by Canada Law Book. This software enables employees from any detachment to quickly access federal and provincial statutes such as Martin’s *Criminal Code*. This database is updated on a quarterly basis in order to provide officers with up-to-date information (OPP, 1997a: 29).

As well, the team noted that distance learning technologies (which were advocated previously by the Employee Selection and Competency Development sub-project team) were being developed in the Training Development and Distance Learning Unit. The purpose of this Unit is to conduct research on training needs, to design courses and distance delivery strategies, and to develop evaluation strategies. As well, the OPP had produced CD-ROM learning packages that individual officers could access at their convenience (OPP, 1998h: 6). This promoted the idea of “self-directed learning” which had also been advocated by the Employee Selection and Competency Development Sub-project Team, as well as the Strategic Planning Committee.

The Learning Strategy Team’s approach to organizational learning was based on the assumption that the “traditional” form of learning provided by the Ontario Provincial Police Academy is a “complement” to organizational learning (OPP, 1997a: 29). The distinction between “training” and “learning” is described here by an interviewee:

*I look at a learning organization being a non-training thing. Training is teaching people to do something. I see a learning organization being a function of communication. A learning organization has to be one that there's some sort of an information flow, a conduit for information where if you do something that goes really really well or really really badly then you can feed that in and anybody else that needs that information has ready access. To me, that is a learning organization. A learning organization is not one that simply tells everybody everything everyday. It's one that learns from its experience...[I] see a learning organization and a training institution walking hand in hand, but being very distinctly different (#16)*

Once again, we see an emphasis being made on building a communication network within the organization, whereby local forms of knowledge are dispersed throughout the network. Indeed, the Learning Strategy Team found that approximately 80% of learning actually takes place in one’s practical, day-to-day activities, such as debriefings, working with teams, and through secondments (OPP, 1998i). By harnessing and sharing such

knowledge, “productive capacity”, as Hayek puts it, “is multiplied by different individuals obtaining access to different knowledge whose total exceeds what any single one of them could muster” (Hayek, 1988: 104).

Another theme which emerges from this notion of a network is the “responsibilization” (De Lint, 1998) of the agent to both share knowledge and to acquire knowledge. In terms of the latter, one of the conclusions of the Learning Strategy Team was that employees should be empowered to take charge of their own career development according to their particular career needs and goals.<sup>44</sup> The thrust toward self-directed employee development was an idea that the OPP recognized in the private sector:

*[E]ven if they have no desire for movement and they're happy with their careers as is, our research indicated that the most successful organizations were those that were able to create that expectation within the organization that people will continue to grow and learn and develop. By way of example, the Bank of Montreal, we've gone on tour there and they suggested that it was their approach that - they had a phrase or slogan, “move ahead at your own pace, but move ahead” – that was a clear organizational expectation that you're a part of this team, you're a part of this team, you're a part of this organization, this is what we do, this is the way we do business. So, how do we create that culture within our organization, and I think it's starting to happen anyway (#14)*

This “responsibilization” approach (De Lint, 1998) is also being advocated in the OPP Academy (OPP, 1998g: 3). The Commanding Officer of the Provincial Police Academy explains:

*Above all, training is an individual responsibility. You as an individual are responsible for your own development. As instructors we will complement your efforts. We will assist a person with large or small amounts of training...Each individual going through the OPP promotional system must remember that the onus is on them to have a*

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<sup>44</sup> Efforts to empower employees to take charge of their own personal development is also reflected in the Employee Continuous Development Program developed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Within this program, “each employee is encouraged to conduct a self-assessment of their need for training and competency in areas where they feel they are lacking in order to fill the learning gap. Employees are empowered to search out and acquire those missing skills. Information on an extensive number of matters is continuously made available on-line to all individuals who request it” (RCMP, circa 1998: 18).

*development plan, and to acquire the knowledge, skills and abilities of the position they are seeking (OPP, 1998g: 3)*

In this vein, the new Learning Strategy Project Team listed the various responsibilities that employees should have for enhancing their learning potential:

*You are responsible for:*

- *identifying your workplace learning needs e.g. by completing a development plan*
- *discussing your development plan with your supervisor/manager*
- *seeking out information/ways to meet these needs e.g. articles/books (GHQ Library), courses, development opportunities such as secondments, subject matter experts within the organization*
- *being a continuous learner e.g. keeping on top of ongoing changes in your business/profession*
- *sharing knowledge learned with colleagues (OPP, 1998i)*

This emphasis on “responsibilization” (De Lint, 1998) strategies echoes a more general attempt to re-govern the agent. In contrast to a command-and-control form of management - even though a certain hierarchy has been maintained for certain operational purposes - where employees are told what to know and what they need, the agent must now determine their own needs as well as the capacities they must develop. This new form of internal governance is consistent with those broader shifts in governmental authority discussed in Chapter Two, whereby communities – instead of being told what is best for them – determine their own needs as well as the capacities they require. One can conclude from this that there is an attempt to align the OPP’s internal form of governance with their external form of governance. After all, OPP agents can not be expected to abdicate a certain degree of authority to communities if they are completely dis-empowered within their own organization.

In this vein, the new Learning Strategy Team decided that the best means of promoting continuous learning is to embed responsibility for learning in everyone, rather than to establish a specific Learning Centre. As one interviewee explained,

*[I] think as an organization, strategically looking at learning, instead of operationally looking at it, would be the focus of what we want to do, and our recommendations centre around embedding learning in the organization. The team talked about a Learning Centre, but our feeling was we didn't want to create a place that was responsible for learning and take the onus off everybody else. [S]o, we're trying to include those components within the job, within the organization, within the teams that present have functioning. And a lot of our recommendations are around linking and coordinating, because we do a lot of good things, but if we were all going in the same direction at the same time, I think it would be a lot more powerful (#15)*

Another interviewee added to this issue of “responsibilization” (De Lint, 1998) by stating that

*[it's] not only [an] individual learning issue, but it's linked to performance management, particularly at the front-line supervisor and detachment commander above him, that part of their annual evaluation would include their abilities and efforts to develop others who are subordinate to them, so that it is seen as a responsibility, not just a by-product (#14)*

The Learning Strategy Team identified a series of changes that would need to be made if the OPP were to transform itself into a learning organization. They adopted an “Integrated Change Framework”, or simply, a “people lever” model as a means of structuring their recommendations (OPP, 1998m). The Team states that

*All of the strategies, tools and supports described in the OPP Learning Strategy can be organized under at least one of the levers in this model. This intergrated change framework was chosen because it takes into consideration the changes that need to be made in ALL systems within an organization to ensure successful change (Ibid., caps in original)*

There are seven “levers” organized to support the “strategic intent” of the Learning Strategy Project, which is “[t]o design an integrated learning strategy which supports the OPP Vision 2000” (OPP, 1998n). The central lever is “Leadership”, referring to “[t]he ability of leaders to mobilize the organization around the strategy” (OPP, 1998m). This

understanding of “leadership” is consistent with De Lint’s observation that executives, within a “new managerialist ethos” are re-conceived as “charismatic” people- and organization- shapers (1998: 265; see du Gay, 1994). In this spirit, the team recommended that leaders mobilize the organization by ensuring that they “model continuous learning behaviors”. Leaders were also encouraged to create a Management Development Program and to ensure that learning activities support OPP Business Plans (OPP, 1998m).

“Values and Culture” is cited as another key lever for change. In order to generate the organizational values and culture required to support a learning organization, the team recommends that *all* employees have equitable access to learning opportunities, and that there is “[p]lanned and deliberate use of learning methods” (Ibid).

A third lever is called “Work Processes and Systems”. This refers to OPP policies and procedures in the area of learning that support learning organization principles. It also refers to the development of systems for identifying/analyzing/meeting learning needs of employees. Thirdly, it relates to the development of an inventory of contacts/linkages/partnerships (Ibid).

Under the lever of “Structure and Functions”, the Team suggests that a “Knowledge Management System” be created. They also recommend that a “matrix” structure be developed. A particular matrix structure was developed in the Calgary Police Service in its organizational learning strategy, and it is a structure aimed at ensuring that there are cross-functional teams which cut across organizational units. Such teams are designed to consist of individuals with expertise on particular issues. This is a means of moving away from a “silo” system while promoting “holistic problem

solving and the importance of continuous improvement of the membership throughout learning” (Juscha, 1996: 31). This idea of a matrix structure also supports this implicit notion of a knowledge network, whereby people come together to share their knowledge in order to produce a particular result for the organization. Such teams are formed in order to solve a particular problem or to produce a particular product, and after the task is accomplished, they disband. The agent within this team setting is therefore reconceived as a “networker”, “problem-solver” and “information broker” (De Lint, 1998: 278; Ericson and Carriere, 1993; see Ericson and Haggery (1997) on their notion of “interinstitutional networks”).

Another lever for change advocated by the Learning Strategy Team is called “Individual and Team Competence”, which involves the development of “competencies” for managers as well as the identification of competencies of learning development. It also encompasses the creation of learning plans for all employees and the provision of support to employees in the acquisition and use of computer technology (OPP, 1998m). The notion of “competencies”, as well as the development of individual employee learning strategies has been developed extensively by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in their Employee Continuous Development Program as well as in their CAPRA problem-solving model (see RCMP, circa 1998). The RCMP defines “competencies” as “the combination of attitudes, skills, knowledge and techniques necessary to perform your functions” (RCMP, 1999). This focus on “competencies” reflects a dual emphasis on “responsibilization” as a key strategy of internal rule as well as a privileging of practical capacities over theoretical knowledge (see De Lint, 1998). The idea of “competencies” refers more to a set of characteristics which constitute the identity of the

agent. They refer more to “frameworks for action” (Morgan, 1986), or particular “qualities and attitudes” (De Lint, 1998: 275). In the RCMP, for example, their list of competencies include: the ability to partner with other institutions and individuals; the ability to acquire and synthesize information; and the ability to continually assess problem-solving methods to the end of continuous improvement (RCMP, 1999).

The sixth lever for change advocated by the Learning Strategy Team is called “Reward and Recognition” and the Team recommended that the OPP continue to support those mechanisms designed to reward and recognize teams and civilians (OPP, 1998m). The final the lever is called “Management Processes and Systems”, where the team suggested that the assignment of individuals to positions within the OPP should be based on “skills” rather than “specific policing expertise”. This opens up space for increased civilianization to occur where, for example, a civilian is brought in to oversee certain “business processes” within the organization. Given the degree to which the OPP has been reinvented in the image of a market-based institution, it is more than likely that people well-versed in the relationships between “inputs” and “outputs” will be more valued than those who have substantive knowledge relating to law enforcement. Additionally, the Learning Strategy Team recommended that the current performance management system be reviewed in order to ensure that it includes organizational learning expectations (Ibid).

In the OPP’s Annual Report of 1998, there is a section titled “The People Who Are the OPP” (1998o: 33). This title reflects an attempt to garner a holistic and organic image of the institution, thus blurring the previous boundaries between individual identities and the identity of the institution (see De Lint, 1998). Within this section, the



OPP indicates that one of the goals of its business planning process was “the commitment to enable “the people, who are the OPP, to be a productive workforce in service of the people of Ontario”” (Ibid). The Learning Strategy Project<sup>45</sup> was cited as one of the strategies for enhancing the productivity of workers. According to the Report, several “directional recommendations” of the Learning Strategy were implemented in 1998.

For example, while recognizing that ““mentoring” is an excellent means of passing information from a senior employee to one at a more junior level of responsibility” (Ibid), the Learning Strategy (as part of the Organizational Development Bureau) began reviewing current mentoring practices in terms of their potential for promoting learning development (Ibid).

In relation to the shearing of information across the organization, the OPP began using its “intranet’ site to disseminate information and messages widely and quickly. For example, the “how-to’s” of planning a conference were disseminated through the internet.

Thirdly, the OPP began working in partnership with academic institutions to the end of developing learning opportunities for OPP employees. Two suggestions in particular were discussed: first, to customize university-level courses in accordance with the needs of OPP employees; and second, to encourage academic institutions to provide credits for courses taken at the Provincial Police Academy (Ibid).

The 1998 Annual Report also placed more emphasis on recognizing the accolades and awards achieved by OPP personnel. This emphasis on recognizing the work of individuals was of course a recommendation of the Learning Strategy Team and serves as

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<sup>45</sup> After the development of its final report and recommendations, the Learning Strategy Team was disbanded and a consultant was hired to develop an implementation plan.

a strategy for enhancing morale, productivity, and individuals' identification with the organization as a whole.

Suffice it to say that the OPP has conceived "organizational learning" as a vehicle for addressing a variety of governmental problematics that have been articulated over the last several years. These problematics are evident in the following list of organizational learning objectives. By becoming a "learning organization", it is argued that the OPP will:

- ◆ *remain competitive as Ontario's police service of choice*
- ◆ *be on the leading edge of police learning organizations*
- ◆ *better serve the needs of Ontario's diverse communities*
- ◆ *view errors and successes as learning opportunities*
- ◆ *build the collective learning of the OPP*
- ◆ *maximize the contributions of our skilled employees*
- ◆ *create a work environment that fosters innovation*
- ◆ *develop a flexible workforce equipped to manage constant change*
- ◆ *expand police knowledge and expertise*
- ◆ *practice continuous improvement*
- ◆ *establish learning as a vehicle for implementing community policing*
- ◆ *support OPP employees in understanding the OPP mission and their role*
- ◆ *assist OPP employees to develop partnerships within their communities*
- ◆ *increase sharing and partnerships within the policing community (OPP, 1998p)*

As one can see, not only is organizational learning regarded as a strategy for doing community policing effectively and efficiently, but it has also been re-conceptualized as the key to thriving in a market-based environment.

## **Conclusions**

It is often the case that particular metaphors, imagery and language are never entirely "new", but rather circulate and "take bite" when the time is right, or when certain "conditions of possibility" (Foucault, 1996b) emerge. That is, certain ways of making up the world that were previously subjugated can shift to the centre from the periphery in

response to the emergence of new problematics of governance. This has certainly been the case with regard to the particular metaphors, imagery and language surrounding this notion of the “continuous learner” and its institutional counterpart, the “learning organization”. One can easily contend that the idea of organizational learning would not have been possible without the emergence of new “realities” and problematics. Accordingly, the focus of this chapter was on the complex relationship between new images of the agent and shifting problematics and objectives of rule.

While it is clear that there is a direct relationship between new mentalities of rule and new individual subjectivities (as De Lint suggests, 1998), the purpose of this chapter was to examine those precise conditions that have made it possible for new mentalities to enter into policing discourse and to take root in the form of newly conceived agents. Similar to the last chapter, then, the analytical starting point of this chapter was not new “mentalities”, but rather, those changing “realities” and new problematics of rule which have made it possible for the agent to become the object of reflection, and subsequently, reinvention. In this context, this chapter also provided a basis for examining the relationships between shifting articulations of “organizational learning” and shifting governmental objectives. Indeed, in a similar vein to Chapter Two, one could suggest that there have been at least two different “waves” in organizational learning in the same way that there have been several different “waves” in community policing. These “waves” have of course represented particular sets of responses to changing governmental problematics and objectives.

In this context, this chapter has shown that the agent has become the object of reinvention precisely at those points when her identity, role, and capacities were no

longer in *alignment* with the new identity of the institution and its new policing strategies. One can observe that the first significant manifestation of the “continuous learner” emerged when community policing emerged as the new strategic orientation of policing services across this province. Within this “wave”, as it were, the agent was rethought as a “continuous learner” armed with a particular set of skills for doing community policing effectively, hence the emphasis on “soft skills” and problem-solving skills advocated in the Police Learning System. De Lint rightly characterizes this “wave” as an equal combination of “new managerialist” and “community policing” discourses (1998).

With the emergence of “competition” as a very real problematic for the OPP, the metaphors, imagery and language associated with organizational learning acquired a new and profound meaning. Having been recently plunged into a competitive policing market by the Harris government, the institution of the OPP would now have to reinvent all of its agents once again, this time as “producers” within a community policing market. While the OPP had begun to re-think its agents in market-based terms during its Organizational Review process, it would now become necessary for the institution as well as its agents to address the very “real” problematic of “competition”. What this points out is that similar to mentalities, problematics also have varying degrees of “bite”, depending on the extent to which they present very real and practical consequences for particular institutions. Specifically, it is not surprising that the issue of “competition” was not taken seriously in the early 1990’s when it was first articulated by the Strategic Planning Committee. However, once it became a local reality, an even stronger emphasis

was placed on organizational learning as a key strategy for achieving organizational success.

In sum, the central argument of this chapter has been that the relationship between mentalities of rule and the identity or subjectivity of the agent is a considerably complex one, because it is mediated by a series of time- and space-specific “realities” and problematics. Such problematics not only determine the extent to which new mentalities enter into discourse, but they also determine the particular meanings and forms these mentalities acquire, as well as the concrete ways in which they are translated into new human identities.

## Chapter 5

### **Reinventing the Governance of Policing: The Legislative Effects of the "Common Sense Revolution"**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter is aimed at exploring the ways in which the governance or regulation of policing is being reinvented. Specifically, it will examine the ways in which the regulatory regime surrounding police service delivery is being transformed with the rise of new governmental objectives and problematics, as well as new governmental authorities. This chapter takes up and extends some of the queries of the previous chapters, as it explores the effects of broader governmental developments on the governance of security. For this chapter, there is one main development that is of interest: the election of the Harris government and its "Common Sense" platform.

This chapter focuses on the variety of effects that the "Common Sense Revolution" has had on the governance of security, and will begin with an examination of the ways in which it has altered the regulatory environment of policing. The Harris government has transformed the ways in which policing is regulated in this province by amending the *Police Services Act*, and these amendments stemmed from the "Review of Police Services in Ontario", undertaken by the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services in 1996. This chapter will examine the nature of the "Common Sense" agenda driving the legislative changes, and will explore the practical effects of this new regulatory regime on the nature and organization of policing in this province.

From a governmentality perspective, the Common Sense agenda would be analyzed as an emblematic example of a new (neo-liberal) mentality of rule. Some characteristics of this mentality are, for example, a shift from "rowing" to "steering"

(Osborne and Gaebler, 1993); the constitution of citizens as “active” participants in self-governance strategies (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996); governance through “communities” instead of the “social” (Ibid; Rose, 1996a); and the operation of governmental institutions according to an enterprising, rationalist logic (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996). In relation to the governance of policing, a governmentality approach would involve an analysis of those programs and technologies for regulating policing that index this broader mentality (see O’Malley et al., 1997).

This chapter draws on this analytical approach, which is considerably useful for understanding the intentions behind certain governmental programs, or as Garland puts it, the “nature of programmes” (1997: 201). However, such an analysis appears to privilege the goals or intentions of programmers instead of their various intended *and* unintended effects or “unforeseen consequences” (Ibid). Garland argues that “we should do more than anatomize the governmental programmes that are brought to bear. [We] should also seek to explain the pattern of their effects, including their...unanticipated consequences” (1996: 201; Crawford, 1997: 211). In taking this cue from Garland (as well as Crawford), this chapter is aimed at exploring both the intended and unintended effects of the “Common Sense Revolution” on the governance of security, and as such, is aimed at extending the utility of the governmentality approach.

### **The Review of Police Services in Ontario**

In December, 1995, the Ontario Solicitor General and Minister of Correctional Services, Robert Runciman, announced the government’s intention to conduct a

“comprehensive review of the structure and financing of police services in Ontario”.<sup>46</sup>

Within this review, six core issues were examined in-depth by the provincial government in consultation with such organizations as the Ontario Association of Police Services Boards, the Ontario Police Association, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario, and the Ontario Provincial Police. These six issues were: the equitable financing of police services; alternative sources of revenue; the structure and organization of police services; civilian governance of police services; and oversight of police services.

This Review would represent the most thorough examination of policing in Ontario since the 1974 Task Force on Policing. The Ministry argued that since the last review in 1974, a variety of new “realities” have emerged. For example, the Ministry argued that there were “increasing expectations on police services (regardless of size) to be cost effective, efficient and provide a wide range of services” (MSGCS, 1996b: 2). Because of this, small police services were having difficulty sustaining a certain level of service (Ibid). Another issue identified by the Ministry was that municipalities were seeking “alternative means of fulfilling their policing obligations” (Ibid). This is presumably due to the provincial fiscal crisis, which has prompted municipalities to explore new ways in which they could provide certain services. Also, service delivery levels were no longer deemed to be consistent with shifts in the urban/rural population mix. The Ministry also stressed the fact that some municipalities were paying for policing while others were not. This concern with “inequities in the financing of policing” was compounded by the large financial debt that had been incurred by

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<sup>46</sup> In November, 1995, a moratorium was placed on requests for OPP municipal policing services pending the review so that the OPP could review their municipal costing formula. The OPP was asked to recommend ways of determining actual municipal policing costs rather than just providing estimates (OPP, 1996c).



government at the provincial level. In this context, the Ministry noted that the level of provincial assistance to municipalities had decreased, and that municipalities were “seeking greater control over police service budgets and/or majority representation on police services boards” (Ibid).

The identification of these particular problematics, which were all primarily *financial* in nature, stems from a particular agenda on the part of the Harris government, which is to minimize the financial costs incurred by government (particularly provincial government) in the provision of security by: first, exploring alternative forms of service delivery; and second, by re-negotiating and re-distributing governmental authority for security between the local/municipal and central/provincial levels of government. In essence, not only did the Harris government intend to reduce the provincial debt-load, but it had a specific program for doing so. In pursuit of this fiscal agenda, the Ministry set out to formulate amendments to the *Police Services Act* that would “improve the cost-efficiency and effectiveness of police service delivery and to enhance public safety in Ontario” (MSGCS, 1997c). It is interesting to note that the “improvement of cost-efficiency” and the “enhancement of public safety” are articulated as if they are two very interdependent objectives. This statement indeed reflects an attempt, on the part of the Ministry, to lend coherence to an agenda that was essentially aimed at realizing two largely independent goals: cost-effectiveness and public safety. In fact, this statement makes it seem as if public safety would invariably be enhanced by a more cost-effective system of service provision.

In pursuit of this mandate, the Ministry set out to create a new security service delivery system that would be characterized by: cost-effectiveness and efficiency; an

equitable system of financing at the local level; “greater fiscal accountability at the local level”, the flexible deployment of security resources; streamlined administrative and operational processes; and “adequate levels of policing throughout all parts of the province” (MSGCS, 1997c).

A key component of the Ministry’s consultation process during the course of this review was the drafting of a “Framework for Discussion” that was released to stakeholders and to caucus that outlined possibilities for change within the six issue areas listed above. These stakeholders were then asked to submit written opinions on this framework. A Police Summit, titled *Policing Ontario: Building for the Future* was hosted by the Ministry and was held in Toronto on June 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of 1996 (see MSGCS, 1996b: 2). Following the Summit, the Solicitor General and Minister of Correctional Services held consultations with police and municipal representatives. A working committee was then established, which consisted of Ministry officials and representatives from the different associations who participated in the Summit. The working committee fulfilled its mandate at the end of August, 1996 and the amendments to the *Police Services Act* were formulated. A “Who Does What Panel”, established by the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing in May, 1996, also provided recommendations relating to matters of police financing and governance. The Solicitor General and Minister of Correctional Services, along with the Attorney General, also launched an independent review of the civilian oversight of police in October 1996 (MSGCS, 1997c). The Ministry’s assessments of the six main issue areas are depicted as follows.

### *Equitable Financing of Police Services*

As indicated earlier, a major issue for the Ministry was that some municipalities were required to pay for their security provision through municipal taxes while others received the services of the Ontario Provincial Police at no cost due to subsidies by the province. This inequity had been identified approximately twenty-five years ago in the 1974 Task Force Report on Policing in Ontario. This report stated:

*[I]t is imperative that this inequity be eliminated. Earlier in this report, we have recommended that the structure of policing in Ontario be realigned so that each community will either provide its own policing or obtain police services through a negotiated contract with the Ontario Provincial Police or other operating force. This rationalization of police forces in Ontario should eliminate the problem of free policing (Task Force on Policing, 1974: 125)*

This "free rider" issue was not addressed subsequent to this 1974 report. Similar to the discussion of the 1974 Task Force Report discussed in the previous chapter, one can contend that the range of problematics identified by the Task Force were not issues which represented any "real" consequences for police organizations at the time. Specifically, the Task Force had indeed identified a series of concerns relating to the increasingly expensive nature of policing, and the possibility that the province would no longer be able to sustain the system as it was organized. However, the province had not yet experienced a fiscal crisis, which did not make it a material necessary for the province or its policing organizations to challenge their prevailing assumptions. So, while the Task Force introduced a variety of new ideas, such ideas did not take "bite" at the time.

It was not until the fiscal crisis of the early- to mid-1990's, in combination with a fiscally savvy government, that this "free riding" issue was defined as a very real problem. To be sure, the issue of equitable financing would constitute Phase One of the Review, relating to issues of financing, while Phase Two would concentrate on problems

relating to policing structure and organization (MSGCS, 1996a: 3). At the time of the Review, 202 Ontario municipalities were financing their local police services through municipal taxes. Among these municipalities, 168 were policed by either municipal or regional services and 34 were contracting the services of the OPP. Together, these municipalities represented 85% of the province's population. In the remainder of the province, there were 576 municipalities located mainly in rural and northern parts of the province. In these 576 municipalities, the province was paying for their policing (MSGCS, 1996a: 4).

While the *Police Services Act* indicated that the provision of adequate and effective police services would be the responsibility of municipalities, there were certain exemptions in the *Act* and in some municipal statutes. For instance, a town with a population under 5,000 could be exempted from this responsibility by the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council upon recommendation by the Solicitor General and Minister of Correctional Services. However, not all towns under the population of 5,000 have been so exempted. As well, certain towns had exceeded a population of 5000 over the years and continued to receive "free policing". In addition, the *Regional Municipalities Act* created some inequities in two towns in particular. The municipality of Haldimand-Norfolk was being jointly policed by a regional police service and the OPP. However, it was only those areas policed by the regional police that had to pay, while those areas that were policed by the OPP did not. The second issue concerned the *District Municipality of Muskoka Act*, which exempted all municipalities within the District of Muskoka from any financial responsibility for policing (MSGCS, 1996a: 4-5).

In response to this “free rider” problem, the Ministry wrote (in its Framework for Discussion) that

*Phase 2 is contingent upon the elimination of the inequities in the financing of OPP services to those municipalities currently not paying. Eliminating these inequities will remove disincentives to any possible restructuring of police services. Without the implementation of a policy on equitable financing of police services, the advancement of initiatives to meet the government's vision of a modern, smaller, more effective justice system will not be realized. Further, it is unlikely that meaningful change will occur in policing unless all municipalities pay their fair share of policing costs (Ibid., 3-4)*

The Ministry's considerable emphasis on instilling a system of equitable financing represents an underlying agenda aimed at re-articulating the identity and role of municipal governments. As the above passage indicates, an explicit objective of the Harris government is to create a “smaller, more effective justice system”, and a key means of doing this is to hive off certain “steering” functions to the municipal level. The assumption of the Harris government is that if *all* municipalities were to subsidize the local provision of security, these municipalities would inevitably become more entrepreneurial in their approach to service delivery. So, the elimination of the “free rider” problem is a key means of fostering a new entrepreneurial ethos at the municipal level.

The Ministry argued that the 576 municipalities should pay and be responsible for their policing services “regardless of the type of arrangement for police services” (1996a: 6). This would ensure not only that the inequities are eliminated, but that municipalities would be able to explore the different service delivery options listed in the *Police Services Act* (MSGCS, 1996a: 6). At the time of the Review, the *Act* contained a list of four key service delivery options for municipalities, which, according to the Ministry, have not been taken advantage of by municipalities. These options are: (1) that

municipalities create their own police service and pay for the cost of this service; (2) that municipalities share a police service; (3) that municipalities acquire the services of the OPP; and (4) that “[w]ith the Commission’s<sup>47</sup> approval, the municipality may adopt a different method of providing police services” (Statutes of Ontario, 1990: Section 5). Generally speaking, most middle- to large-sized municipalities had their own services and paid for them through municipal taxes, or the smaller municipalities would acquire the services of the OPP (and in a large majority of cases be subsidized by the province). While the fourth option, relating to a “different method of providing police services”, provided the legislative basis for considerable innovation in the delivery of policing services, it was largely not taken advantage of. According to the Ministry, this was because municipalities were not required, particularly from a financial perspective, to be entrepreneurial in the delivery of security. The solution to this problem was, for the Ministry, very simply – to remove any “disincentives”.

#### *Alternative Sources of Revenue for Police Services*

In the spirit of its vision of a smaller and more cost-efficient criminal justice system, the Ministry explored the possibility of alternative sources of revenue for policing services. Due to the extent of the province’s debt load, the Ministry suggested that police administrators may have to think beyond their traditional sources of funding which derived, in most cases, from municipal tax levies on residential, commercial and industrial properties. Several alternatives were mentioned, such as: charging fees for police services, selling products, assets or services, selling advertising rights and private funding (MSGCS, 1996a: 15-16; MSGCS, 1996b: 5). The fees for which police services could charge, for example, could include such activities as repeated responses to false fire

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<sup>47</sup> “commission” refers to the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services

alarms or billing homeowners responsible for loud parties which necessitated repeated visits on the part of the police. In terms of selling products, one example would be the manufacture and sale of law enforcement training videos. With regards to advertising, the police could be paid by manufacturers to endorse particular products and/or services. In terms of private funding, the Ministry argued that businesses could become a source of revenue given the popularity of “community policing” and the notion that communities should take more responsibility for their security. The argument was that since businesses form a key part of communities, it would be logical that they could provide funding according to schemes such as corporate giving programs or foundations and trusts (MSGCS, 1996a: 16-18; MSGCS, 1996b: 5).

The Ministry was effectively suggesting that municipalities and their police departments begin acting as if they were corporate entities. Although municipalities were not out to make a profit, they could still *imagine* themselves as profit-making institutions and be innovative in terms of their funding structures (see Chapter Three on this notion of “imaginization”). This would also alleviate the financial burden on the provincial level of government.

#### *Structure and Organization of Police Services*

Because of decreasing government resources, the Ministry argued that “[t]he challenge facing all public sector organizations is not only to maintain, but to improve, the quality of services given the increasingly limited resources available” (MSGCS, 1996a: 20). A variety of cost-inefficiencies were identified by the Ministry. For example, there were 101 municipal police services in Ontario which had as few as 3 police officers and as many as 5,507 police officers. In addition, there were 778 lower

tier municipalities – that is, those which did not constitute metropolitan areas or regions – which were policed in considerably cost-ineffective ways. For example, there were 91 municipal and 10 regional policing institutions that were providing services to 168 municipalities, ranging in population size from 1,237 people to 2, 183, 655 people. Also, it was noted that there were 34 OPP contract locations in municipalities that ranged in population size from 1,106 people to 43,362 people. In addition, there were certain “hybrid” policing arrangements involving the sharing of services between the OPP and regional police services for particular regions (Ibid., 6-7).

Having identified the inefficiencies associated with these kinds of policing structures, the Ministry intended to determine what should be the “optimal” size of a police service. For them, the optimal size was one that was cost-effective while also being responsive to local needs and direction (MSGCS, 1996b: 24-25). From a cost-effectiveness standpoint, the Ministry favoured a “centralization” approach, because, for example, it would ensure “economy of effort and reduction of unnecessary duplication of services”, and it would ensure that larger services could provide more programs, due to greater “economies of scale” (MSGCS, 1996b: 7; MSGCS, 1996a: 26-27).

At the same time, the Ministry wanted to determine the most appropriate ways of measuring “adequate and effective” police services. While measures such as police per population ratios and clearance rates had been traditionally used, the Ministry stated that other factors relating to adequacy such as performance indicators, minimum standards and community perceptions should also be explored (MSGCS, 1996b: 31). Technologies such as performance indicators and community perception surveys (discussed in previous



chapters) reinforce this shift toward the introduction of market-based disciplines in the measurement of policing services, a theme which will be discussed later on.

### *Police Functions*

Having identified the "financial pressures" associated with public policing, the Ministry decided to re-think the role of public policing institutions in the delivery of security, particularly in terms of what their "core functions" should be (MSGCS, 1996a: 33). This re-thinking took place in recognition of the "rapid growth in private security over the last twenty years" (Ibid). The Ministry stated,

*While public and private sector organizations continue to view the "public police" as the primary provider of police services that are designed to ensure public safety and personal security, many individuals and organizations also believe that there is a role to be played by the private security industry in areas such as personal security, property protection, and the investigation of specific types of crime (e.g., white-collar crime) (Ibid)*

Accordingly, the Ministry attempted to differentiate between "core" and "peripheral" or "ancillary" police functions. The most commonly agreed upon core functions were listed as:

- *crime prevention;*
- *law enforcement, including apprehending criminals, laying charges and participating in prosecutions;*
- *assistance to victims in crime;*
- *public order maintenance activities, including activities designed to prevent breaches of the peace; and*
- *emergency response (MSGCS, 1996a: 34)*

Examples of ancillary functions were:

- *care and control of prisoners;*
- *prisoner transportation;*
- *court security;*
- *the issuance of summons; and*
- *other types of activities that are currently provided by police services (Ibid)*

In the context of these "core" functions, the next step would be to determine who would be the most effective provider of such services (Ibid., 35). "In other words, which functions require the knowledge, skills and abilities of a highly trained, professional police officer and which functions can be performed by others?" (Ibid) When the skills of sworn police officers aren't required, other kinds of personnel were suggested, including civilians, special constables, volunteers, auxiliaries, and public/private partnerships (Ibid., 36). While this list of core functions implies that the Ministry still views the public police as playing a central role in the governance of security, their fiscal agenda has opened up the possibility for some of these core functions to be carried out by people other than "highly trained professional police officers". This is suggestive of a tension between the Harris government's fiscal orientation and their otherwise conservative, law-and-order stance (found, for example, in their "Boot Camps" initiative and in the establishment of their "Crime Control Commission").

#### *Civilian Governance of Police Services*

The Ministry also examined the nature and mechanisms of civilian governance, that is, those non-political bodies that govern the delivery of police services. While police services have always had a great deal of latitude with regard to their operational duties, they have always been accountable in terms of adequacy and effectiveness to civilian authorities such as Police Services Boards. While such Boards have governed municipal police services, the OPP has been directly accountable to the Solicitor General and Minister of Correctional Services (MSGCS, 1996a: 44). Historically, there were *no* structures in place that would ensure that the OPP were accountable at the local level. In those cases where the OPP were providing contract policing to municipalities with their

own Police Services Boards, these Boards have traditionally been allowed under the *Act* to “advise” the Solicitor General and the relevant Detachment Commander on matters regarding the service. However, in this situation, the Board does not have the same “steering” capacity as Boards with their own municipal police services (MSGCS, 1996a: 48-49). So, while the Ministry was concerned with the cost-effectiveness of current policing structures, they were equally concerned with the apparent lack of local forms of accountability with regard to the OPP.

This lack of local accountability has been most apparent in the fact that the provincial level of government has historically played a large “steering” role in the governance of security. This steering role was legislated in the *Police Services Act* (Statutes of Ontario, 1990) which required the Ministry to:

*(a) monitor police forces to ensure that adequate and effective police services are provided at the municipal and provincial levels;*

*(b) monitor boards and police forces to ensure that they comply with prescribed standards of service;...*

*(d) develop and promote programs to enhance professional police practices, standards and training;...*

*(i) provide to boards and municipal chiefs of police information and advice respecting the management and operation of police forces, techniques in handling special problems and other information calculated to assist;*

*(j) issue directives and guidelines respecting policy matters (Statutes of Ontario, 1990: 5; MSGCS, 1996a: 47-48)*

So, while policing has been regarded primarily as a local service, it is clear in this legislation that the Ministry has exercised considerable power in the nature and form of police service delivery (MSGCS, 1996a: 48). This degree of provincial governance was also reflected in the composition of Police Services Boards, where the majority of their members have been appointed by the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council, and the minority appointed by municipal councils (Ibid). In this regard, the Ministry was contesting its

own authority in the governance of policing, given that local direction was an important part of the “Common Sense” agenda.

The Ministry also argued that due to “increasing fiscal constraints”, municipalities were seeking a greater steering role with regard to the allocation of security budgets (Ibid., 49). Accordingly, the Ministry argued that the current structure of civilian governance should be transformed in ways that would ensure enhanced local direction. One possibility would be for municipal councils to have responsibility for municipal police service budgets. Another possibility would be for Police Services Board members to be nominated by municipal council (MSGCS, 1996b: 10). As well, the Ministry suggested that they examine the possibility of introducing a Police Services Board for the OPP generally (MSGCS, 1996b: 10; MSGCS, 1996a: 54).

#### *Oversight of Police Services*

While the Ministry was devoted to abdicating certain steering functions to the local level, it also wanted to *centralize* police governance by “streamlining police oversight bodies and functions” (MSGCS, 1996a: 55). At the time of the Ministry’s Review, the following institutions were devoted to overseeing the activities of the various police services: the Chief of Police (including Commissioner of the OPP); the Police Services Board; the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services; the Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner; the Board of Inquiry; the Special Investigations Unit; and the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services, Policing Services Division (MSGCS, 1996a: 57; MSGCS, 1997b). The Ministry indicated that several concerns were identified by police and citizens regarding various aspects of these bodies, including: mandate, protocols, duplication and overlap, and the issue of reconciling

police and community expectations (MSGCS, 1996a: 61). As well, this system cost approximately \$8 million per year to maintain (MSGCS, 1997c). The Ministry argued that this system was inordinately complex:

*Currently, the oversight responsibility is divided among local police chiefs and police services boards, the Divisional Court, two provincial ministries, two quasi-judicial tribunals and three primary oversight agencies. The result has been a reactive and disjointed approach to policy development and legislation of police oversight, and it fails in many respects to foster an efficient, coordinated approach to attaining excellence in the delivery of police services in Ontario (Ibid)*

The question for the Ministry then became, “How can police oversight bodies and functions be streamlined and rationalized while preserving the principle of police accountability to civilian governing authorities?” (MSGCS, 1996a: 62). Once again, while centralization was perceived as the best means of achieving a cost-effective structure, the Ministry wanted to ensure that accountability at the local level was also promoted. Accordingly, the Ministry was trying to determine whether or not civilian oversight should be a matter of provincial interest (MSGCS, 1996a: 70).

While the Ministry was reviewing the six core issues described above, the “Common Sense Revolution” had already begun transforming governance relationships between the provincial and municipal levels of Government through a dual strategy of centralization and localization. Before we discuss the outcomes of the Review of Police Services, and the subsequent amendments to the *Police Services Act*, it is important to highlight other related components of the “Common Sense” Agenda.

### **Reinventing Municipalities**

At the heart of the “Common Sense Revolution” – as the term “common sense” quite literally suggests – is a critique concerning the utility of theoretical knowledge and

an argument for the utility of practical knowledge as a basis for governance. A most insightful understanding of this sentiment is provided by Friedrich Hayek (see 1944, 1948; 1988), who strongly espouses the kind of practical knowledge that is found emblematically in markets. Coupled with this concern with the nature of knowledge is the view that the locations of governmental authority should be less centralized (see Elkins, 1995 and Hayek, 1988: 82). To be sure, the Harris government regards *business* "as the quintessential practical enterprise", and as such, deploys the market-based imagery required "to inspire new and more practical and local ways of governing" (Wood and Shearing, 1999: 315). In fact, during his election campaign, Mike Harris argued that the province needed a "revolution of practical ideas" (Harris, 1995:2).

Soon after they were elected, the Harris Conservatives began their "revolution of practical ideas" by embarking on a "functional and financial reorganization of the internal institutional workings of the province" (Courchene and Telmer, 1998: 198). This broader initiative would include the following components:

- *A new Municipal Act, borrowing from the Alberta model, which would enhance the scope for municipal manoeuvrability, including "natural person powers" for the municipalities;*
- *A restructuring/amalgamation of municipalities (including amalgamation of Toronto, Scarborough, Etobicoke, York, North York and East York into the "megacity" of Toronto);*
- *A wholesale reshuffling of provincial-municipal powers – shifting "hard" services (services to property and infrastructure) to the municipalities and moving "soft" services (education, health and welfare) to the provincial level;*
- *Property tax assessment reform – actual-value assessment (AVA);*
- *Restructuring of the school systems (school-board amalgamation, financing and curriculum); and*

- *Restructuring the hospital sector, including designating roughly a score of hospitals for closure (Courchence and Telmer, 1998: 198-199)*

All of these changes, except for the last one, were announced within the span of one week in January (the 13<sup>th</sup> to the 17<sup>th</sup>) of 1997, which has since been referred to as “megaweek” (Ibid., 199). All of these transformations had one thing in common: the re-articulation of the “central” and the “local”. Generally, the centralization and/or elimination of certain service delivery structures took place in order to enhance cost-effectiveness, while some steering functions would be transferred to the local level. Among these changes were two initiatives in particular that served to transform the ways in which the delivery of policing services was to be governed in the province. The “Who Does What” Initiative and the changes to the *Municipal Act* (and in particular the municipal restructuring provisions) will be discussed next.

#### *The “Who Does What” Initiative*

The “Who Does What” initiative formed part of the province's effort to create a “more efficient and cost-effective government in Ontario” (Government of Ontario, 1998). The first major phase of implementation began on January 1, 1998, based on the intention of “transforming the roles and responsibilities of the province and the municipalities” (Ibid). This initiative was touted as “the first reform initiative to bring about fundamental changes to the way the two levels of government manage and fund key public services in Ontario” (Government of Ontario, 1998). These “fundamental changes” would be aimed at:

- *greater accountability to taxpayers;*
- *protecting priority services and maintaining critical standards;*
- *streamlined service delivery;*
- *better rationalized funding responsibilities;*
- *capitalizing on local expertise and innovation; and*

- *greater autonomy for local government (Ibid)*

This list of objectives reflects the broader intention of the Harris government to enhance the cost-effectiveness of service delivery while at the same time harnessing local capacities and knowledge. The desire to both centralize and localize are articulated as two coherent and interrelated components of a broader agenda.

There were five key Who Does What initiatives, all devoted to pursuing this broader agenda. These were: Revenue and Financing; Emergency Services; Social and Community Health Services; Transportation and Utilities; and Municipal Government (Other Key Services and Related Matters) (Government of Ontario, 1998). In general, the re-structuring initiatives stemming from the "Who Does What" recommendations led to a full-scale re-articulation of the "central" and the "local". Examples of this re-structuring include:

- *the withdrawal of the province from funding for municipal water and sewer services;*
- *the withdrawal of the province from funding for municipal transportation services...;*
- *the withdrawal of the province from Planning Act approvals; and*
- *the withdrawal of the province from funding and administering social housing (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 1996)*

The work of the Emergency Services sub-panel, which is of particular interest for this chapter, contributed to this re-articulation of the central and the local in specific relation to security delivery. These transformations will be discussed later on in the context of the legislative changes stemming from Bill 105.

### *Municipal Restructuring*

The Harris government set out to develop a new *Municipal Act* as a means of "reducing government entanglement and bureaucracy" and creating "efficient local



government" (Harris, 1995: 17). The specific reasons for altering this legislation are explained here:

*Ontario's current Municipal Act is prescriptive, detailed and complicated. It has not had a comprehensive overhaul since it was enacted in 1849. Municipalities and other stakeholders have for many years been asking for a simpler, more modern Act, which would be more understandable and provide a more flexible framework for municipal activities. The...draft Act is intended to do that. It proposes a more streamlined Municipal Act that would provide municipal flexibility and the appropriate checks and balances (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 1998)*

The thrust of the new *Act* is to minimize provincial regulation of municipal affairs and to allow municipalities the flexibility to operate in ways deemed locally appropriate.<sup>48</sup> One of the provisions in the *Municipal Act* which directly relates to the governance of security is "municipal restructuring". According to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, municipalities had been requesting more flexibility to engage in restructuring initiatives. The Ministry therefore set out to develop, "[c]hanges to the regulation for implementing restructuring proposals [which] will give municipalities more tools to develop and negotiate locally-initiated, locally-driven solutions" (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 1996). The Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Al Leach, stated that "[t]hese amendments are all part of a broader mandate to reduce bureaucracy, eliminate waste and duplication, and deliver services more efficiently" (Ibid).

A main effect of the new *Savings and Restructuring Act* has been the reduction of numbers of municipalities as well as numbers of politicians (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 1997). Municipal restructuring can now be achieved in several ways:

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<sup>48</sup> As indicated earlier, one of the proposals was to grant municipalities "the powers of a natural person", which would "enable municipalities to conduct their day-to-day business without the need for specific legislative authority, eg., to enter into agreements, to purchase land and equipment, to hire employees, and

- a) *annexing part of a municipality to another municipality,*
- b) *annexing a geographic area that does not form part of a municipality to a municipality,*
- c) *amalgamating a municipality with another municipality,*
- d) *separating a local municipality from an upper-tier municipality for municipal purposes,*
- e) *joining a local municipality to an upper-tier municipality for municipal purposes,*
- f) *dissolving all or part of a municipality, and*
- g) *incorporating the inhabitants of a geographic area as a municipality ("restructuring") (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 1998)*

The agenda driving the restructuring of municipalities in rural Ontario was the same agenda driving the amalgamation of the five cities in the Greater Toronto Area. Indeed, this emphasis on governance at the local level was strongly reiterated throughout the Greater Toronto Area Task Force Report. The Task Force claimed that municipalities should take on more of a “steering” role in the delivery of local services and should be given the tools and the space to do so in more cost-effective ways. With regard to matters of regional interest, it was argued that the amalgamation of the five GTA cities would ensure a common and integrated approach to the same issues (Ibid., 14). In essence, the GTA Task Force was calling for a process that would both *centralize* and *localize*. As the Task Force stated, “[w]e recommend that municipalities continue to be given the freedom and flexibility they need to be more entrepreneurial and efficient by legislating a new ***Municipal Act***” (GTA Task Force, 1996: 13). In terms of the impact of municipal restructuring on policing, the reduction in numbers of municipalities means

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to delegate administrative responsibilities to committees, staff members or other bodies, such as boards of management” (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 1998).

that there would be overlaps in policing service delivery (OPP, 1998j: 5). Accordingly, the newly restructured municipalities would be required to “decide how to provide adequate and effective police services” (Ibid., 5-6).

The Review of Policing Services took place in the context of these other initiatives aimed at transforming service delivery into a cost-effective enterprise. The next section will discuss the particular amendments to the *Police Services Act* and the ways in which they have served to reinvent the governance of policing.

### **The New *Police Services Act***

The Review of Police Services led to the formulation of Bill 105, titled “An Act to renew the partnership between the province, municipalities and the police and to enhance community safety”. This Bill proposed amendments to the existing *Police Services Act*, and received Royal Assent on June 26, 1997. The Bill became a law on November 27, 1997 (Government of Ontario, 1998), and the legislative changes took effect on January 1, 1998 (MSGCS, 1997c).

The legislative changes reflected in Bill 105 addressed five out of the six issue areas discussed earlier. The Ministry’s idea of examining alternative sources of revenue for police services appears to have been too contentious among those stakeholders that were consulted. To be sure, the OPP’s written submission to the Ministry during the review process argued that receiving revenues from alternate sources, such as charging fees or receiving sponsorships, could lead to conflicts of interest (OPP, 1996d: 1) They stated in particular that:

*Sponsorships and donations have the potential to create perceived, if not real, conflicts of interest. This type of revenue may be viewed as an attempt to influence police and consequently, the administration of justice. In addition, there could be a perception that*

*sponsors/donors would receive preferential police protection or could be accorded a higher priority with respect to matters they bring to the attention of the police for purposes of investigation (Ibid)*

This sentiment was reinforced by an OPP representative during an interview:

*I've always argued that there's significant differences between bureaucracy and private enterprise, and one of the concerns I think is that governments want to treat policing like a business, and there's been lots of inquiries concerning corporate sponsorships in policing. On the corporate sponsorship issue..., no matter how you look at it, the independence of the police is paramount to fairness in the image of the public, and private enterprise doesn't have to deal with that (#6)*

The Ontario Association of Police Services Boards echoed this discomfort in their submission to the Ministry when it stated that “the OAPSB membership is concerned that the public might perceive that one can “buy” police or police services by donating or contributing in some manner to police revenue” (OAPSB, 1996: 2). The rejection of this proposed shift toward alternative sources of revenue points to a profound tension between the marketization tendencies of the Harris government and the identity of policing institutions as objective and impartial law enforcement professionals. Their identity as a “social” institution that embodies the interests of “all” has remained strong in relation to this corporate sponsorship issue. This resistance demonstrates that at this point in time, the degree to which policing institutions will perceive themselves as “businesses” is limited. Obviously, the idea of alternative sources of revenue has pushed the boundaries of what is thinkable for institutions like the OPP at the present time.

Notwithstanding this issue, the ways in which the market-based logic of the Common Sense Revolution inspired the changes to the *Police Services Act* is quite striking. To begin with, the Government's desire to shift the responsibility for security to the local level is made explicit in its emphasis on “equitable financing”. In a statement in the Legislature, Runciman said, “I intend to introduce long-awaited amendments to the

*Police Services Act* that will bring similar fairness to the way that Ontario taxpayers pay for their policing...[I]t is only fair that everyone pays for their policing” (MSGCS, 1997d). He argued that equitable financing would bring *local accountability* to communities (Ibid). He added, “we believe that this renewed partnership between the province, local government and the police will benefit all the taxpayers of Ontario. Our proposals will allow community leaders to play a critical role in keeping our communities safe” (Ibid). In a news release sent out by the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services, the central rationale behind the amendments is captured in this excerpt:

*The amended Act will cut red tape, foster community involvement and allow more local control over police service delivery. “Local governments should make decisions about local services, while the provincial government must ensure province-wide standards of policing and community safety,” said Mr. Runciman. The amendments will return control of police budgets to municipalities while maintaining a provincial presence on police services boards (MSGCS, 1997c)*

The government’s dual tendency to localize *and* centralize is reflected in this statement by Runciman. While the Harris government is clearly *not* interested in the micro-management of municipal affairs (which would be too costly), it still wishes to retain control at the centre through the development of “province-wide standards of policing and community safety”. While the province wishes to re-negotiate its authority, it certainly does not what to abdicate its authority entirely, and this is also reflected in its intention to “maintain a provincial presence on police services boards” (Ibid).

This new “government at a distance” strategy (Rose and Miller, 1992) is being reinforced through the “customerization” of municipalities. Specifically, by ensuring that security service delivery is paid for at the local level, the provincial government has created a condition in which municipalities will be motivated to creatively “shop around”

(just as a "business" would) for security serves that are both cost-effective and tailored to local needs. In turn, equitable financing has instantly created a new regulatory regime that privileges both *local* and *financial* forms of accountability. In other words, equitable financing is also a technology for rendering municipal governments *fiscally accountable* to their taxpayers or "stakeholders". Thus, equitable financing has served to re-constitute municipalities as businesses or "private governments" (Macaulay, 1986; Crawford, 1997) in two senses; first, they must now "shop around" as consumers of services; and second, they must be accountable to their "stakeholders" for how they spend municipal money. As one Ministry newsletter explained, "[b]y correcting a long-standing inequity, the amended act heightened financial accountability and caused many municipalities to seriously consider exploring their policing options" (MSGCS, 1998a).

As stated earlier, under the old *Act* there were four service delivery options for municipalities. To reiterate, these options were: (1) that municipalities create their own police service and pay for the cost of this service; (2) that municipalities may share a police service; (3) that municipalities can acquire the services of the OPP; and (4) that "[w]ith the Commission's approval, the municipality may adopt a different method of providing police services" (Statutes of Ontario, 1990: Section 5). Stemming from the Ministry's Review and the subsequent formulation of Bill 105, the section of the *Police Services Act* governing these options (Section 5) was repealed, and six options for providing municipal services were provided. As stated in the new *Act*,

*5. A municipality's responsibility to provide police services shall be discharged in one of the following ways:*

*1. The council may establish a police force, the members of which shall be appointed by the board...*

2. *The council may enter into an agreement...with one or more other councils to constitute a joint board and the joint board may appoint the members of a police force...*

3. *The council may enter into an agreement...with one or more other councils to amalgamate their police forces.*

4. *The council may enter into an agreement...with the council of another municipality to have its police services provided by the board of the other municipality....if the municipality is contiguous to the municipality that is to provide the police services or is contiguous to any other municipality that receives police services from the same municipality.*

5. *The council may enter into an agreement...alone or jointly with one or more other councils, to have police services provided by the Ontario Provincial Police.*

6. *With the Commission's approval, the council may adopt a different method of providing police services (MSGCS, 1997a: 2-3; MSGCS, 1997b)*

This amended section is not radically different from the previous section in that it retains the previous four options for service delivery. However, it does encourage municipalities to be more innovative, particularly from a cost-effectiveness perspective. In conjunction with the *Savings and Restructuring Act*, this particular Section encourages the *centralization* of policing services by using the terms “amalgamation” or “sharing” in reference to Police Services Boards, service delivery and/or contracts with the OPP. So, while the Harris government is encouraging municipalities to be innovative, it was certainly emphasizing the option of centralization in the interests of cost-effectiveness.

As one interviewee commented:

*In actual fact, the options to municipalities hasn't changed significantly since the forties - they've had options since then... I think what's making that a key issue now is the -for lack of a better term - “downloading” from the provincial government to the municipal level, and I think some of that puts the checks and balances and the controls at the right level of government. I think we're going to see improved government budgets because of this, and it shouldn't have a huge impact on municipalities. It's going to make them review their options, it's going to make them review their spending and be very critical of it, which is probably a good thing, because it is where it belongs - at the municipal level (#2)*

This quote demonstrates that when the “free rider” problem is eliminated, municipalities want to become “customers” and closely examine the kinds of services they are receiving for the price they are paying. At the same time, it should be noted that a contract with the OPP still remains an option under the new *Act*, but it is now one of six options, instead of four. Compounded by the “customerization” of municipalities, as well as municipal restructuring, the OPP must now take its doctrine of “customer service” very seriously, because its previous monopoly - and perhaps its very existence - is being threatened. The following interviewee discusses the consequences of equitable financing for the future of the OPP:

*[S]maller areas that got us for free, I shouldn't say they weren't really interested in what we were doing, but they got us for free, they weren't paying for it. Now, they have to pay for it, and they've got these other options - they want to know what's been going on in the past, "what are you going to do for us in the future"... That's something our officers really have to get on board with... [W]e really have to do some customer service because people have a choice, you know, if you don't treat the public right and the customer right, somebody else will and we've seen it in lots of areas where we've lost areas, whether it be by finance or whatever, so we're not guaranteed to be policing, and that's why I try to get through to these people that we've got to go out [and] do our job, be productive, besides just the fact of doing your job is the fact that you might be out of a job (#18)*

The amendments reflecting the introduction of equitable financing are captured in the newly created Section 5.1, sections 1, 2 and 3:

5.1 (1) *If a municipality does not provide police services by one of the ways set out in section 5, the Ontario Provincial Police shall provide police services to the municipality.*

(2) *A municipality that is provided police services by the Ontario Provincial Police under subsection (1) shall pay the Minister of Finance for the services, in the amount and the manner provided by the regulations.*

(3) *The amount owed by a municipality for the police services provided by the Ontario Provincial Police, if not collected by other means, may be deducted from any grant payable to the municipality out of provincial funds or may be recovered by a court action, with costs, as a debt due to Her Majesty (MSGCS, 1997a)*



In addition to this new section governing equitable financing, a regulation was developed concerning the cost recovery of OPP services. This regulation provides a method for determining the amounts owed by municipalities for OPP services, as well as indicates how payments should be made. The determination of costs are now based on actual costs incurred by the OPP, as specified in relevant regulations. Municipal costs are determined by the local detachment commander according to a local detachment operational assessment (MSGCS, 1997c). Costs are now determined according to such workload data as salary and benefits for uniform members and civilians, direct operating expenses such as office accommodation, vehicle usage, and uniforms and equipment (MSGCS, 1998a: 8).

These costs are now allocated to lower tier municipalities, except for the upper tier municipality of Muskoka which is a regional municipality. Police services are now financed through the collection of municipal property taxes (MSGCS, 1997c). Under the new *Police Services Act*, the OPP may also recover their costs for services that are provided to municipalities or other policing institutions (Government of Ontario, 1998).

While the Harris government has encouraged (or more accurately, required) municipalities to be more entrepreneurial and cost-effective in the area of police financing, the revised *Act* has also enhanced the civilian governance of policing at the local level. In particular, there is now enhanced legislative emphasis on the role of Police Services Boards as well as “Community Policing Advisory Committees”. In relation to Boards, any municipality that enters into a contract with the Ontario Provincial Police, either alone or jointly with other municipalities, *must* have a Police Services Board. If there is a joint contract, then a joint Board must be established. Prior to this,

only those municipalities that maintained their own police service were required to have a Board (Statutes of Ontario, 1990: Section 27(1)). Accordingly, for all OPP contract locations, municipalities are now required to establish a Board upon renewal of the contract, and any new contracts now require the establishment of a Board (MSGCS, 1997c).

Both the authority and composition of these Boards have been altered as well (Government of Ontario, 1998). Under the new *Act*, the role of Police Services Boards is detailed at length and the responsibilities of Boards have been formalized. For example, Boards must “participate in the selection of the detachment commander”, who will in effect be acting as Chief of Police in that community. In fact, the role of the Detachment Commander as a local Police Chief has been formalized in several sections of the new *Act* (OPP, 1998k: 4). Boards must also determine the objectives and priorities for the police, in consultation with detachment commanders. Although boards may not interfere with or override provincial policing policies, they may determine, again in consultation with detachment commanders, local policing policies. Boards are also required to monitor the performance of detachment commanders (MSGCS, 1997b: Section 10(9)). In essence, “[p]olice services boards are now required in all OPP contract locations, and their roles and responsibilities are expanded to more closely mirror those of municipal police services boards” (Government of Ontario, 1998). Accordingly, “in locations where the OPP provides detachment services to a municipality under a formal contract, the Detachment Commander is directly accountable to a Police Services Board” (OPP, 1998k: 4).

Municipalities are now able to appoint the majority of Board members. Prior to this, the province appointed the majority of members, with a minority coming from the municipalities. The membership of the Board must now consist of a municipal representative and a community representative, and neither can be an elected official or a municipal civil servant (MSGCS, 1997c). This emphasis on enhanced civilian governance reflects the intention of the Harris government to shift some steering responsibilities to the local level. The Detachment Commander is no longer an exclusive recipient of provincial directives, but is now rendered both strategically and financially accountable to civilian authorities at the local level.

In terms of financial authority, municipalities now have the authority to determine their police budgets (MSGCS, 1997c). In a Ministry background document it states, “Municipalities that pay for police services from municipal property taxes will have the ultimate say in financial matters” (Ibid). This reflects the primary principle of this new form of civilian governance, termed “pay for say”, which captures this new thrust toward local decision-making (Government of Ontario, 1998). Police Services Boards now allocate and administer this budget, and have the option to appeal on budget matters as they relate to the issue of “adequacy” to the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (Ibid).

The expansion of civilian governance at the local level is also enhanced with the establishment of Community Policing Advisory Committees. According to the new *Police Services Act*, these Committees, in addition to Police Services Boards, will serve overall as an important institution and mechanism through which the civilian governance of the police will occur. The *Act* has established these Committees as a “formal point of

local accountability” (OPP, 1998k: 4). The remainder of section 5.1 (sub-sections 4 through 9) of the new *Police Services Act* details the nature and function of such committees. Sub-sections 4 through 7 are listed here:

*5.1 (4) One or more municipalities served by the same Ontario Provincial Police detachment that provides police services under this section may establish a community policing advisory committee.*

*(5) If a community policing advisory committee is established, it shall be composed of one delegate for each municipality that is served by the same Ontario Provincial Police detachment and that chooses to send a delegate.*

*(6) A community policing advisory committee shall advise the detachment commander of the Ontario Provincial Police detachment assigned to the municipality or municipalities, or his or her designate, with respect to objectives and priorities for police services in the municipality or municipalities.*

*(7) The term of office for a delegate to a community policing advisory committee shall be as set out by the council in his or her appointment, but shall not exceed the term of office of the council that appointed the delegate (MSGCS, 1997a; MSGCS, 1997b)*

While the creation of Community Policing Advisory Committees would serve to enhance the local governance of policing in Ontario, it should also be noted that such committees would be volunteer-based, and hence considerably cost-effective for both provincial and municipal levels of government. In essence, such Committees (as well as Police Services Boards) enable the governance of policing services to be both cost-effective as well as locally driven.

At the same time, as stated earlier, the provincial government intends to centralize the governance of policing by establishing province-wide standards of adequacy. In particular, a regulation concerning “minimum adequacy standards for effective and cost-efficient police service delivery” is currently under development (MSGCS, 1997c). The “Who Does What” Panel stated that “[t]he Adequacy and Effectiveness Regulation and supporting standards will, for the first time, establish standardized, province-wide

effectiveness measures that allow the province, local governments, police services boards and the community to assess the value and impact of their investment in policing” (Government of Ontario, 1998). The Regulation is also aimed at achieving the government’s broader objective of enhanced cost-effectiveness in policing service delivery. By providing municipalities with the tools for determining the “value and impact of their investment in policing” (Ibid), municipalities will be empowered to pursue cost-reduction strategies, including: sharing services, contracting with another police service, or centralizing or regionalizing certain services (such as specialty services that are rarely used) (Government of Ontario, 1998).

The government’s pursuit of a cost-effective system of police governance is also reflected in its attempt to centralize the civilian oversight of police behavior. During his announcement of the key changes to the policing legislation, the Solicitor General and Minister of Correctional Services stated that the structures and processes of civilian oversight had previously been “complex, expensive, and slow” and that “[t]hese amendments will eliminate waste, duplication and overlap” (MSGCS, 1997d). He announced that the new oversight system would offer “an efficient, coordinated approach to civilian review and judgment of police actions...At the end of the day we will have a modernized, streamlined and simplified oversight system that is more responsive and accountable to the complainant” (Ibid). “Efficiencies will be realized by ending administrative duplication and overlap, not by compromising civilian authority” (Ibid). In essence, this centralization strategy is justified on the grounds that it will enhance the governance of police behavior/conduct at the civilian level, even though the primary objective is one of cost reduction.

The new “streamlined” model of police oversight was achieved through the merger of the public complaints and discipline systems into one system, eliminating two of the previous four provincial oversight agencies (i.e. the Police Complaints Commissioner and the Board of Inquiry) (Government of Ontario, 1998). The Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services will continue to exist, but will now reflect an integration of the Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner, the Board of Inquiry and the Ontario Civilian Commission (MSGCS, 1997c). This new Commission will have a broader range of responsibilities, including:

- *conduct inquiries, on its own motion, into complaints related to policies of, or services provided by, a police service, or about the conduct of a police officer;*
- *conduct reviews at the request of the complainant into local decisions on the handling of complaints;*
- *impose penalties (e.g., days off, dismissal, etc.) or take other action (e.g., training counseling, etc.) similar to those available at the local level in cases where the OCCPS holds a hearing into the conduct of a police officer;*
- *make recommendations with respect to policies of and services provided by a police service to the Solicitor General, police services board, chief of police, or police associations, as the case may be (Government of Ontario, 1998)*

This Commission will continue to hear appeals from police officers or complainants

(Ibid). At the same time, the Special Investigations Unit - devoted to police conduct resulting in serious injury or death - will continue to operate under its previous mandate and under the authority of the Attorney General. Although the government has centralized civilian oversight, this model is designed to encourage the resolution of problems at the local level. According to the Ministry, police and municipal stakeholders believed that “where possible, oversight should be anchored at the local level!” (MSGCS, 1997c).

The separate sections of the previous *Police Services Act* which dealt exclusively with discipline and public complaints were repealed and replaced with one section on complaints. The definition of “complaints” was also broadened to refer to complaints regarding the policies *and* services provided by a police service (Government of Ontario, 1998). The thrust of the new complaints provision is to promote “informal resolution for non-serious matters at any time in the process while ensuring appropriate safeguards are in place for both the police officer and the public complainant” (Ibid). Thus, oversight of police services will be anchored at the local level through the police chief/detachment commander and/or the police services board. Disciplinary penalties meted out at the local level by police management range from dismissal to three days without pay, and managers may also arrange for remedial measures such as counseling or training (Government of Ontario, 1998). If complainants are dissatisfied by local resolutions, they may have their complaints reviewed by the Commission (MSGCS, 1997c). Divisional courts may review those decisions made by the Commission in appeal cases (Government of Ontario, 1998).

The Harris government’s dual emphasis on centralization and localization is reflected in this new civilian oversight system. Again, the pursuit of cost-effectiveness drove the centralization of previous oversight bodies. At the same time, the system is designed to promote the resolution of complaints at the local level, which also saves the government money because cases are solved at the “front end”, or “customer service” level of government. The promotion of “informal resolution for non-serious matters” also reinforces a cost-effectiveness orientation that avoids, to a large extent, government bureaucracy and “red tape”.

In the area of police functions, the Who Does What Panel argued that the province should establish standards relating to the kinds of services provided by policing institutions. In concert with the Panel's position, the Ministry decided on a list of "core functions" that every police service would be required to carry out in order to achieve a provincial standard of adequacy (Ibid, MSGCS, 1997c). Section 4 of the amended *Act* highlights the responsibility for municipalities to carry out these core functions adequately and effectively, and to provide the necessary infrastructure to do so. The *Act* states:

4. *(1) Every municipality to which this subsection applies shall provide adequate and effective police services in accordance with its needs.*

*(2) Adequate and effective police services must include, at a minimum, all of the following police services:*

- 1. Crime prevention.*
- 2. Law enforcement.*
- 3. Assistance to victims of crime.*
- 4. Public order maintenance.*
- 5. Emergency response*

*(3) In providing adequate and effective police services, a municipality shall be responsible for providing all the infrastructure and administration necessary for providing such services, including vehicles, boats, equipment, communication devices, buildings and supplies (MSGCS, 1997a; bold added)*

This provision, in combination with the provision regarding service delivery options, leaves it considerably "open-ended" for municipalities to determine how to provide security services "in accordance with [their] needs". Because these core functions are listed in a rather vague way, municipalities have the legislative support to develop tailor-made security contracts with service providers that balance service levels with costs.



### *Financing the OPP*

The implications of these legislative changes for the Ontario Provincial Police are unique because this organization has a dual-mandate - that is, to provide certain security services for the province as a whole *and* to provide municipal security services according to a contract. There are specific changes within the *Act* that address the OPP exclusively. The following section of the *Police Services Act* details the responsibilities of the Ontario Provincial Police, which have remained unchanged:

19. *(1) The Ontario Provincial Police have the following responsibilities*
1. *Providing police services in respect of the parts of Ontario that do not have municipal police forces other than municipal law enforcement officers.*
  2. *Providing police services in respect of all navigable bodies and courses of water in Ontario, except those that lie within municipalities designed by the Solicitor General.*
  3. *Maintaining a traffic patrol on the King's Highway, except the parts designated by the Solicitor General.*
  4. *Maintaining a traffic patrol on the connecting links within the meaning of section 21 of the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act that are designated by the Solicitor General.*
  5. *Maintaining investigative services to assist municipal police forces on the Solicitor General's or the Crown Attorney's request (Statutes of Ontario, 1990).*

While this section has remained the same, Bill 105 introduced a new sub-section that states:

19. *(3) The Ontario Provincial Police may, with the approval of the Solicitor General, charge a municipality, a law enforcement agency or any prescribed corporation or organization for any service it provides to them under this Act (MSGCS, 1997a)*

The purpose of this section is to regulate those rare situations where municipalities do not, or are unwilling to, provide for their own police services, thus creating situations where the OPP becomes obligated to take over service for that locale (MSGCS, 1997e).

The Ontario Provincial Police provides three kinds of services: provincial services; basic municipal services; and specialized support services. Provincial services are those that are provided to all municipalities for the benefit of the province as a whole, and include illegal gaming enforcement, criminal profiling, forensic identification, anti-rackets (fraud) investigation and emergency-based helicopter services (Ibid). Basic municipal services are those services that any municipal police service would provide. Examples include breath analysis, technical traffic collision investigation complaint investigation, and scenes of crime investigation. Specialized support services are best described as those that fall between basic municipal services and provincial services. Such services are provided to municipal police forces on an as-needed basis. Investigative services, for example, are provided to municipalities in accordance with the obligations of the OPP as listed in the *Police Services Act*. Other such services include crowd management, explosives disposal unit, and underwater search and recovery (Ibid).

The impact of the “Common Sense” agenda on the financing of the OPP is that the province will continue to fund OPP services if they are “provincial” services (i.e. services that benefit the province as a whole). However, as stated previously, all services defined as “municipal” services shall be subsidized by municipalities, and if such services are provided by the OPP, cost recovery will be required. Methods of cost recovery include Mutual Aid agreements, Co-operative funding initiatives or fee for

service agreements (Ibid).<sup>49</sup> Thirdly, “specialized” services provided to municipalities will be subsidized by the province in situations where such services are needed infrequently. However, if the provision of such services becomes a regular requirement, the financing of such services becomes the responsibility of municipalities (Ibid). In essence, the agenda of the Harris government is to devote the provincial level of government exclusively to “provincial” level issues. In relation to those services meant to benefit “communities”, the province is involved with a broad oversight function, while municipalities carry out the majority of steering and rowing functions.

In sum, the new system of police governance, engendered by amendments to the *Police Services Act*, and supported by other initiatives (such as municipal restructuring), can be directly linked to a broader fiscal or rationalist agenda. In pursuit of an optimally cost-effective system of police governance, the Harris government (and primarily its Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services) has engaged in a dual process of centralization and localization. These two processes are not articulated as mutually exclusive, but rather, as two interrelated components of a coherent agenda to cut costs.

#### *The Commodification of Security*

The implementation of equitable financing, in conjunction with the establishment of new civilian nodes of authority, has led to the marketization of governance

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<sup>49</sup> The mandate of the Municipal Policing Section is: to develop municipal policing proposals; to maintain and re-negotiate existing contracts; determine policing costs of municipalities without contracts; determine policing costs for unorganized territories; and develop and maintain contracts for specialized services. Due to the new municipal contract environment, the work of the OPP’s Municipal Police Section has expanded considerably. The number of contract costing proposals have increased dramatically in relation to those municipalities that had previously received OPP services for free. Proposals have also increased as a reflection of requests from amalgamated municipalities, municipalities requesting joint costings, and municipalities with existing police services. Now, this Section must collect workload data according to municipality so that policing costs can be apportioned correctly (MSGCS, 1998a: 8).

relationships in the area of security. Specifically, municipalities have been constituted as “customers” who must choose a method of police service delivery that is both cost-effective as well as tailored to local needs and preferences. Accordingly, the OPP is now in the unfamiliar position of “competing” with other institutions for municipal contracts. The OPP no longer holds the “monopoly” on security services and must now prepare itself as a viable choice in the new “business” of community policing. This shift has also been observed by Johnston in the British context, where the government has developed policies to “introduce market-based forms of service delivery into the public sector or, at the very least, to subject public sector organizations to the effects of quasi-markets” (1999: 181). The need for the OPP to operate in this “quasi-market” environment is explained by the following two interviewees:

*Well certainly, [equitable financing has] caused not only our police service, but other police services to be more competitive. There's a good part of that...in the sense that...all the more reason why you have to continue to look inwardly to be able to assess how you deliver service and whether you're service-oriented, and yes, to move towards acting like a business, because, I mean, let's face it - the cheaper that you can provide your service, quality service, then the better a chance that you will have to be selected if you're being considered by a municipality (#19)*

*The problem for the police was that they were now being put into sort of a competitive environment and we're not used to working in a competitive environment. [For] the private sector... they know what the rules are and they know it's a "dog eat dog" world and so if you're effective and efficient you will survive and if you're not, you won't and that's the way life is and I think they've come to grips with that... We're not used to that at all... The upside of it of course is that... it has also caused everybody to really look at their operations and say, "am I as efficient as I could be, am I spending my money as wisely as I could be, is there a better way of doing this to give better service?"... [W]e will emerge from the other side probably better than we were.. .and the reason for it is [that] necessity will have driven us to it (#1)*

Both of these statements highlight the fact that the OPP must now, more than ever, operate according to a rationalist logic in order to function in this new “common sense” regime. This regime has served to simulate a market-based environment where the OPP

is now made financially accountable to its “customers”. As one interviewee put it, “[t]here’s no way in 1992 one could have predicted a competitive market for policing that was primarily designed... [according to what] the taxpayer wants, to know what he or she is getting for their tax dollar”.

In response to this new environment, the OPP developed its Vision 2000 project<sup>50</sup>.

This vision is explained here:

*As an organization, the OPP realized that significant transformations were occurring in the function, structure and financing of policing in Ontario, primarily as a result of the recent changes to the **Police Services Act, 1990**. In order to remain viable in this new, fluid environment, the Vision Statement was redrafted to include the pledge that “into the year 2000, the OPP will be the community police service of choice outside large urban areas”. The OPP is also committed to introducing changes and improving processes to ensure full capability to provide highly efficient and responsive municipal police services (OPP, 1997a: 16).*

For all intents and purposes, the OPP are now required to operate as a business that must maintain a certain amount of contracts in order to survive in this competitive environment. The extent to which the OPP see themselves as a competitive business is reflected in the following statement by Commissioner O’Grady at the Commissioned Officer’s Conference of 1996:

*In the initial stages as we began to develop our vision we recognized that not unlike the private sector, our future would depend on the impression we make on our stakeholders. In the private sector, they would be called the “board of directors”, “partner companies”, “the competition”, “labour” and “customers”. We identified ours as the provincial government through the Minister, municipal governments through councils and police services boards, other ministries with similar interests, RCMP, municipal police services, OPPA, OPSEU, and most importantly, the public. We cannot impose our will on our stakeholders. They must choose to employ, contract with, or otherwise support us (OPP, 1996e)*

In this vein, the OPP would set out to determine what aspects of its service was either attractive or unattractive to “customers”. The OPP would need to understand why some

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<sup>50</sup> Please see Chapters Two, Three and Four for a discussion of Vision 2000 in different contexts.

municipalities would choose them, and conversely, why they wouldn't choose them (OPP, 1996e). This "marketization" of the OPP confirms Loader's observation, in the British context, that "[p]olitical and professional talk about policing is now preoccupied with how to make the police more "business-like"...The public has been constructed as consumers of policing, entitled to expect a prompt, courteous and efficient service" (1996: 6).

There are two main reasons why it is important for the OPP to be the "community police service of choice". If the OPP does not engage in this "competition", its pool of people will diminish. If this happens, there will be less people to train for specialist positions in the future. According to an interviewee, a good specialist must first have a set of well developed skills from doing generalist duties. One OPP representative stated, "[t]here is no substitute for having dealt over a number of years with the public" (#1). The second issue concerns the maintenance of a critical mass of people so that when a provincial emergency arises, the OPP will have the human resources to mobilize on a large scale. Simply put, if the OPP reduces its generalist/community policing services, its provincial mandate of providing specialist services is threatened. Ironically then, the OPP must be competitive in order to continue to exist as a "social" institution.

In light of its goal of becoming the "community policing service of choice", the specific objectives of "Vision 2000" were to:

- *provide a faster response to municipal requests for cost proposals;*
- *develop models for police service delivery;*
- *streamline the design and proposal process;*
- *provide solutions to infrastructure and capacity issues, and*
- *develop a transition process for changing municipal policing responsibilities (Ibid)*

In pursuit of these objectives, “Vision 2000” consisted of 12 sub-projects. In one sub-project, the organization sought a comprehensive understanding of the new policing environment and the areas that would require change. From this, the OPP set out to develop various service delivery models that they could tailor to different municipal needs. Then, a method for recovering costs or fees for services was developed in addition to a communications strategy designed to distribute this information both internally and externally. At the same time, the OPP required a process for recovering costs for services delivered to municipalities for which there was no current contract. Another project was devoted to ensuring that the OPP had the appropriate infrastructure for acquiring municipal contracts in a quick and effective manner and with an adequate level of human resources and equipment levels to respond to contract demands (OPP, 1997a: 16-17).

Apart from cost recovery issues, the OPP had to prepare itself for the civilian governance structure that would consist of new governance relationships, particularly between local detachments and governing authorities at the local level. Within this new structure, police personnel would not only be held accountable through the OPP chain of command, but they would be accountable to municipal authorities as well (OPP, 1997a: 17; MSGCS, 1997e: 2).

In this regard, another challenge for the OPP was to develop the systems required to gather relevant information at the municipal level relating to quality and service levels that might be asked by new local governing authorities. This shift in emphasis on gathering data at the local level is expressed by one interviewee:

*[T]here's been a big change... When I first came here, it was basically in terms of performance measurement and management of information, there was a corporate need*

*for it and it was really corporately driven and it's operational information, people on the operations side, detachments, constables, they're the input in a sense, they provide the information to us which is then corporately used for planning. And when you do that, in a sense these front line people who are in a sense completing forms and taking the time to do it, they don't see an immediate value in it and they're saying, "I have to fill this thing out, I don't like filling it out, I really don't know what use it is to me, the only thing I can think of is it's in a sense a "stick" to keep us in place or to monitor or in a sense control us". So, there was always that tug and that pull... but during my time here and in the last year, I've seen a complete reversal, in a sense that operationally they've come to realize the importance of in a sense managing information and collecting it because of changes in accountability which were driven by changes to the Police Services Act. So now, there is that accountability factor, like detachments are directly accountable to their municipalities, and part of that is reporting to municipal police agencies or bodies like Policing Services Boards..., so you have to go back to them and say, "here is the work that we've completed in your area", and it's such a radical change because it's like, before, like "you gotta complete these forms, you gotta complete them accurately". Now, they're coming back and saying, "we want more and more detail", which is kind of ironic. They're saying like issues around directed patrol, they're saying, "we want to be able to report back to municipalities" and saying, "this municipality said that they wanted a foot patrol in our downtown area at certain times of the day, would you please provide that". So, it's all part of detachments, their local accountability in managing their own resources, so it's been a big change... [W]e have been basically... developing the systems to meet that need (#20)*

This statement highlights the extent to which the OPP is now being rendered accountable to local governing authorities. The OPP did acknowledge that prior to the new municipal policing environment, it did not have the kind of local accountability that was required of other municipal policing services (OPP, 1997h: 2). To be sure, there was “no municipal governing authority empowered to ensure accountability in the delivery of police services” (Ibid).

In recognition of these weaknesses and the necessity of enhancing both its image and its accountability at the local level, the OPP has determined the direction that it will have to follow in order to thrive in the new policing environment. While the OPP would continue to form a part of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services (and hence be subject to the direction of the Minister), it is asking that the provincial



government develop policy that would enable it to respond more quickly to the needs of their contract locations. As well, it is asking for the development of another policy that would allow the OPP to invest cost-savings back into the organization (just as a profit-making institution would), hence providing an incentive for further fiscal responsibility (Ibid).<sup>51</sup>

Given this new competitive policing environment, *accountability* is necessarily shifted to the local level. That is, by creating a regulatory system that serves to constitute municipalities as customers, this “purchasing power” is placing municipalities in a new relationship of governance between themselves and the OPP. Whereas the OPP previously enjoyed a monopoly in hundreds of rural areas, municipal restructuring, combined with equitable financing, has made it imperative for the OPP to satisfy its “customers”. As a business therefore, it must be made accountable to its “stakeholders” or “customers” for the services it provides.

#### *Reinventing Accountability*

Due to the emergence of this market-based environment, the police are being governed in new ways, through new regulatory mechanisms, and according to the interests of new local authorities. Not only are the OPP being governed by new local authorities, but the *mechanisms* through which they are being governed reflect the emergence of new governmental problematics and objectives. There is a body of literature that has explored changes in governance relationships between the police and other institutions/auspices/nodes from the vantage point of “accountability”. In particular, scholars have traced the various ways in which the police have been “brought

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<sup>51</sup> It is still the case that any savings generated by the OPP is appropriated by the provincial government’s Consolidated Revenue Fund. As such, the organization has never been financially rewarded for realizing

to account” (Stenning, 1995: 3), particularly during the 1980’s and 1990’s. As Stenning explains, accountability “entails a set of normative prescriptions about who should be required to give accounts, to whom, when, how, and about what” (Ibid., 5). The establishment of new nodes and governance relationships described above have served to reinvent accountability both in terms of “normative prescription” as well as the practical mechanisms for doing accountability.

During the 1980’s and the early 1990’s, two forms of accountability were emphasized in policing discourse and practice. These forms were “legal” accountability and “political” accountability. The central aspect of legal accountability is to ensure that the police act within the law. It is associated with the traditional conception of representative democracy and “professional” policing, whereby as “representatives” of the people, the police cannot do anything “above the law” or infringe on the rights of citizens, particularly as legitimate bearers of coercion. Accordingly, certain institutions were established that would govern the “legal” behavior of the police. These institutions generally came in the form of citizen complaint systems and internal disciplinary systems (Shearing, 1998a; see also Reiner, 1995).<sup>52</sup>

“Political” accountability relates to the normative position that the police should be insulated from political direction and control. Because of the sovereign function of the police, and their ability to exercise considerable amounts of force, mechanisms have

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cost-savings activities .

<sup>52</sup> Loader argues that apart from the ways in which the law serves as an instrument for governing police behavior, there is also a broader mechanism of “democratic accountability” (1996: 10). This mechanism consists of various “access points” or “nodes” “through which various public constituencies are able to have an effect over police policy and practice. It encompasses both the formal institutional means through which the police are rendered democratically accountable for their actions, as well as the informal channels through which particular social groups may influence police decision-making” (Ibid). In another essay, Loader adds that “democratic accountability came to be viewed – especially by those on the political left –

been developed to ensure that such force is not wielded according to the partisan interests of a government. These mechanisms have been developed to ensure that government participates in the development of policing policy while remaining independent or separate from particular operational matters (Shearing, 1998a; see also Reiner, 1995).

Given the “common sense” transformations described above – including the “customerization” of municipalities - we have witnessed the emergence of a new mode of market-based accountability. In contrast to “legal” and “political” forms of accountability, the governmental objective within this new accountability structure is to ensure that the police operate in a cost-effective and efficient manner. As suggested, “security” has effectively emerged as a “commodity” that can be bought and sold within the emergent security “market” of Ontario (see Shearing, 1998a). Because the OPP are being constituted as “producers” aimed at meeting “consumer” needs, the essential form of accountability being promoted here is one of *fiscal accountability*. As the former Commissioner of the OPP stated in 1998, “[f]or the purposes of determining who we will be accountable to, simply follow the money” (1998!; emphasis in original). While the legal and political forms of accountability continue to exist, they are being re-articulated within this market-based mode of accountability. The role of the provincial government, through its setting of adequacy standards and the like, will be to regulate this security market and this tripartite system of accountability (see Shearing, 1998a).

One of the effects of this new fiscal form of accountability is that the distinction between policy direction and operational independence is being re-figured. Because communities as “customers” are asking for security services that are tailored to their

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as an institutional panacea for many of the substantive policing concerns that surfaced from the 1970’s onwards (such as the rise of para-militarism and the troubled police-black relations)” (1994: 521)

needs, the direction of policy will thus become an expanded terrain while the terrain of operational independence will become narrowed. This, of course, relates to the issue of police "expertise", discussed in Chapter Two, where the expertise of the police is now being tailored to the demands of their consumers (Shearing, 1998a). To borrow from Crawford, "in place of a rhetorical model of professional 'expertise' is one which emphasizes shared information, stressing the importance of diverse knowledgeable organizations and the knowledgeable public...[E]xpertise is being recalibrated, restructured, and redefined" (1997: 59).

Due to the emergence of this market-based mode of accountability, municipalities can choose - based on their expert knowledge of local needs and preferences - to contract with "suppliers" other than the OPP. These suppliers may be a mix of two or more public organizations or a mix of public *and* private institutions (Shearing, 1998a). As Shearing explains, "[u]nder such circumstances the police would be only one supplier among many and would be required to compete directly both with other private and public suppliers" (Ibid).

Thus, due to the emergence of this competitive environment, and the new regime of fiscal accountability which is supporting this environment, it is quite conceivable, in the words of Kramer, that the "next wave in policing may be private policing" (Kramer, 1998). In contrast to traditional conceptions of private security companies, imbued with images of unskilled persons in blazers patrolling shopping malls, outfits like Intelligarde International Inc. are seeing themselves as a viable commodity in this new "market". At the time of Kramer's article in March of 1998, Intelligarde had submitted a proposal to the Megacity for a second-tier policing service (Ibid., 16). In addition to large

municipalities, however, Intellegarde has set its sights on rural Ontario, given the choices that municipalities now have in determining appropriate levels and kinds of policing services. As explained earlier, according to Section 5 of the *Police Services Act*, municipalities can choose to “adopt a different method of providing police services” (Ibid). In Kramer’s words, “[t]his opens the door for private law enforcement organizations, like Intelligarde, to be a player” (Ibid). As one interviewee put it,

*if [private security] can portray themselves as an attractive solution to a community’s problem and present that in some fashion and they’re successful, then they’ve got it made, and we’re seeing that in the United States where they have these closed communities, and these people are their own police and they’ll do whatever you ask of them... The demands on the public police are such that you can’t be all things to all people anymore. The reality is that the governments, the public is not willing to inject into policing the kind of money that they would need to see policing levels that existed years ago. I mean, things were simple then, and it was not unusual to see the police on the corner of every street in the community, but times have changed and demands have changed and this is not cost effective (#13)*

For this interviewee, the emergence of private security institutions within this new policing environment is inevitable, because public policing has simply become too expensive. What he is suggesting is that since any possibility for enhanced government funding of public policing has been closed off, a large space has opened up for experimenting with new security delivery arrangements involving other institutions such as private security.

For example, as of March of 1998, Intelligarde had submitted six bids to police rural municipalities. The first of these contracts that they “won” was the new municipality of Quinte West, which consists of the city of Trenton, Murray Township, Sidney township and the village of Frankford (Kramer, 1998). The president of Intelligarde explains that his company was asked to provide quotes for “response to non-crime in progress of 30 minutes or less”, and “provide foot/bicycle patrols to the village

of Frankford for 20 hours per week” (cited in *Ibid.*, 16). In essence, the services provided by companies like Intellegarde are characterized as “second tier” or “non-emergency” policing, which are described as follows:

- *Events not requiring immediate police presence;*
- *There is no potential of imminent danger or escalating violence;*
- *A victim does not require immediate or primary support;*
- *The event is not a “domestic”, nor does it involve the mentally ill;*
- *Primary and detailed investigation is unnecessary;*
- *Response can be scheduled at a later time;*
- *The call can be referred to alternate internal and external service providers*  
(*Ibid.*, 17)

Intellegarde actually markets itself as a “true para-police company” (*Ibid.*), and its viability within this new competitive environment is acknowledged by the following interviewee:

*[W]e’ve got private security now and private security is just booming in the fact that they’re able to [deal with] a lot of the smaller occurrences for twelve dollars an hour, so why pay the police twenty dollars and up to do something, when I can get private security at twelve dollars?... We’ve lost some contracts over that, and that’s probably going to be the future... a real mix. You’ll probably have the police to do your higher crimes like homicides and things like that, but your trespassing, break and enters, stolen bicycles, stuff like that, is all going to be done by private security (#18)*

Because this new environment has created the conditions for “private” institutions to compete with “public” institutions, the OPP’s biggest challenge, according to one interviewee, is “to meet private sector standards with public sector policies” (#9). For public policing organizations like the OPP, there are a variety of implications stemming from the possibility of competing with private policing institutions. An issue raised by one interviewee concerns the fundamental differences between the “public” and the “private”:

*[O]ne of the reasons public policing is so expensive is because all of the oversight, public accountability and all of that, and... we’ve put all this regime in place around public police because we’re concerned about what it is that they have the authority to do and*

*how mistakes and problems can be associated with it. There's a group over here [private security] who are doing a number of similar kinds of things and don't have anything regulating them. So, there needs to be some concern about it, because it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to have created in some respects a parallel group without any of the rules around them. So, I think it really makes some sense to at least look at the entire regime we're putting in place to determine whether, maybe we put too many controls on the police, maybe we don't put enough controls on private police, and maybe we need to look inside our organization to say, "is there a way... that we should be doing business differently that would encompass some of these activities and not be so expensive" (#3)*

This interviewee is implying that there is a profound tension being introduced between the "public" and the "private" which will need to be resolved. From the perspective of this interviewee, this tension can be resolved in one of two ways: by diminishing the legal and political regulation of the public police, or by enhancing the legal and political regulation of the private police (see Johnston, 1999 on a similar debate in Britain). In this vein, another interviewee suggests that this newly marketized environment has the potential to threaten the integrity of the OPP as a "public" institution of governance:

*[T]here's a very thin line between the climate that we're in now and maintaining the integrity of policing services, and we are not focussed in on capturing the market share, and that's crucial for us. It would be negligent policing if we only responded to customer demand as opposed to delivering appropriate policing services that are based on historical analysis and expertise and..., you have to be really careful (#9)*

Suffice it to say that public policing institutions, such as the OPP, are now being regarded as only one institution, within an emergent network of other institutions, devoted to the governance of security. To borrow from Crawford, "[t]he central, unifying symbol of the blue-uniformed police officer as the repository of social order has become fragmented as that task is increasingly dispersed throughout the body politic....The public along with diverse organizations, associations, and private business has become implicated in the task of crime control" (1997: 60; see also Johnston, 1999). In essence, the commodification of security has served to "nodalize" governance – that is, it has

served to open up a large space for governance networks to emergence. The next section will be devoted to this “nodalization” effect of the “Common Sense Revolution”. While this effect was not directly intended by the Harris government, it is entirely consistent with its fiscal agenda and its desire to “marketize” governance relationships.

### **The Nodalization of Governance**

The “nodalization” of governance is a process that Bayley and Shearing have begun to explore in their work (forthcoming). In particular, Shearing has identified a much broader and global pattern of “networked nodal governance” which he has associated with the proliferation of “mass private property” (Shearing and Stenning, 1983) and the subsequent formation of “private governments” (Shearing and Wood, forthcoming; see Macauley, 1986 on “private governments”). He argues that in place of a state monopoly on the governance of security, the current governance landscape is characterized by a complex web of public and private institutions (see Kempa et al., 1999). Such institutions all contribute to the governance of security in accordance with diverse governmental objectives as well as strategies. The governance relationships between the institutions are fluid and ever-changing. Sometimes these institutions operate in a relationship of cooperation with each other through the sharing of resources or expertise. At other times, these institutions may operate independently according to a benign neglect of others. Finally, some institutions may contest the presence of other institutions because their objectives are not in alignment (Bayley and Shearing, forthcoming). Notwithstanding, Shearing points out that one must acknowledge this broader shift toward a networked system of governance. As Johnston points out, “the



state has become one player – albeit an important one – in a complex network of governing agencies” (1999: 193).

This shift has also been observed by globalization theorists, who contend that the centrality of the state in global forms of governance is increasingly being displaced by the proliferation of trans-national corporations and global public-private alliances (see Eade, 1997; Bateson, 1990; Kempa et al., 1999; see Sheptycki, 1998 and Johnston, 1999 on “transnational” policing). Such scholars have also observed a dual process of globalization and localization, which is reflected in the phrase, “think globally, act locally” (Pieterse, 1995: 49). Specifically, while broad governance networks are being forged through the alignment of interests and the sharing of resources, governance is directed at the local level. This global/local dynamic is associated with the fracturing of collective life and the diversification of interests and values (Wood and Shearing, 1999). Robertson refers to this process as “glocalization” (1995).

This broad shift to a system of “networked nodal governance” (Bayley and Shearing, forthcoming) is indeed being indexed in the province of Ontario. In fact, nodalization is occurring as the result of the “customerization” of municipalities in conjunction with re-articulation of the “central” and the “local”. Specifically, the “customerization” of municipalities, primarily through the introduction of equitable financing (i.e. “pay for say”), has shifted some steering functions to the local level, hence localizing governance. At the same time, the centralization of governance through, for example, the development of province-wide adequacy and effectiveness standards will serve to link these local forms of governance together in the form of a network. This re-articulation of the “central” and the “local” can be seen as analogous to, and supportive

of, this broader re-articulation of the “global” and the “local”. In essence, the changes in policing legislation initiated by the Harris government has served to create a system of networked nodal governance wherein resources for the governance of security can be shared and distributed across the network as dictated by local knowledge. Although this process is not associated with the proliferation of “mass private property” (Shearing and Stenning, 1983), one could suggest that the “customerization” of municipalities, along with the marketization of accountability, has led to the development of novel forms of “private governments” (see Macauley, 1986).

What is important to point out is that the Harris government did not set out to directly create a system of networked nodal governance. Indeed, the government was motivated by a single goal - to reduce the provincial debt load – and the primary strategy for realizing this goal was two-fold: to centralize and streamline those government functions deemed to be in the “provincial” interest (for example, adequacy and effectiveness standards), and to shift decision-making and accountability to the local level. This centralization-localization process was touted as two integrated components of a coherent agenda to enhance the cost-effectiveness of government operations. However, this process has not only served to enhance cost-effectiveness, but it has also created space for a new system of networked nodal governance to take root. This system was made possible through the introduction of market-based disciplines in the governance of security, and it will continue to thrive in an environment where the “customer” is sovereign. For the Harris government, the emergence of networked nodal governance in this province is most likely quite desirable, given that it will serve to reinforce a market-based ethos in the governance of the province.

## Conclusions

The political turn to the “right” in the province of Ontario has had profound implications for the way in which governance is thought about and promoted, and this is nowhere more apparent than in the context of policing. For governmentality scholars, such a political shift would not be surprising in the least, given that a much broader shift to the “rationality of the marketplace” (Osborne, 1993) has occurred. In fact, the governmental program associated with the Harris government would be regarded as quintessentially “neo-liberal” - although some would prefer to say “neo-conservative” in order to emphasize his “moral” persuasions. Regardless of one’s terminological inclination, it is clear that the “Common Sense Revolution” is a local example of a much broader “revolution” in governance taking place across the globe. In this vein, this chapter has simply served to confirm the findings of governmentality scholars by demonstrating the connectedness between broad mentalities of rule and site-specific governmental programs and technologies. The new regulatory model developed by the Harris government has served as an empirical window through which this linkage could be seen.

That being said, the kind of analysis provided in this chapter was also intended to extend the utility of the governmentality approach by examining both the intended *and* unintended consequences of this new regulatory model. As Garland (1997) and Crawford (1997) point out, the tendency in governmentality scholarship to focus on the *nature* of governmental programs, while considerably useful, is analytically limited. It is analytically limited because it privileges “elements of intention and calculation” (Crawford, 1997: 211). With regard to the new regulatory model that was created by the

Harris government, it is clear that the intention was to cut costs by centralizing certain governmental functions, localizing others and by introducing market-based principles and strategies. This, in essence, captures the nature of the “Common Sense” program for the regulation of policing in Ontario.

However, if one were to pay exclusive analytical attention to the nature of this program, some of its unintended effects may be obscured. While it would be naïve to suggest that the Harris government did not intend to create a market-based regulatory regime, suffice it to say that a system of networked nodal governance was not directly intended. Thus, not only is it important to examine the purpose of governmental programs, but to be aware of the conditions these programs have created, or the spaces they have opened up, for further transformations in governance to occur.

Finally, an examination of this “nodalization” effect has served to confirm, at a site-specific level, observations by some scholars of globalization in relation to the emergence of global nodal networks. As such, this examination of the unintended effects of a new governmental program has served to support the primary intention of governmentality-based work, which is to map the “collective connections and contours” (Crawford, 1997: 92) of governmental shifts occurring at both the local and global levels.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Implications for the Study and Renewal of Governance**

As stated in Chapter One, this dissertation has had three principal aims. The first aim was to contribute to the substantive question of how it is that the state governance of security is being reinvented. The second and most important aim is to assess the analytical utility of the concepts and models offered in the governmentality literature. Finally, another intent of this study was to provide both an empirical and theoretical basis for determining those areas where normative engagement might occur. The purpose of this present chapter is to summarize the ways in which this dissertation has contributed to these aims.

#### **On the Reinvention of Governance**

In any attempt to describe how governance is being reinvented, we are constantly confronted with the challenge of “pinning down” new governmental forms as if they were static and distinctly different from forms that had existed previously. Indeed, governance is a perpetually fluid process, involving the constant identification of governmental failure and the subsequent formation of new problematics and objectives (see Miller and Rose, 1990:4). Accordingly, it is more accurate to suggest that what we have seen in the previous four chapters have been stories depicting the identification of specific governmental problematics and the subsequent construction of new governmental objectives and forms. Hence, the first section of this chapter is devoted to sketching the changing face of governance that has begun to emerge in these stories.

For those who have always assumed a de-centred conception of governance, the notion that governmental authority is fractured will be taken as a theoretical given.

However, from the institutional vantage point of this study – i.e. an institution of state governance – the fracturing of governmental authority has been a particularly acute and profound process over the last decade, and more specifically over the last five years. Indeed, for those who suggest that the emergence of “community policing” reflects a “paradigmatic shift”, one could certainly agree with this, given the continual shifting of governmental authority between the state and “civil society”.

Prior to the emergence of “community policing”, the public police were accorded, at least discursively, with exclusive authority to govern security. The police were **the** experts, and citizens were to heed this expertise accordingly. The bodies of knowledge which buttressed this expertise – i.e. knowledge of the Criminal Law and strategies of law enforcement – existed as dominant bodies of knowledge, while all other forms of knowledge were subjugated. The police were an emblematic institution of representative democracy, and as such, were theorized as a “repository of public interests” (Johnston, 1999: 193). In essence, the police governed security “through crime”, as Jonathan Simon would say (1995).

Over time, however, the authority of the police became contested, and as a result, various “waves” in community policing ensued. Within each of these “waves”, governmental authority was re-negotiated and re-distributed. What Chapter Two demonstrated, however, was that these various waves were associated with quite complex transformations in governance, and in particular, quite complex re-articulations of the “social” and “community”. While governmentality scholars have observed an overall shift from the “social” to “community” as the terrain of collective life, and hence, governance, one of the purposes of Chapter Two was to stress the importance of not

forming an “ideal typical” (Garland, 1997) understanding of this notion of the “death of the social” (Rose, 1996a). Indeed, within each “wave”, the terrain of “community” was constituted in particular ways, and as such, was coupled in a distinct fashion with the terrain of the “social”.

For example, in wave one, where the normative legitimacy of the police was being contested, the police adopted a conception of “community” that largely reflected a “mini-social”. Within this *community-based* model, the police were attempting to re-legitimize themselves as the single source of authority by regaining the consent of “communities”. However, the use of the term “community” did not represent a wholesale celebration of diversity, but rather a sustained effort to treat diverse individuals equally. In this concerted effort to make representative democracy, as well as the professional model of policing, work better, the domain of the “social” and the domain of “community” were coupled in a particular way. Specifically, these were coupled as two complementary aspects of the same broad mentality of rule (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996). Within this first wave, the police retained exclusive authority over the governance of security. However, this scenario did not last long with the onset of “wave two” and a more radical articulation of “community”.

While the normative legitimacy of the police had been a source of contestation, their “expertise” and capacities were increasingly being challenged. Specifically, the “expertise” of the police in terms of their strategic ability to promote security was being challenged in various academic and policy circles, as well as through day-to-day practical knowledge. At the very least, citizens’ feelings of safety were not being maintained, and at worst, feelings of safety were on the decline. Consequently, the police began

experimenting with “problem-solving” techniques, which ironically threatened the exclusivity of their “social” expertise – i.e. expertise relating to law and law enforcement. By expanding their strategic “tool-box” and by embracing the notion of generalist policing, the notion of “community” acquired a new meaning. Now, the police would not only be required to gain the consent of the public, but they would need to harness local knowledge and capacities in order to conduct “problem-solving” successfully. As such, community diversity was acknowledged as a strategic asset. In recognition of the limits of the “bandit-catching” approach, the police would now deem it necessary to abdicate a certain degree of authority to communities. This new conception of “community” would serve to threaten the primacy of the “social” as well as “social” forms of expertise. It is at this point, therefore, that a “paradigm shift” to “generalist community policing” occurred.

Given the increasing emphasis being made on local knowledge and capacities, it is not surprising that the “third wave” of community policing represented a shift toward a model of “co-production”. The term “co-production” would serve to exemplify a more equal distribution of governmental authority between the police and institutions and auspices located in civil society. It should be stressed, however, that the “social” identity and functions of the police was both reinforced and rearticulated. That is, while the police recognized that the governance of security entailed and required a range of strategic approaches and resources, they continued to assert their own identity as an institution of law enforcement. However, while the police continued to assert that what they do - and what they are meant to do - is law enforcement, they have now come to realize that they are only “one player” within an emergent network of public, private and



grassroots agencies devoted to the governance of security (Johnston, 1999: 193). This shift in governmental authority to the community level was extended and reinforced in the wake of the provincial fiscal crisis. In the context of burgeoning “neo-liberal” or “new managerialist” discourses “communities” were soon constituted as “consumers” of security delivery. From the perspective of the police, they were now in the “business” of community policing, which called for an even more meaningful relationship of “co-production”, where the needs and preferences of their “consumers” would become tantamount. The efficient allocation of policing resources would depend on a more comprehensive understanding of the priorities and wishes of “communities”.

In “wave four”, this “customerization” process became less of a discursive exercise and more of a material necessity. With the creation of a competitive policing environment in Ontario, governmental authority would shift more profoundly to the community level. As newly constituted “consumers” of security, municipalities would harness their local knowledge and capacities as they acquired more of a “steering” function. As such, institutions like the OPP would have to cater their “rowing” services to the interests and demands of municipalities. While the police continue to assert their “social” identity – which is reinforced in its provincial mandate – their approach to community policing has been re-figured according to a new contractual imagery. Hence, the “social” and “community” are coupled in a new way, where the terrain of the “social” is beginning to fracture with a more profound re-distribution of “steering” and “rowing” functions.

If experimentations in “community justice” continue to occur, governmental authority will once again be re-negotiated and shifted. Because the “restorative justice”

movement embodies a critique of criminal justice, both from a moral and strategic standpoint, the salience of the “social” as the imagined terrain of collective life, or as the “repository of public interests” (Johnston, 1999: 193) will lose much of its salience. The conception of “community” being articulated within this model is one of a localized terrain of shared interests and values, whose moral fabric is threatened through violations of security. In conjunction with this profound challenge to the *terrain* of the “social”, the “community justice” model also profoundly challenges “social” forms of *expertise* associated with law enforcement. Specifically, a law enforcement approach to the governance of security is criticized both for its inability to “restore” the moral fabric of communities as well as to prevent further violations of security from occurring (see Zehr, 1990). It is in this possible “fifth wave” where a shift in governmental authority from the state to communities will be most dramatic.

Having addressed, in Chapter Two, the various ways in which the governmental authority of the police (or more broadly, the state) has been contested and re-negotiated, Chapter Three focused on the ways in which the *institution* of the police has been reinvented. One could argue that it was inevitable that the police would have to re-imagine themselves from an organizational standpoint, given the ways in which their authority in the governance of security had been re-figured. Notwithstanding, the broader imperatives that led to the OPP to reinvent itself were considerably complex. In fact, the OPP were required to address a series of new problematics, some of which were largely independent from each other. So, not only was the OPP required to reinvent itself in light of changes in its strategic orientation, but it would have to meet the economic and political objectives set by other programmers within the Ontario Public

Service (i.e. the ruling parties). Having re-imagined the OPP as a “business”, its managers exercised considerable agency in building a coherent institutional identity that would simultaneously address this range of governmental problematics. The reinvention of the OPP provides a site-specific example of the emergence of “new managerial” and “neo-liberal” discourses in the organization of governance.

Associated with these shifts in governmental authority, as well as transformations in governmental institutions, the identity, role and capacities of the *agent* have been re-thought. This re-thinking has taken place in the context of the spread of “continuous learning” discourse – which, to use a phrase from De Lint, can be regarded as a “close bedfellow” (1998) of neo-liberalism or new-managerialism. The image of the “continuous learner” has been deployed in response to the broad shift to community policing programs and strategies. In particular, the “continuous learner” embodies an identity and set of capacities deemed essential for the achievement of strategic objectives as well as relationships of “co-production” with communities.

Even more, with the emergence of “competition” in the area of policing, the idea of the “continuous learner” became even more salient. With a more stark shift in authority to the level of the “consumer”, the agent would be more fully constituted with market-based imagery and language. Given the shift to a marketized environment, it would now be essential for all agents in the OPP to possess market-based skills. Such skills include: the ability to harness local and practical knowledge of conditions in order to determine appropriate, customized responses; and the capacity to be continually self-reflexive, that is, to learn from past mistakes in order to optimize success in the future. Accordingly, the success of the agent would be premised on a history of “best practices”

rather than a claim to theoretical superiority. Agents would now be regarded as “producers”, whose expertise is tailored to a range of ever-changing internal and external demands. So, this re-constitution of agents represents an attempt to align the ethos of agents, and hence the governance of agents, with the strategic and institutional transformations described in the previous chapters.

The “marketization” of institutions and agents depicted in Chapters Three and Four has been extended with the “marketization” of policing regulation/governance discussed in Chapter Five. The new regulatory regime created during the “Common Sense Revolution” privileges market-based governance relationships, and promotes the cultivation and circulation of local knowledge and capacities as the best means of determining governmental priorities and strategies. While centralizing and “streamlining” certain provincial functions, the Harris government has devolved authority to the local level by figuratively and materially constituting municipalities as “customers” of service delivery. This “customerization” process, associated with the commodification of security, has profoundly threatened the monopoly of the OPP – and hence, the state – in the governance of security.

This marketized regime of policing governance has created the conditions for a system of networked nodal governance to emerge and proliferate. Since *private* institutions of governance, such as private security companies – naturally thrive in a system of market relations – it is more than likely that the governance of security in Ontario will become a fractured enterprise, consisting of a range of public, private, and grass-roots “authorities”. The local governance of security has also been enhanced through the establishment and proliferation of municipal Police Services Boards and

Community Policing Advisory Committees. The emergence of networked nodal governance within the province of Ontario, while locally specific, serves to confirm a broader shift toward networked nodal governance at the global level.

*Reinventing Democracy?*

While it is clear that governance has been reinvented on a variety of levels, a more subaltern theme that unites each of these developments can be gleaned upon closer examination. This theme relates to the subtle ways in which the notion of “democracy” has been re-thought. Throughout the various processes of reinvention summarized above, a variety of implicit claims were being made about the need to re-invent democracy. Claims were being made regarding the constitution of collective life, mechanisms for the expression of collective interests, and ways of holding institutions of governance accountable to these interests. Indeed, the previous four chapters have depicted a variety of local and practical experiments that may ultimately serve to reinvent democratic governance. To use Crawford’s words, “in the context of a political agenda dominated by a neo-liberal ideology, the above strategies and trends resonate with, and draw upon, critiques of representative forms of democracy and established notions of crime control and justice” (1997: 92).

Let us begin with what has occurred in relation to the re-constitution of collective life. In a paper aimed at exploring the normative implications of recent developments in the governance of security, Shearing and Wood (forthcoming) argue that the reinvention of public policing is continuing to promote the model of “representative democracy”, buttressed by an implicit “social contract” between citizens and the state. We argue that the state, within its “community policing” programs, has continued to “retain its steering

capacities. At best, citizens have become junior partners in the governance of security, and at worst, they are tasked with carrying out rowing functions that they had no part in determining” (Ibid). We contrast this re-affirmation of representative democracy with developments that have been occurring under corporate auspices. Specifically, we suggest that corporate forms of governance - or “private governments” - are serving to promote a different model of democracy, whereby “corporate communities are in practice highly self-directed in the determination of their collective objectives and strategies (buttressed by implicit “community contracts”). In essence, corporate communities have effectively become self-directed communities” (Ibid).

Having conducted the study that constitutes this dissertation, it has become clear that this argument needs refinement. This is not to suggest that representative democracy is not being re-affirmed or re-articulated in the developments within the OPP and other institutions of the state, as was made clear in Chapter Two. However, given Chapter Two’s depiction of shifts in governmental authority, this is not all that has been going on. While Shearing and Wood argue that “communities” have been mobilized for the sole purpose of undertaking “rowing” functions, it is now clear that “communities” have appropriated “steering” functions as well. This transfer of “steering” capacities has been most acute since the amendments to the *Police Services Act* that took effect in January of 1998.

The question then becomes, what kind of democratic model is being promoted in the developments described in this study? Obviously, representative democracy has been re-articulated and re-affirmed through the re-negotiation of governmental authority and expertise that has occurred throughout the various “waves” of community policing.

Accordingly, the police are continuing to serve as representatives of an elected government. In this sense, an implicit “social contract” between citizens and the state is re-affirmed, and hence, the political sphere of the “social” is retained. However, we have also witnessed the re-constitution of municipalities as “private governments”, as it were.

For lack of a better term, we could perhaps surmise that a “hybrid” model of democratic governance is being promoted by these practical developments. While the “social” retains its salience, the expression of collective life in terms of “communities” is serving to carve out a new political space. Accordingly, being “political” involves more than just voting on election day. As the best means of expressing collective interests, citizens are now being encouraged to “act locally”.

In concert with this re-constitution of collective life, a variety of new mechanisms have emerged for expressing collective interests. This study has traced the ways in which *market-based mechanisms* have been introduced for the expression of collective interests as well as for the governance of state institutions, and in particular, the police. In order to give concrete effect to the conception of citizens and communities as “customers”, the OPP, and the “Common Sense” government more generally, have introduced new accountability and regulatory mechanisms. The development of the *Policing for Results Survey* represents an effort on the part of the OPP to “tap into” its market, to gain a thorough understanding of its demographic make-up, as well as the needs and fears of its customers. As well, the introduction of Business Planning has served to render the OPP, and its Ministry, accountable to the *bottom line* of safety which it has guaranteed to citizens as a “product”. During the business planning process, various “bottom lines” are determined in consultation with members of the public, and

are couched in quantifiable and measurable terms. In addition, with the recent amendments to the *Police Services Act* and the “marketization” of accountability, municipalities can tailor service contracts according to the expressed needs and wishes of their locales. One can conclude therefore, that in addition to the re-constitution of collective life, new *mechanisms* of democracy have been introduced into the governance of security. Since “representative” democracy is no longer the exclusive model of “democracy” being deployed, the police - and state institutions in general - must be rendered accountable in new ways, and not simply through the vote.

As discussed earlier in this dissertation, while the police continue to be “professionals”, the meaning of “professionalism” has changed. The police continue to enforce the law according to strict standards, but in pursuit of objectives that have no longer been exclusively determined by them according to their “expert opinion”. If one agrees with this observation, then what does this mean in relation to *the political*? Has the “political” been re-constituted? Has public policing become more “political” than before? Given that citizens have now been given the opportunity to co-determine policing priorities, are they being more political? Has a new political sphere been opened up at the local level?

Related to this question is another one regarding the ways in which notions of the “public” and the “private” have been deployed in the various reinvention processes described above. While notions of the “public” and the “private” contain no essential meaning, these terms have been used discursively over time as binary oppositions in order to give effect to, and perhaps legitimate, a particular image of governance. Generally, the notion of “public” has been used to refer to a set of collective interests



which transcend, and precede, other interests which do not represent the interests of all (i.e. individual interests, interests articulated by certain “interest groups”). One can say that the term “public” has been associated with the term “social”. Thus, the notion of the “private” stands in binary opposition to that of the “public”. For *public* institutions of governance, such as the public police, “private” interests have not been accorded the same degree of importance as “public” interests.

Perhaps one could suggest that “community” (in its various conceptual manifestations) is emerging as a terrain of governance that represents the intersection of the “public” and the “private”. In other words, one cannot say that the term “community” is meant to represent the interests of *all*, but on the other hand, one cannot say that such contracts do not represent a broader set of collective interests. The ultimate implication of this is perhaps that the linguistic utility of the public/private dichotomy is on the decline. This becomes particularly obvious with the emergence of a securities market in Ontario where “private” security companies may be working in partnership with “public” policing institutions in order to promote the interests of a pre-defined collective. Given the emergence of a system of networked nodal governance in Ontario, will it be of any utility in the future to differentiate between “public” and “private” forms of service provision?

In sum, one can conclude that governance has been reinvented in ways that pose quite profound theoretical implications relating to the identity and role of the state. The findings of this study certainly remind us that the state has no essential properties or propensities (Gordon, 1991:4), and as Rose and Miller state, one must not “over-valu[e] the ‘problem of the state’, seeing it either as a ‘monstre froid’ dominating us, or as the

essential and privileged fulfillment of a number of necessary social and economic functions” (1992:174). Having surveyed some ways in which governance has been reinvented, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is indeed something unique about our present condition, and that a sharp historical transformation is marking the turn of a new century. With this in mind, the following section will summarize the ways in which this study has served to critique and/or extend the governmentality approach.

### **On Governmentality and Neo-liberalism**

As explained in Chapter One, the main virtue of the governmentality approach is that it offers an analytical model and set of conceptual tools that scholars can use in order to explore the ways in which trends within “highly specified fields of enquiry” (Crawford, 1997: 92) relate to broader mentalities of rule. For scholars of policing, it enables one, in the words of Crawford, to “transcend the organizational strait-jacket of specific criminal justice agencies and seek to connect simultaneous developments across different organizations” (Ibid: 4-5). This over-riding concern with broad shift in *governmentalities* enables one to abandon that “constraining intellectual embrace” (Ibid., 4) associated with scholarship that limits itself to shifts *within* certain institutional or site-specific parameters (Ibid).

With this in mind, the theoretical aim of this study was to contribute to this scholarship in two essential ways. First, this study was intended to provide an original empirical example of the ways in which governance, more broadly, is being reinvented. In other words, it was intended to provide a new empirical window through which shifts in broad mentalities of rule can be seen. As such, this study served to confirm some of the findings of established governmentality scholarship.

Secondly, while an understanding of the linkage between site-specific shifts and broad mentalities of rule enables one to determine a “family resemblance” across shifts – which is extremely important – another purpose of this study was to provide an empirical basis for refining, modifying and/or extending those analytical concepts and tools associated with the governmentality literature. In order to do so, it set out to examine the precise ways in which mentalities are appropriated, shaped, and translated within a time- and space-specific context of contingent and fluid governmental objectives. Each chapter was intended to provide insight into some of those “*messy actualities*” associated with site-specific transformations in governance (O’Malley et al., 1997; Barry et al, 1993; Garland, 1997).

The importance of understanding those “messy actualities” was apparent in Chapter Two, where shifts in governmental authority were explored. Indeed, the focus on “waves” was a means of providing insight into the ways in which “community policing” as a “floating signifier” (Stenson, 1993: 380), was appropriated, shaped and translated within a set of time- and space-specific contexts of ever-changing problematics and objectives. Whilst acknowledging that there has been a shift in policing away from a Keynesian mentality toward a neo-liberal mentality (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996), this broad-based analysis must be considerably qualified and contextualized, as Chapter Two sought to demonstrate. Specifically, whilst acknowledging that there has been a shift away from the “social” as the primary terrain of governance to the “community” (Rose, 1996a), one must be analytically cautious. Just as there have been a series of articulations of “community policing” over the last decade, so too have there been a

series of ways in which the “social” and “community” have been constituted, coupled and given effect.

Chapter Three’s focus on the ways in which the institution of the OPP has been reinvented also served to highlight the importance of pursuing more than just an ideal typical understanding of what has occurred. The chapter’s focus on the ways in which a new institutional model was constructed provided an analytical vantage point from which to understand those complex, messy and on-going processes associated with the creation of a new institutional identity. If one simply examined the ways in which the newly reinvented institution of the OPP reflected a broad neo-liberal mentality, one would be lending an undue coherence to a process that was plagued with ever-changing objectives that emerged from different centers of governance at different points in time. While OPP managers arguably succeeded in creating a coherent institutional identity, the analysis in Chapter Three demonstrated that there was more to this institutional shift than a simple colonization of managerial subjectivity by a new *governmentality*.

Chapter Four’s analysis of the ways in which agents have been re-thought and re-constituted serves to highlight the importance of qualifying our arguments surrounding shifts in mentalities. While a broad shift to a neo-liberal and new managerial mentality can be discerned in relation to the increasing prominence of organizational learning discourse, it is important to examine the ways in which this discourse was appropriated, shaped and translated according to time- and space-specific problematics and objectives. In a similar vein to those “waves” in community policing, Chapter Four also provided an empirical basis for suggesting that two “waves” in organizational learning have occurred, pointing once again to the need to consider the “messy actualities” associated

with mentality shifts. Each wave represented a particular way in which the ideas and concepts associated with organizational learning were put to use, the degree to which they were implemented, and the meanings they had acquired in a particular context (see Garland, 1997: 199).

The “messy” nature of governmental shifts is in part a consequence of *contingent events*. As the previous four chapters demonstrated, a variety of contingent events served to unleash various governmental reforms. Chapter Three, for example, described how the implementation of the Social Contract and its financial target of 17 million dollars made it a material necessity for the OPP to re-invent itself. At the same time, however, the Organizational Renewal was a particular vision of the Commissioner at the time. Had another Commissioner been in office, chances are that things would have been otherwise – or at the very least, the kind of re-structuring that took place would have been different. Then, of course, the election of the Harris government was not something that was particularly planned for within the OPP. Having just accomplished their own re-structuring, the OPP was now required to partake in a new reinvention process. In addition, the Review of Policing Services in Ontario, another contingent event, served to profoundly influence the ways in which the OPP thought about, and promoted, “community policing” in their organization. This Review also created the conditions for re-thinking the identity, roles and capacities of the policing agent in the emergent landscape of competitive policing.

While acknowledging the importance of contingency in our analysis, this study has also highlighted the importance of understanding the role of *agency* in governmental reinvention. Chapter Three, for example, demonstrated that the art of managing reflects

an ongoing practical accomplishment by managers who are faced with ongoing practical problems. In addressing these problems - which are at times largely independent from one another - managers must choose from the ranges of discourses available to them to lend a coherence to a set of events which, on their own, would generate contradictions or ironies within the worldview and operational paradigm of an organization. The managers' ongoing practice of *aligning* seemingly incompatible demands and imperatives into a singular organizational response involves the exercise of considerable agency and innovation. While one can observe the influence of a "new managerial" mentality on the ways in which managers were re-imagining and reinventing the institution, this mentality was consciously appropriated, tailored and translated in order to simultaneously address a range of problematics related to the business of policing.

This complex interaction between discourse and agency was also apparent in Chapter Two. Within each "wave" of community policing, for example, considerable agency was exercised in the appropriation of abstract notions of "community" and "community policing" in order to address time- and space-specific governmental objectives and problematics. Each "wave" represented a particular way in which OPP managers translated particular ideas surrounding "community policing" into specific strategic responses to specific problems. Thus, by providing a richer analysis of the complex interaction between discourse and agency, one can avoid the tendency, in much governmentality-based work, to limit human agency "in the face of all-embracing discourses, technologies, and political rationalities" (Crawford, 1997: 212; Curtis, 1995: 581-585).

In conjunction with this need to pay more attention to the role of agency there is also a related need to consider the *constitutive role of resistance* (O'Malley, 1996a) in the shaping of governmental forms. Chapter Two's discussion of "waves" in community policing discussed the ways in which the police, the public, government and others were "resisting" or "contesting" the authority of the police in the governance of security. This authority was resisted through critiques of their normative bases of legitimacy as well as their "expertise" and set of capacities for governing security. In response to this resistance, the police began experimenting with new ideas and practices. Thus, this form of resistance played a role in constituting governance. At the same time, OPP managers were demonstrating forms of "unconscious resistance" in the development of new programs. While they were open to new ideas, they were also unconsciously closed off to others, because the discursive and practical possibilities for change were limited. Instead of regarding this form of resistance as "negative", this chapter demonstrated the importance of seeing it as "positive", since it also played a role in shaping and constituting governance. Accordingly, the findings of this study confirm O'Malley's observation that current governmentality scholarship pays inadequate attention to the "ways in which resistance...plays a constitutive role in the formation of rule" (1996a: 312). If scholars were to open up more analytical space for considering the role of resistance, they would be less inclined to produce an "ideal typical" description of events and more inclined to see the importance of those "messy actualities".

While acknowledging the important role of agency and resistance in transforming governance, this study also served to highlight the importance of exploring the *unintended effects* or "unforeseen consequences" (Garland, 1997: 199) of new

governmental forms or programs. Linked with its tendency to generate ideal typical understanding of shifts in governance is another tendency, on the part of governmentality scholarship, to focus exclusively on the *nature* of new governmental programs, strategies and technologies. This focus is not surprising, given that it serves as a clear window through which new mentalities of rule can be seen. However, by focusing explicitly on the nature of programs or on the intentions of programmers, various programmatic *effects* are cut off from one's analysis. The new system for the governance of policing put in place by the Harris government is a case in point. Had we limited ourselves to exploring the ways in the "Common Sense Revolution" indexes a broader mentality of rule, we would not have had the analytical basis for understanding some of the consequences of this "Revolution" for the "policing division of labour" (Jones and Newburn, 1998). By expanding our analytical horizons in this regard, we are also opening ourselves up to seeing patterns of governance that may be observable elsewhere, such as at the level of the global.

To summarize thus far, this study has demonstrated that our analysis of shifts in governance could be strengthened by focusing more explicitly on the following analytical areas: the role of contingency; the interaction between discourse and agency; the constitutive role of resistance; and the unintended effects of governmental programs. In addition to these issues, the findings of this study also provide a basis for critiquing those spectres of Althusser that appear to haunt governmentality-based work.

#### *Confronting the Spectres of Althusser*

As explained previously, the term "governmentality" has been used in reference to the "governmental rationality" of state power" (Valverde et al., 1998: 4). In



particular, scholars within this tradition have examined the emergence of contemporary state forms in terms of the ways in which the *state* has been constituted by dominant political rationalities (Ibid). As such, the analytical approach of governmentality scholarship has been “state-centred” in this regard, notwithstanding the emphasis made in Foucault’s work on various forms of governance *outside, or in conjunction with, the state*. If one were to agree with the notion that a new “rationality” has emerged, is one correct in assuming that this rationality is linked exclusively with the state?

Having looked, for example, at the emergence of this trend toward “re-engineering” or “managing for change”, such governmental texts (or practical approaches to governance) (Valverde et al., 1999: 4) have emerged across both state *and* non-state spheres. The new managerial approaches adopted by the OPP, and discussed in Chapter Three emerged, in part, in response to the changing roles of citizens in governance. Citizens were becoming more active due to increased access to information, technology, as well as access to other cultures, etc...Accordingly, private corporations, *as well as* public sector bureaucracies, were seeing the need to accommodate to the changing role of citizens. Obviously, citizens have been *constituted* as active agents in governance, but it is not just the state that has been involved in this process.

A similar argument can be made in relation to “organizational learning”. This is a concept that has proliferated in profit-making circles *as well as* public sector bureaucracies. It represents a new means of constituting workers in ways that will promote the new objectives of corporations. In this regard, could one not argue that *corporations* are governing their employees “at a distance”? One can conclude, therefore, that it is too simplistic to argue that new forms of subjectivity are simply an

artifact of *state* governance or that strategies of “responsibilization” (if one uses this term) have originated in state institutions. One should not give the state too much credit for ideas that exist elsewhere.

There also appears to be a normative sub-text to governmentality research, which says that what has been happening in state governance is normatively, or politically, undesirable. Consider, for example, the contention that neo-liberal governance is characterized by a form of “government at a distance” (Rose and Miller, 1992), whereby forms of ethical self-governance are shaped in accordance with broader state objectives. Various studies in the governmentality tradition (cf. Cruikshank, 1993, 1996; Hindess, 1993), including the work on community policing (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996), have suggested implicitly that this strategy is ultimately aimed at *enhancing* state power, and that it represents a novel attempt on the part of the state to deceptively subject citizens without coercing them directly (see O’Malley, 1996a: 313). In relation to community policing, the suggestion is that even though the police are withdrawing their “reins”, they are actually extending their power into the ethical conduct of individuals. In this regard, some governmentality scholarship tends to reinforce, rather than demystify, the image of the state as a “monstre froid” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 174).

In sum, it would be both analytically and normatively useful if one addressed these spectres of Althusser found in governmentality-based scholarship. While it is important to examine the ways in which state governance has been reinvented, it would be simplistic to suggest either that the new developments discussed in this study have originated in the state sphere or that they are necessarily contributing to the enhancement of state power and the further subjugation of citizens.

## **Normative and Policy Considerations**

While it is important to explore the ways in which our analyses of governance could be improved, it is also important for academics to explore possible normative or political courses of action. Interestingly, the articulation of a new politics, or as some would suggest, a “post-social” politics, is rarely found in the literature on trends in governance. Bayley and Shearing (1996; see also Shearing and Wood, forthcoming), Johnston (1999) and Jones and Newburn (1998) are notable exceptions to this in relation to the governance of security. The next section will highlight some of the “actionable knowledge” that one may be able to deploy for political purposes (see O’Malley, 1997: 378).

Chapter One identified the broad sets of literature which, taken together, are suggesting that the governance of security is becoming increasingly pluralized. The general consensus is that the institutional and strategic hegemony of the state is declining, and that new institutions, auspices and strategies of governance are emerging. Given that this study has focussed on developments in the state governance of security, and has confirmed that this pluralization is indeed taking place, it is perhaps worthwhile to consider future possibilities and directions for public policing in particular.

One could perhaps begin with a rather open-ended question regarding the future role of the public police. Given that they are increasingly being considered as only one service delivery option among an expanding set of other options, what will serve to distinguish the police from other providers? Of course, any representative of a public policing institution will tell you that it is their standards, their degree of *public* accountability that sets them apart, and this theme was introduced in Chapter Five. As

much as *community* has emerged as the new terrain of collective life, the police will continue to suggest that they re-affirm the *social* – they are governed by Supreme Court decisions, they are governed by due process, the Criminal Code, etc... In addition, as holders of the monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force, they are accountable to standards in this regard – they must exercise force in a minimalist fashion, and any infraction of protocol would have severe consequences. As well, Loader reminds us that the police have a considerable “symbolic” significance in western culture, in that they are the mythical embodiment of social order and control (1997).

For the police, the inevitable rise of private security institutions within an emergent security market poses some profound implications. To begin with, while the police are starting to be governed, and made accountable, through market-based mechanisms, they are still accountable through other mechanisms as well (i.e. forms of “legal” and “political” accountability discussed in Chapter Five). However, private security institutions are governed primarily (although not exclusively) through the mechanisms of the market. As such, in a newly “marketized” environment, private security organizations are bound to have the competitive edge – their costs are low because training is relatively minimal and their product does not come with any “bells and whistles”, so to speak. For the public police, their costs are high due to the high level of training and education required to uphold the Criminal Code and to exercise force legitimately. It is not surprising therefore, that public police organizations in general have explored the option of “civilianisation”, and have begun to re-think the roles of fully fledged, armed and trained police officers. Perhaps the logical route is for public police

organizations to focus on what they do best – that is, to continue to remain the *exclusive* institution devoted to emergency response and the application of restricted force.

However, even this possibility is being contested, as other non-state or quasi-state institutions of security have begun to enhance their capacities to exercise force. Institutions like the University of Toronto police now have “Special Constable” status, as do security officers with the Toronto Transit Commission. One can also notice at a casual glance that these Special Constables dress like public police officers, conduct patrols like public police officers, and react to incidents (albeit with less statutory powers) in a similar fashion to public police officers. All indications suggest that institutions like the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority will continue to arm their officers with enhanced statutory and “police-like” powers (Wood, 1996). Given such developments, it is becoming less likely that the public police will always hold the monopoly on the exercise of force.

Even programs such as “9-1-1” could become pluralized and subject to the mechanisms of the market. While a full-scale marketization of emergency and “armed response” functions is largely outside our realm of possibilities at the moment in most of North America, this process has already occurred in South Africa. If one’s house is burgled, it may not be the public police who come to the door first – it may well be one of several private “armed response” companies who have the authority to carry guns. One should note, however, that this trend has been observed in Los Angeles by Mike Davis in his book titled City of Quartz (1990). Davis comments that “[t]he carefully manicured lawns of Los Angeles’s Westside sprout forests of ominous little signs warning; ‘Armed Response!’ Even richer neighborhoods in the canyons and hillsides

isolate themselves behind walls guarded by gun-toting private police and state-of-the-art electronic surveillance” (223). Clearly, North Americans ought to think seriously about the “division of labour” (Jones and Newburn, 1998; Crawford, 1997) within the governance of security by considering the normative implications of different security arrangements.

Scholars such as Bayley and Shearing (1996), as well as Jones and Newburn (1998), have begun to do just that, and have provided considerable insight into the consequences of marketization. There is a consensus that if the governance of security is completely dominated by the logic of the market, then “inequities” in the provision of security are bound to occur. Chapter Five discussed the ways in which small municipalities in Ontario are beginning to act as “consumers” of security – having collected a certain amount of municipal taxes, municipalities “shop around” for services which fit their security needs as well as the size of their pocket books. However, in contrast to Shearing’s concern with the inequities of “privatization”, the “customerization” of municipalities might well present the best of both worlds, because municipalities can exercise choice, but the money is collected through taxes. Therefore, the “poor” and the “rich” benefit from the choices made (at least in theory).

However, normative implications arise when the rich decide to purchase “extra” security. Inevitably, this could lead to the purchasing of alarm systems for houses, the erection of walls around homes, and even the construction of “gated communities”. This “fortress mentality” is criticized for promoting a deep fissure between the “have’s” and the “have nots”, and again, this is nowhere more apparent than in South Africa (as well as Los Angeles). Jones and Newburn suggest that the development of such “individualised

solutions” to security may generate less, rather than more, security (1998: 269). So, how are we to prevent this inequity from occurring? This trend toward “fortification” among the rich appears to be gaining in popularity, and it presents us with considerably complex moral and political issues. Our recognition of an emergent “fortress mentality” is causing us to reflect on questions concerning notions of the “common good” and the potential “dark side” of the fracturing of collective life.

Another potential problem associated with marketization is that private forms of coercion may be used in sinister ways by the rich against the poor (see Shearing and Wood, forthcoming). In other words, it is conceivable that the “civil” or “human” rights of the underprivileged are, or will be, infringed by private policing bodies, because such bodies are not subject to the same regulatory mechanisms as the public police. The answer to this, according to Jones and Newburn (1998: 269) is that a regulatory mechanism must be developed in order to ensure the democratic governance of non-state institutions:

*If private security and other forms of policing provision are to play an increasing role in the provision of public safety (i.e. in the policing of public spaces), without compounding the inequities that already exist, then they will have to be made subject to some form of democratic governance. This is something more than a contractual relationship between purchaser and provider, or even an economic or legal form of regulation. It concerns what are essentially a set of political decisions about the common good and the balancing of conflicting interests*

Indeed, this forms the crux of the issue. If we are to accept that a nodal network of security will be our future, then how are we to ensure that each node within this network is governed according to a broader set of democratic objectives? Would it be desirable to create one overall regulatory regime, or would this compromise the autonomy of locally-directed forms of governance with distinct objectives? It appears that at the moment, we

are normatively “torn” between the democratic potential of the “social” and the democratic potential of “community”.

If we return to the institutional site of this study – the public police – probably the most pressing issue for practitioners, policy-makers and academics alike concerns the extent to which the police can operate as a “business”. Is it conceivable that the police can regard their services in the same vein as any other services on the market? Perhaps for some police managers this question is a non-starter, particularly if they believe that public policing institutions are first and foremost institutions of the “social”, whose role it is to ensure that all members of society can live, work and play in safety. Perhaps what we are witnessing at this present moment is simply a re-articulation, rather than the extinction, of the public-private divide.



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