DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOSITY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

APPENDICES

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the thesis is to establish a correlation between human rights and democracy, and between human rights and religiosity. The two-fold hypothesis posits that states which demonstrate a low degree of democracy also exhibit a high number of human rights abuses, and that states which demonstrate a high degree of religiosity also exhibit a high number of human rights abuses. To this end, five indicators are used for each of the three subjects. The indicators selected deal specifically with either human rights, religiosity, or democracy. Each state is assigned a score for each of the indicators, which are grouped into the three subject areas. The indicators are taken predominantly from Charles Humana's work, as well as that of the United States Department of State. Upon this basis, the scores are then placed on three continua, whereupon they are ranked relative to each other. The continuum for democracy is then compared to the continuum for human rights, and the continuum for religiosity is then compared to the continuum for human rights. The surmised correlations between both human rights and democracy and between human rights and religiosity are valid.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Amnesty International
dem	Democracy
EOHR	Egyptian Organization of Human Rights
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FSD	Fascist-style Dictatorship
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	Islamic Call Society
MA	Modernizing Autocracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RIR	Radical Islamic Regime
TA	Traditional Autocracy
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UID	Universal Islamic Declaration
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
YHRO	Yemeni Human Rights Organization

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The only time you need pull is when you lack push.   *- Stephens*

It has often been said
there's so much to be read,
you never can cram
all those words in your head.

So the writer who breeds
more words than he needs
is making a chore
for the reader who reads.

That's why my belief is
the briefer the brief is,
the greater the sigh
of the reader's relief is.

And that's why your books
have such power and strength.
You publish with shorth!
(Shorth is better than length.)

- Dr. Seuss

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Many of the reports of human rights abuses which filter through the international media are scandalous and shocking. Those cases of abuse which are documented by such agencies as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch, among others, are often more shocking still. These abuses can and do take many forms. Their commonality is a blatant disregard for the sanctity of human life, and its potential. Rarely, however, are we told why the abuses do occur, and what other facets of life might affect human rights.

Human rights abuses happen world-wide. Many of these abuses are often attributed to a particular region: the Middle East. To be sure, the citizens of this region and their governments are the perpetrators of a great many incidents. Regardless, no country in the world is free from accusations of wrong-doing. Social inequality for women is prevalent in many states around the world, including the Republic of Ireland, and lengthy delays in sentencing routinely occur in states such as Italy; these are commonly considered "modern" states, in which offenses such as these are presumed not to occur. The truth is that human rights abuses routinely occur in virtually every hemisphere.

That aside, there are a number of characteristics of the Middle East which appear to the casual outside onlooker to be the root causes of such behaviours. Often, the

cultural differences of a particular region and their manifestation, from dress and language to behaviours, give rise to notions of superiority on the part of the observer. For example, the *hijab*, or head covering, worn by many Muslim women is often seen as a sign of domination, of a defeated and defenseless woman who is compelled against her will to conform to a particular standard which in turn takes away her freedom.

Many of the countries of the Middle East do, of course, have distinctive features which are not found elsewhere in the world, each of which has a profound effect upon the human rights records of these states. One such distinguishing property of the Middle East is oil, discovered in the early 20th Century, which, although not unique to the Middle East, certainly exists in the region in plenteous quantity. Another is religion; the Middle East is the birthplace of the three modern religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, all of which are still practiced within the region. Racial divisions also exist, primarily between the Arab population and the other various cultural groups which are found therein. These gaping divisions have led to a series of shifting alliances within the Middle East and from outside, which is also, at times, problematic. Due in part to a number of shaping factors, many of the countries of the Middle East are now ruled by monarchical families, leaving the citizens of these states at the mercy of wealthy and often eccentric rulers. This list is by no means exhaustive; those that have been included above are simply a few of the more pronounced qualities.

What have these attributes to do with the human rights records of the countries of the Middle East? The analogy of the bicycle tire can be used here to describe the relationship of each of the above-mentioned factors to human rights. If each property

is likened to a spoke of the wheel, one gets a sense of the many hundreds of factors which come into play when examining the region. The hub of the wheel, however, for the purposes of this study, is human rights. Therefore, continuing with the bicycle wheel analogy, each of these features at some point intersects with human rights. Its outcome may be positive; it may be adverse. The point to be made here, though, is that it has an effect.

The study which follows is an attempt to isolate only two of these factors: democracy and religiosity. That having been said, it is necessary to recognize the fact that the work of the political scientist cannot be performed in a vacuum. Rather, the isolation of these two features has been done with the full knowledge that there may well be other factors which have a bearing upon them, and that they in turn have some effect on human rights.

A thumb-nail sketch of the countries of the Middle East points to many commonly-held notions. The first of these is that oppressive leaders such as Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the Ayatollahs of Iran wield virtually all of the power within the region. Another is that the Muslim faith, held by more than 90% of the 18 countries of the study, gives its practitioners *carte blanche* in terms of respect for other human beings. Many aspects of Islam are frequently cited in this regard; *jihad*, veiling, and segregation come instantly to mind. Yet another is that development, both of humans and of industry, is years behind the western standard. The trouble with such sweeping generalizations, each of which actually contains some shred of truth, is that they are not entirely accurate. Nor are they true in each and every case.

Democracy is something which is thought commonly not to exist within the Middle East. After all, monarchies such as *Al Saud* in Saudi Arabia and despotic leaders such as Qadhafi in Libya, do nothing to dispel the myth of helpless citizens trapped in their own countries. When defined in an institutional way, this may even be true. However, when defined as a system in which citizen participation is encouraged, this notion is challenged.[1]

Similarly, religiosity, "the quality of being excessively, ostentatiously, or mawkishly religious"[2] seems to be in full force in the Middle East. The fundamentalist activities of the PLO and *hezbollah* guerrillas nightly fill television screens with stories of bombings and terrorism. Certainly, these groups and others in the Middle East conform to the conventional fundamentalist definition; so, too, do some religious groups in Canada, including Baptists and Pentecostals. It would appear, then, that the religiosity level thought to exist might be misleading or overblown.

The interesting thing is that both democracy and religiosity, as described here, have wild connotations attached, and occur in an area in which human rights abuses are inordinately high. The basis upon which the thesis proceeds, then, is that there is a negative correlation between human rights abuses and democracy, and a positive correlation between human rights abuses and religiosity. The assumptions made are two-fold: that states which demonstrate a high degree of democracy correspondingly exhibit

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[1] Jack Lively, Democracy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975) 9.

[2] David B. Guralnik, ed., Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition (New York: Simon and Schuster: 1980) 1200.

a low number of human rights abuses, and that states which exhibit a high degree of religiosity demonstrate a high number of human rights abuses.

As such, the body of work which follows deals with religiosity, human rights and democracy in the Middle East. Eighteen states have been selected, and are compared on the basis of several different indicators which show levels of religiosity, human rights abuses, and regime type. The data has been collected by several different people and organizations, each of which has its own method of documentation and quantification, as well as a unique set of indicators.

There are many reasons why behaviouralism has been selected as the theoretical approach of choice. The primary reason is the empirical nature of this work. The study is in no way concerned with the beliefs, attitudes or early life experiences which have shaped the people of the 18 states, thereby shaping their countries. Instead, the study relies almost entirely upon the use of indicators to show that the theory has validity. For very crude reasons, this is a necessity: from this distance, there is virtually no way of testing the source of the actions of the individuals within Saudi Arabia, for example. This matters not at all, as the study is concerned solely with finding links between human rights and religiosity and between human rights and democracy.

The fact that, with the use of a behaviouralist approach, assumptions regarding human agency cannot be made, is not really important. The sole aim of this work is to show that something happens, and not why. The reasons why someone would perpetuate violence against the disabled, for example, while interesting, will not be considered.

Instead, such cases will be quantified, and a correlation found between those abuses and the level of religiosity or democracy within the countries selected.

Using this approach alone may be viewed by some as problematic, as it does not provide a complete picture. Nonetheless, the aim of the study is simply to show that high levels of human rights abuses do occur in countries with high levels of religiosity, and that low levels of human rights abuses do occur in countries with more developed democracies. There will be no attempt to explain these events with regard to why. This, however, might be a useful starting-point for future research in this area. In fact, beginning with such data, a theorist of virtually any stripe who studies interior motivations would do well to start with a study such as this.

The very fact that some variables within each of the three categories (human rights, religiosity, and democracy) have been selected to the exclusion of others implies that there is some judgement which has been made. For example, the correlation between the allowance human rights monitoring and the presence of an official state religion might produce a strikingly different result than the correlation between high levels of church attendance and high levels of female genital mutilation (FGM). The inclusion and exclusion of particular variables can greatly influence the results of a study.

Another problem is that the interpretation of results will, without a doubt, also be skewed. Looking in on the Middle East from outside, from the vantage-point of a predominantly Anglo-Saxon, Christian, English-speaking community, the events which are seen in a predominantly Arab, Muslim, Arabic-speaking community may appear to

be something which, in actual fact, they are not. This presents a problem which may be overcome only to a point.

The use of other approaches was considered, to no avail. While both Interpretivism and Ego Psychology are extremely interesting, and, one would suppose, valuable in other instances, in this case their use makes no sense. The primary use of indicator data goes against the primary objectives of both these approaches. Interpretivists would seek to interpret various actions in a narrative context; ego psychologists look to ego identity development to more fully understand what has occurred. In no way does the use of statistics attempt to explain meanings for actions, which is problematic for both approaches.

Accordingly, the study which follows sets out to accomplish one thing only: to determine, using a behaviouralist approach, whether or not any correlation exists between human rights abuses and democracy, and between human rights abuses and religiosity. The method used is simply a rough way to convey the meaning at the heart of the theoretical concept. The indicators and scales serve to make concrete those things which would otherwise remain abstract: human rights, democracy, and religiosity.

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

The Middle East is comprised of no less than 18 states: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. All of these countries are clustered around the Arabian Peninsula and along the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. They range from tiny Qatar, whose population numbers barely more than 500,000, to Iran, with a populace of more than 65,000,000. As such, there is great disparity among these states, which manifests itself in many ways.

Several states which are located in the north of the African continent, such as Mauritania and Tunisia have not been included, although Morocco has. The selection of states was more or less arbitrary; however, the availability of data for these outlying states played a key role in their selection. Another fact remains: many of these are small and even marginal in the context of the Middle East, belonging instead to African organizations and alliances. Turkey is also somewhat marginal in the region, in that it operates more often in the Western realm, unlike many of the other countries in the region, with a couple of exceptions. For this reason, along with its geographic location, it was not included in this study. Another state which will no doubt be noted for its absence is Afghanistan; like Turkey, its geographic location is the major reason why it was not included. However, another reason was simply that recent events within

Afghanistan have made finding up-to-date materials next to impossible. As such, Afghanistan has not been included either.

Historical Summary

The remaining states share a rich history. Quite possibly the wealthiest region in the world, the Middle East has been endowed with plenteous oil reserves, which served to bring the region to prominence in the early post-war years. The modern history of this region as a whole is commonly believed to have begun only in 1948, when the state of Israel was created, although most of the other states within the region existed in advance of that year. The ensuing struggle between various contingents of Muslim and Jewish and Christian citizens in the region has caused bloody disagreement; in the years since, the Middle East has seen perhaps more open warfare than any other region on earth.

The states within this system, as listed above, can be divided and grouped in various ways, although not conclusively. First, and perhaps superficially, they can be arranged on the basis of religion. This perspective would see the region divided into basically two camps: Muslim versus Jew. However, further divisions within the Muslim quarter, such as Shi'ite versus Sunni, make this simple partition rather inadequate. As well, states can be divided as to their resources and wealth, into the "have" and "have-not" states; oil reserves within the region have created vast disparities among countries in the Middle East, as in the case of Saudi Arabia versus Sudan. However, financial and military backing by both other countries within the region and by outside powers make

this factor insignificant in many cases. Another distinction which is sometimes made is a division between those states who are governed by dynastic families, such as Kuwait, Qatar or Saudi Arabia, and those who have elected governments, such as Egypt. In reality, however, this does not have much validity in terms of success or legitimacy of specific governments, one way or the other. Finally, the Middle East can be divided on the basis of alliances. During the Cold War, states which lined up behind either the United States or the former Soviet Union were pitted one against another, and these strategic alliances made the region a hotbed of unrest. This factor has become somewhat distorted due to the recent shift in global power; however, Cold War alliances are dwindling in large part, and new alliances seemingly change almost on a per-issue basis. It can be assumed, then, that none of these categorisations provides a complete and total picture of relations within the Middle East, and that conditions within each state of the region result from a number of factors.

Sources

The data used in this study comes mainly from two sources, although others have also been used. These are Charles Humana's World Human Rights Guide and the U.S. Department of State's Country Report on Human Rights Records for 1996. These two sources were selected for one important reason, among others: each covers many, if not all, of the states included in this study. As well, each assesses many of the types of indicators considered here, and is presented in a fairly straightforward style, without much room for interpretation. Additionally, information was taken from The World

Almanac and Book of Facts 1997 and from Bernard Lewis' article in the Journal of

Democracy. There were, however, shortcomings for each of the sources.

· *World Human Rights Guide*

The World Human Rights Guide is a reasonably comprehensive guide which

considers 40 different human rights across 104 states. Humana is careful to state that

the study is concerned only with states of one million people or more. These indicators

were selected from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These 40 human rights

indicators were then assessed and placed into one of four categories for each state:

YES   represents the category of unqualified respect for the freedoms, rights or
       guarantees of the article or indicator of the questionnaire.
yes   qualifies otherwise satisfactory answers on the grounds of occasional breaches of
       respect for the freedoms, rights, or guarantees of the article or indicator of the
       questionnaire.
no   indicates frequent violations of the freedoms, rights, or guarantees of the article
       or indicator of the questionnaire.
NO   indicates a constant pattern of violations of the freedoms, rights or guarantees of
       the article or indicator of the questionnaire.[1]

Points were then awarded as follows: 0 points for NO, 1 for no, 2 for yes, and 3 for

YES. In Humana's study, the total number of possible points was 120, the results

according to which were divided and presented finally in terms of a percentage. All of

the 104 states were then ranked in relation to one another.

Humana's Guide presented three fairly major problems which had to be

overcome. First, Humana's study does not look at all of the 18 states addressed in this

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[1] Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)
5.

study. Four states, Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, are excluded

from Humana's work, with absolutely no explanation. This, of course, posed serious

problems for the collection of data pertaining to these states for this study. The inclusion

of all but four states is a marked improvement for Humana's publication, whose previous

edition, published in 1987, gave only "summary form" analyses for four of the countries

and completely excluded five other states. Another serious deficiency in Humana's work

is the fact that his total study is weighted, in that some human rights abuses are seen as

more serious than others. Accordingly, Humana subjected six of the 40 indicators to a

mathematical equation, which allows for subjective analysis and fuzzy results. His

weighting appears to be less than accurate: Israel, for example, scored 76% on his

overall ranking scale, which implies a reasonably solid record on human rights, one

which compares well with western industrialized countries. One other problem is that

the data was collected before November, 1991, and does not cover or account for recent

developments. This is not to suggest that there are not other problems with Humana's

study. However, these problems are the most serious.

To compensate for these shortcomings, this researcher invented a number of

solutions which allowed for reasonably equal comparison. To address the problem of

excluded states, for these four states, information was taken instead from the United

States Department of State's <u>Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996</u>. To

combat the weighting problem, weighting was avoided altogether. Although these

indicators of rights are not all equal in terms of human suffering and anguish, the

indicators were selected on the basis of their relativity to each of the three subjects of

study: democracy, religiosity, and human rights. The information was then coded using

Humana's scoring system: 3 for YES, 2 for yes, 1 for no, and 0 for NO. Regarding

the outdated data, again data was taken from the information compiled by the U.S.

Department of State. Where Country Report data was substituted for Humana's, the

figures were marked with an asterisk (*) in the Appendices wherein the information was

presented in chart form.

· *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996*

The information contained in the U.S. Department of State documents was

obtained from the Internet, and was released in January of 1997 by the Bureau of

Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. Each of the 18 Reports used was organized in

a systematic manner, in paragraph form. The information covers many rights and is

divided into the following categories: Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Respect

for Civil Liberties, Respect for Political Rights, Governmental Attitude Regarding

International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights,

Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status, and

Worker Rights. Many of these headings are further sub-divided into smaller headings,

and include, among others, The Right of Association, and Torture and Other Cruel,

Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. As such, the reports look at many

of the indicators which are applicable to democracy, religiosity and human rights, the

three subjects of the study. In most cases, the information has been collected by

representatives of the United States Government in each country.

Again, there are some fairly significant limitations to the U.S. State Department

information. Three of these are important for this study. The first is that the United

States has no official presence in Libya. Consequently, a disclaimer on the first page of

the report states that "information on the human rights situation is therefore limited."

Secondly, the Country Reports, while not subjective in the manner in which Humana's

information is, give no hint as to a grade or classification for each of the states. Instead,

the information is displayed in terms of examples of the specific activity which has

occurred in each of the states. This presents the third difficulty with the State

Department material: the severity of the transgressions of the state is not readily

apparent.

To address these problems, solutions were developed. In looking at the obstacle

introduced by the fact that the United States has no official representation in Libya, the

assumption has been made that the U.S. State Department has gone to fairly elaborate

lengths to ensure that the information collected is both correct and complex enough to

warrant inclusion. Therefore, the Libyan information has been taken at face value, as

has the other information. To meet the challenge of classification, a system was

developed wherein each indicator was assessed by a general categorization. In the case

of Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of

Alleged Violations of Human Rights, for example, which was included in the Human

Rights section, a scale was developed: 2 for unqualified tolerance and respect, 1 for

some, and 0 for none. This same scale was used and modified for each indicator drawn

from the Country Reports; 2 for unqualified tolerance, 1 for some, and 0 for none. In

cases such as "Percentage of Population which belongs to one particular sect or religious

group", the same system was used: 2 for 55-79 percent of the population, 1 for 80-94, and 0 for 95-100. The exception to this grading system occurred in cases such as "Official State Religion" in the Religiosity chapter, where either there is, or there is not, an official religion in the state. As such, scores were assessed in the following manner: 1 for none, and 0 for an official state religion.

- *Other Sources*

For classification by regime type. the material was gathered from the grouping provided by Bernard Lewis. His classification included many categories which were applicable to the present study. However, one category was not, and not every state was included. As such, the fifth category. Central Asian Republics, was exchanged for a category loosely labelled "democracy". The categorization of these states was assessed in much the same manner as the information which came from the U.S. Department of State: 0 for Traditional Autocracies, Fascist-Style Dictatorships and Radical Islamic Regimes (each of which shows no signs of democracy), 1 for Modernizing Autocracies, and 2 for democracy, or a condition which somewhat resembles democracy.

For information regarding concentration of one particular religion within the state, information was taken from Famighetti's The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1997. For each country, the percentages of major religious groups are given in the Almanac. The assumption is that states with a more heterogeneous population in terms of religiosity will be less religious. These percentages were then taken and assessed in the same way as the U.S. State Department information was grouped: 0 for 95-100, 1 for 80-94 and 2 for 55-79.

Scoring

As mentioned above, for each indicator, a score was given. These scores were determined in the manner which is discussed earlier in this chapter. Each of the three subjects, religiosity, human rights and democracy, included five indicators. For each state in each subject, a total was tabulated by adding the scores from each of the indicators. Scores ranged from zero to nine in religiosity: the lower the score, the higher the level of religiosity in the state. Democracy's scores ranged from zero to twelve, with higher scores demonstrating higher levels of democracy and lower scores showing lower levels of democracy. In terms of human rights, the highest possible score was twelve, and the lowest zero; the higher the score, the lower the number of human rights abuses, and the lower the score, the higher the number of human rights abuses.

Once the scores were added together, the states were divided into three groupings: red, yellow, and green. These are meant to serve as the approximate indicator of a state's relative levels of religiosity, democracy, and human rights. This is due to the limitations of analysis of individual scores, because of the limitations incurred in using only five indicators per subject. The aim of the scores is to permit simple and uncomplicated comparison of the countries in the Middle East. When a specific state is rated for a particular indicator, that score is added to the state's scores from the other indicators. In this way, for each of the subjects, there is a "total" score, which allows for comparison of the states against each other. The "bad" and "good" states are then easily identifiable.

Presentation

The information has therefore been laid out in what is hoped will appear to be a straightforward manner. As the human rights information is used in comparison with both religiosity and democracy, it has been placed first, followed by democracy and religiosity. What follows is an attempt to find the supposed correlations between human rights and democracy and between human rights and religiosity. All of the tables and appendices appear at the very end of the study in a reasonably accessible format; reference to these will enhance the reader's perception of the research done and conclusions drawn. The beginning of the chain of understanding begins with a thorough grasp of the human rights situation in the Middle East, and culminates with comparable study in the areas of religiosity and democracy, at which point the posited correlations will be shown.

CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

The scholarly study[1] which has been generated regarding these three subjects is eclectic. Due to the nature of the study, the existing literature is neither entirely applicable, nor, in some cases, completely valid. The following, then, attempts to capture the most important, accurate and relevant of what has been written.

RELIGIOSITY

John Dewey identified a "distinction between religion, a religion and the religious."[2] This is perhaps the most useful starting-point in an analysis of the literature surrounding religion and the Middle East, as hundreds of interpretations exist regarding the validity of and place for religion, even within the predominantly Muslim countries of the region, exist. Books with titles such as The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society and The Failure of Political Islam, two of only hundreds of such volumes, convey the amount of importance given to religion by the authors.

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[1] This particular literature review is necessarily selective and based solely on its relevance to this study.

[2] Milton J. Yinger, Religion in the Struggle for Power: A Study in the Sociology of Religion (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961) 6.

The Middle East is often identified as the "heartland" of Islam.[3] Certainly, as Muslims out-number Christians and Jews by many millions throughout the 18 states encompassed in this study, a tendency to emphasize Islam over the other predominant religions which exist today in the Middle East is justified. Because of the focus of the literature on the Islamic component of the religions of the Middle East, and the fact that many authors neglect even to mention the existence of these others, however, this often results in a very narrow interpretation of events in the Middle East.

In actual fact, the Muslims in the Middle East are themselves divided. The Sunna/Shi'a split, evidenced particularly in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), and in the many alliances between states, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is extremely pronounced. The differences between the two sects, and explanations thereof, make up a significant portion of the literature. The division between the groups is counted among the most significant reasons for the "enduring conflict" between Shi'a and Sunni Muslim states.[4]

There are "rival interpretations" of Islam.[5] One of the major divisions between Muslims is fundamentalism. There is a similar division among Christians in the west and

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[3] Jeffery Haynes, Religion in Third World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994) 51.

[4] Clive Irving, "Special Introduction," Sayings of the Ayatollah Khomeini, Tony Hendra, ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1980) viii.

[5] Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995) 208.

around the world. Twentieth century religion in the Americas[6] gave rise to a brand of

religious belief which has become known as "fundamentalism". Dollar calls

fundamentalists "soldiers of the scriptures", those who seek to reaffirm the truth of the

Apostles of Christ.[7] There are many parallels between Islamic fundamentalists and

Christian fundamentalists. Fundamentalists of the Muslim faith see Islam as superior to

the West, and plan to defeat it. They see Islam as the only "moral order", and themselves

as the "only representatives of the Divine on earth".[8] The main adherents of

fundamentalism in the Middle East are the "urban poor." The Kingdom of Sau'di Arabia

is strongly fundamentalist as well.[9] The goals of Muslim fundamentalists are quite clear.

They seek to:

- restore Islamic institutions and beliefs to their original pristine purity
- reject the call to interpret Islamic doctrines in modern terms
- conflict with modern Islam and with secularists[10]

Sunni scholar Muhammad Rashid Rida postulated that the restoration of rule by an

Islamic leader and the paramountcy of *Shar'ia* (Islamic law) are two further goals of most

fundamentalists.[11] It is helpful to remember that these radicals, however, are the

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[6] For case studies in early American fundamentalism, see James Barr, Fundamentalism (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977) and George M. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), among others.

[7] George W. Dollar, The Fight for Fundamentalism (Sarasota: Daniels Publishing Company, 1983) 1.

[8] Mansour Farhang, "Fundamentalism and Civil Rights in Contemporary Middle East Politics." Human Rights and the World's Religions, Leroy S. Rouner, ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 65-66.

[9] Robert Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Sa'ud (New York: Avon Books, 1983) 142.

[10] Farhang 67.

[11] Haynes 65.

minority, and not to be equated with the "moderate mainstream" of Muslim society.[12]

Religious scholars are careful to assert that "Islam is intrinsically a universal creed and world-view which recognizes no geographical boundaries."[13] In this way, it is possible to view the entire region and beyond as one greatly influenced by the strains of Islam. In fact, Islam now influences much of Africa, Northern India and Southeast Asia, along with parts of Eastern Europe. Its nucleus, however, remains firmly implanted within the Middle East.

The conflict among Muslims, in actual fact, is less observable than the rift between Muslims and the other major religions of the region, Christianity and Judaism. Islamization, the growth of Islamic adherence, has been called a "prophylactic against social and cultural westernization."[14] The western influence is seen as coming from outside the Middle East, of course, but also from states within the region. Israel is considerably different from the other nations, and has different alliances and influences than do the other states.[15] Lebanon is referred to as the bridge between [the gap of] the

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[12] Haynes 44.

[13] Ziauddin Sardar, "Islam and Nationalism," Religion and Nationalism (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1995) 103.

[14] Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Dilemmas of Islamic Identity," Human Rights and the World's Religions, Leroy S. Rouner, ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 99.

[15] Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993) 90.

East and West[16], but others see it as digging a deeper trench between the many cultures.[17] Lebanon routinely attracts the attentions of outsiders.[18]

This rift between the three major religions is perhaps nowhere more observable than in Lebanon, where the origins of the civil war which began in 1975 are often blamed on the "religious animosities among the Lebanese."[19] Until the seventh century, Christianity constituted the dominant religion in Lebanon. Today, Christians constitute approximately 30% (1,132,895) of the population of Lebanon.[20] This group of Christians, however, is not homogeneous. Lebanese Christians have many different origins: the dominant group is the Maronites (approximately 59%), the Melkites (approximately 10%), and others, including Greek Orthodox (approximately 16%) and the Protestant Christians (approximately 3%). Each group differs in the amount of "Arabness" which they accept.[21]

Due to the on-going animosity between the Palestinians, who are Muslim, and the state of Israel, some would argue that not much need be said regarding Judaism in the Middle East. Roughly 82% of that nation is Jewish[22]; the other portion of Israel is

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[16] Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: Death of a Nation (New York: Congdon & Weed, Inc., 1989) 19.

[17] "Putting back the pieces," The Economist 24 Feb. 1996: 3.

[18] "Outside influence," The Economist 24 Feb. 1996: 5.

[19] Mackey 91.

[20] Robert Famighetti, The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1997 (Mahwah, New Jersey: K-III Reference Company, 1996) 792.

[21] Mackey 29-31.

[22] Famighetti 785.

made up of Palestinians, who comprise 14% of the population. These, for the most part,

are Muslims who are still attempting to settle land claims issues. Jewish Israel itself is

divided on issues of religion and cultural values.[23] Partially because of the relative

acculturation of Jews in host countries before their return to Israel in 1948, there are many

levels of religiosity and commitment which may be observed among the Jewish population

of Israel. The fundamentalism within Israel comes from two main camps: the *haredim*,

comprised mainly of Hasidic and Misnagdim Jews, and Zionist forces, embodied in the

religiopolitical radical movement Gush Emunim. The debate between scholars focusing

on Israeli fundamentalism seem to disagree about the relative importance of these two

groups. One side asserts that "contra-acculturative activists" (so-called because of their

fervent attempts to remain unassimilated and unacculturated while still being active within

the Israeli political scene) are the most ardent supporters of fundamentalist Judaism.[24]

The other camp asserts that the more militant Zionists are a greater force with which to

be reckoned due to their "Principles of Action" and battle cry of "not one inch".[25] The

current government of Israel contains these two fundamentalist blocs; it is headed by

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[23] Jeffrey Simpson, "New Israeli PM must be skilled juggler," The Globe and Mail 31 May, 1996: A12.

[24] Samuel C. Heilman and Menachem Friedman, "Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews: The Case of the Haredim," Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 197-264.

[25] Gideon Aran, "Jewish Zionist Fundamentalism: The Bloc of the Faithful in Israel (Gush Emunim)," Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 265-344.

Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud, a right-wing, hard-line party.[26] Due in large part to

their religious orientation, the majority of Jewish voters hold "center-to-right positions."[27]

DEMOCRACY

Democracy is a concept which is often taken for granted in western liberal

societies. Many of the development scholars in the 1950s and 1960s saw the development

of democracy, and the preconditions of this development as the primary goal for

developing states.[28] The definitions of the thing which they sought were varied, and

ranged from the traditional to the *avant garde*. The democracy sought by John Stuart

Mill was "the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally

represented."[29] Years later, Schumpeter followed a similar vein in defining democracy

to mean that "the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are

to rule them."[30] In any case, the notion which they sought was one in which those being

ruled would have some form of input. This thing, however, took longer to reach in some

parts of the world than in others.

A renewed focus on sovereignty has therefore appeared, more along the realist

line, which calls regime theory into question. Thompson defined sovereignty as "the

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[26] "Arab leaders press Israel to stick to peace plan," The London Free Press 6 Jun., 1996: A5.

[27] Gideon Doron, "Israel: The Nationalists Return to Power," Current History Jan. 1997: 32.

[28] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," Understanding Political Development Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 1987) 5.

[29] J.S. Mill, Considerations of Representative Government (London, n.d.) 126.

[30] Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: , 1957) 285.

recognition by internal and external actors that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within the territory."[31] Cederman's definition implies "pure command, devoid of democracy."[32] If this is the case, then the latter must certainly apply to the states within the Middle East; or must it? The international interaction between sovereign states has been termed by Deutsch and Haas "regional interaction,"[33] which, for believers in the sovereignty of states, accounts for association between sovereign states, while allowing for the retention of sovereignty within territorial boundaries.

This is so for a number of reasons, including the systems of government which existed and still exist within states. The form of organization in the state is an interesting sub-topic within the topic of democracy. Much has been written about the Middle East and the perceived fundamentalism which is sweeping across the region, as if that, somehow, could account for the vast differences which exist across the states within the region. However, a much more plausible explanation can be made with regard to regime classification. At least three different interpretations of regime classification have been put forward.

The three which will be examined here provide a general sense of the differences between them, and show the development of the classifications over time. Haas, in his

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[31] Thompson 219.

[32] Cederman 511.

[33] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization 42.3 (1988): 430.

work from 1956-1960, and again from 1961-1968, used typologies of countries based

largely on the development level of the polity in question in his work in coding human

rights. His classification included six different categories, and was applied evenly to

states around the world; none was exempt. His regime types include: modernizing

autocracy, mobilization regime, reconciliation regime, modernizing oligarchy, traditional

oligarchy, authoritarian regime.[34] These are juxtaposed with Cox and Jacobson's three

typologies, largely based upon the same loose criteria: mobilization, authoritarian,

reconciliation.[35] Both of these classifications are and were seen as legitimate, although,

as with any typology, there are limitations. Lange and Meadwell argue that typological

analysis of this or any sort ought to be abandoned in favour of multivariate analyses.[36]

Especially with regard to the Middle East, where great similarities, primarily due to

religion and culture, exist between countries, it is therefore necessary to narrow the

categories for classification. Lewis provides a classification of the Middle East in four

categories[37]: traditional autocracies, modernizing autocracies, fascist-style dictatorships,

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[34] Ernest B. Haas, Human Rights and International Action: The case of freedom of association (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1970) 38-41, 153-155.

[35] Haas 156-157.

[36] Peter Lange and Hudson Meadwell, "Typologies of Democratic Systems: From Political Inputs to Political Economy," New Directions in Comparative Politics, rev. ed., Howard J. Wiarda, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991) 84.

[37] Lewis actually proposed five different regime classifications. The fifth deals with the six Central Asian republics, which will not be explored in this context as they are located outside of the geographic region of the Middle East, as defined for this study. He notes, however, that they are currently experiencing similar problems with the process of becoming separate entities from their "former imperial masters" that various states within the Middle East have had in the past. He points out that these states may have a very different experience, however, as their "former masters" are not liberal democracies, but Moscow. As well, a fifth category has been added, that of "democracy". This is explored further in the "Democracy" chapter.

and radical Islamic regimes.[38] The categorization provided by Lewis is the most helpful

in the study which follows.

The classification by Lewis allows the researcher to account for virtually every

state within the region, with the exception of Israel. It does so because it takes into

account the "Islam" factor, which predominates throughout. As discussed above, the

religiosity of Muslims within Muslim states varies. An Islamic state is based upon

Qur'anic prinicples, and, as such, is subject to much interpretation. As such, the role of

the individual ruler(s) within a given state can have inordinate influence upon that state.

In a true Islamic state, the ruler, while selected from and by the people, is seen as a

"representative employee, deriving his authority from his obedience to the Law of

God."[39] Although the number of true Islamic states within the region is often debated,

all of the predominantly Muslim states presume to derive some authority from the Qur'an,

making the question of leadership a very important one.

Are there other entities within the state that also have an impact on democracy?

Pinkney has developed a list of institutions (in the loosest sense of the word) which must

be in place in order for the development of democracy. These may or may not be

present, or be present in varying degrees, in those states which are to be examined. These

include economic development, political attitudes and behaviour, inter-elite relations,

social structures and interaction between social groups, political institutions, sequences in

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[38] Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview," Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996): 58-60.

[39] Hammudah Abdalati, Islam in Focus (Indianapolis, Indiana: American Trust Publications, 1975) 132.

development and external influences. His work is based upon the writings of those such

as Lipset, Almond and Verba, Rustow and Dahl, among others.[40] Pinkney's argument

continues in addressing three transitory stages through which states must go: challenging

authoritarianism, configuration of interests, and resolution of conflicts.[41]

If Pinkney is correct, one would assume that every country which successfully

meets some or all of these criteria would necessarily become a democracy, and that those

which gradually grow to encompass these would be working toward democracy. This

simply is not the case. Fatima Mernissi identifies one factor which cannot be well

quantified, yet which appears to pervade the Arab Middle East: fear. It is her hypothesis

that the citizens of the Middle East are afraid of many things, among them democracy,

and that this is why the Arab Middle East has not embraced it.[42] Having reviewed the

literature, this provides one of the most convincing arguments as to why democracy has

eluded so many of the states of the Middle East.

The biggest challenge to democracy, however, appears to be Islam itself. At first

blush, it seems that Islam and democracy are entirely incompatible. However, there are

mounds of evidence to indicate that this is not the case. Esposito and Voll's hypothesis

is that if Islam is defined generally, and without the strictures of western institutions, then

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[40] Robert Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1994) 18-33.

[41] Pinkney 100-167.

[42] Fatima Mernissi, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World (Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1992) 42-59.

democracy is indeed possible.[43]   Hamdi concurs, stating that "Western intellectuals

should take more seriously than they do the possibility that there are limitations to their

brand of democracy."[44]   In fact, institutions within Islam already exist which allow for

public participation.   Esposito and Voll, along with Choudhury[45], Ayalon[46] and others,

all speak to the notion of democracy and Islam.

HUMAN RIGHTS

As with the literature regarding regime differentiation, the literature which exists

in the realm of human rights is diverse.   Due to the especially eclectic nature of human

rights documentation, it is perhaps helpful, once again, to divide the information by type.

Once again, while the information is not comprehensive, it is a representative sample of

the major works in the field.

The most obvious starting point in any discussion of human rights, of course, is

the human rights documents which exist, and which have been developed in conjunction

with the United Nations.   In December 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations

ratified and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).   Its thirty

Articles were developed as a "common standard of achievement for all..."; it is a

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[43] John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 21.

[44] Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, "The Limits of the Western Model," Journal of Democracy 7.2 April, 1996: 81.

[45] G.W. Choudhury, Islam and the Contemporary Wold (London 1987) iii.

[46] Ami Ayalon, " Language and Change in the Arab Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 121.

document mainly concerned with individual rights.[47] The rights involved are juridical

in nature, concerning particular entitlements such as life and liberty, and other basic

freedoms. 1966 saw the development of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR); many of the rights and freedoms contained in the act reiterate

the declarations of the UDHR. However, the Covenant goes further in articulating rights

with respect to actual States, in terms of rights during arrest and/or imprisonment, liberty

of movement, and freedom of expression, and also the right to participate in the carrying

out of public affairs, including the right to vote. Part IV of the Covenant also defines the

duties and actions of States and Human Rights Committee members. Again, such a study

is a juridical approach. Also in 1966, the General Assembly adopted the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which aims to ensure the

security and safety of the person, in areas such as governance and self-determination, and

employment rights, including the right to strike. In 1993, the World Conference on

Human Rights in Vienna produced a document known as the Vienna Declaration and

Programme of Action. It is important to note the influence on this document by the more

than 7,000 participants, each of which came from bodies such as national institutes,

academia, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Without a doubt, it is the most

up-to-date and comprehensive human rights document yet produced by the United

Nations, or one of its committees. This document, however, delineates many specific

rights and targets both recognition and elimination of abuse against many groups,

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[47] James Fawcett, "The International Protection of Human Rights," Human Rights (Toronto: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. (The United Kingdom Committee for Human Rights Year 1967), 1968) 18.

including women, migrant workers, and indigenous people. Finally, it calls for specific

action in the development and strengthening of these human rights.

As has been alluded to, there are many types of rights, and many different ways

of dealing with human rights documents and documentation. All of the above documents

are juridical in nature, meaning that they point out and declare certain rights. The

opposite approach is "natural", meaning that they do not actually define or set out

particular rights; rather, they provide a sketch or outline of sets of rights which are, in

and of themselves, fundamental. The second approach, however, is considered to be more

effective, as it eliminates the problem of specificity. The "spirit" of a particular right is

more important than the actual definition. In this case, none can be placed above any

other in "ranking" order. Human rights in general, however, are presumed to be

"attributable to every human being."[48]

Another dichotomy in the approach to dealing with human rights comes when

distinguishing between fundamental human rights and another group of rights, including

civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the

other. Fundamental rights have also been called "great" rights, the right of personal

security including "a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his

body, his health and his reputation."[49] It has been affirmed by the United Nations

General Assembly that elemental human rights are asserted to be indivisible from

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[48] Stanley I. Benn, "Human rights - for whom and for what?" Human Rights, Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978) 59.

[49] John Klenig, "Human rights, legal rights and social change," Human Rights, Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978) 37.

fundamental freedoms.[50] Again, this approach supposes that no one right can be ranked above another. The number of human rights instruments which have been developed since 1948, and the actions thereof, seem to suggest that there are at least a few human rights which cannot be anything less than fundamental. These include, for example, the right to be born free and equal. They are considered to be inviolable, irrespective of individual State laws, and are binding on States.[51] Even within the second category, there is a dichotomy. Civil and political rights are often considered to be enforceable at a particular point in time, while economic, social and cultural rights (the second classification within the second category) were to be implemented over a period of time. Civil and political rights, such as the equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses in marriage, it is argued, must be provided immediately; economic rights include the right to an adequate standard of living, a goal to be attained in the future. The problem with even this distinction is that it is not clear; the line is blurred and "a question of gradation."[52]

Following these two approaches, various people and organizations have attempted to statistically record and analyze the human rights abuses which do occur. These abuses, of course, are in direct contravention of the United Nations documents which expressly prohibit such actions. One of the most widely-cited is HURIDOCS. It codes various

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[50] This can be seen in General Assembly resolution 32/130 (1977).

[51] Theodoor C. VanBoven, "Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights," The International Dimensions of Human Rights, Vol. 1, Karel Vasek, ed. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press (UNESCO/Paris, France), 1982) 46-48.

[52] VanBoven 52-53.

countries with regard to their location, assigns it a number (ie. Sa'udi Arabia 7345), and

then with regard to the human rights information to be recorded.[53] The main problems

with this system are two-fold: first, it is extremely difficult to access information quickly,

and, second, the information does not seem to be coded uniformly. Castil and Humana

also attempted to record human rights in 1983 and 1986. They used a statistical technique

called "clustering"; they also resorted to variable reduction, which results in a ranking of

different rights through a process of selection. Due to their many similarities, only the

approach developed by Humana will be discussed below. Banks compared these two

approaches and found many criticisms, including the employment of variable reduction

by both; his main argument was that the similarity of some of the forty rights compared,

some were difficult to assess. Humana's approach follows the juridical approach

discussed above. These were drawn from the UDHR, the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the ICCPR. The ratings Humana produced

were based on specific criteria, including population, life expectancy, infant mortality,

GNP, and government spending. The world average found by Humana was 62/100,

which he uses as a distinguishing line between those good and bad countries. However,

some rights, due to the inevitable nature of the ranking process, are seemingly

disregarded. Israel presents a good example of a country which has been evaluated on

the wrong criteria, as its score is 76, placing it in the acceptable category; the question

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[53] Bjørn Stormorken, HURIDOCS Standard Formats for the Recording and Exchange of Information on Human Rights (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985) 146.

of the Palestinians appears to have been left aside, or given less credence.[54] One is then forced to wonder about the validity of Humana's ranking system, and the biases which obviously come into play during the process.

The entire process of statistical codification of human rights has been called into question. Claude recognized the worth of statistics for monitoring progress and explaining change. He states that statistics can assist practitioners in building theory, enhancing the NGO community and enlarging government and United Nations functions.[55] Goldstein agrees, stating that statistical information performs three specific functions. Statistical analysis has the ability to:

1. disprove "common" knowledge

2. document startling phenomena

3. reassure [the public][56]

However, he also identifies certain types of problems prevalent in most statistical analysis of human rights. He stresses the extreme importance of defining terms and specific types of violations, and states that total reliance on statistics is useless, as, however, is attempting to study things which cannot be measured. Lopez and Stohl take a more hard-line, general approach, citing problems with all of the existing data sources, and

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[54] Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) xviii.

[55] Richard P. Claude and Thomas B. Jabine, "Exploring Human Rights Issues with Statistics," Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight, Richard P. Claude and Thomas B. Jabine, eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).

[56] Robert Justin Goldstein, "The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses," Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight, Richard P. Claude and Thomas B. Jabine, eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) 36.

advocating a more multidimensional approach. They admit, however, that scholars are forced to "make do" with the existing sources.[57] In the end, however, of the three, Goldstein is the only analyst who does not support studies of the kind done by Humana where scores are assigned; "it is much more effective," he states, "to know which states have repressive regimes... [Also, the] scores and differences between scores are not terribly accurate."[58] This is perhaps the most valid and comprehensive criticism toward Humana's study and classification.

One final issue which is addressed in the human rights literature, and which is applicable especially to this study, is the special relationship between human rights and Islam. In many cases, the traditional priorities and values of Islam still persist.[59] A different definition of culture may well be applied to those living within the Muslim Middle East, one which encompasses "a totality of values, institutions and forms of behaviour... [and] an historically transmitted pattern of meanings."[60] The Qur'an itself, translated by Ansari, states that "all members of the Islamic society, therefore, ... are *equal* members and possess, originally and basically, equal fundamental rights... It may

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[57] George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl, "Problems of Concept and Measurement in the Study of Human Rights," Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight, Richard P. Claude and Thomas B. Jabine, eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) 224-228.

[58] Goldstein 55.

[59] Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991) 87.

[60] Abdullahi Ahmed An Na'im, "Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment," Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, Abdullahi Ahmed An Na'im, ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) 22.

also be termed as an *Egalitarian Society*; [emphasis added in original text]"[61] this is a passage frequently held up by those who seek to defend the actions of Islamic states. The difference in Islamic culture may, then, be adequate for explaining the violation of human rights which occurs in these countries. Said points out the differences in Western and Third World interpretations of rights; the West, he says, focuses on rights, freedoms, and individual interests while the Third World values obligation, virtue in the perpetuation of the existing system, and the collective good.[62] However, the interpretation of another passage states that, "all rights are, however, always subject to curtailment if the interests of human society or even if the individual so demand, because of the unhealthy and injurious attitude or action on the part of anyone."[63] It would appear, then, that both of these forces may well be responsible for the poor human rights records of many Muslim countries.

CONCLUSIONS

Obviously, then, the literature surrounding each of these three areas is abundant. Because of the strictures of space, not all of the literature can be examined. However, the above represents a fair sampling of what exists. The literature, then, reveals some

[61] Muhammad Fazl-ur-Rahman Ansari, The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society, Vol. I (Karachi: Indus Educational Foundation) 188.

[62] Abdul Aziz Said, "Pursuing Human Dignity." Human Rights and World Order, Abdul Aziz Said, ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1978) 3.

[63] Muhammad Fazl-ur-Rahman Ansari, The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society, Vol. II (Karachi: Indus Educational Foundation) 241.

very interesting points which are helpful in the study of the three subjects, human rights, democracy and religiosity. First, Islam is a strong force with which to be reckoned and provides the region with a cohesive means of identification. However, the influx of Judaism into the region also represents a significant force, and the presence of Christianity adds more tension to the mix. Secondly, the concept of democracy is by no means foreign to the region, and the structures which currently exist could well lead to its growth. Finally, the human rights abuses which occur in the Middle East contravene the many conventions and documents which have been developed by international groups and organizations. It is also important to note that Islam and the Qur'an in no way promote human rights abuses. All of these are important premises on which to proceed. The definition of the human rights situation in the Middle East is the cornerstone of this study, and the correlations which will be shown hinge upon this area of study.

CHAPTER FOUR: HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights abuses world-wide have gained media attention in recent years. Perhaps because of this, many states have taken up the human rights cause, and have begun to address human rights concerns more and more frequently. The United Nations has provided a forum for such discussion. These exchanges have borne much fruit; several statements have been issued which proclaim various states' willingness to stand up against human rights abuses, and other states' violations of these rights. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Genocide Convention, and the Vienna Declaration.

During the Cold War, issues of security took precedence over what were perceived as "soft" issues such as human rights. The different schools of theory which developed diverged completely over the issue. Morgenthau's Realist Theory became the basis for foreign affairs decision-making for administrations which faced enormously difficult decisions, including Kennedy's. Realism views human rights as being largely insignificant, in light of the actions which states undertake to secure their borders in the international arena, and the struggles which ensue between states. The other, the path more lately chosen, is liberalism; this theoretical approach has become more and more popular recently. This approach values the welfare of others, and espouses a belief in

a human nature which is by nature good, wherein people collaborate through a process of mutual aid. State-centric approaches are, in fact, seen by liberal thinkers as the primary reason that human rights are ignored; therefore, non-state actors such as Amnesty International (AI) are given enormous credibility and their importance grows. This recent shift has led to a greater awareness of human rights, and a greater willingness to do something about the problem.

However, much like the concept of democracy, human rights is a bone of contention among states. There are many elements which contribute to an understanding of human rights including tradition, religion, and culture. The western experience with Christianity and relatively high levels of democracy is certainly atypical. As such, not everyone approaches the subject of human rights from the same starting-point, leading to the achievement of different levels of understanding and action in this regard.

The opinion which persists in many states is that the Islamic world blatantly disregards the human rights of its citizens. There is a perception, for example, that the Qur'an dictates that women are to be subordinate in the Muslim world. Certainly, movies and books such as *Not Without My Daughter* do nothing to correct this incorrect impression. However, this is not the case; the Qur'an says that men and women are equal. It is the culture and tradition within specific countries, such as Iran, which has led to the practice of gender discrimination. In fact, this provides one answer as to why some Muslim states within the Middle East have human rights records which are much worse than other, seemingly comparable Muslim states. The Islamic world's response to this has varied from ignoring allegations to directly confronting the issue. In 1980,

the Secretary General of the 26th Jumad Al-Ula issued the Universal Islamic Declaration

(UID) in an effort to "dispel from the minds of many people the confusion and

misapprehensions caused by the spread of false and misleading notions about Islam."[1]

The document, although packed with religious connotations and also emphasizing other

concepts not normally associated with human rights, affirms many of the principles that

the UDHR also affirms. It affirms rights such as "All citizens are equal before the law...

[and] the rights of people to life, liberty, honour and property..."[2]

It is totally incorrect, then, to assert that Islamic states have no foundation

whatsoever for the respect of human rights. As can be seen in both the work by Esposito

and Voll (see Democracy chapter) and the UID, many within the Islamic community

believe that the respect of individuals must be paramount. Even so, why, then, are the

records of some Islamic states so shoddy? The reasons are many. First, however, their

records must be examined.

Indicators

As with the other two indicators, a continuum was developed whereon states will

be compared as to their relative levels of human rights abuses. "Red", "yellow" and

"green" were used to classify states roughly in this manner; red indicates relatively high

levels of human rights abuses, yellow points to relatively moderate levels of human rights

abuses, and green indicates relatively low levels of human rights abuses. It is important

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[1] Universal Islamic Declaration (London: Jumad Al-Ula, 1980) 1.

[2] Universal Islamic Declaration 12.

to remember, once again, that these classifications and ratings are only "relative" to the other states in the study, and that these states would manage poorly if positioned against other states throughout the world. As well, the difference between scores of six and seven is not as significant as the difference between scores of one and twelve.

Five indicators were chosen that reflect the many different considerations that must be taken into account when human rights are weighed. They include both positive and negative rights, and look at civil and political rights, as well as personal rights and rights of the person. It is believed that these rights are representative of other rights, and that the scores obtained by using these indicators are typical. It is possible, however, that the use of other indicators could result in a different score or ranking. The indicators selected indicate whether states allow elections to be monitored, whether equality of sexes is respected, whether property is unlawfully seized, whether citizens are tortured or arrested without just cause or given reason.

"Monitor violations" (mon/vio) indicates whether or not the state allows nongovernmental and international inquiry into alleged violations of human rights. This right is in keeping with Article 19 of the UDHR, which guarantees the right to "seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."[3] As suggested earlier, in some cases this right is respected wholeheartedly, while in others it is routinely denied. Those states with records of allowing these agencies to perform their tasks were given a score of two. Those which sometimes violate this right were assigned a score of one, and those which habitually violate the

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' Fawcett.

right for these organizations, zero. The data used here was taken from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports for 1996.

"Equality of sexes" (eq/sex) shows whether women are, in practice, treated as equals during marriage and divorce proceedings. Both the UDHR and UID call for full rights for women. However, none of the countries of the region has a good record in this regard. Scores were assessed on a scale of three. States that respect this right were given a score of three. Those in which this right is occasionally violated were assessed a two. In cases where this right is frequently violated, a score of one was given, and in states where equality of sexes, particularly of women, does not exist, the state was rated at zero. The information in this case was taken from Humana's World Human Rights Guide. Information on the four states not covered in Humana's survey was taken from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports for 1996.

The indicator, "Seizure of property" (sze/prp) is used to show whether or not citizens experience freedom from police searches of their home without a warrant. In some states, this is taken for granted, while in others, this right is regularly abused. The information was taken from the World Human Rights Guide by Humana. Again, where gaps occurred, the information required was taken from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports for 1996. The states were rated on a scale of zero to three. States which respect the right of citizens not to have their property unlawfully seized were given a score of three. States which occasionally breach this right are rated a two. Those which are frequently in violation of this right are assessed a score of one.

Those states which constantly violate the right of citizens to freedom from seizure of property are given a zero.

"Torture" (torture) indicates the relative levels of torture within the states in the study. Torture, inhuman and degrading treatment are addressed in Article 5 of the UDHR and western states have long sought to outlaw this form of punishment. In all of the states of the region, torture is in the lower two classifications. This category divides states into three categories, with two being the highest score possible, and zero being the lowest. The information here was taken from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports for 1996.

The final category, "Arrest" (arrest) looks at a state's propensity for arbitrary arrest and detention. Many of the states in the region have a horrible record in this regard, although there are those which have adequately addressed and dealt with the problem. As such, states have been classified accordingly. Those which exhibit absolute consideration of this right were given a score of two. Those which sometimes breach this right were scored a one. States which regularly contravene this right rated a score of zero. Information for this category came from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports for 1996.

The five indicators listed above were selected to reflect the different perspectives on human rights. States were then given a grade to indicate levels of human rights abuses. "Red" signifies a considerable number of human rights abuses, "yellow" denotes some, and "green" only few human rights abuses. The numbers given suggest inclusion in these categories as well: the highest are "green" (8-12), the median scores are

"yellow" (4-7) and the lowest scores are "red" (0-3). Once again, these categorizations are only applicable relative to the other states of the region. These scores, when compared to those of other states world-wide, are extremely low. Even so, there is very little continuity between the states of the region, and anomalies exist throughout.

Table 1
FACTORS INDICATING HUMAN RIGHTS RECORDS

	mon/vio	eq/sex	sze/prp	torture	arres
Algeria	1	1	3	0	
Bahrain	0	*1	*0	0	
Egypt	0	2	1	0	
Iran	1	0	0	0	
Iraq	0	2	1	0	
Israel	2	1	3	1	
Jordan	1	1	3	0	
Kuwait	1	0	1	1	
Lebanon	2	*1	*1	1	
Libya	0	1	1	0	
Morocco	2	0	3	1	
Oman	0	1	3	1	
Qatar	0	*0	*3	2	
Saudi Arabia	0	0	3	0	
Sudan	1	1	0	0	
Syria	1	1	2	0	
UAE	0	*1	*2	1	
Yemen	2	0	1	0	

* indicates that data was taken from a different source than the balance of the column, due to lack of data or outdated sources

LEGEND:
mon/vio	monitor violence	2-yes	1-some	0-none	
cq/sex	equality of sexes	3-yes	2-much	1-some	0-none
sze/prp	seizure of property	3-none	2-some	1-much	0-yes
torture	routine torture	2-none	1-some	0-yes	
arrest	arbitrary arrest	2-none	1-some	0-yes	

Table 2

CATEGORIZATION OF STATES BY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
AND TOTAL HUMAN RIGHTS SCORES

GREEN (LOW)	YELLOW (MODERATE)	RED (HIGH)
Israel (9)	Algeria (5)	Bahrain (1)
	Jordan (6)	Egypt (3)
	Kuwait (5)	Iran (1)
	Lebanon (6)	Iraq (3)
	Morocco (7)	Libya (2)
	Oman (6)	Saudi Arabia (3)
	Qatar (7)	Sudan (2)
	Syria (4)	Yemen (3)
	UAE (6)	

Table 3

Continuum of Human Rights

State Assessments[4]

Israel is a state which is commonly considered to be a developed country, modeled on the western liberal democratic model, as discussed previously (see Democracy chapter). There are tragic abuses which occur in Israel and reportedly more in the Occupied Territories; human rights reporting, therefore, is warped. Many reports look only at the record of Israel and exclude the Occupied Territories altogether. This must certainly be the case in Humana's work. Humana scores Israel very highly even in comparison with countries like Canada. However, credible reports from agencies such as the U.S. Department of State and United Nations Committee Against Torture indicate that this is simply not so. A recent report revealed that the UN has chastised Israel for its horrible human rights record, and called on officials to stop the "brutal forms of interrogation" and to de-institutionalize the violence regularly carried out in Israel in questioning Palestinians.[5]

When activity from the Occupied Territories is considered, Israel's score drops significantly. However, because it does not come into play for the other two "indicators", democracy and religion, and for equal comparison to be possible, the Occupied Territories will not be considered here. Conveniently, however, the scores for Israel proper are quite high. It is extremely important to note here that if the scores for the Occupied Territories were included, Israel's score in the categories of torture, arrest and seizure would be zero. Human rights monitoring organizations are, however, allowed to conduct their work unhindered by the government in both Israel and in the Occupied Territories (2). As well, there is no government

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[4] The states have simply been listed in descending order. Those states with high human rights scores have been listed first.

[5] Serge Schmemann, "UN calls Israel to account for methods of interrogation," Globe and Mail 09 May, 1997: A1, A13.

censure upon women, and so the equality classification would be the same as well; both Shari'a and rabbinical courts regularly treat men more favourably than women (1). However, in Israel, seizure of property rarely occurs (3). Unwarranted arrests are rarely carried out in practice (2). Torture, however, appears to pervade throughout both Israel and the Occupied territories; while not as severe in Israel, it does occur sometimes (1). Therefore, Israel alone scores relatively highly in comparison with the rest of the states of the region. It rates a "green" score. (Total=9 [Israel only], Total=5 [Israel and Occupied Territories])

Morocco scores highly, based on these indicators. It, too, is a study in contrasts. This is partly because, as King Hassan II once said, Morocco is "like a palm tree - seeded by Islam, rooted in Africa, and with the breeze of Europe wafting through its leaves."[6] Arbitrary arrest is often carried out (1), and prisoners are then forced to endure physical abuse and torture (1). Unlawful seizure of property, however, is one violation to which Moroccan citizens are not subjected (3). Monitoring organizations, conversely, are permitted and almost encouraged (2). These include both international organizations such as Amnesty International and local groups. Women are not respected as equals in society (0); inheritance laws, employment opportunities and divorce rules all work in favour of men. Equal access to higher education is provided for by the state, although tradition, culture and rural isolation compromise this.[7] Morocco, therefore, falls into the "green" category, in spite of its shortcomings. (Total=7)

Qatar is a quickly modernizing autocracy. Its human rights record is modernizing almost as fast. The ruler of the country, Sheik Hamad, has bucked Islamic tradition and implemented new reforms, including the ending of censorship of the country's newspapers and

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[6] "Morocco," Marie Claire June 1997: 162-163.

[7] U.S. Department of State, Morocco Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/morocco.html) Mar. 06, 1997: 12.

allowing women more freedom.[8] Certainly, it would appear that this is at least partly the case. Seizure of property is not a problem within the state; government officials rarely, if ever, resort to such tactics (3). As well, the Government's record on arbitrary arrest (2) and torture (2) is clean. However, the situation regarding human rights monitoring organizations is not as good; local organizations are not permitted, and international organizations show little interest in the tiny state. As such, none exists within the Emirate (0). As well, despite rhetoric promulgated by the Emir himself, as well as others, the situation for women has not greatly improved, largely due to traditional cultural pressures (0). The result, however, puts Qatar in the "green" category. It would also seem that, with the application of very little effort, Qatar's score could improve. (Total = 7)

The Kingdom of Jordan, thankfully, is not so complicated. Instead, a fairly uniform record on human rights exists throughout the country. As seems to be a common trend with states in the Middle East, freedom from arbitrary seizure of property is respected (3). The Kingdom's record on arrest is not as good (0). Arrest is warranted according to the Constitution for some actions, and although formal charges are required to be filed within 10 days of an arrest, 15-day delays are often granted.[9] Prisoners are routinely tortured during their detainment (0); frequently-used methods of torture include sleep deprivation and extended solitary confinement, largely amounting to psychological abuse.[10] These abuses, however, go unreported, as it is illegal to report abuses administered by security forces. Monitoring groups can and do report on human rights abuses which take place within the Kingdom (1). Women are

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[8] Daniel Pearl, "Tiny Qatar flexing muscle in the gulf," Globe and Mail 01 Apr., 1996: A11.

[9] U.S. Department of State, Jordan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/jordan.html) Mar. 20, 1997: 3.

[10] Jordan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 2.

frequently discriminated against in the courts, in terms of inheritance and government social security matters, and in employment situations, although the latter is due almost solely to cultural pressure and is not institutionalized (1). Jordan's classification is "yellow", due to its moderate position on many of the human rights discussed here. (Total=6)

Lebanon's record on human rights is not much better. Arbitrary arrests often take place, even though the Government and security forces contravene Lebanese law in so doing (1). These prisoners are regularly tortured by means of beatings (1), and property is sometimes seized without warrant (1). Human rights monitoring groups operate without limitation of any sort in providing a sense of the Lebanese human rights picture (2). Equality of women is only partially guaranteed, although much of the discrimination felt by women is due to societal pressure. Women are eligible to own property, although the may not confer citizenship on their husbands (1). Lebanon ranks in the "yellow" category due to its moderate record. (Total=6)

The Sultanate of Oman is another state which excels in one category more than the others. The arbitrary seizure of property rarely occurs, and citizens are normally free from government confiscation (3). The Government's record on other issues, however, is not as clean. Citizens are sometimes subjected to imperious arrest by security forces (1). Some of these detainees are abused (1). Omani authorities resort to cruel measures; "techniques range from sleep deprivation to harsher measures such as hanging a bound victim from a steel bar in such a way that the wrists must support the full weight of the body."[11] Human rights monitoring organizations are strictly prohibited in the Sultanate (0). Women are not equal, although their situation is better in many ways than that of their neighbours. Since 1970, conditions for women

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[11] U.S. Department of State, Oman Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/oman.html) Mar. 06, 1997: 2.

have improved dramatically, and women are now being educated and gaining access to the work force (1). These circumstances point to Oman's status as a "yellow" state. (Total=6)

The United Arab Emirates is another state which seems to suggest high levels of support for human rights by some indicators, and yet falls miserably short of this in one or two others. The status of women is one such area in which there is contradiction. Women are encouraged to pursue education, and many work outside of the home, although they must obtain permission from their husbands in order to do so, and are eligible for maternity leave. Polygyny is permitted by Islamic law, and in cases of divorce, custody is normally granted to the father (1). Seizure of property is not usually carried out, although security forces do sometimes rely on this form of intimidation (2). Arbitrary arrest rarely occurs (2), and no reports of torture were made in 1996 (1). One major exception to this is public flogging, which is occasionally done in accordance with Shari'a law, in answer to charges of adultery, drunkenness and prostitution. Human rights monitoring organizations do not exist, and criticism of the government would not be permitted if they did (0). The UAE, then, is a country wherein great things could be on the way. It rates a score of "yellow". (Total=6)

Algeria is certainly no different than any of the other states of the region in terms of its abominable human rights record. In fact, Algeria is a state of contrasts. Although the Constitution bans torture and other cruel treatment, state officials and the police regularly detain and arrest people without just cause (0), and torture the prisoners in their care (0). One technique which Algerian officials frequently employ is called "Le Chiffon" and entails putting a cloth which has been immersed in poisonous fluid in the mouth of a victim; electric shock and

police beatings and brutality are also common practice.[12] Conversely, Humana reports that

citizens enjoy full freedom from the arbitrary seizure of personal property (3). This seems a bit

puzzling, as the State Department reports that illegal searches "remained a problem" in 1996.[13]

Women's rights appear to be increasing in terms of equality, although women are treated as

minors, under the legal guardianship of their fathers or husbands under the Family Code of 1984,

among other things (1).[14] Polygyny[15], in which a man may take more than one wife or

concubine, is tolerated. The Algerian government is now beginning to allow human rights

organizations to operate; foreign observers are permitted to enter the country and new

monitoring groups are being formed.[16] The vast contrasts of the state, then, make it an apt

candidate for the yellow category. (Total = 5)

Kuwait's record sits in the same category and with almost the same score as

Jordan. However, its transgressions are in different areas. For example, the right of citizens

against seizure of property is only sometimes respected (1). In the same vein, arbitrary arrest

is rarely, if ever, carried out (2). Torture, however, is not so sparingly carried out. In fact,

blindfolding, slapping and verbally threatening detainees sometimes occurs (1). These abuses are

not reported by local associations, which are not allowed to exist, but are reported by

international organizations which are allowed to report from their offices within the country (1).

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[12] U.S. Department of State. Algeria Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/algeria.html) Mar. 04, 1997: 1.

[13] Algeria Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 2.

[14] Algeria Report on Human Rights Abuses for 1996 13.

[15] Polygyny is defined by Webster as, "the state or practice of having two or more wives or concubines at the same time." This is distinct from polygamy, which Webster defines as "the state or practice of having two or more wives or husbands at the same time; plural marriage."

[16] Humana (1992) 15.

Women, however, are frequently discriminated against; laws and regulations discriminate against women, who are not enfranchised and polygyny is widely practiced in accordance with Islamic tradition (0). Kuwait has a spotty record which places it in the "yellow" category. (Total=5)

The Syrian example is much the same, although with higher levels in some cases. There has been a state of emergency in Syria since 1963 in response to the perceived Israeli threat. As such, the government justifies its human rights abuses as being a side-effect of its war offensive. The Government rarely seizes the property of its citizens arbitrarily (2). However, its citizens are routinely arrested without just cause or warrant (0). Once in the custody of Syrian authorities, detainees are subjected to hideous torture (0). The favoured methods include hyperextension of the spine, and the insertion of objects into the rectum; these tortures are rarely carried out at prisons, and are more likely to happen at detention centres during confessions.[17] Monitoring groups have not been allowed to operate within Syria, although in 1995, the group Human Rights Watch (HRW) was allowed into the country for 48 hours in March, and again briefly in July. Since that time, none has been allowed entry (1). The situation for women, although far from equal, is better than in neighbouring countries. Syrian women are encouraged by the government to seek education, and may own and manage property. However, polygyny is widely practiced, inheritance laws favour men, and are discriminated against in divorce law (1). Syria's condition warrants inclusion in the "yellow" category. (Total=4)

Egypt is not much better. Human rights monitoring organizations have been as yet unable to obtain licenses to carry out their activity; these include Amnesty International, and the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights (EOHR), whose parent society is the Arab Organization for Human Rights. In this way, the Egyptian government does not directly suppress

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[17] U.S. Department of State, Syria Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/syria.html) Mar. 06, 1997: 2.

existing organizations, but simply obstructs their entry into the country (0). In Egypt, as well,

the Constitution legislates against inhuman or degrading punishment. However, this seems to

have little or no effect on the activities of the authorities, who customarily douse detainees with

hot and cold water, and hang them by their wrists with only their feet touching the floor (0).[18]

As well, arbitrary arrest occurs regularly; mass arrests and detainments are frequently carried

out (0). As well, property is often confiscated (1), and the actions of government authorities in

this regard are justified under the Emergency Law. Women are treated unequally, in terms of

citizenship and legal polygyny, but the law provides for equality of the sexes (2). Egypt's

record, then, is spotty. It rates totally in the "red" category. (Total=3)

Iraq is another state which fits into the "red" category. Like many of the

previous states, Iraq's situation is one of dreadful conditions and a lack of government action in

the direction of preventing the hideous abuses which occur within. Human rights monitoring

associations are not allowed to exist within Iraq, and the government has refused to permit

UNHCHR monitors to enter the country (0). This is perhaps due to the Government's tragic

records on arrest and torture. Citizens are routinely subject arbitrary arrest (0). Once in the

custody of state officials, they are subject to many kinds of torture (0); the methods of torture

favoured by the Iraqis include branding, dripping acid on skin, and burning prisoners with hot

metal.[19] Property is also regularly seized (1) in the name of the "national interest" since the

deprivation caused by the Gulf War.[20] The situation for women, though, appears to be better

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[18] U.S. Department of State, Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/egypt.html) Mar. 04, 1997: 4.

[19] U.S. Department of State, Iraq Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/iraq.html) Mar. 04, 1997: 5.

[20] Humana 153.

than that of some of its neighbours (2); women are not, however, allowed to own or inherit property or assets. The government does purport to support and promote equality for women. Supposedly due to the shortage of men caused by the warfare in which the Iraqi army has engaged for many years, women far outnumber men in many areas. Iraq, then, has far to go in improving its human rights situation. It rates a score of "red". (Total=3)

Saudi Arabia is often thought of in the west as having the worst human rights record of any of the Middle Eastern states. However, at least according to the five indicators selected here, this is not the case. Substantiated allegations of "denial of... the right of women to drive or to own businesses... [and] torture or other inhumane practices"[21] have been filtering out of the country for many years. Certainly, the Saudi record on arbitrary arrest is ruthless: citizens are routinely picked up by security forces for no apparent reason (0). Once in custody, detainees are subjected to harsh torture practices, including beatings and relentless sleep deprivation leading to extreme weight loss (0). Human rights monitoring organizations are not permitted to exist within Saudi Arabia. The government strictly outlaws societies critical of its policies.[22] In keeping with rigid conformation with traditional Wahhabi Islamic practices, the status of women in Saudi Arabia is dismal (0). They are discriminated against in virtually every sector of society, and must conform to strict dress codes and restrictions in activities which may be carried out outside the confines of her house. An equal, but segregated, system of education and health care exists for Saudi women. The Saudi case, then, is certainly not glowing, and could use much improvement. It rates a score of "red". (Total=3)

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[21] Paul Knox, "Britain orders deportation of vocal Saudi," Globe and Mail 10 Jan. 1996: A11.

[22] U.S. Department of State, Saudi Arabia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/saudi.html) Mar. 06, 1997: 10.

Yemen, the last state to be examined, has a relatively poor record in the area of human rights. Equality of sexes is not a reality (0). Polygyny, dowry payments and legal restrictions on everything from employment to divorce subordinate their position. The illiteracy rate among women is approximately 80%, compared to 35% for Yemeni men.[23] Citizens are regularly subjected to arbitrary seizure of their property by government forces (1), arrest (0), and torture (0). During interrogations, tortures are carried out, as opposed to prisoners having to endure physical punishment during their detention, which does not normally occur. The Yemeni Human Rights Organization (YHRO) operates in eight Yemeni cities; while it is allowed to exist, staff are regularly harassed by government security forces. As well, AI conducts full-time research from an officially-sanctioned office located in Yemen (2). Yemen's record on human rights is dreadful, and warrants its inclusion in the "red" category. (Total = 3)

Libya is a different story. Libya's record appears to be holding steadily in the "red" category. Although *de jure* equal status for women has existed since 1969, cultural values prevail in many cases. While older women cling to traditional dress and lifestyles (including polygyny), younger urban women appear to embrace modernity (1). Many serious human rights abuses have been reported within the state, and the Government's record in prevention is poor, to say the least. Arbitrary arrest is routinely carried out (0), whereupon detainees are subjected to horrific tortures (0), including corkscrews applied to the back, suffocation using plastic bags, and lemon juice in open wounds.[24] Despotic seizure of property also occurs, but without the frequency of the previous two abuses (1). In keeping with Qadhafi's policies, monitoring

[23] U.S. Department of State, Yemen Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/yemen.html) Mar. 06, 1997: 7.

[24] U.S. Department of State, Libya Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/libya.html) Mar. 20, 1997: 3.

organizations are not permitted to operate within Libya (0).   Libya's rating, then, is "red".
(Total=2)

The Sudan is in much the same position as its Saudi neighbours. Its record truly
could not be much worse. There have been credible reports that "the government has routinely
arrested dissidents... [and that] young people are being grabbed off the streets..." and pressed
into service in the Sudanese Army.[25] Arbitrary arrest, then, is a frequent occurrence (0). Once
detained, prisoners are often sent to "ghost houses" where they are gruesomely tortured and kept
for indefinite periods of time (0), although there is some evidence this practice, or at least the
reporting of it, is declining.[26] Property is regularly seized by the authorities, who present no
reason or warrant for so doing (0). Women are denied basic rights, and are forced to wear
traditional Islamic clothing in public; female genital mutilation is widely practiced in the north.
However, special provisions have been made for women in the National Assembly, and women
have the vote (1). The government itself began to set in motion basic human rights practices,
although human rights NGOs do not exist within the state (1). The Sudanese state is one of low
respect of human rights. It rates in the "red" category. (Total=2)

Bahrain is one of the states which ranks in the "red" category. Like many of the
other states, Bahrain exhibits an abysmal record of human rights abuses. Human rights
monitoring organizations do not exist at all within Bahrain, and those groups which claim to
report on human rights abuses in Bahrain all do so from outside of the state (0).[27] Women are

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[25] Scott Straus, "Sudan's government in peril," Globe and Mail 28 Mar. 1996: A8.

[26] U.S. Department of State, Sudan Country Report on Human Rights for 1996
(http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/sudan.html) Mar. 06, 1997: 3.

[27] U.S. Department of State, Bahrain Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996
(http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/bahrain.html) Mar. 04, 1997: 9.

only moderately equal (1); only in some cases may women own or inherit property, although

they may work and wear what they wish outside the home.[28] A man may have more than one

wife. Property is regularly seized by the police and government officials (0), and contrary to the

1974 Constitution, citizens are routinely detained and imprisoned (0). The government's attitude

toward torture is roughly the same (0). Treatment of prisoners is brutal, and includes cigarette

burns and beatings, although this contradicts the Bahraini law. Bahrain's track record in human

rights is not at all acceptable, and yet the government does not appear to be doing anything to

correct the situation. Accordingly, Bahrain fits neatly into the "red" category. (Total=1)

Iran is another country without superiority in human rights. Local human rights

monitoring organizations have been silenced, although international groups have been better

received. The ICRC and UNHCHR are active in Iran (1). Of the five indicators, monitoring

is the one in which Iran has any degree of protection of the human rights of its citizens. There

is no equality of women in Iran (0). Women are forced to wear traditional Islamic clothing and

are limited in their academic and career pursuits. Property is regularly seized from Iranian

citizens (0). They are often arrested without explanation and/or cause (0), and once in custody

are regularly tortured and beaten (0). Torture methods include being suspended in contorted

body positions for lengthy periods of time, cigarette burns, and severe and repeated beatings with

cables. Iran, then, rates in the low part of the "red" category. (Total=1)

Conclusions

All in all, the states of the region have a tremendously low level of respect for

human rights. All of theses states have traditionally been associated with gross human rights

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[28] Bahrain Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 10.

violations. By using the five indicators which were selected, this traditional wisdom has been upheld. States such as Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, which are often in the news on account of their human rights abuses, are indeed in the "red" category, although mixed in with other, less heard about states.

Only one state, Israel, belongs in the "green" category, and its presence there is highly debateable. If the Occupied Territories had been included in with Israel, the total score would have been considerably lower. Without the Occupied Territories, though, Israel's score is 9. This makes Israel the highest-scoring state in the Middle East, relative to the other states in this study. No state scored over nine, which is telling as to the significantly low levels of respect for human rights in the region.

Interestingly, none of the states scored lower than one. This means that, according to the indicators used here, all of the states have attempted to address the question of human rights, either consciously or unwittingly. Both Iran and Bahrain have the lowest scores of the eighteen states in the study; they scored one point each, putting them firmly in the "red" category. Neither one has made much of an attempt to respect their citizenry, or so it would appear. Six other states also fit into this category, although their inclusion is not firm, especially as the scores climb. These include Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The other nine remaining states fit into the "yellow" category. These states are Syria, Algeria, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Qatar. Syria, for example, could easily be pulled into the "red" category, while Morocco and Qatar would fit into the "green" category, were the lines of division to be changed. There is really no underlying similarity between any of these states, other than a somewhat mediocre record on human rights.

These classifications, though, are rough. The results could certainly vary with the use of other indicators. The indicators that have been used here are representative of many of the other indicators which are available for use. Undoubtedly, they provide a picture of the human rights situation within the Middle East which is symbolic of the actual situation therein. It is upon this basis that a comparison between human rights and democracy, and between human rights and religiosity, can proceed. The topic of democracy will be covered first.

CHAPTER FIVE: DEMOCRACY

There are many different opinions as to what constitutes democracy. Not all of the definitions, however, are helpful in the case of the Middle East. A definition of democracy offered by Adam Przeworski is, "a particular political arrangement characterised by its system of processing and termination intergroup conflicts."[1] Another, more tongue-in-cheek definition of democracy is simply this: "a polity where the government can be changed by elections as opposed to one where elections are changed by the government."[2] The simple Webster's definition of democracy reads, "government in which the people hold the ruling power either directly or through elected representatives; the principle of equality of rights, opportunity, and treatment or the practice of this principle."[3]

These definitions, as mentioned above, are only somewhat relevant to the Middle East, because they fail in many respects to recognize the inherent differences between western and Middle Eastern culture. Islamic scholars would argue (and have done) that the very idea of democracy is invalid in the Muslim context, primarily because of the

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[1] Daniel N. Nelson, "The Contemporary Politics of Eastern Europe," The Comparative Politics of Eastern Europe, Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis, eds. (Houndmills: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1993) 256.

[2] Hamdi 81.

[3] David B. Guralink, ed., Webster's New World Dictionary (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980) 375.

latent cultural values intrinsic in the very meaning of the word. Certainly, "western

liberal democracy" carries with it certain connotations which are common to many of the

states that espouse democratic ideals, including such concepts as multi-party elections and

proportional representation. The Middle East is made up of three main religious groups,

each of which has interpreted democracy differently. Even within each of these groups,

there is diversity.

What has Islam, for one, to do with democracy? The big problem facing scholars

in their quest to classify the states of the Middle East is that the connection between

many of the states located therein and western traditions and practices is tenuous, at best.

Their "worldview" and perception of life itself are completely different. The mere

separation of church and state, in western countries such as the United States, made up

a large part of the impetus toward democracy of the state. In Islamic states, there is no

such concept; true Islam requires that religion be "necessarily inseparable" from

politics.[4]

In fact, the organizational equivalent of Islam does not exist anywhere else in the

world; Christianity and Judaism are not even structurally similar. Words such as

"secular" and "layman" simply do not exist in the modern Islamic languages.[5] In short,

Islam goes far beyond being a form of organized religion. In many respects, Islam and

Shari'a affect virtually everything the Muslim does, from making pilgrimage to Mecca

to praying five times each day to forming a rule of law to which the citizens must

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[4] Elie Kedourie, <u>Politics in the Middle East</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 2.

[5] Lewis 62.

adhere, much like the power of the *Torah* for the Jews, only in a more pervasive manner. Islam is much, much more than a form of organized religion. It affects every aspect of life, from politics to prayer. Mohammed the Prophet was also the divine ruler, in charge of such details as taxation and law-making, and those who follow seek to pattern their leadership after his, all the while adhering to Islamic precepts. For this reason, along with the tradition and culture which have existed as a result of this, democracy, takes a strikingly different form in many of the Islamic states of the Middle East.

Esposito and Voll, however, posit that democracy and Islam are contrary to one another only if democracy is interpreted in a highly restricted way and viewed as possible only if specific western institutions are adopted, or if Islam is defined in an uncompromising manner. In making their argument, Voll and Esposito contend that the practice and significance of democracy are not alien to any part of the world, but that what changes from place to place is the definition of the concepts of democracy and not democracy itself. The ideal Islamic state has a political system based on three things: *Tawheed* (Unity of God); *Risalat* (Prophethood); and *Khilafat* (representation). Within *Tawheed*, each citizen of a given society is required to interpret the law of Islam; this forms the basis of individual participation or democracy. As well, the very notion of *Khilafat*, or representation, ensures that individuals' concerns will be both heard and acted upon.[6] Under such a system, democracy, at least in the sense of participation and representation, flourishes indeed.

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[6] Esposito and Voll 21-27.

Therefore, in almost all of the states to be included in this study, because of the influence of Islam (as demonstrated in the subsequent chapter on religiosity), democracy in the western sense does not exist. The exceptions, as one would expect, do occur in states where Islam does not predominate: Lebanon and Israel. However, they also occur in others, including Yemen, Algeria and Egypt. The one true exception within the region is the state of Israel, as noted above. This could be true for a number of reasons, which range from the international character of the populace to the underlying premise upon which the state was formed, that of Judaism. It is also interesting to note that the ultra-Orthodox Jews of Israel openly oppose any form of democracy.[7]

As such, democracy does indeed exist, albeit in many different forms, within the Middle East. While there may, in fact, be different institutions which facilitate the western ideal of democratic activity within the state, in many cases there are not. However, such things as the citizen's involvement are definite indicators of democracy in the broadest sense of the term. Even by relaxing the definition of democracy, however, there are certain states within the Middle East which simply do not exhibit any tendencies in this regard.

Indicators and Continuum of Democracy

Again, a continuum was developed which allows states to be compared as to their relative levels of democracy. The groupings "green", "yellow" and "red" were used; red indicates relatively low levels of democracy, yellow signifies some democracy, and

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[7] Esposito and Voll 11.

green significantly higher levels. The use of the term "relative" is important, as, when compared to other states throughout the world, each state encompassed in this study would fare badly. Here also, the avoidance of strict classification is essential, because percentages for each of the indicators can be misleading. Instead, loose groupings have been sought so as to show roughly where the states fall. Accordingly, the difference between scores of one and two is marginal, whereas the difference between one and eleven is considerable.

The indicators of democracy which have been selected take into account the "cultural" differences of the Middle East which make it distinct from the rest of the world. Five variables, which appear to take into account these differences, have been selected. These include whether opposition to the government exists, if there are multiple parties within the state, regime type, whether or not peaceful association is allowed in practice, and whether or not citizens have the right to change their government. The data was taken from three sources: Humana's World Human Rights Guide, Bernard Lewis' classification of states, which has been taken from the Journal of Democracy and adapted, and the U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports for 1996.

"Political Opposition" (pol/opp) indicates whether or not there is an opposition to the political regime which exists within the state. In some cases, political opposition is categorically repudiated by the government, while in other cases, governments even embrace the existence of an opposition. Green indicates absolute tolerance of political opposition, and red signifies absolute negation of it; yellow, therefore, acts as a "catchall" for the rest of the states who permit opposition only sometimes, or who *de*

jure sanction their existence, while *de facto* disallowing them. By and large, the data was taken from Humana's guide. However, there were serious holes in his figures; five states were not deemed important or large enough for inclusion in his 1987 version, and five years later only one of those had been addressed. For this reason, the results for Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are based upon data from the United States Department of State Human Rights Reports for 1996. The states were then rated and given a score of three if political opposition is guaranteed without qualification, two if it exists but with "occasional breaches", one if there is regular sanction of opposition within the state, and zero if it does not exist at all.

"Multiple Parties" (mul/par) considers whether there is more than one party or group which controls the government in a given state. In some cases, there is both *de jure* and *de facto* acceptance of parties which attempt to monitor and question the government of the state. In other cases, none are allowed, nor do they exist. Those remaining states may be classified, taking into account occasional breaches and/or frequent violations. Those with absolute acknowledgment and support of multiple parties were given a score of three. States with infractions occurring intermittently rated a score of two. Frequent violations of this earned one. Where no parties other than that of the government exist, a score of zero was earned. Here, as well, the data was taken from Humana's World Human Rights Guide. Where omissions occur, in the cases of Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, the information was obtained from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports for 1996.

Bernard Lewis' classification by "Regime Types" forms the basis of this category,

which looks at the type of government which exists in the countries of the Middle East.

Lewis proposed five classifications, which were effectively dealt with in the Literature

Review which precedes this chapter. Only four apply to the region: modernizing

autocracy, traditional autocracy, fascist-style dictatorship, and radical Islamic regime.

Many of the states within the region fit neatly into these classifications. However, those

others which do not fit are more "modernized"; these fall within a separate category

which is the closest to that of western-style democracy. Therefore, another category has

been added: democracy. Although the democracy referred to here may not meet the

standards of many western liberal democracies, they meet the standards of a more

relaxed definition of democracy. The scores were assessed as follows: zero for

traditional autocracies (TA), Fascist-style dictatorships (FSD) and radical Islamic regimes

(RIR); one for modernizing autocracies (MA); and two for democracies (dem). The

scoring, of course, is meant to reflect the degree of relative participation of citizens

within the state. Only modernizing autocracies, of all of Lewis' original classifications,

indicate any type of participation on the part of citizens. The added category,

democracy, also reflects a higher relative level of participation.

"Peaceful Association" shows whether a state tolerates, in practice, things such

as demonstrations or political gatherings. Surprisingly, many of the states have a poor

record in this regard, allowing none of these things. Some, however are allowed in some

of the countries. Classification of states ranges from zero to two, with zero being no

toleration of such events whatsoever and two being complete sanction of public

gatherings and events; one is used to signify where events are allowed, yet moderately policed. The information is taken from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996.

Finally, "Right to Change Government" (chg/gvt) is meant to indicate whether citizens have the right, in practice, to change their government. Case histories are often spotty, wherein one particular state's history may point to more than one classification, but some interesting trends do emerge. The figures which have been used demonstrate only current situations. A scoring system of zero for none, one for some and two for the absolute right for citizens to change their government was used. Again, the figures used come from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996.

The indicators discussed above were chosen in order to provide a snapshot view of the relative level of democracy currently in evidence within the eighteen states looked at here. The scores given in each of the indicators were tallied for each state to provide an overall score. The total possible points were 12, with a lower number of points indicating little democracy and a higher number pointing to higher democracy. These were then correlated with the colours mentioned previously: "green" for high democracy (8-12), "yellow" for medium democracy (4-7) and "red" for low democracy (0-3). It is important to remember that these scores have no bearing whatsoever on world levels, and that each state has been ranked relative only to the other states within the region.

Table 4
FACTORS INDICATING DEMOCRACY

	pol/opp	mul/par	gvt/typ	pce/ass	chg/
Algeria	2	1	*2	1	
Bahrain	*0	*0	0	0	
Egypt	2	2	1	1	
Iran	0	0	0	0	
Iraq	0	0	0	0	
Israel	3	2	2	2	
Jordan	1	1	1	1	
Kuwait	0	0	1	0	
Lebanon	*2	*2	1	1	
Libya	0	0	*0	0	
Morocco	1	2	1	1	
Oman	0	0	0	0	
Qatar	*0	*0	0	0	
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	
Sudan	*0	0	0	0	
Syria	0	0	0	0	
UAE	*0	*0	0	1	
Yemen	2	*2	1	2	

* indicates that data was taken from a different source than the balance of the column, due to lack of data or outdated sources

LEGEND:
pol/opp	political opposition	0-none	1-some	2-much	3-yes
mul/par	multi-party elections	0-none	1-some	2-much	3-yes
gvt/typ	government type	0-TA,FSD,RIR	1-MA	2-dem	
pce/ass	peaceful assembly	0-none	1-some	2-yes	
chg/gvt	right to change government	0-none	1-some	2-yes	

Table 5

CATEGORIZATION OF STATES BY DEMOCRACY
AND TOTAL DEMOCRACY SCORES

GREEN (HIGH)	YELLOW (MODERATE)	RED (LOW)
Israel (11)	Algeria (6)	Bahrain (0)
Yemen (8)	Egypt (7)	Iran (0)
	Jordan (5)	Iraq (0)
	Lebanon (7)	Kuwait (1)
	Morocco (5)	Libya (0)
		Oman (0)
		Qatar (0)
		Saudi Arabia (0)
		Sudan (1)
		Syria (0)
		UAE (0)

Table 6

Continuum of Democracy

State Assessments[κ]

Israel is the anomaly of the region. Its history, as well, is different than that of the other states of the Middle East. Political opposition exists openly within the state of Israel (3). Israel has a number of different parties, which are elected to the Knesset in regular elections (0).[9] Public assemblies, meetings and the like are regularly held with the full knowledge and consent of the government (2). Elections are held in which citizens have the opportunity to change their government (2). Israel is the only state, therefore, within the region, which qualifies as a democracy (2). It is also the only state which ranks in the green category. (Total = 11)

Yemen scores better than most. Opposition to the government freely exists and openly carries out activities without punishment (2); many parties exist and candidly challenge the government (2). Since the early 1990s, Yemen has vigorously pursued democracy, resulting in its status as a modernizing autocracy (1). Peaceful assembly is allowed on paper, and encouraged in practice (2). The right of citizens to change their government is not apparent in practice, as the President, Lieutenant General Ali Abdullah Salih, still effectively retains power (1).[10] The Republic of Yemen, then, is a relatively high-scoring country, and rates classification in the green category. (Total = 8)

Egypt is another of the countries which exhibits a surprising degree of democracy, at least based on the indicators used here. There is a significant amount of political opposition within the state, although the President ran unopposed in the 1993 election (2). The People's Assembly, however, is filled with elected officials representing different parties (2).

[κ] The states have been assessed in descending order. States with higher democracy scores therefore appear first, and those with lower scores, later.

[9] Simpson A12.

[10] *Yemen Country Report on Human Rights for 1996* 1.

Egypt is one of the better examples of a modernizing autocracy (1); although President Mubarak retains a significant degree of control, the state is moving toward greater representation by the people, and less state domination through privatization schemes.[11] Peaceful assembly is allowed, although citizens are forced to obtain permits before public meetings or rallies may be held (1). Citizens do have the right to change their government, through the elections which are regularly held (1); the President, however, ran unopposed in 1993 which indicates that the government has a hand in repressing this right. Egypt, then, scores relatively highly, and sits squarely in the yellow category. (Total=7)

Lebanon's record on issues of democracy is higher than that of most of the countries within the Middle East. For the most part, political opposition is encouraged (2), although the differences between Christianity and Islam result in discrimination; the Parliament must be equally divided between the two groups.[12] Other parties do exist, but are sometimes subject to pressure from the government (2). Lebanon, as well, is a modernizing autocracy (1). It is a parliamentary republic which is ruled by a President, with ever-greater authority being granted to the populace at large. Peaceful assemblies are tolerated (1), for the most part, and citizens have substantial opportunity to change their governments (1) through a regular process of elections. Therefore, Lebanon's rating is yellow. (Total=7)

The state of Algeria is an interesting mixture, and relative to other states in the region scores fairly high. There is a definite degree of political opposition within the country, and opposition parties have, in fact, been consulted regarding the development of a new political system (2). However, these parties are frequently discriminated against. For example, they were

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[11] Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

[12] U.S. Department of State, Lebanon Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/lebanon.html) Mar. 04, 1997: 1.

denied access to state-controlled radio and television in the 1995 elections (1).[13] Algeria's

government takes the form of a modernizing autocracy (1);   President Zeroual has enormous

control, and initiates many of the changes within the state. However, there is a Constitution, and

the Government's role has increased enormously in the past few years. Peaceful association is

allowed, but the Emergency Law which was enacted in 1992 diminishes this freedom greatly in

practice (1). Although elections do occur, they are only for the Presidency; the legislature is

not elected.(1)   Algeria, then, falls into the yellow category due to its moderate levels of

democracy based on these five indicators. (Total=6)

Jordan is a state which exhibits only mediocre amounts of democracy. There is

almost no political opposition within the state, which has been ruled by a constitutional monarchy

under King Hussein since 1952 (1). A Chamber of Deputies, made up of 80 members, is elected

by the people (1), which balances the 40-member Senate which is appointed by the King.[14]

Jordan is, therefore, a modernizing autocracy (1). While peaceful gatherings and demonstrations

are allowed once a permit has been granted (1), permits for various rallies are denied. Citizens

have no right to change their government (0). Jordan, consequently, is a yellow country.

(Total=5)

Morocco is a country which appears to be modernizing in terms of democracy.

Political opposition has existed since 1993, when Parliament as it now exists was created: 222

of the 333 members of Parliament were elected. As well, a referendum held in 1996 to establish

a second legislative chamber was approved by 99 percent of the 82 percent of the population who

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[13] Algeria Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

[14] Jordan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

voted. An election is expected in mid-1997.[15] As such, it is a modernizing autocracy (1), although still ruled by the King in whom ultimate authority is vested. As such, political opposition is allowed (1) and multiple parties are legal and do exist (2). However, peaceful assembly of many kinds is denied, while protests and sit-ins are generally tolerated (1), and citizens have no right whatsoever to change their government; the monarchy is provided for under the Constitution (0). Morocco, then, appears to be on the right track, although it still has far to go. As such, it rates a score of yellow. (Total=5)

Kuwait exhibits significantly less democracy. There is no opposition to the Emir and the al-Sabah family (0). Parties do not exist (0), and those in positions of power are appointed by the Emir. Kuwait, however, is a modernizing autocracy (1) in much the same way as is Jordan; elections have bee held since 1962 to elect members to the National Assembly.[16] There is, though, provision for neither peaceful association (0) nor for citizens to change their governments (0). Kuwait, therefore, scores only a red rating. (Total=1)

The Sudan is only slightly better. Ruled by the National Islamic Front (NIF), virtually the whole of Sudan is greatly influenced by and tied to the military. The democratically-elected government of the Sudan was overthrown by the military in 1989. Since that time, political parties (0) have been disbanded. Political opposition exists (1), but did not participate in the elections of 1996 because they feared government censure, rendering any opposition largely ineffective.[17] The state is a radical Islamic regime (0), although real power rests with military-minded individuals. Peaceful assemblies, although said to be permitted, are

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[15] Morocco Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

[16] U.S. Department of State, Kuwait Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/kuwait.html) Mar. 06, 1997: 1.

[17] Sudan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

in practice outlawed (0). Citizens have no means by which to change the government, and no right to do so (0). The Sudan, then, exhibits very low levels of democracy, and warrants a rating of red. (Total=1)

Bahrain, however, is completely different. There is no political opposition (0). Multiple parties do not exist (0). The government is a traditional autocracy (0); the country is ruled by a monarchy, headed by Emir Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa, who has governed since 1961.[18] Associations of any type, in public, are quickly curtailed by government forces (0). Citizens have no right whatsoever to change their government (0). The state offers not even a small amount of democracy to those within its borders. A ranking at the bottom of the red category is therefore deserved. (Total=0)

Iran does not score well. There is no political opposition (0). Parties other than the followers appointed by the Ayatollah are not allowed, and heavily denounced (0). The presidential "vote" which was held in late May, 1997, was only between hand-picked high-ranking Shi'a clergy; no others were allowed to run.[19] The government of Khameini is a radical Islamic regime (0), adhering firmly to Islamic principles, without room for any other ideas. Iran was declared an Islamic Republic in 1979, after the monarchical government of the Shah was overthrown.[20] Peaceful opposition of any type is not allowed (0), and citizens have no right whatsoever to change the government (0). Iran, then, is a country without democracy, and sits at the bottom of the red category. (Total=0)

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[18] Famighetti 742.

[19] Stephen Kinzer, "Iranian voters reject Muslim hard-liners," Globe and Mail 26 May, 1997: A1,A7.

[20] Famighetti 775.

Iraq is another red category country. Here, too, political opposition does not

exist (0), and parties other than the Ba'ath Party are not allowed (0).[21] Saddam Hussein is a

Fascist-style dictator reminiscent of Hitler or Mussolini, making Iraq a Fascist-style dictatorship

(0). Neither peaceful association (0) nor changing the government (0) are allowed. Therefore,

Iraq scores no higher than the bottom of the red category. (Total=0)

Libya is a dictatorship, ruled by Colonel Qadhafi. Qadhafi is a dictator, much

in the style, again, of Mussolini and others; Libya is a Fascist-style dictatorship (0). Political

opposition is accordingly denied (0), as are political parties other than the Revolutionary

Committees and the Comrades Organization (0).[22] Any attempt, including public gatherings of

any type (0), to change the government, is accordingly denied (0). Qadhafi uses all kinds of

measures, including extrajudicial killings and intimidation, to suppress the will of the people.

Democracy in Libya simply does not exist, and under Qadhafi's control, it is doubtful that it will.

Libya, therefore, scores a rating of red. (Total=0)

The Sultanate of Oman is another of the states with what appears to be a non-

existent democracy. There are no political parties (0) and consequently no political opposition

(0). Citizens have no right to change their government (0), which is controlled by the Al Bu

Sa'id family. The country is a traditional autocracy (0), although there are signs, such as the new

Basic Law which was enacted in late 1996, that the Sultan recognizes the need for political

participation on the part of the people.[23] Peaceful association of any type is strictly prohibited

(0). Oman is without democracy, and so scores red. (Total=0)

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[21] Iraq Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

[22] Libya Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

[23] Oman Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

Qatar is much the same as Oman in terms of structure and outlook. The Al-Thani family rules the country, which is headed by the Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and has since 1971.[24] The state is therefore a traditional autocracy (0). There is no political opposition (0), no official parties (0), and citizens have no right nor opportunity to change their government (0). Assemblies of any type are outlawed (0). Qatar is therefore devoid of democracy of any type, although the country's Foreign Minister recently stated: "We think democracy is going to reach everyplace today. It is better that we give it to our people, and not to have them take it from us."[25] It rates a score of red. (Total=0)

Saudi Arabia is another country which exhibits absolutely no sign of democracy. Like Oman and Qatar, Saudi Arabia is a traditional autocracy (0) which is ruled by the Al Saud family; the current King is Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, son of Abdul Aziz who unified Saudi Arabia and came to power in 1902.[26] The structure of the country is such that opposition of any description to the House of Saud is banned (0), and there are no political parties (0). Demonstrations and gatherings are forbidden (0) and citizens are powerless to change their government (0). Saudi Arabia, however, shows no signs of changing, unless Prince Abdullah, widely touted as a future replacement for the King, decides to "bounce Saudi Arabia into democratic ways."[27] It rates red. (Total=0)

Syria is slightly lower than the Sudan in terms of democracy. There is no political opposition (0), and political parties have been banned (0). The President, Hafiz Al-

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[24] Famighetti 811.

[25] Pearl A11.

[26] Lacey 52.

[27] "Saudi Arabia needs a face-lift," The Economist 06 Jan., 1996: 14.

Asad, has virtual control over all apparati of the government, according him dictator status, and making the state of Syria a Fascist-style dictatorship (0). The Ba'ath Party, although elected, is guaranteed a majority.[28] There is no arrangement whereby the citizens of Syria may meet publicly (0), and there is no means by which they may change their government (0). The state of Syria, therefore, shows no signs of democratic activity. It scores red. (Total=0)

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a federation of seven Emirates, each ruled by an emirate ruler, in keeping with tradition.[29] The UAE is a traditional autocracy, or, rather, a collection of traditional autocracies (0). There is no electoral process (0) and no political parties exist (0). Peaceful assembly is not allowed (0) and citizens are denied the right to change their government (0). The UAE is another state wherein democracy does not exist. A rating of red has been assessed. (Total=0)

Conclusions

The results of classification as to democracy are somewhat surprising. Based simply based on prior assumptions, and upon the religiosity information provided in the next chapter, one might make assumptions about countries such as Lebanon and Yemen, for example. However, both of these countries break the particular mould into which one might feel that they should be put. There are other surprises as well.

The distribution of states, based on the five indicators used in this study, is not even. There seem to be a great number of states (11) which fall at the lowest end of the spectrum: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the UAE all have

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[28] Syria Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

[29] Famighetti 828.

scores of zero. According to the five indicators, this means that there is not even a hint of democratic practice in any of these states. Many of them are ruled by monarchies and/or military and other dictatorships. As well, Kuwait and Sudan each scored one point, which means that they are by no means far ahead of the other states in the red category.

Those states which are in the yellow category, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt, are a diverse collection. Some of these states have better records in particular areas than other states, but fall down in others. Certainly, there appears to be a wide range of difference between them, as opposed to those states in the red category, which are virtually all clustered at the extreme bottom of the scale. Morocco and Jordan sit at five, Algeria at six, and Lebanon and Egypt at seven. While none of these states is by any means perfect in their democratic quests, each at least appears to be moving toward more democracy.

The final category, green, is fascinating. Both Yemen and Israel could easily form the basis for future study on flourishing democracy in seemingly incompatible states. The Yemeni government is moving rapidly toward democracy, through elections and allowing general political participation and opposition. Its score of eight is indicative of its singular pursuit of democracy. Israel scores the highest of any of the states in the region, in terms of democracy. It rated an 11 out of a possible twelve, falling down only in the category of multiple parties. Otherwise, the political system within Israel appears to embrace and invite political participation. Democracy within the state of Israel thrives. Yemen, to some extent, and Israel stand above the other states within the region with regard to democracy.

Again, the results could vary if other indicators were to be used. Nevertheless, these five indicators provide a fair sample of data in terms of democracy. One must be careful, however, not to award too much significance to differences of one digit. For example, the difference between Yemen (eight) and Egypt (seven) might not be especially significant;

however, one must look at the overall spirit of movements toward democracy within every state

to correctly place them within particular categories. Most importantly, the classifications are not

in any way concrete. They do, however, provide a representation of democracy within these

states which is reasonably reliable. The following chapter examines religiosity in much the same

manner.

CHAPTER SIX: RELIGIOSITY

The level of religiosity within a particular state is sometimes difficult to determine. This is especially true in a region as diverse as the Middle East, because of the many different factors which come into play. Within the region as a whole, a Sunni Islamic majority predominates; of the 18 states considered in this study, 15 boast nominally Sunni Islamic populations of 70% or more. World-wide the population of Sunni Muslims makes up 83% of the almost 1.1 billion Muslims around the world.[1] The differences between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims[2] are exceptionally pronounced and greatly exacerbated by the extreme nationalism which seemingly pervades many of the states in the region. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was fought largely on this basis, although it is true that both have considerably large Shi'ite populations. Many other factors also contribute to the region's diversity: relative wealth and status of some of the countries, dictatorial leadership and oil reserves, among other things. This is by no means an exhaustive list, and the states here will not be looked at in this context, although future study would be warranted in this regard.

Both Israel and Lebanon break the above mould, strictly on the basis of their sizeable non-Muslim populations. When Israel was granted statehood in 1948, it was

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[1] Famighetti 646.

[2] See *Appendix A*, "The Many Faces of Islam" for a synopsis of the variations of Islam which exist within the Middle East.

created in order to provide a homeland for Jewish people after the atrocities which they

had suffered during the Second World War. The state of Israel was erected in the territory

which formerly had been the State of Palestine. Within the Muslim world, this was seen

as a horrible affront, and since that time, the Palestinian population, now residing in

Israel, has continued to fight for land claims recognition and citizenship status, among

other things. This rift of religions has pitted Jew against Muslim in many confrontations,

notably the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973. As a result, religious differences

are very near to the hearts and consciousness of virtually all citizens of the region, and

threaten to erupt at any time into a bitter showdown.

Recognizing that vast differences exist within the region, what is meant by the term

"religiosity"? Religiosity is defined as "the quality of being excessively, ostentatiously,

or mawkishly religious."[3] Anecdotal accounts appear to suggest that in countries with

populations where one religion predominates, for example, there will be more

discrimination of minorities. Several indicators have been isolated, therefore, which

determine the approximate religiosity of the 18 states of the study.

Indicators and Continuum of Religiosity

For the purposes of this study, a continuum of religiosity was developed. The

scale that was developed ranks states as to "red", "yellow" or green. Just like traffic

signals, these particular designations also denote a form of "stop" "caution" and "go;

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[3] Guralnik 1200.

green indicates that the country has little religiosity compared with the others in the study, yellow designates some and red a lot. The benefits of using such a scale are many. First, the scale allows the researcher to avoid the pitfalls of having to assign each state a percentage value; percentages are specific, and yet because one tends to get caught up in the particular percentage designation assigned, the value assigned to each variable then detracts from the significance of the findings. It could well be that errors in data collection or reporting might occur. Additionally, the actual difference between a rating of 45% and 44% may be so slight as to not warrant a difference in classification. In fact, the use of percentages in cases where all of the information exists only between two closely-spaced numbers, may be seen as insignificant. As well, the accuracy of such strict codification when dealing with abstract topics as religion may well result in error.

Accordingly, the scale system allows for a much more rough categorization according to specific variables. It is important to note that the indicators used have produced the categorization which follows; the use of other indicators could well lead to a completely different organization of states along the continuum. As well, others looking at the same sources may well classify the states into different and/or more specific categories. However, the categorization that resulted from tests according to the five particular variables that were selected has produced a particular result which would no doubt be replicated even taking the different factors from the above into account. Five variables, deemed to be the most applicable to this study, were selected for inclusion. These include Freedom of Religion within each state, whether or not each state has an

Official State Religion, Religious Toleration, whether or not the state follows only

Religious Law, and whether or not each state has a high percentage of one particular sect

or religious group within its borders.

The indicator "Freedom of Religion" (Fdm/Rel) considers the official state position

on whether or not freedom of religion is allowed in practice. The consideration of

Freedom of Religion is easily apparent in the cases of some states, as they categorically

do or do not have this freedom within their borders. However, it is more complicated in

other states. For example, a government may prohibit discrimination based on religious

beliefs, and yet not respect this right in practice. Therefore, where a state's behaviour is

at all questionable, it has been placed in the yellow category. A state was given a score

of two if it both *de jure* and *de facto* respects freedom of religion, one if its behaviour is

questionable, and zero if there is no respect at all. The information for this category was

taken from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports on Human Rights

Practices for 1996.

"Official State Religion" looks at whether or not the state has proclaimed an official

religion for the state. Expressed as Off/Rel on the Human Rights charts, this is a simple

indicator with virtually no room for interpretation. Either a state has an official religion

or it does not. The scores range from one, meaning that a state has no official state

religion, to zero, indicating that a state has an official state religion. This information was

also drawn from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices for 1996.

The indicator, "Toleration of Religion" (Tol/Rel) shows that the state tolerates or does not tolerate religions other than the state religion or majority religion. The difference between Toleration of Religion and Freedom of Religion is that the state, in this case, may or may not officially sanction the practice of various religions, even though it might tolerate them. This is more a *de facto* occurrence. If there is both official and practical toleration of religions other than that of the government of the state, a score of two is given; partial religious toleration warrants one, and none is granted zero. The information here, too, was taken from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996.

"Religious Law" (Rel/Law) indicates whether a state follows secular law, with a legal system that is completely separate from the religious institutions of the state, or abides strictly by religious law. In many cases, states have a mixed system, some with more involvement by religious officials, and some with less. In Islam, the religious law is called Shari'a, while in Judaism, religious law is called Torah. The assumption is that states with a secularized legal system are less likely to exhibit higher levels of religiosity. Categorization of states ranges from zero to two, with two being virtually no adherence to religious law, one showing a mixed system of both secular and religious law, and zero being an adherence only to religious law. Again, the information is taken from the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996.

The final indicator is used to show a high percentage of the population which belongs to one particular sect or religious group (%RelPop). It is generally assumed that

in a state where a high percentage of the population practices one particular type of religion there will be a greater degree of cohesiveness among that population. As well, the profile of organized religion in these countries may well be higher, because it will meet with far less resistance from the majority of the population. In fact, each of the eighteen states in this study has a segment of its population which nominally belongs to one particular religion more than any others. Three divisions were made in dividing the population according to this indicator: 55-79%, 80-94%, and 95-100%. These cuts were made for a specific reason. First, none of the states has a dominant religion with a percentage of its population less than 55%, and therefore none under this amount had to be considered. As well, due to the high levels of religious practice within the region, many of the countries should, in fact, have fitted into the middle category (80-94%), leaving only some for the last classification (95-100%), which seems extraordinarily high when compared to western standards. The lowest category warrants a score of two, moderate group size one, and the highest groups of religious groups zero. Many of the states did, in fact, fit into the last category. The information was obtained from The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1997.

The above indicators have been selected so as to provide an accurate and clear picture of the various levels of religiosity within the eighteen states of this study. Each state has been assessed using each of these variables, and was accordingly "graded" as to its level of religiosity. It was given "red" if it has what can be considered a considerable amount of religiosity, "yellow" if it has only some, and "green" if it has little religiosity.

The numbers assigned point to these categorizations as well: the highest scores are "green" (8 or 9) while the lowest scores are "red" (1 or 2); those in between are, of course, "yellow" (3 to 7). Of course, the rankings are only valid relative to the others within the region. Compared to other countries around the world, the religiosity of virtually all of these states is likely red. That having been said, the countries themselves are often anomalous, and the results do not carry over across state borders.

Table 7
FACTORS INDICATING RELIGIOSITY

	fdm/rel	off/rel	tol/rel	rel/law	%relpop
Algeria	2	0	2	2	0
Bahrain	2	0	2	1	2
Egypt	2	0	1	1	1
Iran	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq	0	0	0	2	2
Israel	2	0	1	1	1
Jordan	2	0	1	1	1
Kuwait	2	0	2	1	2
Lebanon	2	1	2	2	2
Libya	1	1	1	2	0
Morocco	1	0	1	1	0
Oman	2	0	1	1	2
Qatar	1	0	1	1	0
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	0
Sudan	2	0	0	1	0
Syria	2	1	2	2	2
UAE	2	0	1	1	0
Yemen	1	0	1	1	0

LEGEND:

fdm/rel	freedom of religion	2-yes	1-some	0-none
off/rel	official state religion	1-none	0-yes	
tol/rel	religious toleration	2-yes	1-some	0-none
rel/law	religious law	2-none	1-mixed	0-only
%relpop	% of population which belongs	2-55-79	1-80-94	0-95-100
	to one particular sect or religious group			

Table 8
CATEGORIZATION OF STATES BY RELIGIOSITY
AND TOTAL RELIGIOSITY SCORES

GREEN (LOW)	YELLOW (MODERATE)	RED (HIGH)
Lebanon (9)	Algeria (6)	Iran (0)
Syria (9)	Bahrain (7)	Saudi Arabia (0)
	Egypt (5)	
	Iraq (4)	
	Israel (5)	
	Jordan (5)	
	Kuwait (7)	
	Libya (5)	
	Morocco (3)	
	Oman (6)	
	Qatar (3)	
	Sudan (3)	
	United Arab Emirates (4)	
	Yemen (3)	

Table 9

Continuum of Religiosity

State Assessments

Lebanon, like Israel in previous variables, is anomalous. However, unlike Israel, this anomaly has resulted in a green classification or low religiosity. The Lebanese Parliament has equal representation among Christian and Muslim representatives. Freedom of religion is unequivocally guaranteed (2), a right which is also guaranteed in practice (2). There is no official state religion (1). This is so because of the religious split among the population (2); 30% of the population are Coptic Christian and 70% are Muslim, with representation of both Shi'ite and Sunni sects, although Sunni largely predominates. The law and court systems are completely secular (2). For these reasons, Lebanon is one of only two states to warrant inclusion in the "green" or low religiosity category. (Total=9)

Syria is the other country which sits firmly, according to all five indicators, in the low or "green" category. Freedom of religion is guaranteed (2) and this is respected in practice by the Government (2). There is no official state religion (1), and the percentage of religious majority within the state is relatively low: 74% (2). The courts, legal and legislative systems are all run according to secular law (2). What this means is that, relative to other states within the region, Syria has a low level of religicsity. It therefore fits solidly within the "green" category, according to the five indicators used in this study. (Total=9)

Bahrain is more firmly ensconced in the middle or yellow category. While the Government readily endorses freedom of religion (2), a fact which is carried out in

practice (2), the official state religion is Islam (0). The Government meets regularly with

Christian and other leaders, and religious materials from many denominations are readily

available, although anti-Islamic writings are prohibited.[4] The legal system in Bahrain is

a mixed system, with some reference made to both Shari'a and to secular legislation, and

there is also an independent working judicial system run by secular interests (1). Only

70% of the population is active in the Shi'a Muslim faith, which makes up the largest

percentage of the population in terms of religious groups (2). Bahrain, then, enters in the

yellow category, exhibiting moderate to low levels of religiosity. (Total=7)

The official religion of Kuwait is Islam (0). Kuwait guarantees freedom of

religion (2), and tolerates other religions (2). Kuwait's Constitution states that:

> all people are equal in... public rights and duties before the law, without
> distinction as to... religion [and that] freedom of belief is absolute. The
> State protects the freedom to practice religion in accordance with
> established customs, provided that it does not conflict with public policy or
> morals.[5]

55% of the country's population is Sunni Muslim, including the ruling family (2); 30%

of the population belong to the Shi'a Muslim sect. The laws of the country and the court

system are based on a mixture of both Shari'a and secular laws (1). These indicators show

that Kuwait is yellow-green, showing low-to-moderate religiosity. (Total=7)

Algeria is one such anomalous state. It fits neatly into neither the green nor

red categories. Algeria has a 99% Sunni Muslim population (0). However, the state

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[4] Bahrain Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 7.

[5] Kuwait Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 6.

officially prohibits discrimination based on religious belief, and there is freedom of religion (2). Although Islam is the state religion (0), communities of Christians and Jews worship without sanction or obstacle (2). This right is respected in actual fact by the Government. It is interesting to note that the Government dictates, to a large extent, the content of sermons given in mosques.[6] Algeria is ruled by secular law only (2). For these reasons, Algeria warrants a score of yellow, a moderate to low score. (Total=6)

Oman reaffirmed Islam as the official state religion in its basic law (0). The basic law also states that Shari'a forms the basis of all legislation, and also that a mixed system of Shari'a and secular courts will form the basis of the legal system (1). The government legislates against discrimination on the basis of religion (2) and, in practice, those of other religions are free to practice their own beliefs, although they are not allowed to gather publicly or to publish religious materials, among other things (1). Sunni Islam is the religion of more than 75% of the population (2). Based upon these indicators, Oma n is decidedly "yellow" or moderate in its religiosity, although it leans toward "green" or low religiosity in a couple of instances. (Total=6)

The Egyptian case is similar to that of Bahrain, in that the majority of the indicators signify moderate religiosity. While the Constitution grants "freedom of belief and the practice of religious rites,"(2) this right is seriously restricted in practice by the Government and its various agencies (1). Recent reports have pointed to cases of blatant disregard for and violent discrimination against recently converted Christians, mostly of

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[6] Algeria Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 9.

the Coptic Orthodox Church.[7] The official religion of the state is Islam (0), which serves also as the legislative basis of the state, although the court system remains secular (1). 94% of the population is Sunni Muslim (1), making this the largest of any religious groups presently active within the state. Based on these indicators, Egypt falls almost squarely within the moderate or yellow category. Although the literature would indicate that it leans more toward green based on current legislation, the *de facto* behaviour of the Government provides enough basis for solid inclusion in the moderate category alone. (Total=5)

Israel is the most dissimilar of all of the countries of the Middle East. Its population is 82% Jewish, the majority of which are orthodox to ultra-orthodox[8] (1), and the official state religion is Judaism (0). Freedom of religion is guaranteed under the law (2) and this right is more or less respected in practice, although there are massive amounts of discrimination perpetrated against the Palestinian minority, the population of which is Sunni Muslim (1). The courts and laws are represented by a parallel system of religious and secular structures, and citizens of Israel may select, in many cases, whichever they prefer (1). There is, however, a differentiation between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews. These differences are becoming more and more accepted by Jewish authorities, seen, for example, in that secular burials and cemeteries are being allowed and secular

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[7] Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 11.

[8] Dorion 32.

weddings, which must be conducted abroad, are now being recognized.[9] Israel is a

country with moderate religiosity, as it so ranks in four out of five categories. It therefore

fits in the yellow category. (Total=5)

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is another yellow category country which

shows moderate levels of religiosity. Its population is 92% Sunni Muslim (1) and the state

religion is Islam (0). Freedom of religion is guaranteed under the Constitution, which

forbids religious discrimination (2). The Government, for its part, does not prohibit any

other worship, and tolerates all other religions (1). Within the Kingdom, there exists a

mixed system of Shari'a and secular courts and laws, although the Government does not

fully comply with Shari'a law (1). Jordan thus ranks in the yellow category, although it

leans toward green as it exhibits less religiosity than others in the region. (Total=5)

Libya is not categorically in one classification or another. 97% of the

population is Sunni Muslim (0). Under Qadhafi's direction, the Islamic Call Society (ICS)

was established to control and disseminate "state-approved" religion, among other things;[10]

this takes the place of an official state declaration of religion (1). There is no official

freedom of religion(1), and those teaching Islam which is not approved by the government

are banned. However, minority religions do exist without official sanction (1). There is

no enforced adherence to Shari'a (2), although religious law is used as a tool to legitimize

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[9] U.S. Department of State, Israel and the Occupied Territories Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/israel.html) Mar. 04, 1997: 8-9.

[10] Libya Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 6.

the actions of the Qadhafi government. For these reasons, Libya is a "yellow" country,

exhibiting moderate religiosity. (Total=3)

Iraq is mostly "red", according to the indicators, although only based on

three out of the five. The official religion of Iraq is Islam (0), and 65% of the population

is Shi'a Muslim Arab (2), although there is a Sunni Muslim Arab minority comprised of

approximately 35% of the population which controls the government. Virtually the entire

population of the state is Arab. The major difference between the Shi'ites of Iran and the

Shi'ites of Iraq is their bloodlines; Iraqis are Arab, while Iranians are not. There is no

official freedom of religion (0) and other religions are not tolerated in practice, including

Shi'a Muslim customs (0). The courts, although not tied religiously (2), are inextricably

bound to the presidency; instead of religious legitimization, as in Iran, Iraq's regime is

legitimized by strong military ties. Accordingly, Iraq exhibits moderate to high levels of

religiosity, making it yellow-red. (Total=4)

The United Arab Emirates, a federation of seven Emirates, is an interesting

case in that each of the Emirates has separate laws and customs, and so virtually nothing

in this regard is consistent. Islam is the official religion throughout (0). 99% of the

population is Sunni Muslim (0), and the balance of the population is Shi'a Muslim.

Officially, there is freedom of religion (2), but in practice, other religions are forced to

curtail some of their activities (1). There are both Shari'a and secular courts within the

Emirates (1). This places the Emirates in no specific category based on all of the

indicators. Instead, three of the indicators warrant the inclusion of the United Arab

Emirates in the moderate or "yellow" category. As the other two indicators are both

"green" and "red", the UAE is to be left firmly within the "yellow"/moderate category.

(Total=4)

The Kingdom of Morocco has a Constitution which explicitly provides for

freedom of worship (1), although toleration of religions extends to only Christians, Jews

and Muslims (1). Islam is the official state religion (0) for a population which is made up

of more than 99% Sunni Muslims (0). Islamic law and tradition are closely followed

within the Kingdom, and the judiciary is made up of a mix of Shari'a and secular systems

(1). For these reasons, Morocco, too, falls somewhere in between moderate and high

religiosity. Its religiosity level is, in fact, moderate ("yellow"), although it leans more

toward "red" or moderate-to-high. (Total=3)

The state of Qatar is inhabited 95% by the Wahabbi branch of the Sunni

Muslim sect (0). The state religion is Islam (0). Freedom of religion is not officially

guaranteed or denied (1), as the country is ruled by a monarchy with only a Provisional

Constitution; other religions are tolerated, although heavily monitored (1). Shi'a Muslims

are also tolerated. The legal system is split between secular and Shari'a courts (1). Qatar

is therefore "yellow" or moderately religious, and leans neither more toward "red" nor

"green". (Total=3)

The Sudanese government has not declared an official state religion, although

Islam is treated as such in practice. Therefore, Islam will be considered to be the state

religion for the purposes of this study (0). The Government has stated that Islam "must

inspire the country's laws, institutions, and policies;" in reality, the system is still a

mixture of secular and Shari'a law (1).[11] The Government guarantees freedom of religion

(2). In practice, however, other religions are not tolerated (0). 95% of the population is

Sunni Muslim (0). For these reasons, Sudan warrants inclusion in the moderate or

"yellow" category. (Total=3)

Finally, Yemen is a relatively new country, which was formed in 1990 when

North and South Yemen united. Islam is the state religion (0). Government sanction of

religious practice is neither confirmed nor denied (1), but there are constraints on other

religions. Christians and Hindus, however, hold regular church services without

persecution (1). The population is virtually 100% Sunni Muslim (0). There is a dual

system of courts: Shari'a and secular (1). Yemen therefore fits nicely into the moderate

or "yellow" category. (Total=3)

One often thinks of Iran as being perhaps the most repressive regime, in

terms of religion and practices affected by religion, of the region. In fact, this is perhaps

the case. What is true is that Iran fits entirely into the red category, based on all five of

the indicators. The population of Iran is 95% Shi'a Muslim (0), with the majority of the

remaining 5% being Sunni Muslim. Islam is the official religion of the state (0). There

is no official freedom of religion (0), and, in practice, religions other than Shi'a or Sunni

Islam are not well tolerated (0), although Christians, Jews and Zoroastrianists are regularly

elected to special reserved seats in the Parliament. Special schools run by these minority

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[11] Sudan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 8.

religions are frequently intruded upon.[12] Many of the top government officials, including the President, the Ayatollah Khomeini are actually Shi'a clergy, making separation of church and state almost non-existent (0). Iran is, indeed, a case of high religiosity. (Total=0)

Saudi Arabia is the only other state with high religiosity, scoring "red" using each of the five variables. There is absolutely no freedom of religion (0). Islam is the official religion of the state (0), and its population is 100% Sunni Muslim (0). Generally, all of the Muslim activity within the state is of the Wahabbi variety, a strict and conservative group. Other religions are not tolerated (0), and those of other religions are, in fact, punished. The only law within the state is Shari'a law (0). Saudi Arabia is therefore firmly within the "red" category, and has perhaps the highest level of religiosity of any of the states of the Middle East. (Total=0)

Conclusions

The breakdown of states is not truly surprising. The states which are traditionally associated with high religious intensity are Iran and Saudi Arabia, and both have been shown to have extremely high levels of religiosity. Those which are thought to be more secular have also shown up in the categories which might have been expected. The surprises have come in the middle or "yellow" states, which have appeared either higher or lower than expected.

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[12] U.S. Department of State, Iran Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/iran.html) Mar. 04, 1997: 8.

Only two states are truly "green", exhibiting low levels of religiosity: Lebanon and Syria. Each of these has a score of 9, the highest possible religiosity score. Both guarantee freedom of religion, a right which is respected in practice. Levels of majority religious populations are relatively low compared to the other states in the survey. As well, both Syria and Lebanon have nothing whatsoever to do with religious law. These states are, indeed, the lowest in terms of religiosity.

Conversely, only two states are truly "red" with high levels of religiosity. Both have a score of 0, the lowest possible religiosity score. Neither guarantees freedom of religion, and other religions are not tolerated in practice. Both use only Shari'a law to determine the legal and legislative aspects of the state. The percentage of the population which belongs to one particular sect or religious group is extremely high in both cases, although Saudi Arabia's number is higher. Iran and Saudi Arabia are, therefore, those with the highest relative religiosity.

The remaining fourteen states fit somewhere in between. Some lean toward low levels of religiosity or "green-yellow", while others lean more toward high levels of religiosity or "yellow-red". These include Bahrain, Kuwait, Algeria, Oman, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and Yemen. Their levels of official freedom of religion vary from a minimum amount to a maximum without official declaration, as do their levels of religious toleration. Some have an official state religion; others do not. Their various majority religious populations are both high and

low. As well, some adhere only to secular laws, while others are greatly influenced by religious law.

As stated before, the categorizations are only rough. Based on other indicators, the results might be completely different. However, the indicators selected are thought to be representative of that which makes up religiosity within a state. In any case, they provide a reasonably accurate picture of the relative levels of religiosity within the 18 Middle Eastern states included in this study. With that covered, the study can now address the correlations between the three variables.

CHAPTER SEVEN: RELATIONSHIPS AMONG VARIABLES

The previous three chapters have been concerned simply with the data as it pertains to human rights, democracy and religiosity. These chapters contain sets of indicators, each of which has been explored within the framework of each state, within the wider context of the three subjects. The scores and rankings ascribed to the 18 states of the study therefore provide a basis on which to proceed with the main analysis: discovering correlations between the three subjects.

The thrust of this study is two-fold. Its first task is to determine whether or not a correlation exists, as suggested, between states which exhibit a low degree of democracy and those which exhibit a high number of human rights abuses. The second is to examine whether or not a correlation exists between states which exhibit a high degree of religiosity and those which exhibit a high number of human rights abuses. The scores and ratings of the states will hereafter be examined in order to test the strength of these correlations.

Table 10

Relationships: Human Rights and Democracy

Correlation between Democracy and Human Rights

The theory posits that states which exhibit a low degree of democracy also exhibit a high degree of human rights abuses. Scales were developed in order to assess the levels of both democracy and human rights abuses. Accordingly, the states were plotted on these scales, allowing an uncomplicated method of comparison. What follows is a look, by state, at the results of both the democracy and human rights scales, and the correlations between them.

· *States* ·

Algeria is a state which exhibits moderation throughout. As such, it would appear that Algeria, although stuck in the past, adhering to practices such as polygyny and the torture of prisoners, is moving to join the ranks of the modern world. Its human rights score was 5, which placed it in the moderate category. Algeria's record on democracy warranted a score of 6, again ranking it in the moderate category. In Algeria, then, there would appear to be a correlation between democracy and human rights.

Bahrain is almost the antithesis of Algeria, in that there appears to be no forward movement in either democracy or human rights. Bahrain's score for human rights abuses was 1, a red score based upon countless instances of blatant disregard for the rights of Bahraini citizens. In terms of democracy, Bahrain warranted a score of 0, leaving it in the red category. These two scores are similar, and would lead to the belief that there is a correlation between the two.

Egypt, however, presents an anomaly. The degree of democracy therein is surprisingly high; multi-party elections are a sign of moderately high levels of

democracy. It therefore rated a score of 7, a moderate score on the cusp of the green

category. Its human rights record, however, does not exhibit a corresponding degree of

good behaviour. In fact, in spite of the rhetoric circulated by their government, Egypt's

record is terrible, which is why it scored a 3, placing it in the red category. In Egypt,

then, there does not appear to be any significant degree of correlation between human

rights abuses and democracy.

The Iranian example does conform to the suspected correlation. Its score of 0 in

the democracy scale rated it in the red category, due to the lack of means to

participation in the system of governance currently being provided to Iranian citizens.

In terms of human rights abuses, Iran's score is 1, based upon the lack of rights granted

to its residents. There appears, then, to be a strong correlation in this case between a

lack of democracy and a high number of human rights abuses.

Iraq provides another example of a correlation between democracy and human

rights, as posited by the theory being investigated. Its score of 0 for democracy, a red

category score, casts light upon the inability of Iraqi citizens to have any input

whatsoever in their government system. Iraq's score on human rights was red, coming

in at 3; this is based upon blatant inequality and lack of respect which predominates

throughout the country. There would appear, then, to be a correlation of relative weight

between the two.

Israel, again, throws a wrench into the mechanics of such a comparison. This is,

of course, due to the hideous record of the state in the Occupied Territories. However,

as stated throughout the thesis, the Occupied Territory information has been left aside

in order to maintain consistency. It is because of this that Israel is able to rate so highly

in both instances. In the case of both democracy and human rights, Israel's score is the

highest score allotted. Israel scored an 11 in democracy, a high score. As well, in

human rights, a score of 9 was obtained, placing it in the green category. This does,

though, again point to a correlation between democracy and human rights.

Jordan is another state which shows remarkable consistency and moderation. The

state was awarded a score of 5 for democracy, a moderate score, due to its forays into

democracy and experiments with democratic means of participation. Its score for human

rights is comparable. It earned a 6, a moderate score, for its moderate record on human

rights abuses. Here, too, a correlation appears to exist between human rights and

democracy.

Like Egypt, however, Kuwait provides an exception to the rule which is quickly

being established. Kuwait's human rights score is comparable to that of Jordan; it rated

a score of 5, moderate, based upon a human rights record which appears to indicate

Kuwait's respect of its citizens, at least in part. Its record on democracy does not come

close to meeting Jordan's standard. Instead, Kuwait scored a paltry 1, placing it in the

red category. Kuwait's record, therefore, does not appear to support the correlation in

question: that high democracy and low levels of human rights abuses are in some way

related.

Lebanon joins the likes of Algeria and Jordan in its consistency. Lebanon's

record in democracy was 7, warranting inclusion in the moderate category, but very

nearly winning a place in the green column. In terms of human rights, Lebanon's score

is again moderate, 6, because of its efforts in improving and maintaining a policy on human rights abuses. Lebanon is a country which also appears to conform to the supposition that there is a relation between democracy and human rights.

Libya also supports this premise. However, it is more apt to be likened to countries such as Iran and Iraq, as studied previously, for obvious reasons. Libya's human rights record is appalling, and there is little respect for its citizens regarding human rights of any description; it scored 2, fitting it into the red category. In terms of democracy, Libya's record is poor. Its citizens are denied the opportunity to have access to government institutions, including voting. Its score for democracy was 0, leaving it to the red category. In the case of Libya, then, the correlation seems apt, that a correlation between democracy and human rights exists.

Morocco presents itself as another moderate country prone to consistency. Its democracy score is 5, a moderate score, which is indicative of its modernizing policies regarding involvement of the populace in decision-making. As well, its human rights record is moderately high. It scored 7 due to the seeming efforts of the Moroccan government in its respect of its citizens' human rights. Morocco appears to reflect the theory that democracy and human rights make a strong correlation.

The case of Oman is not as good a fit. In fact, the Omani case is one of incongruity. Its record on democracy is poor, which gave it a score of 0, or red. However, there is good reason to believe that this will improve over a course of the next several years, if the words of the Sultan can be believed.[1] The human rights score of

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[1] Oman Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 1.

Oman is far superior to its democracy score. It rated a score of 6, which is a moderate score. The presumed correlation does not appear to fit with the Omani example, although if an improvement in its democratic state were to occur, this could quickly change.

Qatar and Oman are like two peas in the proverbial pod; their inconsistencies occur in many of the same areas. The one difference is that Qatari officials do not intend to extend democratic privileges to the citizenry. The democracy score is 0, placing it in the red category. In stark contrast, Qatar's human rights score is a whopping 7, placing it in a high moderate position. Here, as well, the Qatari case is incongruent with the supposition that democracy and human rights have a correlation.

Saudi Arabia, with its low scores, is at least consistent, if nothing else. Its score for democracy is extremely low; it rated a 0, firmly in the red category. In terms of human rights, the Saudi case, with terrorization of those prisoners and no rights for women, rates only a score of 3, again in the red category. Saudi Arabia, then, is another example of the correlation between democracy and human rights.

An examination of the Sudan paints a similar picture. In terms of democracy, the Sudanese score only 1, warranting inclusion in the red category. Its human rights record is also horrible. It rated only a score of 2, firmly red. Again, the correlation between democracy and human rights fits.

Syria is among the states which present no such correlation. In terms of democracy, Syria is a state which rates no score whatsoever, due to the dictatorship which currently exists. Syria, therefore, scores a 0, rating it in the red category. Its

human rights record is not nearly as abysmal; it scored 4, a moderate score. The correlation between democracy and human rights is not visible in the Syrian case.

The UAE is another state, in the same category as Kuwait and Syria. The United Arab Emirates is a country with a brutal record in democracy; its score for democracy is 0, red, due to the absence of any type of allowance for the participation of its citizens. Its human rights record, however, is considerably higher. The state's attempts to reinforce good human rights practices have led to the UAE's human rights score of 6, placing it in the moderate category. There does not appear to be any correlation between democracy and human rights in the United Arab Emirates.

Finally, the case in Yemen is similar to that of Egypt. The country's record on human rights is poor, while its level of democracy is extremely high. Yemen's score on democracy is 8, which gives it the second-highest score of all the states in the study. The Yemeni government's human rights history, however, warrants only a score of 3, putting it in the red category. It would appear, therefore, that Yemen does not conform to the correlation theory that democracy and human rights are related.

· *Findings* ·

In terms of finding correlations between democracy and human rights, then, it would appear that 11 of the 18 Middle Eastern states in the study fit the theory which was earlier posited: in 11 out of 18 cases, a state's record on human rights abuses and its record on democracy are similar. Therefore, it does seem that states which exhibit a low degree of democracy also exhibit a high degree of human rights abuses.

Table 11

Correlation between Religiosity and Human Rights

It is then suggested that states which exhibit a high degree of religiosity also exhibit a high degree of human rights abuses. As with democracy, the development of scales was necessary in order to assess the levels of both human rights abuses and religiosity. The states were plotted on these scales, facilitating an easy comparison of these states. The comparison of these scales and the search for a correlation between them follows.

· *States* ·

Algeria appears to fit the pattern which is posited by the theory. As stated above, Algeria's human rights record warrants its inclusion in the moderate category and score of 5. Its religiosity score is relatively similar; a score of 6, moderate, is derived from Algeria's religious practices and religious behaviour. The theory, then, appears to hold true in the case of Algeria.

Bahrain is a state which presents itself quite differently in the two categories. Its human rights record is extremely low, and Bahrain must therefore be placed in the red category, due to its score of 1. In terms of religiosity, however, the majority of Bahrainis are moderately religious. Bahrain's religiosity score, in fact, borders on a ranking in the green category; this category is reserved for states with little or no religiosity. Bahrain appears to break the pattern which the study attempts to establish, wherein states with high levels of religiosity also have high levels of human rights abuse. This is not the case in Bahrain.

Egypt, like Bahrain, does not fit. The human rights score is relatively low, with a score of 3. Conversely, Egypt's religiosity score is moderate. The score of 5 was awarded with respect to the religious persecution and yet toleration which exist in Egypt. Here, as well, these scores contravene the theory, although the difference between the two scores is not nearly as large as in some of the other states.

Iran, conversely, appears to conform rather well to the standard set by the theory. Its human rights score is extremely low, and Iran rated only a score of 1, placing it in the red category. Its religiosity score is extremely low, at 0, placing it in the red category. Iran's religiosity appears to match its level of human rights abuses. In this case, it seems that the correlation between human rights and religiosity holds true.

Iraq's human rights record and its religiosity score present a bit of a puzzle. As the scores assigned and the divisions made between those scores were meant to serve only as a rough guide, when close scores in two categories exist, and yet are placed in different divisions, the result is indicative of some correlation. This is the story in Iraq. The human rights score, three, warranted Iraq's inclusion in the red category. Iraq's religiosity score was 4, which therefore resulted in its inclusion in the yellow, moderate category. The difference in the scores is only slight, and therefore, had the division been made in another spot, Iraq's scores might have been more similar. Therefore, Iraq's position affords its partial inclusion in the theoretical statement, that a correlation exists between human rights abuses and religiosity.

Israel, however, shows no signs of conflict of this type. Its human rights score, of course unencumbered by the activity of the Occupied Territories, scored a 9, allowing

it to be included in the green category. Its religiosity, however, is not as distinct.

According to the scale developed, Israel's level of religiosity is only moderate; it earned

a score of 5, placing it in the moderate category. In the case of Israel, there is no

correlation to be found.

Jordan is a moderately consistent state. Its human rights record, a moderate score

of 6, shows its growing commitment to the rights of its citizens. Its religiosity scores

are similar. Jordan rated a score of 5, placing it in the moderate category in religiosity,

as well. Jordan appears to support the correlation between religiosity and human rights.

Kuwait is similar in its human rights and religiosity. Kuwait's religiosity score

is 7, which places it squarely in the moderate category. Its human rights score of 5 is

also moderate. The Kuwaiti example therefore supports the posited theory, that a

correlation between religiosity and human rights does, indeed, exist.

Lebanon, on the other hand, does not support this claim. Its religiosity score was

9, tying Lebanon with Syria as the highest-scoring state of the 18 states of the study, and

allowing it to be included in the green category. Its human rights score is not also low,

as would be expected. Instead, Lebanon's human rights score was 6, which puts

Lebanon in the moderate category in terms of human rights. The correlation between

human rights and religiosity is not supported in reviewing the Lebanese results.

Like Lebanon, Libya is somewhat a study in dissimilarities. While the human

rights score was only 2, which indicates a reasonably poor record, and warrants its

inclusion in the red category, its religiosity score was higher. In fact, the level of

religiosity in Libya is moderate. Libya earned a score of 5, which puts it into the

moderate category. In Libya, there does not appear to be any relation between religiosity and human rights.

Morocco, of course, challenges this position while meeting the standards required. Morocco's human rights record of 7, or moderate, reflects the country's growing commitment to human rights. In terms of religiosity, Morocco's score of 3 placed it within the moderate category here as well. While the scores are not as close as in other states, they are both included within the moderate category. This indicates that the correlation between religiosity and human rights is, indeed, present.

Oman, as well, supports this position. Oman's human rights record and human rights record both resulted in a score of 6, and placed them in the moderate category. Oman, then, represents the religiosity and human rights correlation.

Qatar is quite similar to Morocco, in that their human rights record and score of 7, in the moderate category, appears to be continually improving. As well, the religiosity which exists within Qatar is relatively moderate, as reflected in the score of 3. Again, these scores are not extremely close, but are similar enough to be included in the same moderate category, and support the correlation between religiosity and human rights.

The scores for Saudi Arabia are also close. Its human rights record is particularly low. It scored 3, and was therefore included in the red category. In terms of religiosity, Saudi Arabia scored the lowest possible score: 0. This score warranted its inclusion in the red category here, as well. This reflects a correlation between religiosity and human rights.

The Sudan presents an anomaly much like that of Iraq. Its scores, although contiguous, were included in two different categories due to the divisions which were made. Sudan's human rights score was 2, and it wound up in the low category. Conversely, its religiosity score was 3 and it was included in the moderate category. The difference in the scores is only slight, and therefore, had the division been made differently, the two scores might have been included in the same category. As such, the Sudan must be at least partially supportive of the supposition that there is a correlation between religiosity and human rights.

Syria does not offer any such dilemma. There is no correlation to be found in the Syrian case. The human rights score of 4 places Syria in the moderate category, while the religiosity score of 9. green, indicates an extremely low level of religiosity.

The United Arab Emirates is a country which shows consistency in its scores. The UAE was given a score of 6 as a reflection the human rights activities therein; this translates to inclusion in the moderate category. In terms of religion, the score of 4 equals a moderate level of religiosity within the state. The correlation between religiosity and human rights is evident in looking at the UAE.

Finally, the Yemeni experience echoes that of Iraq and the Sudan. The scores of 3 in both religiosity and human rights unfortunately fell into two separate categories: moderate for religiosity, and low for human rights. There is virtually no difference in the scores, and, of course, different divisions could have made significant (if slight) categorical differences. Yemen is therefore partially indicative of the correlation between religiosity and human rights.

· *Findings* ·

The correlation between religiosity and human rights is not as easily determined as that between democracy and human rights. In at least 9 cases, there is definitely a correlation between the two. However, when the other three, Sudan, Yemen and Iraq, are factored in, the correlation is present in 12 states. It would appear, then, that the correlation between religiosity and human rights is also present, and that those states which exhibit a high degree of religiosity also exhibit a high degree of human rights abuses.

Conclusions

The correlations between democracy and human rights, and also between religiosity and human rights, according to the indicators and scales chosen and developed, do, indeed, exist. This would suggest that these factors can and do adversely and positively affect the others. This, then, means that any given state must work at adjusting either its level of religiosity or democracy in order to affect its human rights record.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to attempt to find two particular correlations: between democracy and human rights, and between religiosity and human rights. Many of the preceding chapters have therefore been filled with indicators and scales which attempt to prove such things. The purpose of such numbers, however, is not to prove something on its own. Rather, the numbers have been meant only to test the theoretical assumptions which were made in the first chapter, and carried on throughout the study.

As stated above, the theoretical approach applied in this case is behaviouralist in nature. The consequences of such a choice have an impact not only upon the results found, but also upon the results sought and upon the path taken in finding them. The fifteen indicators were selected for precisely this reason; the reason for their inclusion was never to determine why such violations take place, only that they do or do not occur.

The commonalities of Middle Eastern states which were earlier identified have been categorized and discussed; it appears as though many of these were, indeed, factual. In many Middle Eastern countries, for example, women are exploited and denied what in the west are considered basic rights. Other commonly-held beliefs have also been upheld; citizens in most of these countries are routinely denied the right to peaceful association, and the human rights records of all of the countries are atrocious. It appears that some of the world's worst fears about the Middle East are true.

Nevertheless, some of these conjectures were destroyed by fact. Saudi Arabia's human rights record, for example, was not as low as is commonly believed. As well, the religiosity levels of many of these states, including Morocco and Israel, were substantially lower than anticipated. Regardless, it is a sad day when results such as these are surprising; they should instead be celebrated.

Interpreting Scores and Results

In some sense, the interpretation of these scores has as much to do with the results which were found as does the data collected. In Chapter Seven, the scores of each country were stated and compared; the results were then given, and correlations found. It is interesting to see that both correlations were found to roughly the same degree, when factoring in the "near misses" of the correlation between human rights and religiosity.

All told, fifteen different indicators were selected for inclusion. Five each were used in each of the three subjects: human rights, democracy, and religiosity. As has been stated many times above, the scores which were determined in using these indicators could certainly have been different had other indicators been used. For example, had FGM been selected as an indicator of religiosity, the scores for particular countries like the Sudan would most certainly have been higher. However, in countries like Israel, FGM is not widely practiced, and this, therefore, would tend to skew the data. Also, FGM is not so much an Islamic religious practice as it is a cultural and traditional convention. As such, one prime criterion of indicator selection was

applicability to all. This holds true in each of the three subjects. Therefore, each of the

fifteen indicators applies evenly to each of the eighteen states in the study. When based

upon religion, the five indicators deal specifically with neither Islam, Christianity, nor

Judaism; in the same way, the human rights and democracy indicators, especially due

to the presence of non-Islamic countries like Lebanon and Israel, have no cultural

specificity.

The results were surprising in many cases. In part due to this, the scores were

checked and re-checked in order to account for any unanticipated anomalies. Upon

deeper reflection, however, the scores are not altogether incomprehensible. Happily, the

results found in this study comparably mirror those obtained by Humana and Human

Rights Watch, among others; this was used as a measuring-stick to ensure that the

fifteen indicators were appropriate.

Nonetheless, there were a few surprises. One of the biggest of these was Yemen,

whose religiosity, democracy, and human rights abuse levels conform closely to those

of many western countries; evidence that the Yemeni government is contemplating still

more modernizing changes is exciting. Another amazement was Israel, whose scores,

while significantly higher than some other states, were not altogether remarkable. It

appears that while Israel is touted as the one success story of western tutelage, its record

in each of the three subject areas could use improvement. Israel could have been

predicted to be the highest-scoring state of the 18 in the study, but its scores should

presumably be higher. Syria provided much cause for concern; extremely low

religiosity levels in no way indicate the low democracy and low human rights results. There must therefore be other forces at work in Syria.

Each of these anomalies, however, is counteracted by predictabilities. Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Sudan provided the anticipated results, and only varied by one or two from the expected low scores. This suggests that these states are those which could and should be the most heavily sanctioned by the rest of the world. Another grave predictability which was realized is that none of the 18 states of the Middle East has a human rights record which is altogether good. The highest possible score was 12, and yet, strangely, none of the 18 states scored higher than 9. What this says is that all of the states must make significant strides in their human rights programs in order to avoid world-wide condemnation.

The purpose of the scores was to allow for easy comparison of the states, and that is what has been achieved. As each of the states was rated for an indicator, that score was added to the state's scores from the other indicators. In this way, for each of the subjects, there was a "total" score, which allowed the state to be held up to the other states of the study. When placed on the continua, the "bad" and "good" states were easily identifiable. For human rights, Iran and Bahrain stood out at the low end of the scale, while Israel stood out as the highest-scoring state, even though its score was pitiful. In terms of democracy, nine of the states registered no score at all, while Israel obtained an almost perfect score. The religiosity scores were, with the exception of Israel, those which were expected: Iran and Saudi with scores of zero, and Lebanon and Syria with "perfect" scores. The final benefit, of course, comes with the fact that these

scores and continua can then be compared from one subject to the next. In this way, the correlations can be better viewed.

In fact, the correlation which was expected between human rights and democracy, as stated in the previous chapter, was found to be valid. Those states with high levels of human rights abuses are also those states with low levels of democracy, according to the scores determined by the examination of each indicator in the 18 states. As well, the correlation between human rights and religiosity, which was also expected, was also found to be true. States which exhibit high levels of religiosity are also those with high levels of human rights abuses.

This information is important enough in its own right. However, the possible uses for such data are endless. One opportunity for the material which has been gathered is to export the indicators, scales, and "mechanics" of the study to another region of the world, in order to test the same things. In this way, different regions could be assessed as to their relative levels of human rights, religiosity and democracy. These scales could also be used and compared to other scales, different spokes of the bicycle wheel; at that point, researchers could compare the impact of each of these, in order to determine which of these "spokes" has more bearing upon the human rights situation. Another possibility is that the scales as they now exist could be used as a template for other subjects, upon which states could be studied. Yet another option is to use this particular study as a basis for interpretive study, wherein the researcher could take the results on democracy, for example, and from there divine why the particular conditions, as demonstrated by the indicators, now exist.

Whatever the case, human rights abuses are a fact of life for millions of people world-wide. The fact that democracy and religiosity appear to be related to human rights is a discovery which should allow practitioners to more readily identify existing problems. Once identified, the human rights situation perhaps then could be manipulated by adjusting the various levels of either democracy or religiosity, or both. It is extremely important to remember, however, that human rights abuses are not totally linked to either of these two variables. Instead, there are a number of factors, as alluded to in the introductory chapters, which may have significant impact upon human rights situations in any state. These could range from average annual rainfall to wealth or poverty to the availability of "modern" technology; the point is that there are a number of significant factors which come into play in shaping a particular state's response to the horrors of human rights abuses. Unfortunately, a study of this size and scope simply can not hope to capture all of these in sufficient depth; it is doubtful that all causes could even be listed here. The size of the study, therefore, was kept small in order to allow for a more descriptive and in-depth analysis of the two variables used here: democracy and religiosity. In any event, the hope is that human rights abuses will be dramatically lessened and someday eliminated.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

THE MANY FACES OF ISLAM

The Islamic faith is said to be not only a religion, but also a total and unified way of life. Religion and politics in Islam are "two sides of the same coin". The Muslim religion can be divided into two diverse groups: *Sunnism* and *Shi'ism*. Both groups believe in Muhammad the prophet, and recognize the holiness of Mecca and Medina, although to varying degrees. From there, however, these two groups have very divergent beliefs.

Shi'a faith is characterised by a belief that the earthly community should be led by a "charismatic, semi-divine leader", the *imam*, who acts as a mediator between humans and the divine. There are three main divisions:

1. *Zaydis* (Fivers) - believe in five main *imams*; widely practiced in North Yemen.
2. *Isma'ilis* (Seveners) - believe in seven main *imams*; its main adherents are Iranians whose ancestry can be traced to North Yemen.
3. *Ja'afirs* (Twelvers) - believe in twelve main *imams*, one of which was the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, during his reign in Iran.   Its largest following is in Iran.

The *Sunni* believe that the individual should stand face to face before God, with no need for intercession. It is comprised of four main divisions:

1. *Maliki* - prominent in north and west Africa, upper Egypt, and Kuwait.
2. *Hanifi* - found in many countries which formerly constituted the Ottoman empire.
3. *Shafi'i* - widely practiced in Lower Egypt, North and South Yemen. This sect is largely responsible for broad economic reforms within   these countries.
4. *Hanbali* - most influential and popular in the 18th Century, this branch is the most conservative of all Sunni Muslims. *Hanbali's* are opposed to such things as logic and analogy. The *wahhabi* follow *Hanbali* practices. Their largest following is in Saudi Arabia, with smaller followings in the Sudan, India and Indonesia.

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TEST TARGET (QA-3)

1.0
2.8   2.5
3.2   2.2
3.6
4.0   2.0
1.1
      1.8
1.25 1.4   1.6

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
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