The Role of Education in a Multicultural Society:
The Theoretical Foundations of Mainstream Multiculturalism and
Their Implications for Educational Policies

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Abstract

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At present, it is generally accepted that multiculturalism is concerned with realizing an ideal multicultural society by protecting and preserving its citizens' cultural traditions and identities. This rather vague definition of multiculturalism has been one of the sources of controversies especially at the theoretical level. Against this backdrop, this dissertation explores the theoretical foundations of multiculturalism and multicultural education in a culturally diverse, liberal, democratic society. The implications of the theoretical foundations for actual educational policies, in particular those that affect minority students, are also examined.

I identify common criticisms of multiculturalism, which are then critically assessed drawing especially on the theories of multiculturalism developed by Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka. It is shown that their version of multiculturalism, which is called mainstream multiculturalism in this dissertation, is more sensitive to socio-historical contexts of minorities than their critics and argues that *in certain cases* promoting the recognition of

minority cultures is compatible with liberal, democratic ideals and maximizes the chances of achieving individual autonomy, the capacity for critical reflection, and empowerment.

When translated into educational practices, the theory of mainstream multiculturalism supports one type of multicultural education, called culturally relevant pedagogy in this dissertation. The appropriateness of supporting culturally relevant pedagogy in actual educational settings is discussed using the cases of aboriginal peoples in Canada and the Korean minority in Japan. Through the examination of socio-historical conditions affecting these particular minority groups and relevant empirical research data on minority students' identity development, it is suggested that the two groups represent rather clear cases where culturally relevant pedagogy could and should be supported by educational policies.

It is further noted that mainstream multiculturalism intends to promote intercultural understanding through engaged dialogue between different cultural groups. However, engaged dialogue cannot universally replace the implementation of culturally relevant pedagogy, as described above.

I conclude that the approach of mainstream multiculturalism and culturally relevant pedagogy is applicable to various parts of the world and is legitimate and valuable in realizing an ideal multicultural society in a modern, democratic, and liberal framework. (337 words)

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Education and Multiculturalism

(I) Introduction

As controversy over the conception of multiculturalism continues, this dissertation is intended to explore the theoretical foundations of multiculturalism and multicultural education in a culturally diverse, liberal, democratic society. The dissertation also examines the implications of these theoretical foundations for actual educational policies, in particular those that affect minority students.

This dissertation is particularly concerned with criticisms of one type of multiculturalism, which shall be called **mainstream multiculturalism**, and the type of multicultural education that mainstream multiculturalists would support, which shall be called **culturally relevant pedagogy**. The first goal of the study will be achieved by critically assessing major arguments against mainstream multiculturalism and also by examining the theories of mainstream multiculturalism developed by Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka. In order to achieve the second goal, I examine the case of aboriginal peoples in Canada and, at greater length, that of the Korean minority in Japan. The empirical findings about bicultural identity development will also be utilized.

Multiculturalism is a complicated and controversial area that covers a wide range of policies and practices. Because the emerging definition of mainstream multiculturalism is ambiguous, it is perceived differently depending on, for instance, one's political view. Four types of multiculturalism—oppositional, dominant, liberal, and mainstream

multiculturalism—are briefly described to illustrate the perceptions of multiculturalism relevant to this dissertation. Although one perception does not in all cases exclude the others, later in the dissertation the relation of mainstream multiculturalism to other types of multiculturalism will be indicated.

Some other assumptions on which I draw in the dissertation will also be stated. In the last section of this chapter I will indicate briefly the contents of each chapter.

(II) Problem Statements

Although many countries today are culturally diverse, at a theoretical level we still lack a model of how to face the "challenge of multiculturalism" (Gutmann, 1994, p.3). For instance, in spite of the fact that most political communities on record have been culturally diverse, "most Western political theorists have operated with an idealized model of the polis in which fellow citizens share a common descent, language, and culture" (Kymlicka, 1995, p.2). McCabe also states:

> I have no doubt that the capacity to value cultures other than our own is a crucial human advance and, as surely, I want to adopt a relation to my own culture which is not one of simple adulation and congratulation. However, it is not clear on what basis we can value other cultures nor exactly how we are to adopt this critical attitude to our own culture. The theoretical arguments which are very generally held about the value of other cultures seem deeply flawed. (McCabe, 1986, pp.5-6)

This lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework for approaching cultural diversity is reflected in our struggle to accommodate the phenomenon in a manner acceptable

to everyone. Most of us today would say that we have a positive response to cultural diversity, and yet we completely disagree with each other over practical issues such as whether Muslim girls should be allowed to wear chadors in public schools. There is no simple answer to questions such as: Should schools in a multicultural society reinforce students' cultural identities or not? If so, in what ways? If not, why? These controversies over cultural diversity indicate that we are facing challenges of multiculturalism; challenges that touch our deep-seated conceptions of self, community, and world view.

Given this context, it is no wonder that multicultural education has been a controversial topic in the educational literature for the past few decades. As Cummins (1996b) notes, "the concept and implementation of multicultural education has been attacked by both sides of the political spectrum" (p.xv). The conceptual ambiguity of multicultural education has been recognized as a problem for quite some time now. Reviewing the literature on multicultural education in the late 1980s, Sleeter and Grant (1987) concluded: "Clearly, the term *multicultural education* means different things to different people. The only common meaning is that it refers to changes in education that are supposed to benefit people of color" (p.436, emphasis in original). However, their observation is again increasingly becoming dated. In more recent years, proponents of multicultural education have advanced the view that multicultural education is not just for the benefit of minority students (e.g., Banks, 1994; Nieto, 1996).

One way to conceptualize multicultural education, a relatively new field that is constantly developing and expanding, is as a broad, umbrella concept that is still in the process of evolving. Since it is possible to identify different approaches to multicultural education (e.g., Gibson, 1976; Pratte, 1983; Sleeter & Grant, 1987), it could be argued that

the latest approach is most appropriate, at least at the time of discussion, since it has emerged out of the recognition that that there are limits to the former approaches. For instance, the approaches of multicultural education Sleeter and Grant (1987) identified are: "Teaching the Culturally Different," "Human Relations," "Single Group Studies," "Multicultural Education," and "Education That Is Multicultural and Social Reconstructionist." They note that the last approach is the least developed because it emerged out of critique of the Multicultural Education approach (Sleeter & Grant, 1987, p.436). Recognizing the need for development, we could concentrate our effort on the conceptual clarification of the approach.

The problem with this way of conceptualizing multicultural education, however, is that there exists no clear reason why all of these approaches should come under the term "multicultural education." If each approach to multicultural education draws on a distinctively different conceptual framework, there is no point in calling all of the approaches by the same label. It is quite reasonable to assume that, if all of these approaches are labeled multicultural education, there should exist a common theoretical framework that binds them together. It is also quite reasonable to assume that this theoretical framework is multiculturalism.

It may strike one by surprise to learn that many advocates of multicultural education do not make reference to theories of multiculturalism, although it can be immediately pointed out that theories of multiculturalism have not been very well developed until very recently. Cultural pluralism, rather than multiculturalism, has often been seen as the theoretical foundation of multicultural education (e.g., Gollnick, Klassen and Yff, 1976; Suzuki, 1984). But then, again, what cultural pluralism actually means is not quite settled yet. To make the situation even more complicated, the connection between multicultural education and

cultural pluralism has also remained ambiguous (Martin, 1993). Some multicultural

education advocates simply refrain from mentioning cultural pluralism. In this state of

confusion, it may sound like a bad idea to examine the connection between multiculturalism

and multicultural education, as I am about to do, because this may seem to complicate the

situation even more.

What multiculturalism means is also often quite ambiguous, as I will mention

below. However, I contend that it is important to consider the implications of cultural

pluralism/multiculturalism for multicultural education, since it is this connection indicates

what multicultural education is. I think we can safely say that multicultural education is

education that moves away from the principle of assimilation. The increasing legitimacy of

multiculturalism as a value—no matter how ambiguous the definition—indicates that

traditional assimilation policy is reaching its limit. Many statistics indicate that various

ethnic minorities are not integrated into the social fabric of the "mainstream." For instance,

in Canada it is argued that there exists a 'vertical mosaic,' with "Anglo- and Euro-Canadians

occupying the top political and economic spheres; Ukrainians, Italians, and other European

minorities occupying a middle level; French Canadians occupying somewhere in between;

and visible minorities, such as blacks, Asians, and native peoples located at the bottom"

(Samuda, 1989, p.12). The strategy of assimilation is not effective for everyone. But the

relative clarity ends at this point

We are still struggling to conceptualize the alternatives to assimilation, and this is

one of the main reasons why we have controversies over cultural pluralism/multiculturalism.

I think it is particularly important to understand the theories of multiculturalism and their

implications for education. This is because the basic assumptions implicit in the discussion

of multicultural education, such as culture and identity, are increasingly being subjected to more critical examination (e.g., Wax, 1993; Hoffman, 1996). Theories of multiculturalism—in particular that proposed by Taylor and Kymlicka, called **mainstream multiculturalism**[1] in this dissertation—are, as will be discussed in the chapters that follow, deeply grounded in issues of culture and identity. Indeed, one underlying issue in the discourse of multiculturalism is that cultural recognition has come to play a significant role in identity formation in modern societies. As Taylor (1991, 1994) acutely points out, after the feudal system was replaced with democracy, which is the embodiment of the Enlightenment thinking that individuals are autonomous, the recognition of our identity has become an important political issue. In the modern context, the request for equal respect is increasingly becoming essential. We have to respect "the potential for forming and defining one's own identity, as an individual, and also as a culture" (Taylor, 1994, p.42). But this is not as simple as it sounds. This dissertation tries to illustrate how mainstream multiculturalism can help resolve the complexity associated with this task.

Previous efforts at clarifying the theoretical underpinnings of multicultural education have tended to focus on analysis of existing literature advocating educational change under the name of multicultural education (e.g., Edwards, 1992; Eldering, 1996; Gibson, 1976; Martin, 1993; Sleeter & Grant, 1987). This dissertation, however, discusses theories of multiculturalism first, and then considers its implications for educational policies concerning minority students. This way of approaching the theoretical foundations of multicultural education is important because, as mentioned earlier, discussion of the link between multiculturalism and multicultural education has been infrequent.

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[1] I am following Fraser (1998) in this use of the term.

(III) Defining Multiculturalism

Now, how can we understand a controversial and complicated concept such as multiculturalism, the perceptions of which now range from ideology (Ng, 1995) to culturalism (Bromwich, 1995)? One of the factors contributing to the state of confusion is that, just as with multicultural education, there seem to exist various types of multiculturalism; the definition of multiculturalism tends to be ambiguous. As Kymlicka (1995) states: "the term 'multiculturalism' covers many different forms of cultural pluralism, each of which raises its own challenges ... Generalizations about the goals or consequences of multiculturalism can therefore be very misleading" (p.10).

Even though the definition of multiculturalism is vague, however, there is a consensus emerging that, as an alternative to the assimilation model, we should respect and promote the protection and preservation of traditional cultural heritages and ways of life in the public sphere. Poole (1996) defines this emerging type of multiculturalism as follows:

> ... multiculturalism is a *political principle* which claims that the government should act so as to protect and sustain this social diversity: at the very least by preventing discrimination on the basis of cultural identity and not discriminating in its own practices ('negative multiculturalism'), and perhaps also by acting positively to ensure the continued viability of minority cultures ('positive multiculturalism'). (Poole, 1996, p.410, emphasis in original)

It is also generally accepted that, if different from the dominant culture, one's native cultural heritage and identity should be valued in a larger society. For instance, comparing multiculturalism with pluralism, Feinberg (1996) states that "whereas pluralism allows

cultural identity to flourish, the multicultural ideal encourages it to do so" (Feinberg, 1996, p.1). He also states that multiculturalism "values cultural difference and authenticity, and seeks to maintain it in ways that are not solely dependent on the momentary interests of individuals" (Feinberg, 1996, p.1). Therefore, in general, multiculturalism can be understood as **a value and political principle that intends to promote peaceful and meaningful coexistence of culturally diverse groups by protecting people's cultural heritage and identity.** For the convenience of discussion, this is the definition of **mainstream multiculturalism** on which I would like to build my discussion. This definition will also be referred to from time to time as the cultural recognition thesis. In this dissertation, when I say multicultural society, I refer to a society that tries to adhere to the values expressed in the above definition.

This general definition, of course, requires further clarification, which will be undertaken in the following chapters. Before discussing the controversies over multiculturalism in more detail, it should be mentioned that I do not intend to consider every aspect of multiculturalism in this dissertation. For instance, Kymlicka (1995) lists thirteen different kinds of policies and programs practiced and proposed under "the rubric of 'multiculturalism' in the public debate" (p.42). Each of Kymlicka's categories is indeed an important aspect of multiculturalism, but this categorization is too comprehensive for our purposes here. For instance, the first category in the list is "affirmative action programs"; the sixth is "Anti-racism educational programs" (p.42). Obviously it is impossible to deal with every issue that multiculturalism is taken to cover.

Instead, below I will describe types of multiculturalism most relevant to this dissertation. Each type characterizes a particular perception of multiculturalism, although it

does not necessarily exclude the others. I do not intend to show that one perception is better than the others, except for the case of dominant multiculturalism. The different perceptions are provided to illustrate that there are different views of multiculturalism. Later, in Chapter 4, after examining the theories of mainstream multiculturalism and the arguments against them, I will describe how each type relates to the others, trying to illuminate what is meant by mainstream multiculturalism.

Regarding the definition of multiculturalism, it may also be pointed out that the complexity associated with the term is at least partly due to the fact that it is now used in various international contexts. *Random House Webster's College Dictionary* (1995) traces the origin of the term to around 1960-65 in the context of the United States, but it was used internationally after 1971 when multiculturalism became the official government policy of Canada and then "spread to the U.S., Australia and Western Europe" (Schierup, 1997, p.111). The word has now become very popular, especially in these countries, although multiculturalism as an official policy exists only in Canada and Australia.

One way to clarify this situation would be to distinguish Canadian multiculturalism from the American one, the Australian one, and so on. However, even within a given nation, there are various conceptions of multiculturalism, and we can also identify certain types of multiculturalism cutting across national boundaries. Therefore, I will not limit multiculturalism to the context of a particular society. Rather, I will discuss it and its implications for education in the context of modern, liberal, and democratic societies. Of course, we cannot entirely ignore national boundaries, and I will mention them when they are relevant.

(1) Oppositional Multiculturalism

One of the inherent characteristics of multiculturalism is that it is oppositional to the modern concept of nation-state.[2] The nation-state is a political concept which assumes one-culture, language, and national policy within its sovereignty. As Poole states, "the characteristic modern form of the state is the nation state, i.e., the state whose legitimacy depends on its claim to represent a community defined by its culture" (Poole, 1996, p.417). In such a community, a government assumes that the community it serves has only one culture, which is common to citizens of the nation. Cultural diversity tends to be ignored or marginalized in the face of the demand for cohesion as a political community. This demand is called "homosociality" by Sakai (1996). Discussing society in a modern context, he describes the characteristics of our typical world view as follows:

> In modernism, boundaries of each entity such as national community, culture, language, society, economy (and we might as well add ethnicity and race to this list) are thought of as if they all are piled up and matched together ... In spite of numerous exceptions and counter examples, it is extremely difficult for us to free ourselves from this request that these boundaries have to match. (Sakai, 1996, p.171, my translation)

Multiculturalism is controversial partly because of its resistance to the force of the well accepted modern conception of a political unity—the notion that one political community should exist bound by a common culture. Goldberg (1994) uses the term "monoculturalism"

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[2] Here, Canada may be considered an exception because Canada operates under a federal system that recognizes more than one "nation." Nevertheless, in the Canadian literature we can also find numerous calls for a unified culture, not just multi-nations (e.g., Bissoondath, 1994; Gairdner, 1990).

instead of "homosociality" and claims that multiculturalism emerged as a resistant to monoculturalism (p.7).

This basic assumption that we should have a common culture as a basis for political unity has been, for instance, supported by the assimilation theory of the "melting pot" in the context of the United States (Gordon, 1964). In their processes of nation-building, other Western countries, too, believed they needed a strong assimilation policy to achieve a common national identity. The dominant culture was strongly imposed on minority groups and their descendants. And Asian, Black, and aboriginal populations were often considered to be unassimilable, even when their existence had predated the establishment of the Western political unities, and they were forced to remain non-citizens or second-class citizens. In this historical and political context, the long-time marginalized ethnic groups in the United States and Canada—Chicano/as, Latino/as, American Indians and First Nations, and Quebecois/ses among others—can be distinguished from immigrants as national minorities, because they were incorporated into the current political systems involuntarily. Multiculturalism in this context demands cultural and political recognition of these minorities. Therefore, from the perspective of national minorities, multiculturalism is a counter movement against the homosociality that modern nation-states demands. As such, multiculturalism inevitably has an *oppositional* aspect to its origin.

An oppositional force against a common, unified culture in a single political unity has been reinforced by another trend in Western countries: a shift in immigration policies. These countries had tight immigration policies until around the 1950s, partly because of the desire to build a nation with a common culture and partly because there were enough immigrants available from the mother countries. Increasingly, however, since the 1960s

immigration policies have been relaxed to include Asians and Africans workers were needed and less Anglo or European people wished to emigrate (Samuda, 1989, pp.6-8). The majority ruling groups of these nation-states then needed a new tactic to deal with the cultural diversity which had become increasingly "visible" (Poole, 1996). The assimilation theory was challenged by the influx of more culturally and racially diverse immigrants. This demographic change has helped increase the need for a multicultural solution.

(2) Dominant Multiculturalism

The oppositional nature of multiculturalism, however, has often been reduced as a dominant social group has tried to replace the assimilation policy with multiculturalism. For the reasons noted above, the dominant discourse on multiculturalism has increasingly tended to describe the concept in terms of cultural diversity within a larger society. We can notice such use of the term, for instance, as the Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chrétien, proudly writes:

> Multiculturalism is a defining characteristic of our country. Cultural diversity is both a fact of life in Canada and a vital Canadian value. Through generation upon generation, Canadians have built a nation on the principles of democracy, opportunity, fairness, cooperation and mutual respect. Those principles have made our country the envy of the world. (Chrétien, 1997, Introduction)

This kind of demographic recognition of multiculturalism can be perceived as a gesture toward cultural diversity as a value, without accepting the oppositional nature of multiculturalism.

However, this perception of multiculturalism is not only non-oppositional, it is also simply inaccurate. If multiculturalism merely reflected the presence of cultural diversity in any given society, the coinage of multiculturalism would not have been required. The concept of multiculturalism has emerged because it is required to describe and conceptualize a specific phenomenon in a specific socio-historical circumstance. Cultural diversity has been the norm rather than the exception throughout history and the world. For instance, the Ottoman Empire, which was founded in the 13th century and reached its territorial peak in the 16th century, ruling parts of the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, was a religiously, culturally, and ethnically diverse state. Certainly from the 16th century until the 19th century, when the empire enjoyed its greatest prosperity, the Muslims tolerated the religious diversity of Christians, Jews, and others, making use of non-Muslims' abilities to Muslims' benefit (Yamauchi, 1996, pp.122-132). Or we can think of Japan, say, about two hundred years ago. Although many now believe it is one of the most culturally homogeneous countries in the world, Japan is relatively well known for its lively tradesman and artisan (*chonin*) culture during the Edo period, which was in a clear contrast to that of the ruling class (*samurai*) culture. But these two societies, while culturally diverse, are not considered as multicultural.

The demographic recognition of various cultures within a single polity in the West tends to "celebrate" cultural diversity; but often it just promotes superficial understandings of cultures, spreading exotism and commodification of non-Western cultures. I call this type of multiculturalism *dominant* multiculturalism, because it privileges the dominant, European culture.

This does not mean, however, that multiculturalism necessarily becomes the dominant type when it gains official legitimacy. Gaining official legitimacy may sometimes increase the frustration of the previously unrecognized voices, but this is not supposed to happen as multiculturalism develops. For instance, examining the historical process by which official multiculturalism has come to be implemented, McRoberts (1997) argues that Canadian multiculturalism has been used to dismantle Quebec nationalism. As a result, the Multicultural Act has attracted mainly English Canadians, without the support of the Quebecois/ses. One could argue, then, that official multiculturalism in Canada would not embody oppositional voices. If so, we might have to consider that Canadian multiculturalism could represent only the dominant type of multiculturalism.

However, the distinction between oppositional and dominant should not merely reflect the official existence of multicultural policies. There should be an example of official multiculturalism accommodating aspects of oppositional multiculturalism. Moreover, even if McRoberts is right in pointing out that the current Canadian multicultural policies are not appealing to the Quebecois/ses, potentially there could be a multiculturalism that is acceptable for the Quebecois/ses. This seems to be what Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, Canadian proponents of multiculturalism, have been exploring in their writings, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

In this dissertation, multiculturalism is seen as often having an oppositional quality, whether there is an official policy or not. And it is recognized that not all official multicultural policies are dominant. Dominant multiculturalism does not, as a matter of fact, fit the definition of multiculturalism I described above and for which I will argue in this dissertation. I mention dominant multiculturalism because it usually helps to clarify what

something means by describing what it *does not* mean; also, even dominant multiculturalism seems to acknowledge that there is a need to move away from assimilation policy.

(3) Liberal Multiculturalism and Mainstream Multiculturalism

How liberalism could accommodate multiculturalism is still an issue of controversy, as we will see in the following chapters. In this dissertation, it is assumed that liberalism is not hostile to the idea of multiculturalism. As a political principle and value concerned with the maintenance of cultural diversity, multiculturalism has been struggling to claim its legitimacy within a liberal framework. This is because, as will be discussed in the chapters below, protection of a culture is seen as involving valuing and maintaining cultural traditions even when, to a degree, they restrict the kind of personal autonomy and critical reflection essential to liberalism. Therefore, liberals, concerned with the possibility that recognizing cultural rights may override individual rights, propose that the emphasis on culture should not be articulated too strongly. Walzer (1995) refers to this kind of liberalism as "Liberalism 1," which is "committed in the strongest possible way to individual rights and ... to a rigorously neutral state, that is, a state without cultural or religious projects or, indeed, any sort of collective goals beyond the personal freedom and the physical security, welfare, and safety of its citizens" (p.99). Similar to the idea of "negative multiculturalism" suggested by Poole (1996), some liberals think that the protection of cultural heritage and identity is best served by strongly supporting individual rights and reducing cultural biases of the society at large.

The proponents of mainstream multiculturalism, on the other hand, argue that multiculturalism should be realized differently in a liberal and democratic society. The

proponents of mainstream multiculturalism prefer the type of liberalism that Walzer (1995) calls "Liberalism 2," which "allows for a state committed to the survival and flourishing of a particular nation, culture, or religion, or of a (limited) set of nations, cultures, and religions—so long as the basic rights of citizens who have different commitments or no such commitments at all are protected" (p.99). This is again similar to Poole's (1996) "positive multiculturalism." This perception of multiculturalism seems to be the most closely related to the general definition of multiculturalism suggested earlier.

For some, mainstream multiculturalism appears to accommodate oppositional as well as liberal perspectives on multiculturalism, but many critics perceive mainstream multiculturalism as a product of a mere compromise which loses sight of more critical issues such as personal autonomy or critical capacity. The abstraction of "cultural diversity," moving away from concrete and unique socio-historical positions of all "cultures," has especially obscured the intentions of mainstream multiculturalism. The significance of mainstream multiculturalism in resolving the controversies over multiculturalism is the main theme of the dissertation, and discussion of mainstream multiculturalism will be developed in Chapters 3 and 4.

I would like to add that I am aware of the negative connotations of liberalism, especially since the 1980s, when neo-conservatism dominated the political climate in the United States and elsewhere. For instance, McLaren (1993) states that "liberal multiculturalism" falls short of challenging the assimilation ideology because liberal multiculturalists wrongly assume that relative equality between the mainstream society and cultural minorities exists. This is the view that "liberal multiculturalism" is essentially the same as dominant multiculturalism, mentioned above. This is not, however, the

interpretation I would like to apply to liberal multiculturalism. In this dissertation, liberalism is understood in a broader sense, its essential values being seen as individual autonomy and critical reflection (Chapter 2).

(IV) Objectives of the Dissertation

This dissertation is concerned with the realization of mainstream multiculturalism in the midst of criticisms of multiculturalism in general. Reviewing the literature on multicultural education and multiculturalism, we see foremost that we have an overwhelmingly large volume of objections to multicultural education and multiculturalism at theoretical as well as practical levels. In particular, we are faced with a large amount of criticism of special treatment of groups of people based on particularities of groups, such as ethnicity and religion. This criticism comes from **individualistic liberals** (e.g., Kukathas, 1992; Rorty, 1994; Walker, 1997) as well as **critical educators** albeit for different reasons. If one accepted this type of objection to multiculturalism, it would be inappropriate to publicly support education that incorporates the cultural heritage of students in a culturally diverse society. What is called culturally relevant pedagogy (Ladson-Billings, 1995a, 1995b; Maina, 1997; Osborne, 1996) or culturally compatible education (Nieto, 1996, pp.145-147) would thus be severely marginalized in education.

This dissertation questions some aspects of these objections to multiculturalism. I critically assess these criticisms, clarifying the issues the criticisms raise, where appropriate. To do so, I draw on the theories of mainstream multiculturalism developed by Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka. I explore their arguments and assess them, trying to clarify what mainstream multiculturalism could mean, rather than criticizing the vagueness of the

concept. Through this process, it will become clearer how mainstream multiculturalism is perceived, and what it actually is or should be.

The appropriateness of culturally relevant pedagogy is then considered drawing on the above examinations as well as relevant empirical studies such as those on bicultural identity development and the effectiveness of culturally relevant pedagogy for integrating minority students into the mainstream society. The case studies of aboriginals in Canada and Korean minorities in Japan will be conducted to examine how the discussions thus far can be applied to actual educational policies for realizing an ideal multicultural society.

The objectives of this dissertation are, therefore:

1.   To assess criticisms of multiculturalism and multicultural education;

2.   To clarify the theoretical foundations of mainstream multiculturalism;

3.   Based on the above, to show the theoretical underpinnings of culturally relevant pedagogy as part of multicultural education;

4.   Through case studies, to show examples of how the theory of culturally relevant pedagogy can and should be applied to educational policies in liberal, democratic, and multicultural societies.

The main argument is that mainstream multiculturalism does not support separate cultural identities, cultural nationalism, or cultural determinism as many critics of multiculturalism claim. The two major groups of critics, individualistic-liberals and critical educators, tend to deny mainstream multiculturalism as they try to propose a universal principle of multiculturalism. However, I will argue that it is this universal application that

mainstream multiculturalists problematize. I will show that there are certain contexts where mainstream multiculturalism can and should be applied.

Before we discuss the details, below, I would like to describe the assumptions and limitations of the dissertation.

(V) Assumptions and Limitations

In this dissertation, it is assumed that education[3] can and should play a leading role in pursuing social ideals within the larger society. By this, I do not mean that education is merely a means to achieve social goals. I recognize that personal goals and the well-being of all children are significantly related to how they interact within a larger society and that social and personal well-being cannot be entirely separated. As such, I also recognize that we cannot put too much burden on education, as if it were the sole source of social woes and by changing education we could single-handedly solve the problems such as discrimination, inequality, or poverty. Rather, with Beck (1990) I recognize that education is a part of society and education and society should work together toward social goals.

The term culture requires some clarification, since it is used to refer to various conceptions. In this dissertation, culture is used in a broad sense, as it is in ordinary usage, but it should be noted at this point that culture does not necessarily imply shared and coherent frames of reference. Such a conception of culture implies that culture determines individuals, forcing individuals to prioritize collective goals at the expense of individual autonomy. However, to accept such determinism, especially toward non-Western cultures,

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[3] The term "education" and "schooling" are used interchangeably in this dissertation. I am not directly concerned with higher education.

often exhibits the exoticism of Westerners. Rather, culture is referred to as a source of collective identity for its members. Here, I am following Young's (1990) conception of a social group. She states that "[m]embers of a group have a specific affinity with one another because of their similar experience or way of life, which prompts them to associate with one another more than with those not identified with the group, or in a different way" (Young, 1990, p.43). This description may not sound very different from a classic conception of culture. Indeed, like many earlier anthropologists, Young recognizes that "[a] person's particular sense of history, affinity, and separatedness, even the person's mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or his group affinities" (Young, 1990, p.45). However, Young also stresses that "[t]his does not mean that persons have no individual styles, or are unable to transcend or reject a group identity. Nor does it preclude persons from having many aspects that are independent of these group identities" (Young, 1990, p.45). It is especially important to note that a "social group is defined not primarily by a set of shared attributes, but a sense of identity" (Young, 1990, p.44).

The term minority has also become controversial in recent years. As Cummins (1996a) indicates, "minority" students are becoming the "majority" in some areas in North America (e.g., Asian-Americans in parts of California). In other words, it has become clear that the "minority" and "majority" distinction is not merely a matter of numbers. In this dissertation, I would like to follow the definition that minority refers to "a group occupying a subordinate position in a multiethnic society, suffering from the disabilities of prejudice and discrimination, and maintaining a separate group identity" (Gibson, 1991, p.358). It should also be noted that minority is also interchangeable with other terms such as: subordinated; culturally marginalized; and non-dominant.

I limit the scope of my examination by assuming that democratic, liberal, and multicultural societies by definition strive to realize the peaceful coexistence of culturally diverse groups of people by respecting their cultural resources. As Gutmann (1994) states, "Multicultural societies and communities that stand for the freedom and equality of all people rest upon mutual respect for reasonable intellectual, political, and cultural differences" (p.24). The question we are concerned with here is *how* we respect cultural diversity in a liberal democratic society.

Some may question whether my general analysis of multiculturalism in a liberal democratic context could be applied to "unique" countries such as Japan. Indeed there have been discussions of whether Japan is truly liberal and democratic or not. For instance, Herzog (1993) writes that "[i]t can hardly be maintained that at present democracy is flourishing in Japan" (p. 10). However, Japan is a modern nation-state which claims to be liberal and democratic. Democracy is hard to define, but the basic principles of the democratic political system can be summarized as follows:

> Essentially, a democratic political system exists when political institutions provide opportunities for citizens to gain and exchange information, articulate opinions, and express their political view points. Potential political leaders are free to compete for the support of these citizens. And governmental institutions ensure that state policies are in some measure congruent with citizens' expressions of preference. (Ishida and Krauss, 1989, p.18)

According to Ishida and Krauss (1989), "[b]y virtually any such empirical measure, contemporary Japanese institutions are democratic" (p.18), although, of course, there is plenty of room for more democratization.

In my view, then, it is appropriate to refer to the Japanese context in Chapter 5, as explained below, as we try to see how the principles of mainstream multiculturalism could and should be practiced.

(VI) Outline of the Dissertation

This and the next four chapters of the dissertation attempt to clarify the nature of and arguments for mainstream multiculturalism.

In Chapter 2, I go over major criticisms of mainstream multiculturalism presented by liberals and critical educators. In doing so, I describe the representation of multiculturalism in the public discussion and implications for educational policies and practices as perceived by its critics. I also show that the main concern of liberals is autonomy and that of critical educators is empowerment.

In Chapter 3, I discuss whether or not liberals' representations of mainstream multiculturalism are accurate, examining the arguments of mainstream multiculturalists. I show that although the concern about autonomy is legitimate, mainstream multiculturalists share similar concerns. I further argue that in certain cases mainstream multiculturalists may have stronger arguments than their critics.

Chapter 4 examines critical educators' criticisms of mainstream multiculturalism. In general, critical educators perceive mainstream multiculturalism as non-oppositional, and therefore non-empowering. However, I argue that mainstream multiculturalism has not lost its oppositional nature and therefore is empowering. Although some critics insist that mainstream multiculturalism and critical education theory remain different (e.g., Mullard 1982, 1984; Olneck, 1990; Rezai-Rashti, 1995; Troyna, 1987; Watkins, 1994), I show that

they actually share a similar perspective. As a matter of fact, our analysis of the critics as well as the proponents of mainstream multiculturalism reveals that they all share similar concerns, although the emphases in their arguments are different. Therefore, although some criticisms are indeed significant and mainstream multiculturalism has to accommodate them, mainstream multiculturalism can survive these criticisms.

Since this argument strongly calls for empirical support, in Chapter 5 I examine the cases of aboriginal peoples in Canada and Korean residents in Japan (*zainichi Koreans*). Through these examples it will be shown that there are certain contexts in which mainstream multiculturalism has to be protected in spite of the arguments against it.

In Chapter 6, I further argue that the mainstream multicultural approach to education thus far discussed does not complete the project of mainstream multiculturalism. I show that it also supports the dialogic engagement some liberal-critical theorists advocate (I refer to this as education for dialogic engagement). However, I argue that this approach cannot replace the previous claim of mainstream multicultural education, as the liberal-critical theorists argue, for the reasons explained in the previous chapters. This does not imply that mainstream multiculturalism is inconsistent, either. Mainstream multiculturalists recognize that the two approaches can and should be taken together at this socio-historical moment.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the dissertation and larger questions regarding the entire framework of mainstream multiculturalism will be discussed, along with summary and significance of the dissertation.

Chapter 2

Criticisms of Multiculturalism and Multicultural Education

(I) Introduction

In this chapter, I examine some of the major criticisms of multiculturalism and its implications for education in general. I do this not to reproduce the already much debated controversies over multiculturalism but to overview how critics of multiculturalism have interpreted and represented the concept. Among various criticisms of multiculturalism, I identify two distinctive streams of argument: **liberal-individualist** perspectives and **critical educators'** perspectives.

Liberal-individualist critics argue that multiculturalism promotes separatism, cultural ethnocentrism, and determinism. In this discourse, multiculturalism is perceived as a threat to developing personal autonomy and reflective thinking, which are the two major educational goals for liberals. On the other hand, critical educators are more concerned with the issue of empowerment for minority groups. They argue that multiculturalism and/or multicultural education does not offer an effective, and is even, a counter productive strategy for solving serious problems that minorities are facing. They even argue that multicultural education, by focusing on issues of culture, is merely a strategy to move our attention away from more serious social problems such as poverty and inequality. The alternative approaches suggested by each perspective are also noted.

(II) Liberal Criticisms of Multiculturalism

As noted in the previous chapter, there seem to exist two liberal perspectives when discussing multiculturalism. As we will see in the following sections, some liberals believe that articulating the agenda of mainstream multiculturalism could endanger individual freedom and restrict critical capacity. This is "Liberalism 1" as termed by Walzer (1995). Indeed, *individual* freedom is the foundation of liberalism. Although covering a wide range of political and social values, we can identify some basic principles of liberalism. For instance, Mill (1956) argues that in a liberal society individual freedom has to be protected at any cost, unless it causes harm to others. Life should be lead based on individual beliefs, not societal convention. This principle is derived from concerns about oppressive rules as well as imposition by "the majority" (p.7). Mill is especially concerned with social tendency that moulds our way of thinking in one direction and can hinder the progress of society. He thinks that diverse opinions have to be welcomed in order to avoid political despotism. As he states, "there needs to be protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to *impose* ... its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development and, if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own" (p.7, emphasis added). Here we see Mill's strong concern about the stifling social influence which can discourage individuals from forming opinions not well accepted in the society at large. Mill recognizes that society, made up of the people around us, often imposes opinions about what life is supposed to be on individuals, often favouring traditions and customary ways. Individual freedom, which

ensures that one leads her/his life the way s/he would like, is fundamental in liberalism in order to resist conformity and encourage progress.

Freedom of thought and discussion is especially important for liberals because it is only through considering diverse views that we can know that what we *believe* to be good is indeed good. In a liberal society individuals should be able to lead their lives in whatever manner they like, so long as it does not hurt others. Liberals think that beliefs about what is valuable come from inside, and the meaning of "a good life" should not be imposed simply because it is a tradition; at the same time, liberals encourage individuals to revise freely their opinions about "a good life" when encountering different perspectives. Kymlicka (1989) describes the liberal perspective as follows:

> we have an ability to detach ourselves from any particular communal practice. No particular task is set for us by society, and no particular cultural practice has authority that is beyond individual judgement and possible rejection. We can and should acquire our tasks through freely made personal judgements about the cultural structure, the matrix of understandings and alternatives passed down to us by previous generations, which offers us possibilities we can either affirm or reject. (pp. 50-51)

In this way, liberals are concerned with the development of personal autonomy, characterized by our capacity to freely make personal choices about how we live our lives and how we reflect on our own choices, also feeling free to revise them.

As we will see below, this tradition of liberalism, which sees *individual* freedom and autonomy as the fundamental values, appears to be challenged by the claims of multiculturalists that cultural groups should also be respected, not merely individuals. In the

next chapter, we will see how mainstream multiculturalism proposes to accommodate the protection of individual freedom as well as certain cultural protections.

Liberalism is important in discussing educational aims since it has long influenced educational thought in many parts of the world, especially in North America and the United Kingdom. As Feinberg (1995) states:

> This influence [the influence of liberalism] extends to our conception of educational aims as we emphasise the importance of individual development and choice, and it extends to our understanding of educational research where the more prominent paradigms take as the primary unit of analysis individual differences in such things as motivation, intelligence or environment. (p.203)

In general, the liberal view of essential educational goals includes:

(i)   the aim of developing autonomy;

(ii)   an emphasis on fundamental and general knowledge;

(iii)   an aversion to mere instrumentality in determining what is to be learnt; and

(iv)   a concern for the development of critical reason which, notwithstanding the complex issues (not least of interpretation) to which they give rise, constitute fundamental elements in the basic concept of liberal education. (McLaughlin, 1992, pp.116-117)

As we will see below, the development of autonomy and the ability of critical reflection are the two major concerns of liberal critics of multiculturalism. In their criticisms of multiculturalism, they perceive that it threatens these core liberal educational principles.

I would also like to clarify the general context in which the liberal criticisms are embedded. This is important because different types of critics often perceive

multiculturalism and multicultural education differently. The liberal criticisms of

multiculturalism I examine below have emerged partly in response to actual implementations

of programs and policies supported by "multiculturalists." For instance, in 1989, the

Commissioner of Education in New York State submitted a report called *A Curriculum of

Inclusion*, proposing that "all curricular materials be prepared on the basis of multicultural

contributions to all aspects of our society" (Report of the Commissioner's Task Force on

Minorities: Equity and Excellence, cited by Fullinwider, 1996, p.4). According to

Fullinwider (1996), the report perceives that the current curriculum is systematically biased

toward European culture and so is miseducating all children. Therefore, the report suggests

that curricular materials should include the contributions of Native Americans, Puerto

Ricans, Latinos/nas, African-Americans, and Asian Americans so that children of these

categories can have greater self-esteem, while children of European descent become less

Eurocentric (Fullinwider, 1996).

The liberal critics would also consider the recent revision of "reading lists" at San

Francisco high schools as another typical example of a "multicultural" influence. In March

1998, the San Francisco Board of Education revised the reading list for high school students

because the existing list included only white, male authors. The aim of this action is to help

minority students relate to authors, which would, in consequence, help students to develop

self-esteem and keep their grades high. In the words of the co-author of the initiative, "[i]n a

district that is nearly 90 percent students of color, the point of education is not to glorify

Europe, but to (let) students see themselves in the curriculum" (Guthrie, 1998, March 10).

Eventually, the San Francisco Board of Education became the nation's first to require that

reading lists include culturally diverse authors. The new provisions are as follows:

(1)   Works of literature read in class in grades 9 to 11 ... must include works by writers of color, which reflect the diversity of culture, race, and class of the students.

(2)   The required reading in high schools shall include those works ... referenced on the SAT.

(3)   Writers who are known to be lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender shall be appropriately identified in the curriculum. (Asimov, 1998, March 21)

When the liberals criticize multiculturalism or multicultural education, they generally perceive multiculturalism as the theory behind multicultural movements of this type. This means that, for many liberal critics of multiculturalism, it supports the following thesis: Culture is a primal source of identity which should be recognized; the present public sphere, including public education, of a given society is not culturally neutral, but rather favours White, Anglo-European views; this marginalizes non-dominant cultures and damages the self-esteem of minority students; therefore, education should represent the cultural backgrounds of students so their self-esteem is affirmed positively and Anglo-Euro-centrism should be avoided.

Liberal critics seem to perceive this thesis behind multiculturalism and multicultural education as problematic. Below I would like to list some of the major liberal criticisms of multiculturalism.

(1) Multiculturalism as Separatism

One popular criticism of multiculturalism is that since it emphasizes cultural differences, it threatens cohesion of social unity and leads to cultural fragmentation of a

political unity. For instance, Schlesinger (1998) is concerned with the weakening of national cohesion as a result of too much emphasis on racial and ethnic identity. Calling multiculturalism "the cult of ethnicity" and "the new ethnic gospel," he criticizes the concept as follows:

> The new ethnic gospel rejects the unifying vision of individuals from all nations melted into a new race. Its underlying philosophy is that America is not a nation of individuals at all but a nation of groups, that ethnicity is the defining experience for Americans, that ethnic ties are permanent and indelible, and that division into ethnic communities establishes the basic structure of American society and the basic meaning of American history. (Schlesinger, 1998, pp.20-21)

He argues that, because of this group identity emphasis, national identity is at stake in the United States. For him, multicultural education is a means of encouraging minority students' "ethnic or racial pride" instead of prioritizing a national identity. He states as follows:

> The impact of ethnic and racial pressures on our public schools is more troubling. The bonds of national cohesion are sufficiently fragile already. Public education should aim to strengthen those bonds, not to weaken them. If separatist tendencies go on unchecked, the result can only be the fragmentation, resegregation, and tribalization of American life. (Schlesinger, 1998, p.23)

Schlesinger views multiculturalism simply as an attack on the traditional assimilation theory of the "melting pot." However, this alternative theory does not work because, as Schlesinger sees it, multiculturalism and education supported by multiculturalists only serve to separate Americans into ethnic and cultural sub-groups. For him, multiculturalism is a theory that wrongly prioritizes ethnic and racial identities over a national one.

In the Canadian context, Bissoondath (1994) agrees with Schlesinger. He fears that "it [multiculturalism] is leading us into a divisiveness so entrenched that we face a future of multiple solitudes with *no central notion to bind us*" (p.192, emphasis added). Bissoondath criticizes the official multicultural policy of Canada, the Multiculturalism Act, arguing that it draws on assumptions that "[immigrant] people, coming here from elsewhere, wish to remain what they have been; that personalities and ways of doing things, ways of looking at the world, can be frozen in time" (Bissoondath, 1994, p.43). The act Bissoondath criticizes states that "the Constitution of Canada recognizes the importance of *preserving* and *enhancing* the multicultural heritage of Canadians" (Excerpts from the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, cited by Kymlicka, 1998, p.184, emphasis mine). Instead of "preserving" and "enhancing" ancestral heritage, Bissoondath would like to see a new common, central culture, which does not aim at "preserving differences but at blending them into a new vision of Canadianness, pursuing a Canada where inherent differences and inherent similarities meld easily and where no one is alienated with hyphenation" (p.224).

(2) Multiculturalism as Cultural Ethnocentrism

In educational settings, separatism of multiculturalism means that it encourages segregation—albeit voluntary—based on cultural backgrounds of students. For instance, Appiah (1994b) disagrees with the "separatism" of "multicultural education." In his words, separatism is "the thought that the way to deal with our many cultures in public education is to teach each child the culture of 'its' group: in order, say, to define and strengthen her or his self-esteem," (Appiah, 1994b, p.12) as favoured by some Afrocentrists and some bilingual educators for Hispanics. He argues that cultural differences could influence *how* we teach

students, but not *what* we teach, because he believes that "traditions are worth teaching in our public schools and colleges because they are beautiful and good and true—or, at least, interesting and important and useful—never because they are ours or yours, mine or thine" (Appiah, 1994b, p.13). If there are cultural differences, Appiah thinks, they do not need to be strengthened at school. He believes that schools should function to make such culturally particularistic understanding of the world disappear, rather than emphasizing it. According to Appiah, ethnicity and religion should be cultivated at home, not in public schools. He summarizes his arguments against multicultural separatist education as follows:

> ...consider what might happen if we adopted a policy in which the public schools set out to teach children according to their identities and subcultures; that not only taught *about* collective identities but set out to reinforce and transmit them. If carried out to its ultimate, this policy would require segregation into cultural and religious groups either within or between public schools, in ways that would be plainly unconstitutional in the United States since the *Brown* decision. (Appiah, 1994b, p.15, emphasis in original)

Appiah supports the minimalist approach of liberalism, which intends to create a culturally and religiously neutral public space, clearly distinguishing private and public issues.

The liberal critics also argue that putting too much emphasis on the cultural part of personal identity is not appropriate for educating students in multicultural societies not just because it threatens national unity but also because it promotes cultural ethnocentrism. For instance, Gutmann (1995) is against the idea of supporting any type of separate school for minority students. She warns that such a type of multicultural education is only concerned with boosting the self-esteem of students from marginalized cultures. According to

Gutmann, this is a problem because this type of education teaches these children that their culture, ethnicity, or race is better than that of others. She states:

> They [some contemporary American educators] defend schools designed primarily to cultivate the separatist cultural identities of minorities and to bolster the self-esteem of students based on their membership in a separatist culture ... The chief problem with such segregation academies from a democratic perspective is ... their attempt to cultivate among these children a sense of superiority based on race. These schools try to teach racial discrimination, albeit for differing reasons. (p.2).

Because of this possibility of encouraging "separatist cultural identities" and ethnocentrism, she concludes that such "separatist" multicultural education cannot be supported in public schools in a democratic society.

Schlesinger (1998) also observes that the history curriculum supported by multiculturalists is essentially intended to affirm the ethnic pride of minority groups and argues that this results in supporting ethnocentrism. He states that "'[m]ulticulturalism' arises as a reaction against Anglo- or Eurocentrism" (p.80), but multiculturalism is merely another form of ethnocentrism as it tries to teach myths that glorify one's ethnic ancestral past so that it can affirm a sense of pride.

Schlesinger argues that any history taught under an ethnic banner is "bad" as it glorifies its past and endangers historical "objectivity." According to him, the Afrocentists' argument that "black Africa is the birthplace of science, philosophy, religion, medicine, technology, of the great achievements that have been wrongly ascribed to Western civilization" (Schlesinger, 1998, pp.81-2) is incorrect, as many non-Afrocentrist scholars argue otherwise. He also criticizes a common Afrocentric proposition that ancient Egypt was

a black African country which influenced Greek civilization. Again, he shows that many other scholars disagree with such a view. The list of historical grounds supporting Afrocentrism could go on, but Schlesinger declares that most of them are "myths" that "carry us back to Plato's 'noble lies'" (Schlesinger, 1998, p.85). At best, Afrocentrists' presuppositions are still controversial. As a result, he concludes that multiculturalists intend to promote the self-esteem of students from marginalized social groups by defending a subjective and inaccurate understanding of history. He criticizes multiculturalists for distorting facts and turning history into mythology which glorifies the achievements of one's kind, true or false.

(3) Multiculturalism as Cultural Determinism and Fundamentalism

Multiculturalism is also often referred to as supporting cultural determinism and fundamentalism. This may be the most serious concern for liberal critics, since perceived this way, multiculturalism clearly conflicts with the liberal principle of individual freedom. Multiculturalism is understood here as a theory that argues the following: people depend on culture as a source of identity; cultural representation in the curriculum is so significant that the lack of it damages self-esteem and this leads to lower achievement of students. Liberals argue that this theory advocates cultural fundamentalism, that is, human beings are determined by culture and children can only learn in particular cultural frameworks. For instance, Ravitch (1990), calling multiculturalism particularism, states:

> Advocates of particularism propose an ethnocentric curriculum to raise the self-
> esteem and academic achievement of children from racial and ethnic minority
> backgrounds. Without any evidence, they claim that children from minority

backgrounds will do well in school *only* if they are immersed in a positive, prideful version of their ancestral culture. If children are of, for example, Fredonian ancestry, they must hear that Fredonians were important in mathematics, science, history, and literature. If they learn about great Fredonians and if their studies use Fredonian examples and Fredonian concepts, they will do well in school. If they do not, they will have low self-esteem and will do badly. (p.340, emphasis in original)

Perceived this way, multiculturalists seem to support the view that learning is about *consuming* one's own cultural heritage *only* (Rorty, 1995). The critics argue that learning should not be about only transmitting culturally specific knowledge and values; rather, it is about encouraging critical thinking and constructing new perspectives. Burtonwood (1985) illuminates this issue by using an analogy contrasting Kuhn's model of normal science with Popper's view of science. In Kuhn's normal science model, researchers are engaged in experiments within a paradigm, a sort of conceptual framework that shares common languages just like people in the same cultures. They are accumulating knowledge but the development is linear as the nature of scientists here can be described as puzzle-solving within the tradition (Burtonwood, 1985, p.120). According to Burtonwood, in Kuhn's model, education scientists receive is limited to the theoretical and methodological skills appropriate for such puzzle-solving. Burtonwood states that Popper is against such a view of education appropriate for normal science and emphasizes the critical and transformative aspect of education necessary for any scientific inquiries. Rather than preparing students with certain cultural identity to hold a rigid world view, Popper promotes culture clash, inviting other points of view for critical reflection.

Citing an example of a black athlete whose role model was Mikhail Baryshnikov, Ravitch (1990) dismisses the multiculturalists' claim that the lack of cultural recognition and

representation in a larger society is unjust. She writes: "How narrow-minded it is to believe that people can be inspired *only* by those who are exactly like them in race and ethnicity" (Ravitch, 1990, p.354, emphasis in original).

Many critics point out that cultural determinism and fundamentalism in multiculturalists' arguments are derived from a concept of culture that is too static and deterministic. For Bissoondath (1994), this is evident in 'multicultural' events such as Caravan which showcases exotic cultural foods, clothes, customs, and so forth. He criticizes such cultural events as reducing the complexity of cultures and treating them as commodities, which "can be displayed, performed, admired, bought, sold or forgotten" (p.83). He argues that this type of "festival" approaches only promotes stereotypes, denying the complexity and non-static nature of cultures. Vertovec (1996) identifies the understanding of culture implicit in diverse types of multiculturalism as follows: "a kind of package ... of collective behavioural-moral-aesthetic traits and 'customs', rather mysteriously transmitted between generations, best suited to particular geographical origins yet largely unaffected by history of a change of context, which instils a discrete quality into the feelings, values, practices, social relationships, predilections and intrinsic nature of all who 'belong to ... it'" (p.51). The conception of multiculturalism as a homogeneous, static entity that determines moral and behavioural traits of individuals has also been referred to as another type of racism (Schlesinger, 1998, p.87), "cultural fundamentalism," "culturalism" (Vertovec, 1996), "simplification of culture" (Bissoondath, 1994), or cultural essentialism (Rorty, 1995).

This is indeed problematic not only because 'culturalism' spreads stereotypes but also because it entails cultural relativism. The theory of cultural relativism rests on the static and holistic conception of culture promoted by earlier anthropologists. In this context,

culture is defined as "the source of the individual and communal world view" which "provides both the individual and the community with the values and interests to be pursued in life, as well as the legitimate means for pursuing them" (An-Na'im, 1992, p.23). This classic conception of culture is conceived as a "system of elements in relationship to one another"; "analyzable whole"; and "could be looked at by itself, without necessary reference to things outside of it, and could be understood as parts working together as a whole" (Redfield, 1956, p.35). This static, stable, and coherent conceptual framework would be well accepted by, for example, Ruth Benedict and other earlier cultural anthropologists. Here, it is recognized that it is culture, not an individual, that determines her/his purpose of life, which shows a sharp contrast to liberal ideals of personal autonomy and critical capacity. Relying on this conception of culture, cultural relativists claim that individuals are born and raised as members of a particular cultural community and the cultural environment surrounding them determines the way each of them sees the world. Therefore, world view, values, morality and so forth are relative to cultures and there is no point in making a universal claim that involves judgements crossing rigid cultural boundaries.

Cultural relativism was successful in questioning the superiority of Western values and raising our awareness of the value of cultural diversity. Cultural relativism has challenged the superiority of Western thinking which justified Western colonialism, claiming that people in Western societies cannot call non-Western cultures 'primitive' because their world view, values, morality, and so forth are culturally relative. The theory has some serious limitations, however. First, the theory is self-contradictory. Cultural relativists argue that, for instance, morality is relative to cultures. But then, this very claim of cultural relativism is also relative to culture. Tesón (1992) points out the contradiction of cultural

relativism as follows: "[cultural relativists claim that] (a) there are no universal moral principles; (b) one ought to act in accordance with the principles of one's own group; and (c), (b) is a universal moral principle ... If it is true that no universal moral principles exist, then the relativist engages in self-contradition by stating the universality of the relativist principle ..." (p.48). Second, cultural relativism, claiming that every culture has a distinctive conception of morality, denies any moral principle that cuts across cultural boundaries. This is problematic because, failing to establish any means of cross-cultural judgement, it leads to moral subjectivism which allows anything in the name of culture. As Burtonwood (1986) states: "Relativism so easily becomes a defence of the current orthodoxy: what is, ought to be. In suggesting that other cultures must remain hidden from us it denies that very intercultural experience which is so vital to our awareness of our own cultural bias" (p.19). Third, cultural relativism supports the view that intercultural understanding is impossible. This view, which shall be called "the incommensurability thesis" and will be discussed in Chapter 6, is questionable since there exist many people who do communicate across cultures in our culturally diverse societies, where intercultural contacts are becoming an everyday experience for many of us.

(4) Culture as a Source of Identity Questioned

Finally, some critics question multiculturalists' assumption that self-esteem is tied exclusively to one's cultural identity. Fierlbeck (1996) points out that many people feel their self-esteem is hurt more because of personal traits than their cultural backgrounds. For instance, people can have low self-esteem because they wear thick glasses, are fat, thin, and so on. Because of this various sources of identity, she argues that "it is difficult to expect

people always to intuit which traits or characteristics are most fundamental to a person's identity, and even more formidable politically to institutionalize this responsibility to be sensitive" (Fierlbeck, 1996, p.16). Rorty (1994) also states:

> An individual's cultural identity is by no means the sole or even the dominant influence on his or her conception of a good life. Many other groups and associations also shape the habits—the frames of interpretation and categorization, the primary practices, interests, and motivational preoccupations—that express, actualize, and define an individual's identity. (p.154)

Even if it could be shown that culture is more significant than other elements in forming one's identity, it seems to be difficult to support the multiculturalists' argument since they would also have to support public protection of numerous traits or characteristics that are not generally appreciated in the larger society. If we were to practice what multiculturalists advocate here, we would have to include all human characteristics and traits, personal and cultural, physical and mental, when using illustrations to describe human beings. But there is always a limit to such a gesture of inclusiveness. Perhaps, the most extreme case is to protect religious fundamentalism or any kind of fundamentalism. Macedo (1995) argues that multiculturalists would have to support religious fundamentalists since many fundamentalists indeed feel the "lack of recognition" and marginalization with which multiculturalists are concerned.

(III) Critical Educators' Criticisms

Another line of major criticism comes from critical educators, who are called or call

themselves under various names, e.g., *anti-racist educators*, *critical pedagogues*, and *critical*

multiculturalists. I would like to call them **critical educators** hereafter for the convenience

of our discussion, although this does not mean they all hold a unanimous view about what

they perceive as problems of the current educational situation and how they propose to

resolve the problems, just as not all liberal critics share exactly the same vision about good

education and society. Nevertheless, just as many liberals share similar concerns about

multiculturalism, critical educators also share certain views about education, society, and

multicultural education in general.

Many critical educators actually share some of the same concerns as liberal critics.

Just like liberal critics, critical educators perceive that multiculturalism draws on the

deterministic notion of cultural identity, leading to support of cultural fundamentalism. For

instance, McCarthy (1994), who proposes "a critical or emancipatory multicultural

education," describes one problem of multicultural education as follows:

> Current multicultural formulations tend to define racial identities in static or
> essentialist terms. By this I mean that proponents tend to treat racial identities as a
> settled matter of physical, cultural, and linguistic traits. Minority groups are
> therefore defined as homogeneous entities. (p.92)

Watkins (1994), who offers another critical view on multiculturalism and multicultural

education, also criticizes current popular practices of multiculturalism because it draws on

the notion of cultural nationalism and the anthropological conception of culture. He notes

that multicultural education today emphasizes "the similarities of people within the same

cultural group" (p.106), focusing on "group behavior and custom" (p.106) and group identity. This kind of criticism is quite similar to that of the liberal critics that we have just seen above.

However, the type of multicultural education critical educators in general are criticizing is slightly different from the one criticized by liberals. As we saw earlier, liberals perceive multicultural education as a type of education that supports culturally sensitive, not Anglo- or Euro-centric, education in order to raise ethnic or racial self-esteem. In particular, liberals perceive that a main multicultural agenda is to make the curriculum reflect the cultural diversity of the current demographics so that minority children do not feel that they are excluded. Critical educators are not supportive of this kind of multicultural education either, as we saw above. However, they are also sceptical of multicultural education that intends to promote respect for cultural diversity as if to do so would resolve more serious social problems.

More specifically, critical educators are concerned with the vague definition and goals of multicultural education that can be found in many relatively early documents supporting "multicultural education." For instance, in 1973, multicultural education was defined as follows:

> [M]ulticultural education affirms that schools should be oriented toward the cultural enrichment of all children and youth through programs rooted to the preservation and extension of cultural alternatives. Multicultural education recognizes cultural diversity as a fact of life in American society, and it affirms that this cultural diversity is a valued resource that should be preserved and extended. (The Commission on Multicultural Education, 1973, p.264)

Thomas L. Wells' definition of multicultural education in the Legislature of Ontario Debates
also shows similar features:

> It [multicultural education] is an education in which the individual child of
> whatever origin finds, not mere acceptance or tolerance, but respect and
> understanding. It is an education in which cultural diversity is seen and used as a
> valuable resource to enrich the lives of all. It is an education in which differences
> and similarities are used for positive ends. It is an education in which every child
> has the chance to benefit from the cultural heritage of others as well as his or her
> own" (Wells, quoted in Michalski, 1977, p.81).

Such phrases as "cultural enrichment for all children," "cultural diversity is a valuable
resource," and "differences are good" all sound comfortable to our ears, but for
critical educators this appears to pay only lip service, preventing us from facing the
real issues that students from marginalized cultures are suffering: economic and
political inequality.

For instance, for Watkins (1994), the trouble with the multicultural approach to
education is that it only makes it easier for the majority of people to accept the issues of
cultural diversity without critically examining the relations between social oppression and
race, ethnicity, gender, and other social categories. He argues that the currently available
version of multiculturalism separates culture from politics since "[c]ultural nationalism in its
most harmless version is easily and readily acceptable to the mainstream political and
educational communities alike" (Watkins, 1994, p.106). As a result, multiculturalists "do not
get at the fundamental arrangements of an economically and politically stratified society"
(Watkins, 1994, p.115).

Especially in practice, it is noticeable that multicultural education tends to be treated as a "frill." Multicultural issues do not seem to require students' serious attention as much as other core curricula do. Many observe that various types of educational programs are implemented as multicultural education (Suzuki, 1984; Young, 1984; Sleeter & Grant, 1987; Edwards, 1992; Martin, 1993), and their analysis reveals that the most common practice is food festivals or ethnic music appreciation that reduces multiculturalism to non-political and non-economic issues. At best, multicultural programs are often an ethnic study, which focuses on the history and traditions of a certain cultural group, which does not question what is dividing "us" and exotic "cultural others." McCarthy (1994) also states that multicultural education is implemented only under themes of "cultural understanding" and "sensitivity training." He regrets that "[t]he transformative themes of the multicultural movement were quietly rearticulated into just another reformist set of discourses to be absorbed into the dominant curriculum" (McCarthey, 1994, p.82).

Similarly, another critical educator, McLaren (1993), argues that any multiculturalism emphasizing the importance of culture without addressing economic and political structural transformation is ineffective as a strategy to envision a more just society. He categorizes the standpoints of multiculturalism into (1) conservative or corporate multiculturalism, (2) liberal multiculturalism, and (3) left-liberal multiculturalism. Conservative or corporate multiculturalists "pay lip-service to the cognitive equality of all races" (McLaren, 1993, p.101) and affirm the colonial perception of Eurocentrism and white supremacy. McLaren criticizes liberal multiculturalism because it naively believes that we can achieve relative equality among different social groups without dismantling the present social and economic structure. He dismisses conservative and liberal multiculturalisms

equally as they are "really about the politics of assimilation" (McLaren, 1995, p.213). The last one, left-liberal multiculturalism, is similar to the multiculturalism that liberal critics characterize, as McLaren states:

> Left-liberal multiculturalism emphasizes cultural differences and suggests that the stress on the equality of races smothers those important cultural differences between races that are responsible for different behaviors, values, attitudes, cognitive styles, and social practices. Left-liberal multiculturalists feel that mainstream approaches to multiculturalism occlude characteristics and differences related to race, class, gender, and sexuality (McLaren, 1993, p.105).

According to McLaren, multiculturalism has to be "critical," and he demands the replacement of all the three types of multiculturalism, including left-liberal multiculturalism, with critical multiculturalism. McLaren (1993) suggests that teachers and cultural workers "need to build a politics of alliance-building, of dreaming together, of solidarity that moves beyond the condescension of, say, 'race awareness week' which actually serves to keep forms of institutionalized racism intact" (p.112). For critical educators, recognition of cultural differences that many multiculturalists advocate as the main concern for cultural minorities is quite limited as a goal of an ideal multicultural society. They claim that we have to combat racism, sexism, and other types of discrimination by challenging existing political and economic structures including "patriarchy, capitalism, and white supremacy" (McLaren, 1993, p.114). As McLaren (1993) states, critical multiculturalism is "an attempt to transform the very value of hierarchy itself, followed by a challenge to the material structures that are responsible for the overdetermination of structures of difference in the direction of oppression, injustice, and human suffering" (p.114).

Therefore, although critical educators are like liberals in being concerned with the issue of personal autonomy, critical educators can be distinguished from liberals because of another concern, that is, the possibility that multiculturalism is a diversion from more serious social oppressions as it emphasizes the significance of cultural identity. Critical educators' primary concern is not exclusively focused on individual autonomy or the capacity of critical reflection. Rather, they are more concerned with the issue of **empowerment** of oppressed social groups. For critical educators, multiculturalism seems to replace the discussion of structural and systemic social oppressions with that of cultural oppression. In other words, critical educators generally conceive that the existing approaches of multicultural education are not as transformative or empowering as they should be for students from marginalized social groups. As a result, critical educators perceive multiculturalism as an ambiguous and passive approach which simply "celebrates cultural diversity," while avoiding more serious social issues such as equality, discrimination, and economic oppression. Critical educators often perceive multiculturalism as another ideology that tends to undermine a transformative approach that can fight against political and economic oppression.

(IV) Discussion

The first criticism of multiculturalism, namely that it is a threat to national unity, should be recognized as the most difficult to assess, although it is one of the most popular and well-debated criticisms. For instance, Kymlicka (1998) has undertaken the difficult task of assessing the Schlesinger-Bissoondath criticism of "multiculturalism as a threat to national unity" by looking for empirical evidence to support this view.

We can look for some empirical evidence to determine if the Canadian multicultural policy has promoted national disintegration or not, as Schlesinger (1998) and Bissoondath (1994) believe. Although it is difficult to assess such a big question as whether the official multicultural policy in Canada promoted the integration of immigrants or not, Kymlicka suggests that we can look at some criteria related to the process of immigrant integration. For instance, the criteria he examines include: naturalization rates; the level of political participation; the level of acquiring official language competence; intermarriage rates; and so on (Kymlicka, 1998, pp.17-21). If the Schlesinger-Bissoondath criticism were true, the numbers of these indicators would show decreasing trends. However, Kymlicka's examination reveals that data under no criteria support Schlesinger-Bissoondath's thesis. Kymlicka also compares Canada's indicators of immigrant integration levels with those of the United States, and shows us that we can only reach the same conclusion. Kymlicka concludes as follows:

> In short, there is no evidence to support the claim that multiculturalism is promoting ethnic separateness or impeding immigrant integration. Whether we examine the trends within Canada since 1971 or compare Canada with other countries, the conclusion is the same: the multiculturalism program is working. (Kymlicka, 1998, p.22)

However, there does not exist a consensus that the figures Kymlicka cited above are the most appropriate indicators of national unity. In particular, when we recognize that Canada, the country of successful multiculturalism by Kymlicka's above standard, is struggling to deal with the sovereignty issue of Quebec, Kymlicka's conclusion becomes questionable. It could be argued that both Schlesinger and Bissoondath are mainly concerned

with the disintegration of the country from an immigrant's perspective. Bissoondath writes

about his experiences of coming to Canada as an immigrant, and he is not primarily

concerned with the relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Schlesinger is not

discussing national minorities either, as he briefly mentions American Indians and makes an

exception for them in his arguments (pp. 95-6). But to do so would indicate that

multiculturalism works only for immigrants, which would mean that multiculturalism could

promote separatism for national minorities.[4]

Furthermore, this kind of assessment does not explain why "[m]ost Canadians

believe the multicultural mosaic isn't working" (Kapica, *The Globe and Mail*, December 14,

1993, quoted by Bissoondath, 1994, p.1). Nor does it explain why many Canadians agree

with anti-immigrant and minorities remarks such as: Canada allows too many immigrants;

and there are too many visible minorities in Canada (Bissoondath, 1994, p.2).

Simply put, it seems to be still too early to fully examine whether or not

multiculturalism as conceptualized in the contemporary context leads to political instability.

The concept emerged around the mid-1960s and early 70s as mentioned in the previous

chapter. Thus far, no state that embraces multiculturalism as an official policy or otherwise

has actually broken down to cultural entities, but we do not know if this trend will continue.

It seems to be beyond the scope of this dissertation to fully assess the big question

whether or not multiculturalism promotes disintegration of national unity. However, as

mentioned in describing the second liberal criticism of multiculturalism, the concern of

separatism in educational settings is translated into the concern of separatist identity. This is

the concern that certain types of multicultural education promote segregation based on

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[4] The distinction between "immigrants" and "national minorities" will be discussed later in
Chapter 5.

cultural differences. Therefore, in this dissertation, multiculturalism as separatism as it concerns the promotion of separatist identity rather than the question of national unity will be principally examined and discussed.

It is clear that the criticisms of multiculturalism listed above, with the exception of the first one, are directly related to the liberal concern of developing personal autonomy, which, as seen above, is considered as one of the most important educational goals in liberal society. Liberal critics perceive multiculturalism and "multicultural education" as working on a principle that supports the significance of cultural identity over anything else. The liberal critics do agree with multiculturalists' claim that our ancestral culture is important and we should respect our cultural diversity, but do not see why culture is so important that it has to be protected, preserved, and represented in the public sphere. They rather see the disadvantages of respecting culture in the ways multiculturalists advocate, since it implies cultural particularism that could encourage cultural fundamentalism, ethnocentrism, and cultural stereotypes. For liberal critics, an emphasis on cultural identity makes them worry since it signals the possibility of overriding individual autonomy. In other words, liberal critics think or assume that protection of cultural identity and development of individual autonomy are in opposition to each other.

These criticisms appear quite reasonable as summarized above. Cultural particularism cannot and should not be defended, especially in a single polity, as it can result in inadequate moral and social cohesion. Without some consensus a community would not be able to function as a place for people to pursue meaningful lives. If, as the critics of multiculturalism argue, multiculturalism has to respect and tolerate all cultural traditions, individual rights cannot be defended and internal cultural oppression cannot be avoided. The

phenomenon of culture is indeed complex, and it seems to be quite difficult to justify its protection when to do so could allow cultural ethnocentrism and fundamentalism.

Empowerment and social justice are also important issues to be included in the discussion of multiculturalism since, as we will soon see, multiculturalists indeed demand cultural recognition as a way to liberate their oppressed identity as a result of devaluation of their cultural heritage. Multiculturalism that does not aim at empowerment obviously does not make sense. This critical educators' view may be immediately challenged because "transformation" or "empowerment" is too ambitious a goal for education to aim at. As I mentioned in Chapter I, I assume that education cannot single-handedly solve various social problems. It would be too much of a burden for education to be solely responsible for such difficult tasks. However, it would be a mistake for educators to conclude that our effort to educate for a better society is fruitless. To do so would mean to accept social determinism that human beings are incapable of challenging their environment. Therefore, I would like to maintain that empowerment is a plausible educational aim and one that should be pursued in multicultural education. I think we should seriously consider critical educators' concern for empowerment.

However, before we fully agree with these critics, we should examine if the so-called multiculturalists actually support cultural particularism, deny the importance of individual autonomy, and try to inspire cultural ethnocentrism without empowerment. Because it seems to me that if multiculturalists were indeed arguing for these consequences, they would simply be irrational. Do multiculturalists actually support these consequences? If not, why are they charged with these terrible labels?

It is also necessary to clarify exactly what multiculturalism and multicultural education mean, since we have come to learn that liberals and critical educators conceive multiculturalism and multicultural education differently. This complicates the controversies over multiculturalism and multicultural education.

In order to assess the criticisms of multiculturalism, in the next chapter I would like to examine what multiculturalists actually assume, how they argue, and if possible, why.

Chapter 3

Mainstream Multiculturalism and Liberal Criticism

(I) Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the arguments of mainstream multiculturalism, drawing on the writings of Charles Taylor (1989, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1995/97, 1996a, b, c) and Will Kymlicka (1989, 1995, 1998); I also assess the liberal criticisms of this position. Analysis of the two mainstream multiculturalists' arguments reveals that they do not intend to encourage cultural fundamentalism and ethnocentrism, let alone hinder the development of autonomous and critical individuals. Nevertheless, for the liberal critics any mainstream multiculturalist assumption that could possibly affirm cultural essentialism or ethnocentrism, implicit or explicit, is problematic, and therefore mainstream multiculturalism remains unacceptable to them. However, I argue that the liberals' criticisms and alternative suggestions cannot be sustained since they largely ignore the socio-historical contexts with respect to which the mainstream multiculturalists develop their position. Although mainstream multiculturalists are not always explicit, the theory of mainstream multiculturalism is applicable under certain conditions. I conclude that liberal criticisms cannot overthrow mainstream multiculturalism; instead, we have to pay attention to the conditions where mainstream multiculturalism could and should be applied.

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(II) Limiting Our Focus to Mainstream Multiculturalism

In the discussions of multiculturalism by liberals and critical educators, it is noticeable that they often refer to Afrocentrists as "the multiculturalists." When Schlesinger (1998) states that "self-styled 'multiculturalists' are very often ethnocentric separatists who see little in the Western heritage beyond Western crimes" (p.128), he is referring to Afrocentrists such as Clare Jacobs, Charles Willie, Asa Hilliard, and Amos Wilson. Molefi Kete Asante, criticized by both Schlesinger and Ravitch (1990), is a well-known Afrocentrist. Gutmann's (1995) critique of separatist multicultural education also draws on Afrocentrism, although she does not limit her criticism to it. As is evident from the educational reform in New York State and the reading list revisions in San Francisco mentioned earlier, Afrocentric-multicultural thinking has indeed greatly influenced the way children are educated in public schools, especially in the United States.

Indeed, as Schlesinger (1998) argues, the credibility of some types of Afrocentrism is controversial, as it is sometimes supported by inaccurate information. For instance, Asante (1991) states that "Koreans do not study European theorists prior to their own; indeed they are taught to honor and respect the ancestral mathematicians. This is true for Indians, Chinese, and Japanese" (p.271). This observation is, however, obviously incorrect, as pointed out by Ravitch (1990). Personally, I went through the public educational system for my elementary education in Japan, but cannot recall any moment of honouring "ancestral mathematicians."

Afrocentrism is, indeed, a controversial philosophy that revitalizes "classical Egyptian philosophy" as a solid foundation for education of African-Americans (Appiah,

1994c). Appiah severely criticizes Diop, "whose work is clearly the best in this (Afrocentric) tradition," because he

> offers little evidence that Egyptian philosophy is more than a systematized but
> fairly uncritical folk-philosophy, makes no persuasive argument that the Egyptian
> problematic is that of the contemporary African, and allows for a hovering, if
> inexplicit, suggestion that the Egyptians are important just because the originators
> of the earliest dynasty were black. (Appiah, 1994c, p.7)

As Appiah points out, Afrocentrism is, in general, a "reverse discourse" of "Western philosophy," trying to "run off after a philosophy of our own" (Appiah, 1994c, p.7). Mazrui (1998) confirms this view, stating that "[w]hile multiculturalism is a quest for diversity, Afrocentricity is an antithesis. It is an antithesis to the thesis of Eurocentrism" (p.181).

However, it should be noted that not all so-called Afrocentrists argue in the ways Schlesinger and others criticize. Most Afrocentrists would agree, with advocates of multicultural education, that the school curricula currently available today should refer to the achievements of historically marginalized cultural groups so that every student's cultural background would be equally represented. Afrocentrists would agree with multiculturalists that it is important to maintain minorities' cultural heritage and identity. They are also often clear that they do not maintain the superiority of the African race. For instance, Asante (1991), criticized by Ravitch (1990) as a cultural particularist and ethnocentrist, denies that he is trying to foster a sense of superiority or separatist cultural identity. He states that "Afrocentricity does not seek an ethnocentric curriculum ... it does not valorize the African view while downgrading others ... (rather) it is a systematic approach to presenting the African as subject rather than object" (Asante, 1991, p.270). In the Canadian context, Dei

(1996) also affirms that "[a] focus on Afrocentricity is designed not to exclude other 'centric' knowledge but to contribute to a plurality of perspectives and knowledge about schooling in the Euro-Canadian context" (p.177).

Nevertheless, since Afrocentrism is a controversial and distinctive philosophical movement, it would be inappropriate to treat it as if it were the representative of multiculturalism. The differences between multiculturalism and Afrocentrism should be recognized as Mazrui (1998) states: "Afrocentricity emphasizes the impact of the African people on world civilization. Multiculturalism sees world civilization as a pooling of the cultural resources of many peoples ... By definition, Afrocentricity is unipolar—a world centered in Africa. Multiculturalism is multipolar; a universe of many centers" (p.182). Although Afrocentrism and multiculturalism share similar views on the importance of recognizing and preserving cultural identity and heritage, therefore, I will focus on mainstream multiculturalism for the remainder of this dissertation.

As previously noted, mainstream multiculturalism can be defined as a principle that intends to promote peaceful and meaningful coexistence of culturally diverse groups by protecting people's cultural heritage and identities. Among many multiculturalists, Taylor and Kymlicka have thus far advanced the most comprehensive theory supporting this argument of mainstream multiculturalism. They are distinctive theorists, but similar in that they both have advanced what McDonough (1997, 1998) calls the "cultural recognition thesis." This thesis refers to the idea that cultural recognition is indispensable for the development of identity and that this should be understood in the public sphere of the larger society. In particular, Taylor is one of the most prominent of those theorists who have helped us to understand the significance of cultural identity in our modern context. It is also

noticeable that liberal critics of multiculturalism often cite Taylor and Kymlicka as proponents of particularism, cultural nationalism, culturalism, or separatism (Appiah, 1994b; Birnbaum, 1996; Bromwich, 1995; Fierlbeck, 1996; Rorty, 1994, 1995; Walker, 1997).

In what follows, I will examine the arguments of mainstream multiculturalists in order to assess the criticisms of multiculturalism as cultural ethnocentrism and fundamentalism. Below I start with Charles Taylor's theory of multiculturalism.

(III) Charles Taylor's Politics of Recognition

(1) Overview of Taylor's Arguments

Charles Taylor's theory of multiculturalism seems to have emerged, at least partly, as a critique of the instrumental and atomistic North American liberal principles, which I shall hereafter call traditional (North American) liberalism. Taylor's criticisms address two aspects of traditional liberal assumptions: (1) the difference-blindness approach to justice; and (2) individualism without collective goals. Taylor is also critical of a larger framework, that is, the idea of (3) the autonomous and universal self, which has been prominent in rationalistic Cartesian thinking. I examine his theory of multiculturalism, following Taylor's argument behind each criticism. I start with the last criticism as it presents us with the basis of Taylor's multiculturalism.

Rationalism has prevailed in the traditional Western thinking dating back to Plato, Spinoza, Kant, and Descartes. As Taylor describes, what characterizes this rationalistic trend is primarily its emphasis on the autonomy of individual knowledge seekers. In rationalism, the activity of seeking the truth is individualistic. Individuals are perceived as isolated and autonomous workers, being able to acquire knowledge which transcends the socio-political

contexts in which individuals are located. As Code (1991) summarizes, "[a] follower of Descartes's method is radically independent, adhering to the method in a process of solitary rational endeavor and embarking on that pursuit by freeing *himself* both from his previously accumulated beliefs and habits of mind and from the influence of his own physical being" (p.112, emphasis in original).

However, Taylor argues that how others perceive us has a significant influence on how we come to understand ourselves and who we are. He argues, as follows, that the process of identity formation involves dialogic negotiation with others:

> We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us. Even after we outgrow some of these others—our parents, for instance—and they disappear from our lives, the conversation with them continues within us as long as we live. (Taylor, 1991, pp.32-33)

According to this view, identity is negotiated with the people with whom we interact, as if others are the mirrors in which we look at ourselves.

It should be noted that the dialogic nature of self does not immediately lead to irrationalism. For instance, some may fear that such a view of self might confirm that self is entirely a result of social creation and thus totally deny the conception of autonomy.[5] However, Taylor does not imply this in the citation above. According to Mead (1959), whom Taylor relies on to support his view of dialogic identity formation, autonomy *emerges* as a response to others' perception of oneself. Mead explains this using the concepts of 'me' and 'I' (pp. 196-221). 'Me' is the image of oneself that others perceive, while 'I' is one's

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[5] This is known as social constructivism (e.g., Ward, 1994).

response to such perceptions. When recognized as 'me,' one's consciousness responds as 'I,' which is chosen by oneself. With the combination of 'me' and 'I,' our personality and self-consciousness develop.

What Taylor is articulating here is the significance of recognition from others *as we develop our own autonomy.* Taylor argues that modern democratic society is characterized by the increased importance of recognition. In pre-modern times, social hierarchy determined identity and the type of recognition individuals could expect. Identity was fixed and people did not compete over equal recognition because the society was not democratic. However, in a modern democratic society, as the hierarchical order breaks down, the idea of what Taylor calls "the ideal of authenticity" has developed. This is our desire striving to realize "my own way," which, by definition, "cannot be socially derived but must be inwardly generated" (Taylor, 1991, p.47). As such, identity and recognition have become increasingly significant for the development of self and the recognition of others has gained a new importance for our modern identity.

As a result, in our modern society misrecognition or lack of recognition during the process of negotiation can mean oppression. Misrecognition means denial of one's worth as a human being and this is likely to result in lack of self-esteem. Therefore, Taylor argues that one deserves due recognition in a liberal and democratic society that claims itself to be committed to social justice.

> Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it, according to a widespread modern view. The projecting of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that it is interiorized. Not only contemporary feminism but also race relations and discussions of multiculturalism

are undergirded by the premise that denied recognition can be a form of oppression (Taylor, 1991, pp.49-50).

This increased significance of recognition for one's existence leads to Taylor's criticism of the difference-blindness approach to justice. In an attempt to respect individuals *equally*, traditional North-American liberals have tried to respect everyone the same, regardless of their cultural or any other social particularities. This is a difference-blindness approach where collective differences have been treated as if they did not exist. With this approach, equal respect means that individuals are treated exactly the same way, universally. In other words, the recognition is given in the form of universal legal rights of citizenship. We have come to accept that in a just and democratic society each citizen has the same rights as anyone else, regardless of race, religion, or gender. The principle of this recognition is very simple: an equal treatment regardless of differences.

The difference-blindness approach may work well if there are no cultural differences. But there exist diverse cultures within one political unity, which does not exist in a cultural vacuum. Every political unity, intentionally or otherwise, favours one political culture over others. Therefore, in the public sphere, "liberalism can't and shouldn't claim complete cultural neutrality" (Taylor, 1994, p.62). Moreover, the difference-blindness approach does not recognize the significance of cultural authenticity. Taylor argues that the ideal of authenticity, which is a moral ideal that seeks to confirm one's own unique way of being, works at two levels: individual and cultural. Taylor criticizes traditional liberalism for neglecting the authenticity of collective differences. He argues that cultural authenticity is important, drawing on Herder's conception of authenticity:

Being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself ... This is the background understanding to the modern ideal of authenticity, and to the goals of self-fulfillment and self-realization in which the ideal is usually couched. I should note here that Herder applied his conception of originality at two levels, not only to the individual person among other persons, but also to the culture-bearing people among other peoples. Just like individuals, a *Volk* should be true to itself, that is, its own culture. (Taylor, 1994, p.31)

Based on this conception of authenticity, Taylor argues that individuals in a modern, democratic, and multicultural society should be able to be true to their own personal life goals *as well as* to their cultural ones.

The idea of cultural authenticity Taylor promotes includes the view that the culture at issue has to be assured of its survival. It is not just culture as a source of identity that Taylor is supporting. What Taylor aspires to is to "ensure survival [of culture] through indefinite future generations" because "that is what is at stake" (Taylor, 1994, p.41).

Therefore, the "politics of difference" demands the recognition of cultural differences in the modern context where recognition has gained more significance for our existence. As Taylor states, "[t]he idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity. And this assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity" (Taylor, 1994, p.38).

How, then, can this "politics of difference" be applied to realize an ideal multicultural society? Now we move to Taylor's criticism of individualism without collective goals supported by traditional liberals. The alternative picture to the current society formed around rationalistic individualism is captured in Taylor's conception of the

"deep diversity" model (Taylor, 1996a). According to Taylor, a liberal multicultural society should officially recognize culturally distinctive communities, whose collective goals may be different from those of the dominant society. Drawing on the example of Quebec, he argues that the kind of society Quebecois/ses aspire to cannot be realized if "the rest of Canada" does not recognize Quebec as a "distinctive" society with collective goals (Taylor, 1994, especially pp.51-61; 1996). For instance, in Quebec, the laws promoting and preserving the use of French have already been enforced. According to Taylor, "[o]ne [law] regulates who can send their children to English-language schools (not francophones or immigrants); another requires that businesses with more than fifty employees be run in French; a third outlaws commercial signages in any language other than French" (1994, pp.52-53). Traditional liberals would not accept this kind of collective goal, given their commitment to cultural neutrality in the public sphere. However, it is obvious that a liberal society can never be culturally neutral. Therefore, for Taylor, to respect culturally distinctive peoples boils down to the assurance of collective cultural autonomy and survival.

Taylor's model of "deep diversity" may appear to confirm the view that multiculturalism is separatism, but Taylor denies this. He advances the "deep diversity" model of society precisely because he wants to help the unity of Canada to continue. He does not promote Quebec independence in any of his writings. He is promoting an official recognition of Quebec as a "distinctive society," since failure to do so means continued oppression, which can disrupt the unity (Taylor, 1996b). Taylor's whole argument comes from the recognition that "[m]ultinational societies can break up, in large part because of a lack of (perceived) recognition of the equal worth of one group by another" (Taylor, 1994, p.64).

Taylor's multiculturalism is, therefore, a challenge to traditional North American liberalism, which views collective goals as against liberal principles. In general, traditional North American liberalism has usually been against accepting any collective goals because it has been based on the individualistic paradigm. Liberals of this sort strongly support individual goals over collective ones because they are concerned with the possibility that collective goals could restrict the development of individual autonomy. Taylor challenges this traditional liberal view and maintains that a society with distinctive collective goals can be liberal. He states that if such collective goals are fundamental for people in the society, it is not impossible for this society to be liberal, "provided it is also capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those who do not share its common goals; and provided it can offer *adequate safeguards for fundamental rights*" (Taylor, 1994, p.59, emphasis added).

(2) Summary of Taylor's Cultural Recognition Thesis and Its Problems

Taylor's multiculturalism is not, then, simply prioritizing cultures at the cost of individual rights. Rather, Taylor is critical of traditional liberalism because he is concerned with the loss of our attachment to local communities as a result of modernization. Taylor has been offering us critical views about the results of modernization (1989; 1991), and his famous article on multiculturalism, *The Politics of Recognition* (1994), should be considered as a part of his larger concern about modernization. Although many Western, modern, and democratic societies, especially the United States and Canada, are now widely perceived as an embodiment of liberal ideals, Taylor sees that this has often meant the loss of strong connections to one's local, traditional communities.

Taylor argues that "the malaise of modernity" is caused by (1) excessive individualism which focuses on "the self, which both flattens and narrows our lives, makes them poorer in meaning, and less concerned with others or society," (2) "instrumental reason," which is "the kind of rationality we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means to a given end," and (3) "despotism," making people powerless in a highly technological and bureaucratic modern social structure (Taylor, 1991, pp.4-9). Taylor is especially concerned with alienation and fragmentation as a result of modernization, just as Tocqueville (1994) was. A fragmented society is "one whose members find it harder and harder to identify with their political society as a community" (Taylor, 1991, p.117), which discourages active participation of citizens in political and social issues. Fragmentation is a danger for a democratic society.

For Taylor, the context surrounding his arguments for multiculturalism is enough to refute some of the liberal criticisms. For instance, he is clear that he does not promote the fragmentation of a society based on cultural differences. His argument is that if we recognize the increased significance of identity in our society and the dialogic nature of identity development, the failure to give due recognition to minority groups could be a threat to a political unity. Taylor does not support the cultural recognition thesis to inflate cultural identities; rather, his argument is the other way around. The cultural recognition thesis is important in a multicultural society in order to reduce tensions due to cultural differences.

The liberal criticism that Taylor is a communitarian also seems to fail to capture the essence of his arguments. Taylor has never intended to create idealized small communities whose members have to follow strict, never-changing cultural norms, crawling back to lost traditions. Instead, he argues that the decentralization of power in political institutions could

be a solution to our modern problems (Taylor, 1991). He is quite clear that individual rights have to be safeguarded in a society with collective goals. From his concern with excessive individualism and our weakening sense of belonging to our communities, he proposes that a multicultural liberal society can and should support communities with collective cultural goals.

Taylor, then, is trying to articulate the significance of culture in identity formation *within* liberal principles. He is not attempting to impose cultural fundamentalism or essentialism at the expense of individual autonomy. Rather, Taylor wishes to expand traditional liberal principles for culturally marginalized groups, since certain cultures have been and still are oppressed on the basis of culture. In this context, it seems that the criticism of multiculturalism as cultural determinism simply misrepresents multiculturalism. Some multicultural theorists may be considered to be promoting cultural determinism, extending liberal toleration to even the most 'illiberal' cultures (e.g., Tamir, 1995; Tomasi, 1995) but such claims are not likely to be supported by mainstream multiculturalists.

Nevertheless, it is quite noticeable that Taylor continues to receive many criticisms that he is the supporter of cultural determinism. For instance, Bromwich (1995) criticizes Taylor and other multiculturalists as "culturalists," that is, proponents of culturalism. According to Bromwich, culturalism is "the thesis that there is a universal human need to belong to a culture" (p.89). He argues that such a thesis is only "trivially true" (p. 95) and is a danger to a liberal society, contrasting traditional liberalism as opposed to culturalism. He questions the validity of the cultural recognition thesis, problematizes the existence of illiberal cultures, arguing that cultural identity are not as significant as culturalists claim.

In the response to Bromwich, Taylor (1995) states as follows:

Then "culturalist": this is supposed to be some general position "endorsing" cultures in general, or endowing them "with a dignity and ... respect comparable [to those] I would claim for myself." This in turn seems to mean that the "culturalist" gives priority to the demands of group culture over those of the individual. I must say that I find it hard to understand how anyone could espouse such a position who wasn't almost totally dissociated from the realities of human life. Does it mean that one endorses all cultures, always gives them priority? Why would anyone want to do such a thing? (p.103)

In the response to his critics, Taylor tries to indicate that he does not promote cultural fundamentalism or determinism. He admits that he cannot clearly define culture, but "it has something to do with what has defined the important, the holy, the worthwhile for many people over time" (Taylor, 1995, p.104) and he tries to distinguish it from ideology such as Nazism. Further, he explicitly claims that to treat culture as if it is a static, stable, and homogeneous organism is wrong and that politics of recognition cannot be reduced to essentialization of identity (Taylor, 1996c). But the criticisms continue.

One of the reasons that Taylor's thesis is not well received by liberal critics is that Taylor's responses, such as above, are simply not robust or multi-dimensional enough. Sceptical liberals find that some assumptions used in the thesis are weak. For instance, Taylor uses the concept of authenticity in order to emphasize that cultural recognition is necessary. But he does not discuss how one decides that this representation of culture is authentic and others are not. Even if Taylor states that culture cannot be essentialized, does not the concept of authenticity assume the conception of culture as static and stable? Moreover, how does Taylor think that we can exclude fundamentalistic or illiberal cultures from his theory? How do mainstream multiculturalists propose to avoid cultural

nationalism? How can personal autonomy be respected when mainstream multiculturalism promotes the significance of culture? For critics of mainstream multiculturalism, these questions are still unanswered. Although Taylor denies the liberals' criticism that multiculturalism is cultural fundamentalism, such denials are not persuasive unless these questions are answered. Below I would like to examine some of the particular objections to Taylor's multiculturalism.

(3) Taylor's Reliance on Cultural Essentialism

There are certain presumptions in Taylor's arguments that worry traditional liberals, concerned as they are with the protection of personal autonomy and critical capacity. One is his ideal of authenticity, derived from the German philosopher Herder. According to Chirot (1996), "Herder was a strong defender of traditional communities against the growing power of the bureaucratic, modern state exemplified by Frederick the Great of Prussia and his French ideas" (Chirot, 1996, p.5). Herder rejects the main idea of the Enlightenment, namely, that human universality is achieved through rationality, thus homogenizing the cultural diversity of human communities. For Herder, innocent attachment to native ways of life—including native tongue, customs, and so on—is not something that should be removed from our mentality. Herder also developed the idea that each nation has a unique culture, and members of each nation "inherited the conceptual materials and the philosophical principles that defined the spirit of her nation" (Appiah, 1994c, p.88), an idea which was original in his time.

As we have seen above, Taylor argues that authenticity works at two levels, individual as well as *Volk*. As we have also seen, Taylor does not deny individual

authenticity at the expense of *Volk* authenticity. Rather, he is trying to emphasize the significance of *Volk* authenticity in our modern context where individual authenticity has been, in Taylor's view, excessively recognized. However, implicit in this idea of cultural authenticity is cultural determinism. If each culture has a certain way of life that is inherited by each member, and if we should respect this authenticity of culture, this means that culture determines who I am, to a certain extent. As such, the idea of cultural authenticity raises a concern among traditional liberals. We have seen that Taylor does not support cultural determinism, since he recognizes that autonomy emerges through negotiation with others, not simply accepting what others see in ourselves. We have also seen that Taylor does not slide into subjectivism, accepting any type of culture as worthy of survival. However, it is simply difficult to see how he can support the survival of culture and, at the same time, guarantee protection of personal autonomy and critical reflection. For instance, if culture has to be preserved to maintain authenticity, does this not confirm the view that each culture has some essential elements at the core, which cannot be critically reflected on and revised? Is this not the cultural essentialism that Taylor claims to reject?

Taylor could argue that the above argument depends on how we define culture. However, the problem is that it is very difficult to do so; Taylor himself cannot offer a clear answer. It is also problematic that Taylor seems to assume any culture in our modern context would accept the fundamental liberal principles. If, for instance, culture means social traditions including language, rituals, certain social structures, and so on, which give members of the culture special meaning for their life, I do not know if Confucian philosophy, which is evident in many East Asian cultures, can be considered as worth preserving or not, as Confucianism is clearly discriminatory against women. Following Taylor's principle of

valuing fundamental individual rights, certain aspects of these cultures are not likely to be considered worth preserving. But how can Taylor draw on cultural authenticity when he actually does not consider the possibility that some cultures are illiberal? He may want to avoid this problem by stating that illiberal aspects of any culture are not worth preserving. But this strategy may not work because members of a culture could claim that illiberal aspects of their culture are essential to maintain its authenticity. Moreover, if he limits the actual application of his argument to only liberal cultures, it is liberalism, not *Volk*, which is respected. This defeats his own argument for cultural *and* individual authenticity.

Moreover, even if Taylor tries to limit the application of his theory to something good, such good intentions are too weak. We need to pay much more serious attention to this matter than Taylor does. We should note, for instance, that whether or not ethnicity is pre-determined and natural or is rather the result of social creation has been a controversial issue among social scientists (Liebkind, 1992). The traditional view is called **primordialism**. This view assumes that an ethnic group exists based on primordial ties, sharing a common history and culture which "naturally" bind the members together. We may contrast this with **situationism**, which developed as a critique of primordialism. This view considers that an ethnic group is created as a result of the necessity to draw a boundary which keeps the members' ethnic identity unique. Situationism views "ethnicity more or less as 'false consciousness,' 'ideology,' or the like, which obfuscates class inequality and is rationally manipulated or consciously adopted as a strategy for pursuing the political and economic goals of ethnic groups" (Liebkind, 1992, p.154). In the modern period, when radical and major social changes are not rare, there are many historical examples which show that many "traditions," which are believed to be purely non-intentional and to have existed for

generations have actually been created in recent times. By creating tradition, the boundary between us and them is sustained, strengthening the bond among us. During this process, we have often revived or created historical symbols, cultural memories, and so on which will help us to maintain our uniqueness (Yoshino, 1997, pp. 23-52). Although the debates continue, it is clear that culture or ethnicity is not as "natural" or "pure" as we usually assume.

If cultures are, at least in some cases, intentionally constructed, it becomes very difficult to define what cultural authenticity means. As we have seen, Taylor recognizes that we lack a clear definition of culture, and tries to limit what it means to "something good." However, with this vague definition, it seems very difficult to universally accept Taylor's proposal. Taylor will be asked, who decides what is good? How does he know some cultures are authentic, while others are distorted? Rorty draws attention to this problem when she states that "they [multiculturalists] often appeal to the poetics of idealized cultural identity without fully acknowledging the ways that characterizing the 'identity' of a culture is itself a politically and ideologically charged issue" (Rorty, 1994, p.152).

Indeed, it is often difficult to demand recognition of collective identity as strongly as Taylor promotes. Although Taylor explicitly states that he is not proposing an essentialized view of identity and culture, his argument for multiculturalism drawing on cultural authenticity actually defeats such a statement. If one wants to protect some cultures, especially at the governmental level, it seems inevitable that one must rely on a conception of culture that crystallizes at least certain aspects of it. I am not sure how Taylor's multiculturalism can assure the survival of culture while at the same time acknowledging its

instability, although I recognize that Taylor does not *intend* to promote cultural

fundamentalism.

Appiah (1994a) is also concerned with the idea of protecting the authenticity of

collective identity. Appiah recognizes the dialogic formation process of our identity, and

how this affects our sense of self. However, he also recognizes that the concept of

authenticity is about essentialism. He states that authenticity "speaks of the real self buried

in there, the self one has to dig out and express" (Appiah, 1994a, p.155). Cultural

authenticity also presumes "the real culture" is common to all cultural members. And

Appiah is sceptical of the idea of assuring the maintenance of collective identity emerging

from cultural authenticity. As he puts it, "one reasonable ground for suspicion of much

contemporary multicultural talk is that it presupposes conceptions of collective identity that

are remarkably unsubtle in their understandings of the processes by which identities, both

individual and collective, develop" (Appiah, 1994a, p.156). He states that collective

identities provide "scripts," that is, "narratives that people can use in shaping their life plans

and in telling their life stories" (Appiah, 1994a, p.160). Scripts describe certain ways of

being as a member of a social group. Most of us rely on narratives, as we resist any assault

on our collective identities. Appiah questions whether the demand for recognition as

collective selves is the most important thing that has to be protected in the public sphere.

Talking about being black and gay in the United States, for instance, he states as follows:

> Demanding respect for people as blacks and as gays requires that there are some
> scripts that go with being an African-American or having same-sex desires. There
> will be proper ways of being black and gay, there will be expectations to be met,
> demands will be made. It is at this point that someone who takes autonomy
> seriously will ask whether we have not replaced one kind of tyranny with another.

If I had to chose between the world of the closet and the world of gay liberation, or between the world of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and Black Power, I would, of course, choose in each case the latter. *But I would like not to have to choose. I would like other options.* (Appiah, 1994a, p.163, emphasis added)

For Appiah, the idea of publicly protecting collective identity is not subtle enough to accommodate the complexity of identity.

Taylor's emphasis that it is the survival of a culturally distinctive society that has to be recognized also evokes a strong concern from traditional liberals. He states that the goal of such a society is to "maintain and cherish distinctness, *not just now but forever*" (Taylor, 1994, p.40, emphasis added). Even if Taylor argues that a society with collective goals can be liberal, this argument of ensuring cultural survival is very hard for traditional liberals to accept because Taylor seems to argue that there are certain things that can never be questioned or altered in cultures.

This does not mean, of course, that liberals do not accept any form of cultural transmission. As Appiah points out, "speaking abstractly, survival ... is perfectly consistent with respect for autonomy; otherwise every genuinely liberal society would have to die in a generation" (Appiah, 1994b, p.23). However, as we have already seen, the major concerns for liberals are the assurance of personal autonomy and the possibility of critical reflection. The crucial question for liberals is, then, "whether an individual can question and possibly substitute what is in the given, or whether the given has to be set for us by the community's values" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.51). And Taylor's insistence on cultural survival displays a sharp contrast between multiculturalism and traditional liberalism.

(4) Taylor's Defence of Cultural Nationalism

Another of Taylor's assumptions, which many contemporary liberals find hard to accept is his support of cultural nationalism. Although arguing against "nationalism in its chauvinist mode," which leads to defending xenophobic phenomena such as Nazism, Taylor is indeed a defender of nationalism. At first glance, it may be hard to understand how and why a multiculturalist who argues the importance of respecting cultural diversity would defend any type of cultural nationalism, which can imply the affirmation of cultural ethnocentrism. However, if we remember that Taylor's theory of multiculturalism has emerged from his concern over the whole direction our modern society is taking, we can see what kind of nationalism Taylor is suggesting.

As mentioned earlier, Taylor is profoundly concerned with alienation and fragmentation in modern society. He points out that "[a] citizen democracy is highly vulnerable to the alienation that arises from deep inequalities and the sense of neglect and indifference that easily arises among abandoned minorities" and therefore "[a] citizen democracy can only work if most of its members are convinced that their political society is a common venture of considerable moment and believe it to be of such vital importance that they participate in the ways they must to keep it functioning as a democracy" (Taylor, 1996b, p.120). Arguing against traditional liberalism which treats individuals as disengaging from any cultural tradition, Taylor supports a political community of a "republican regime" which is bonded with a common culture:

> My ... moral commitment to the welfare of all humans is altruistic. But the bond of
> solidarity with my compatriots in a functioning republic is based on a sense of
> shared fate, where the sharing itself is of value. This is what gives this bond its

special importance, what makes my ties with these people and to this enterprise peculiarly binding, what animates my "vertu" or patriotism. (Taylor, 1995/97, p.192)

Taylor also supports a common national identity, e.g., that of the United States, since he thinks that it makes the citizens care about the country. According to Taylor, because of the common identity, people get angry about "the shady doings of a Watergate" (Taylor, 1995, p.196), for instance. He explicitly supports patriotism, saying that "the benign effects [of patriotism] have been essential to the maintenance of liberal democracy" and "[patriotism] is still very much with us and plays an essential role in maintaining our contemporary liberal democratic regimes" (Taylor, 1995, p.196). Taylor argues that patriotism carries freedom with it since it brings its citizens to care about their country and works to prevent despotism. Although he acknowledges that we cannot universally accept patriotism and cautions that it has to respect freedom, he conceives it as primarily good; as he says:

> Not only has patriotism been an important bulwark of freedom in the past, but it will remain unsubstitutably so for the future. The various atomist sources of allegiance have not only been insufficient to generate the vigorous defensive reaction to crimes like Watergate; they will never be able to do so, in the nature of things (Taylor, 1995, pp.196-7).

Nodia (1994) also questions the common liberal assumption since World War II (he mainly refers to Francis Fukuyama) that nationalism and liberalism are opposing principles, arguing that nationalism and liberalism do not necessarily exclude each other. Rather, he thinks that it is possible and even desirable that the two coexist. According to Nodia (1994),

nationalism "in its proper sense" is different from chauvinism or fundamentalism. Although he acknowledges that nationalism has often been practiced in an illiberal and antidemocratic manner, he argues that ethnic pride can be "sublimated into patriotic esteem for the institutions and achievements created by a democratic (not just ethnic) 'we'" (p.15).

Patriotism, as Taylor and Nodia see it, does not mean affirming cultural essentialism; on the contrary, they conceive it as useful for inspiring members of a political community to feel that they are a part of a meaningful social life and that participation in it is worthwhile. In this way, patriotism is necessary if the members of a community are to criticize and improve it, rather than just praise and accept it.

Therefore, the multicultural society Taylor envisions is liberal, democratic, and modern, consisting of multiple culturally distinctive sub-communities. His vision of a multicultural society is justified in the liberal, Western (North-American) tradition because (1) people in marginalized cultures cannot expect to receive appropriate recognition from people in the dominant culture; (2) any good community needs a sense of belonging, which can be nourished by supporting culturally distinctive communities with common goals; and (3) the mother culture, like the mother tongue, deserves to be respected and preserved. Although he draws on Herder's concept of cultural authenticity, for Taylor it is different from cultural essentialism. He is proposing the idea that *Volk* is entitled to oppose any alien imposition (Taylor, 1989, pp.413-8). Taylor argues that this way of decentralizing a massive modern society is better because this makes it possible to develop a feeling of belonging among the members of each community. Further, this multicultural society is better than the current individualistic society because it favours only one dominant, common culture.

I must agree with Taylor and Nodia that patriotism plays an important role in building community, *if* it does not mean "chauvinistic nationalism" but one's love, or concern—the kind of love which appreciates the community members' criticisms, the kind of concern without which the community would not become a "better" place to live—for one's own community. I quite agree with their claim that patriotism has a function that can be used to form a desirable community. However, I also see the difficulties of applying this argument *universally*.

For instance, Taylor's multicultural project is problematic as he tries to defend patriotism for the sake of a "good" and culturally distinctive community which is supposed to resist the three malaises about which he is concerned. Taylor seems to suggest that patriotism should be intentionally defended and, probably, promoted. However, I have to note that such an attempt to intentionally recognize the significance of patriotism has often led to xenophobic nationalism, especially when coupled with the idea of cultural distinctiveness. Giroux (1995) warns us in this regard that "[n]ational identity in the service of a common culture recognizes cultural differences only to flatten them out in the conservative discourse of assimilation and the liberal appeal to tolerance" (p.47).

This concern is real in the current world where the former Soviet Union has collapsed and is in the process of re-organizing. Giordan (1994) summarizes the state of affairs as follows:

> The decline of the two main systems of thought which have dominated
> contemporary history—liberal universalism and Marxist universalism—in fact the
> end of the great empires, has coincided with an increase in nationalism, religious
> fundamentalism and a whole range of xenophobic and racist attitudes. These
> phenomena seem to us to be exerting a decisive pressure on social development and

have in the past given rise to events with tragic consequences for humanity, ranging from wars between nations in the nineteenth century to totalitarian regimes, Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism. It is distressing to find this return to identity "values" taking place within a context of acute economic crisis world-wide today as in the 1930s. "Identities" which set themselves up as standards and have no place for otherness and difference belong to the logic of totalitarianism. The social context, like the intellectual environment in which this exposition of "identities" is taking place, give us good reason to dread developments similar to those that resulted in totalitarian systems and the Second World War. (p.2)

It may be argued that xenophobic nationalism emerges as a result of lack of recognition as a distinctive community, but it is still difficult to defend patriotism without making explicit how patriotism and "chauvinistic nationalism" can be separated. Taylor and Nodia show us that patriotism has a role to play in our modern society. But it is not a sufficient argument for us to accept their claim that patriotism should be defended. It is necessary for them to show how we can prevent patriotism becoming chauvinism or fanatic fundamentalism since defending and encouraging patriotism has often meant the formation of an illiberal and undemocratic society.

Further, it is not clear why "common" goals have to exist for members of a community to be encouraged to participate in its political process. If, as Taylor argues, patriotism is so important for the existence of meaningful community, and virtually any small community is becoming socially and culturally diverse, should we not envision a community of concerned citizens, who may or may not share collective cultural goals? To put it in a simpler form, can we not have patriotism—the will to participate in community building and develop it for the betterment of the members—without culturally collective identity and

goals? Why do we often think that commonality is necessary for keeping our patriotism alive?

It is necessary to ask these questions since if we defend patriotism, nationalism, love for one's native culture, and common identity as Taylor does, we will also defend the worth of the current dominant culture. At this point, we encounter the limit of Taylor's multiculturalism resting as it does on the concepts of cultural authenticity, cultural nationalism, and liberalism, since, conceived this way, mainstream multiculturalism could encourage cultural nationalism of the currently dominant culture as well as that of marginal ones. Even if we agree with Taylor that certain illiberal cultures may be precluded from the list of marginalized cultures worth respecting, and recognize that he is not supporting cultural determinism, and that still, somehow, cultural nationalism can be promoted, then the whole point of creating a multicultural society, as opposed to an individualistic liberal one, is almost lost. When Taylor mentions "respect for diversity" in a community with collective goals, he states that such a community should be supported "provided it is also capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those who do not share its common goals; and provided it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights" (Taylor, 1994, p.59). But this is a rather strange statement for a person who argues that culturally distinctive minority community should be supported because the greater society of the majority cannot give it proper cultural recognition. Taylor clearly states that

> a minority ethnicity does not feel really acknowledged by the majority with which it shares a common political form.... The people of this minority are subsumed into a project which is foreign to them because they are not really recognized (Taylor, cited in Birnbaum, 1996, p.35).

If it is impossible for members of minority cultures to receive appropriate recognition by the majority, how does he argue that this new community with collective cultural goals can "respect diversity"? I assume he can do so to the extent that the majority of the original liberal society respects a minority culture. But if this is the case, minorities within the minority culture have to suffer misrecognition. If so, it means this new community is only as liberal as the original greater community and Taylor's argument favours only the minority which outnumbers other minorities. As Birnbaum (1996) points out, there seems to be little space for linguistic and cultural minorities in Taylor's new community with collective goals that are significant for one cultural group. How can he justify this? In order for Taylor to be consistent, it appears that he has to take either one of the following directions: (1) Allow or even encourage minority cultures within this new community to separate; (2) Give up the argument for supporting a community with collective goals and seek the way to encourage cultural recognition in the original community. But he obviously does not follow these paths. As Lamey (1999) argues, this leaves Taylor in a position of maintaining a double standard: Taylor ensures that the Quebecois/ses do not have to suffer the cost of assimilation to the English speaking culture; but he imposes the assimilation to the French speaking culture on recent immigrants.

As Taylor and others have argued, recognition has come to play a significant role in determining our quality of life, especially in a modern society. We can find no significant argument against this thesis. However, Taylor's project of promoting equal recognition by supporting the autonomy of culturally distinctive societies seems to indicate some limitations for envisioning an ideal multicultural society. Taylor's politics of difference seems to be unattractive, as his reliance on cultural authenticity indicates his support, albeit unintentional,

for cultural nationalism and essentialism. He tries to justify the former, but as we have seen, it is not very persuasive. With respect to the latter, he simply denies the view, but his position, especially his concept of cultural authenticity, indicates otherwise.

(IV) Kymlicka's Arguments for Cultural Rights

(1) Overview of Kymlicka's Arguments

Now that Taylor's version of multiculturalism has become clearer, I would like to turn to Will Kymlicka, who has developed another argument for mainstream multiculturalism. Like Taylor, he also criticizes traditional North-American liberals such as Dworkin (1977) and Rawls (1973) because they assume that the public sphere is culturally neutral.

Taylor and Kymlicka are similar in that they emphasize the significance of culture for living a good life. Although Kymlicka does not draw on the conception of cultural authenticity, he describes the significance of our cultural heritage as follows:

> From childhood on, we become aware both that we are already participants in certain forms of life ..., and that there are other ways of life which offer alternative models and roles that we may, in time, come to endorse. We decide how to lead our lives by situating ourselves in these cultural narratives, by adopting roles that have struck us as worthwhile ones, as ones worth living.
>
> ...
>
> Our language and history are the media through which we come to an awareness of the options available to us, and their significance; and this is a precondition of making intelligent judgments about how to lead our lives. In order to make such judgments, we do not explore a number of different patterns of physical movement,

which might in principle be judged in abstraction from any cultural structure. Rather, we make these judgments precisely by examining the cultural structure, by coming to an awareness of the possibilities it has, the different activities it identifies as significant. (Kymlicka, 1989, p.165)

Kymlicka, then, argues in a similar manner to Taylor that cultural membership has a considerable significance for achieving full human potential. He recognizes that "cultural heritage, the sense of belonging to a cultural structure and history, is often cited as a source of emotional security and personal strength. It may affect our very sense of agency" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.175). He makes special reference to the result of the assimilation policy that has had devastating consequences for aboriginal peoples in North America. He concludes that "[i]n these and other ways, cultural membership seems crucial to personal agency and development: when the individual is stripped of her cultural heritage, her development becomes stunted" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.176). Thus for Kymlicka cultural membership is primarily good.

Although Taylor and Kymlicka are often grouped together as they both recognize the significance of culture for developing our sense of self (Fierlbeck, 1996; McDonough, 1997, 1998), we should note that their approaches to the problem are rather different. For instance, Kymlicka, unlike Taylor, does not agree with recent criticisms of liberalism as an atomism that takes no consideration of social influences on individuals. In spite of indications that Dworkin and Rawls have assumed the existence of a common culture in the public sphere, Kymlicka points out that these liberals do recognize and support the significance of cultural structure for making plausible life decisions (Kymlicka, 1989).

If liberals agree that it is only within a particular cultural context that we can make plausible decisions about the alternative options that lie in front of us, they are bound to respect each member's cultural heritage in a society. Therefore, Kymlicka expands the arguments of contemporary North American liberals, rather than entirely opposing their approach.

Kymlicka defends minority collective rights in the framework of traditional North-American liberalism because one's cultural ways of life need to be assured in order to achieve traditional liberal ideals of the autonomous and critical individual. Kymlicka states that liberals should recognize the significance of the cultural structure "as a context of choice." Such cultural rights would help maintain cultural autonomy by imposing certain restrictions on non-cultural members. For instance, he points out that the stability of aboriginal communities is constantly threatened, especially in the northern part of Canada, where natural resources are rich. Because of this special attraction to people outside aboriginal communities, if non-aboriginal people such as short-term workers were unrestricted, their influence could jeopardize aboriginal ways of life. Stability of cultural structure is necessary for people in such marginalized communities in order to make meaningful life choices. Kymlicka recognizes that "the very existence of aboriginal cultural communities is vulnerable to the decisions of the non-aboriginal majority around them" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.187) and, therefore, "certain collective rights can be defended as appropriate measures for the rectification of an inequality in circumstances which affects aboriginal people collectively" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.194).

In sum, Kymlicka argues that since culture is important for people in a marginalized culture to make meaningful life choices, cultural autonomy has to be respected by guaranteeing certain collective rights.

Further, unlike Taylor, Kymlicka articulates that culture per se cannot be protected. Kymlicka is very aware that using a concept such as cultural authenticity can potentially affirm cultural essentialism. Therefore, he tries to synthesize individual and cultural rights by distinguishing culture per se from cultural membership. As opposed to some essentialized conceptions of culture, cultural membership literally means that one belongs to a certain culture, and this does not mean that one has to accept and preserve cultural traditions. For Kymlicka, assuming that his argument is placed in the framework of a liberal and democratic society, it is cultural membership, not (illiberal) culture, which has to be respected. In Kymlicka's theory, no one can impose cultural rights over individual rights. In this way, Kymlicka avoids a potential defense of cultural fundamentalism by carefully distinguishing cultural membership and culture itself, so that individual rights are not denied or subordinated to cultural rights.

Kymlicka illuminates the distinction between culture per se and cultural membership using the example of French-Canadian culture to make this point. According to him, French-Canadian culture radically changed in the 1960s. During this time, "French-Canadians began to make very different choices than they traditionally had done" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.167), so certain characteristics of French-Canadian cultures such as the Roman Catholic Church and parochial schools have eroded. However, there was "no danger to cultural membership in the sense I am concerned with—i.e. no danger to the existence of people's context of choice, no danger to their ability to examine the options that their cultural

structure had made meaningful to them" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.167). The ideal of cultural

authenticity does not seem to allow such radical changes, since it calls for the preservation of

cultural characteristics, not just for now, but "forever."[6] However, the distinction of culture

and cultural membership makes it possible to guarantee the protection of individual

autonomy with which liberal critics are concerned. Kymlicka states as follows:

> The notion of respect for persons qua members of cultures, based on the recognition
> of the importance of the primary good of cultural membership, is not, therefore, an
> illiberal one. It doesn't say that the community is more important than the
> individuals who compose it, or that the state should impose (what it views to be) the
> best conception of the good life on its citizens in order to preserve the purity of the
> culture, or any such thing. The argument simply says that cultural membership is
> important in pursuing our essential interest in leading a good life, and so
> consideration of that membership is an important part of having equal consideration
> for the interests of each member of the community. (Kymlicka, 1989, pp.167-8)

Kymlicka's adherence to the liberal principle that each individual, regardless of her

cultural background, should be guaranteed a cultural context which enables her to make

meaningful life choices, is a crucial difference from Taylor. Kymlicka's theory is much

more convincing than Taylor's as Kymlicka takes care to rebut traditional liberals' fear of

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[6] I recognize that this conclusion is debatable. Since Taylor (1996) explicitly states that he
recognizes that cultures are non-static and can never be essentialized, it could be interpreted
that he would not deny radical changes of cultures. However, at the same time, he does not
have a clear definition of culture. Taylor offers us a clue to his conception of culture when
he states that he hypothetically presumes that "all human cultures that have animated whole
societies over *some considerable stretch of time* have something important to say to all
human beings" (Taylor, 1994, p.66). These words seem to indicate that cultural authenticity
has to continue for at least a few generations, which contradicts his insistence that he
recognizes the non-static nature of culture. Therefore, it is difficult to see how Taylor
recognizes the dynamics of culture in his theory of multiculturalism.

fundamentalism. He argues that such a fear is not limited to minority cultures. A community with distinctive cultural rights does not welcome such fundamentalists just as any community would not. However, Kymlicka argues that this kind of concern does not negate the significance of having a safe cultural context.

(2) Unresolved Criticisms

In this way, Kymlicka's proposal to protect culture as a context of choice would seems to be acceptable to those who are concerned with individual autonomy. Misrecognition from the majority is prevented from penetrating minority communities, while at the same time individuals of minority communities are not coerced in their own "authenticity" of culture. The distinction between culture and cultural membership greatly helps in respecting individual choices because it enables us to respect cultural membership even though cultures are indeed illiberal.

Nevertheless, Kymlicka is not free from criticism, either. It may be pointed out that Kymlicka supports not merely cultural membership but also "the *stability* of a cultural community" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.169). In Kymlicka's writings, the cultural membership and stability of a cultural community, as well as the stability of cultural structure, are interchangeable (Tomasi, 1995). For instance, he states that aboriginal peoples are disadvantaged in *maintaining* their way of life, one that requires more natural resources including vast land areas than non-aboriginal people. Because of this cultural difference, each cultural member cannot be treated equally unless cultural rights are guaranteed so that they can assure cultural survival by assessing cultural disadvantages. Kymlicka states that "[t]he rectification of this inequality is the basis for a liberal defense of aboriginal rights, and

of minority rights in general" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.189). In this particular example, he defends the maintenance of certain characteristics of aboriginal communities, as well as cultural membership. If it is indeed merely cultural membership that has to be protected, the maintenance of the way of life should not come up as an issue. This argument seems to indicate that although Kymlicka recognizes that cultural structure may change over time, he is actually concerned with the preservation of cultural structure as he tries to protect a distinctively aboriginal way of life. Tomasi (1995) rightly points out that the cultural context for an Inuit girl at this historical juncture may not be "purely Inuit" as it once used to be, but this unstable, transitional nature is the cultural context available for her. If so, it is implausible for Kymlicka to argue that stability of culture should be protected for this Inuit girl. Then, Kymlicka's proposal cannot be significantly differentiated from Taylor's cultural recognition thesis.

Neither would critics of multiculturalism such as Appiah be satisfied with Kymlicka's proposal. Although Kymlicka successfully avoids reliance on an essentialized conception of culture and identity, for Appiah, Kymlicka's multiculturalism fails to incorporate the complex process of identity formation, personal as well as collective. Some liberal critics, including Appiah, would prefer to leave the recognition of any collective identity to the private realm.

In sum, for its critics, multiculturalism necessarily oversimplifies every cultural community of minority groups. The critics argue that, in the modern context, the intervention of the government to ensure the protection of cultural identity is too unrealistic and dangerous; unrealistic because communities are not as pure as they used to be and

dangerous because such action might potentially promote the maintenance of mono-cultural hegemony.

(3) An Alternative to Kymlicka's Approach

Because of the implicit assumption of cultural determinism, some liberals suggest that we should dismiss mainstream multiculturalism altogether, adhering to traditional liberalism. However, this option does not appear to be very appropriate because the emergence of the discourse on multiculturalism, which is gaining more and more attention since the term started to circulate, seems to indicate that we need to incorporate cultural differences into our contemporary thinking. As discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, we are in process of looking for answers to the question how we can better understand cultural differences and ensure fairness transcending these differences.

Some other liberal critics have proposed a cosmopolitanism or hybrid-identity model that can accommodate the complexity of how culture influences the identity formation process. This view comes from the observation that in an age of globalization, any conception of pure culture or identity is an idealization that belongs to the past. Waldron (1996) argues that our general assumption that identity and culture are monolithic and stable is becoming outdated. In our contemporary world, traditional social boundaries are becoming obscure, and many social categories contribute to the formation of our identity. Our identity does not entirely depend on one culture, and even if it did, culture is fluid, unstable, and never pure. Relying on the example of Salman Rushdie, Waldron suggests a "many fragments model" of identity as an "ideal type" of identity. The characteristics of this model are well captured in the work of Rushdie (1991), who writes:

The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the pure. (p.394)

Following Waldron, McDonough (1997, 1998) argues that multicultural education should respect persons not merely as members of their native culture, but as ones whose identity is, and will potentially be, very complex. McDonough warns us that to support mainstream multiculturalism without recognizing this complexity of identity can be damaging to children's well-being. He shows this by referring to an example of "culturally sensitive education for Pomo Indian students" described by Deyhle and Swisher. They observed that when a white teacher used an Indian story about Slug Woman, the students "responded with either open hostility or stone silence" (Deyhle and Swisher, cited in McDonough, 1998, p.486). McDonough offers two different interpretations regarding this incident. One is that students sensed that the way the teacher dealt with their ancestral story was not very different from the stereotypical reductionism from which their ancestors greatly suffered. The other is that the students were already internalizing the devaluation of their ancestral heritage in the larger society and were not able to feel proud of their traditional story. In either case, this reaction of Indian students indicates the complexity and difficulty of recognizing cultural identity.

(4) Assessments of the Liberal Alternative

The cosmopolitan or hybrid-identity model quite successfully overcomes the difficulty of protecting cultural characteristics with a hybrid, non-static, and non-absolute conception of identity and culture. Thus, we do not have to be concerned with how to define culture, and our concern for autonomy is resolved. However, the universal application of the cosmopolitan model ignores the disadvantages that members from historically marginalized groups often experience. Although it indeed seems to be quite right to point out that no culture or identity is monolithic or stable, the strategy to replace a "monolithic" identity model with a "plural" one universally seems to minimize the oppression members of marginalized groups often have to cope with on a daily basis.

For instance, Tomasi's critique of Kymlicka is rather misleading as Tomasi ignores the context of Kymlicka's arguments. When he mentions the stability of a cultural community, he is talking about the unequal circumstances aboriginal peoples in North America are facing today. The issue Kymlicka is arguing here is that

> the very existence of aboriginal cultural communities is vulnerable to the decisions of the non-aboriginal majority around them. They could be out bid or outvoted on resources crucial to the survival of their communities, a possibility that members of the majority cultures simply do not face. (Kymlicka, 1989, p.187)

In this argument, Kymlicka is assuming that aboriginals would like to maintain their characteristic ways of life which greatly differ from those of contemporary North American culture. He has a reason to assume this, namely, the historical records of the massive destruction of aboriginal peoples by Anglo-European settlers. Kymlicka cites Michael Gross's statement that "blacks have been forcibly *excluded* (segregated) from white society

by law, Indians—aboriginal peoples with their own cultures, languages, religions and territories—have been forcibly *included* (integrated) into that society by law" (Gross, cited by Kymlicka, 1989, p.145, emphasis in original). Therefore, for Kymlicka, it is clear that the unstable, transitional nature of aboriginal communities is a result of the past injustice. This assumption could be wrong on an individual basis within aboriginal communities. However, recognizing cultural membership as Kymlicka describes it does not limit the meaningful life options for an Inuit girl. As a matter of fact, it is by such recognition alone that she can examine meaningful life choices as an Inuit and Canadian adult. On the other hand, the French-Canadian culture example illustrates that cultural transformation is largely internal. Therefore, when Kymlicka mentions cultural stability, it is not the cultural stability that he wants to protect. Rather, it is within a framework of culture as a context of choice, and in this particular case of aboriginal communities, that such a framework implicitly includes the *stability* of culture. Tomasi's criticism fails to incorporate the very different historical and political circumstances of these two cultures.

In order to clarify when the stability of culture can and should be protected, Kymlicka later proposes a distinction between internal and external restrictions. Internal restrictions are "intended to protect the group from the destabilizing impact of *internal dissent* (e.g., the decision of individual members not to follow traditional practices or customs)" (Kymlicka, 1995, p.35, emphasis in original). For instance, when cultural fundamentalists insist that certain cultural traditions have to be protected in spite of the fact that they strongly restrict individual rights, these fundamentalists are imposing internal restrictions. On the other hand, external restrictions do not work to restrict individual freedom. External restrictions are "intended to protect the group from the impact of *external*

decisions (e.g., the economic or political decisions of the larger society)" (Kymlicka, 1995, p.35, emphasis in original). Mainstream liberals express their scepticism toward any argument for protecting culture because they fear that internal restrictions are imposed on individuals. However, Kymlicka argues that when protecting cultures can reduce the impact of external influences, individual autonomy is supported rather than threatened. Kymlicka argues that "liberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices" (Kymlicka, 1995, p.37).

Of course, it may be difficult in particular cases to determine what are internal and external cultural changes. But Kymlicka (1995) further introduces a distinction among minorities: national and ethnic minorities. National minorities are involuntarily incorporated into the current political system, while ethnic minorities are mostly immigrants and their descendants who chose to live in a new environment. The former includes aboriginal peoples, Quebecois/ses, and Latinos/nas, among others. This seems to indicate that national minorities are the clearest cases entitled to claim external protections.

Therefore, there are some very clear cases where promoting collective autonomy has greater benefit for members of communities for the sake of individual autonomy as well as cultural stability and survival. Mainstream multiculturalists problematize the cases of some cultures or identities which have been historically denied a chance to examine meaningful life options and to be recognized because of their cultural backgrounds. For Taylor, such a case is Quebec. Kymlicka uses examples of aboriginal communities. In both cases, it is clear they have been historically marginalized based on their collective cultural identities. Accordingly, the authors are arguing from a distinctive perspective that recognizes

the reality of some cultural groups disempowered because of their collective identity. In other words, they are making a case against the universal application of liberal principles because there are certain cases that deserve more flexible understanding of the role of culture. It is only within this context that Taylor and Kymlicka support multiculturalism.

It may be argued that Taylor's theory still suffers from inconsistency because his treatment of culture remains vague. He does not distinguish national and ethnic minorities or internal dissent and external restrictions. However, I believe these distinctions are implicit in Taylor's arguments, as he exclusively draws on the example of Quebec. Given this context, Kymlicka's cultural recognition thesis becomes much stronger, especially as the liberal critics' alternative approaches pay little attention to important differences among minorities.

This means that mainstream multiculturalism may not be applied to all minority cultures. How we can determine relevant distinctions between minority cultures remains controversial at this point. Nevertheless, we can state that there are certain cultures whose demand for recognition as cultural groups as well as individuals should be publicly supported because their cultural stability was systematically disturbed to the point where it has become difficult for them to make meaningful life choices. In this context, supporting mainstream multiculturalism does not jeopardize individual autonomy and critical reflection.

It may be noted that Taylor would not accept this version of mainstream multiculturalism. Kymlicka and Taylor both support the argument that there are certain circumstances in which minorities should be allowed a certain cultural autonomy in addition to individual autonomy. But they part company when Taylor insists that such minority cultures should be assured survival over following generations. As we have already seen, Kymlicka argues that such a promise cannot be allowed in liberal society.

However, this difference between the two theorists is not as significant as it may seem. Taylor does agree with the view that identity and culture are complex and non-static, which differs from the essentialized conception. He emphasizes "survival" because he assumes that the assurance of survival does not mean imposing cultural fundamentalism. We have to remember that he assumes the cultures he is defending are not fundamentalistic or illiberal. But this argument is clearly inconsistent, since by accepting collective goals that last forever, Taylor is also supporting an essentialized conception of culture. On the other hand, Kymlicka is aware of this inconsistency and other weaknesses of Taylor's position, and proposes to assure cultural stability rather than cultural essence. In other words, Kymlicka addresses the concerns that upset traditional liberals. Kymlicka's arguments, as a result, are stronger than Taylor's, and at the same time, plausible for the minority cases that both theorists are particularly concerned with. Since Taylor and Kymlicka can both be considered as supporters of the "cultural recognition thesis," mainstream multiculturalism draws on the arguments of both theorists, but it draws more heavily on Kymlicka than on Taylor.

Nevertheless, the last liberal criticism, that is, multiculturalists incorrectly assume that culture is the primary source of our identity, remains. Walker (1997) acutely points out that the loss of stability as a context of choice is not limited to ethnic cultures. Referring to the example of rural farmers who are often forced to restructure their ways of life as a result of urbanization and the market economy, Walker argues that "culturalists'" exclusive focus on supporting ethno-cultural communities cannot be justified.

However, this criticism is not robust enough to refute mainstream multiculturalism altogether. Mainstream multiculturalists limit their analysis to cultural issues because they are arguing that there are some clear cases where assuring cultural stability promotes

liberalism. One has to limit one's analyses depending on the socio-historical context because each minority group is unique. But this does not necessarily imply that one excludes non-ethno-cultural categories. The cultural recognition thesis is currently limited to ethno-cultural groups, but could potentially be expanded to other cultural groups. Mainstream multiculturalism does not necessarily have to deny that the farmers' culture might need more recognition and governmental support. However, mainstream multiculturalists recognize that it would require more systematic examination of the socio-historical context for other socio-cultural groups to be included in the cultural recognition thesis. This does not reveal a weaknesses in mainstream multiculturalism. Rather, it shows mainstream multiculturalists' detailed attention to the unique context each minority culture faces.

(V) Conclusion

In the discussions above, the concept of mainstream multiculturalism has become clearer. It does not just "value[s] cultural difference and authenticity, and seek[s] to maintain [these] in ways that are not solely dependent on the momentary interests of individuals" (Feinberg, 1996, p.1). It values cultural diversity, but it does not simply seek to maintain certain cultural ways of life. Mainstream multiculturalism supports measures to ensure cultural stability when minority cultures have experienced extensive cultural threats.

The argument for mainstream multiculturalism may sound imperfect since it rejects the generalizations of multiculturalism. This may be unsatisfactory to liberals as well as some "multiculturalists." We often want clear-cut conclusions; we understand a phenomenon as we generalize about it. However, since culture is influenced by complex historical and political contexts, it is impossible to talk about it in a purely abstract manner. I

am not against all generalization: I am proposing to situate the arguments in the context of liberal principles, that is, to respect personal autonomy and to assure meaningful life options for everyone. And in this context, mainstream multiculturalism indeed seems to become a significant principle especially for members of minority cultures. I even consider that we can generalize to a certain extent about the complex identity formation process and the role education could play in it. But we have to resist a fully universalist analysis.

In developing this position, I am employing Allen's (1989) concept of phronesis, which, according to him, governs "all forms of thoughtful activity" (Allen, 1989, p.363). He argues that phronesis, originally proposed by Aristotle, is employed to make good sense in a certain context for practical engagement. Good sense making, according to him, does not necessarily require universality. He states that "we have to acknowledge that at least some things can be known only from a practically engaged standpoint" (Allen, 1989, p.364). Because of this limitation, "phronetic sense-making will always prove a bit unsettling, especially to those who expect reasoning to fix everything in its proper place" (Allen, 1989, p.366). However, at the same time, this "elastic" sense making "preserves some manner of continuity that resists splitting variations off into their own isolated realms of meaning" (Allen, 1989, p.368).

Especially in discussions of multiculturalism, elastic sense making is important, precisely because cultures are not static, as some liberals point out. And yet, in a certain socio-historical context, there are *some* general principles that can be applied to *certain* cases. If in such cases mainstream multiculturalism can be shown to protect the individual autonomy of certain cultural members more than other procedures, the liberal criticisms are not robust enough to refute it. Liberals cannot reject mainstream multiculturalism merely

because of their fear of potential cultural nationalism. Cultural or any other form of nationalism in a chauvinistic mode is the fear of democratic, liberal society in general. There is no formula to establish whether increased cultural recognition results in increased nationalism or not. However, Taylor (1996c) notes that as official recognition of Quebec has increased, so has the level of liberal values in this region. There seem to exist at least certain cases in which due recognition discourages cultural nationalism in a chauvinistic mode. If so, the liberal arguments for rejecting mainstream multiculturalism are not plausible in at least some cases.

This complexity leads us to wonder if mainstream multiculturalism can suggest any practical applications of its arguments without imposing another restraint on culturally marginalized groups. This is a concern for everyone, whether liberals, mainstream multiculturalists, or critical educators.

But before we proceed further, we need to examine critical educators' criticisms of multiculturalism. At this point, critical educators may argue that that they have a universal concern—empowerment of all individuals. How do mainstream multiculturalists respond to such concerns? I would like to examine critical educators' arguments in the next chapter in order to further clarify mainstream multiculturalism.

Chapter 4

Critical Education and Multiculturalism

(I) Introduction

Liberals have resisted the idea of multiculturalism, arguing that it could hinder the development of individual autonomy and the capacity for critical reflection. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, mainstream multiculturalists would counter that there are certain cases in which children's identity and choices of meaningful life options are protected, rather than threatened, if their cultural stability is protected. Therefore, it is not possible for liberals to reject mainstream multiculturalism entirely. Mainstream multiculturalism is consistent with the principles of traditional liberalism.

In this chapter, I critically assess the critical educators' argument that multiculturalism has to be critical, transformative, and empowering, not simply culturally relevant. Critical educators tend to perceive "multicultural education" and multiculturalism in general as ineffective approaches to combat injustice (e.g., McLaren, 1993, 1995; Mullard 1982, 1984; Olneck, 1990; Rezai-Rashti, 1995; Troyna, 1987; Watkins, 1994). This scepticism toward multiculturalism, including mainstream multiculturalism, stems from critical educators' strong belief that the development of critical and autonomous individuals and social transformation are essential educational goals.

However, mainstream multiculturalists would argue that there are certain cases in which such goals are possible only after collective identity is recognized. The recent advocacy by critical educators of hybrid identity, in particular, can be potentially threatening,

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rather than empowering, for certain students from marginalized cultures. Therefore, critical

educators' criticisms are not robust enough to refute mainstream multiculturalism single-

handedly, either.

(II) Reframing the Relations between Mainstream Multiculturalism

and Critical Education Theory

One of the main concerns of critical educators about mainstream multiculturalism is

that it is another "liberal-conservative" reformist attempt to move our attention away from

the systematic analysis of economics and politics. This scepticism toward multiculturalism

and multicultural education in general is well summarized in McCarthy's (1994) words:

> ... proponents of multicultural education ... "claw back" from the radical themes
> associated with minority challenges to the white-dominated school curriculum and
> school system, emphasizing instead a normative rhetoric that accepts the broad
> structural and cultural parameters and values of American society and the American
> way. By "clawing back," I refer to the way in which some multicultural educators
> tend to graft the theme of diversity onto the negotiated central concerns and values
> of this society—the values of possessive individualism, occupational mobility, and
> status attainment—leaving completely untouched the structural organization of
> capitalism in the United States. (p.83)

Watkins (1994) also argues that "sponsored multicultural education" operates on

"culturalism" that has been derived from "a blend of cultural nationalism and the discipline

of cultural anthropology" (p.106). In their approach to justice, cultural nationalists draw on

the concept of Black culture, as opposed to race. For Watkins, this approach waters down

the more political nature of racism, only making it more easily accepted by the dominant

group as a "safe" way to deal with racism. He states that the problem of this culturalist

approach is "the decoupling of race from economics and politics" (Watkins, 1994, p.106).

Watkins concludes that such multiculturalism has to be "de-romanticized" and "interrogated

in light of today's socio-political and economic realities" (Watkins, 1994, p.102).

In this critical discourse, multiculturalism and multicultural education are perceived

as operating under the assumption that racism and stereotypes are basically matters of

personal attitude rather than of social structures and institutions (Troyna, 1987; Rezai-Rashti,

1995). It follows that, in multicultural education, solutions to social injustices are assumed to

be attainable through "cultural sensitivity training" and "prejudice reduction" programs

(McCarthy, 1994). Therefore, critical educators often perceive the entire project of

multiculturalism as a compromise rather than an opposition to the monoculturalism that had

characterized modern nation-states.

Critical educators' scepticism toward multicultural education is partly grounded in

their view that the social ideals of democracy and social justice are increasingly jeopardized.

Critical educators see the contemporary economic and political system as governed by

"liberal-conservative" principles that advocate consumerism, individual competition, free

market and trade. The recent extension of market principles into education is a concern for

many educators, as Apple (1995) states:

> In the process of marketization, an understanding of society as a collection of
> possessive individuals is revivified and any serious sense of the common good is
> marginalized. The ideological effects of this have been damaging. Our very idea of
> democracy has been altered so that democracy is no longer seen as a political

concept, but an *economic* one. Democracy is reduced to stimulating the conditions of "free consumer choice" in an unfettered market. (Apple, 1995, p.xvii)

Many critical educators are especially concerned with the rise of the new conservatism during the 1980s, which blamed public schooling for the slowdown in the economy. During this time, "in the new educational reform movement the discourse of citizenship has been reconstituted and reduced to a more blatantly conservative notion of patriotism" (Giroux, 1988, p.18).

Therefore, when critical educators criticize liberal theory, it is often the 1980s "conservative-liberalism," heavily influenced by the political and economic climate of North America. For instance, Giroux characterizes liberalism as "anti-utopianism in which history remains abstracted from the language and discourse of hope" (Giroux, 1988, p.41). He criticizes the instrumental liberal theory of education as assuming education only as cultural "enrichment," failing to make connections between students' everyday experiences and knowledge (Giroux, 1988). As a result, public discourse on education, ethics, public life, and politics is only focused at the level of abstraction. Liberal discourse, according to Giroux, has been abstracted from politics and everyday life (Giroux, 1988).

However, these criticisms of multiculturalism and "liberalism" do not immediately apply to mainstream multiculturalism. In general, the origin and philosophy of multicultural education that critical educators criticize are not exactly the same as mainstream multiculturalism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, critical educators often criticize the *most common practices* of multicultural education. Especially within the UK and Canada, critical educators have proposed anti-racist education as an answer to what they saw as the limitations of the common practices of multicultural education. For instance, when Rezai-

Rashti (1995) contrasts antiracist education and multicultural education in a Canadian

context, specific programs such as an enhanced English as a Second Language program are

considered to be multicultural education. For critical educators, multiculturalists are

supporters of such programs, promoted during the 1970s and 1980s. Critical educators in

Canada describe such multiculturalists as follows:

> They [liberal supporters of multicultural education during the 1970s and 1980s]
> stressed the need to have anglophone teachers and students become more sensitive
> to minority students so that equality of educational opportunity could be attained by
> everyone regardless of race, gender, religion, or ethnicity. They also called for
> reforms in school curricula and celebrated cultural diversity through mainly
> government-sponsored events, in order to break the ethnocentric bias of the
> educational system and of Canadian society at large. (Rezai-Rashti, 1995, p.4)

In the UK, many have proposed antiracist education since they were quite dissatisfied with

the practices of multicultural education. For them, the two approaches are completely

different, as Troyna (1987) states: "it is my contention that the two perspectives are

irreconcilable" (Troyna, 1987, p.311). Troyna analyzes the actual educational reforms from

the mid-1960s through to the 1980s and argues:

> the move towards multicultural definitions of education did not entail any
> significant departure from the assumptions and principles which underpinned
> assimilationist conceptions. That is to say, although representing a more liberal
> variant of the assimilationist model, multicultural education continued to draw its
> inspiration and rationale from white, middle-class professional understandings of
> how the educational system might best respond to the perceived 'needs' and
> 'interests' of black students and their parents. (Troyna, 1987, p.308)

Mullard (1982) also attacks multicultural education, which is, from his perspective, not very different from the earlier assimilation model of education. For him, antiracist education that focuses on the structure of discrimination is "a truly alternative and oppositional expression" (Mullard, 1984, p.12). He goes so far to say that multicultural education is a tool for white educators to control black students and "[o]nly Black ethnic minority groups know and are thus able fully to convey and teach about their own cultures" (Mullard, 1984, pp.34-5).

A similar observation on the currently available practices of multicultural education is also reported in the United States:

> Like intercultural education, dominant versions of multicultural education delimit a sanitized cultural sphere divorced from sociopolitical interests, in which culture is reified, fragmented, and homogenized, and they depict ethnic conflict as predominantly the consequence of negative attitudes and ignorance about manifestations of difference, which they seek to remedy by cultivating empathy, appreciation, and understanding. (Olneck, 1990, p.166)

Watkins also notes:

> Changes in public schooling, and especially in the curriculum, have increasingly been employed by the political state in the late twentieth century in the service of social policy. Multicultural education should be viewed alongside a broad battery of reform initiatives ... designed to redress minority complaints. ... we now have the multicultural movement, supported and sometimes initiated by the state. (Watkins, 1994, pp.101-102)

Some of the currently available programs may appear to be in accord with mainstream multiculturalism. For instance, in Chapter 2 we noted that reading lists have

been revised to reflect the cultural diversity of students in California. In New York, curriculum content has been revised to include culturally diverse perspectives. These revisions do seem to reflect, at least partially, some arguments of mainstream multiculturalists, since they are an attempt to ensure that cultural identity is respected and represented. It is also correct to say that mainstream multiculturalists are mainly concerned with injustice related to cultural and ethnic identity. Further, official recognition of cultural diversity and multicultural nature in many developed countries also seems to reflect the cultural recognition thesis. Mainstream multiculturalism may have influenced the creation of a political atmosphere accepting of at least some forms of tolerance for diverse cultures within various societies. It has informed official multiculturalism, as we saw in Chapter 1.

However, is it the case that "there are *irreconcilable* differences between the two perspectives [multicultural education and anti-racist education]" (Rezai-Rashti 1995p.6, emphasis added)? I think that confirming such a dichotomy between mainstream multiculturalism and critical education is rather misleading. Critical educators seem to think that mainstream multiculturalists would be completely satisfied with the educational reforms reflecting the cultural recognition thesis. However, while mainstream multiculturalists would argue such revisions are *necessary* in certain cases, they would not necessarily argue that they are *sufficient*.[7]

Moreover, although mainstream multiculturalists are indeed mainly concerned with the injustice associated with cultural and ethnic identity, they never suggest that the solution to this injustice can be reached though "cultural sensitivity training." Rather, we have seen that Taylor argues the difficulty of the dominant giving due recognition to the marginalized.

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[7] Chapter 5 will discuss in more detail what educational practices would look like following mainstream multiculturalism.

He proposes decentralization of political structures so that a sense of community could be kept in our modern society that has been characterized by a rise in atomistic individualism and instrumental reason. Similarly, Kymlicka argues that cultural autonomy, especially of national minorities, has to be recognized collectively because the current political structure does not allow the marginalized to affirm their own distinctive collective needs. This entails that mainstream multiculturalism is not behind the thinking of some "brown heroes and holidays" approaches of multicultural education that are intended to introduce cultural differences mainly for students from the dominant social group in a safe and comfortable manner (Nieto, 1995). Mainstream multiculturalists are far from being open to the criticism that they do not deal with structural and institutional analysis. In this discourse, then, mainstream multiculturalism is misrepresented, or, the "multiculturalism" and/or "multicultural education" criticized are not mainstream multiculturalism.

As we saw in Chapter 3, mainstream multiculturalists are seriously concerned with the problem of cultural injustice, just as many critical educators are. For instance, we have seen that Taylor is concerned with the malaise of modernity that he believes is grounded in the idea of atomistic individualism. He is, like Herder, concerned with the development of a modernity which disconnects people from their community through political centralization. Critical educators are also concerned with these undemocratic effects of modernity. They often problematize the centralization of the mass media and the lack of critical thinking as a result of this influence, (e.g., Giroux, 1988; Macedo, 1994). Although critical educators often draw on Mills (1951, 1956, 1959) and Gramsci (1971), among others, who saw that "the rise of bureaucratic structures of executive power undermined the possibility for both a democratic discourse and the exercise of democratic rights based on a critical public

philosophy" (Giroux, 1988, p.13), these concerns are shared with mainstream

multiculturalists, especially with Taylor.

It should also be clear that liberalism as we defined it earlier is not the instrumental

liberalism that Giroux attacks above. As we have already seen, mainstream multiculturalism

is against such instrumental liberalism. For instance, Taylor (1991) has criticized such

liberalism as procedualism, and Kymlicka (1989) has argued that such instrumentalism is

never supported within a liberal tradition. Although the two theorists' approaches are

slightly different, they both are clearly against an instrumental liberalism that has been

"abstracted from politics and everyday life," as Giroux (1988) argues.

Therefore, critical educators' concerns are closely connected to those of mainstream

multiculturalists. In fact, mainstream multiculturalism and critical education theory both

resist "conservative-liberal multiculturalisms" that are "really about the politics of

assimilation; both assume that we really do live in a common egalitarian culture" (McLaren,

1995, p.213). Both mainstream multiculturalism and critical educational theory reject the

assumption that we already live in an "egalitarian culture." In this framework, both are

oppositional to a superficial recognition of cultural diversity that merely celebrates its

existence.

As Taylor (1995) and Kymlicka (1989; 1995) note, liberalism is by no means a

principle with just one rigid application, and actually I think many liberals share similar

concerns with critical educators. The critical educators we are discussing here do not hold

the pessimistic view of Marxist and neo-Marxist analysis that schools are an ideological

apparatus that only serves to maintain the status quo.[8] Rather, they see schools as a public space where everyone can work together to create a more democratic society. For instance, Giroux supports a "strong democracy" that is "characterized by a citizenry capable of genuine public thinking, political judgment, and social action" (Giroux, 1988, p.88) and a concept of a citizen "as more than a simple bearer of abstract rights, privileges, and immunities but as a member of any one of a diverse number of public spheres that provide a sense of communal vision and civic courage" (Giroux, 1988, p.88). This view of democratic community is not against the "liberal" principles of mainstream multiculturalism.

Further, it is simply inaccurate to claim that mainstream multiculturalism proposes to avoid analyses of more serious social problems by replacing them with cultural issues. As we have already seen, mainstream multiculturalists have argued that, in our modern context, recognition has become a significant source of political struggle, and culture is a source of identity for many people. As such, non-recognition or misrecognition has come to mean oppression (Kymlicka, 1989; Taylor, 1991, 1994; Young, 1990). If so, the concern for cultural oppression cannot be considered as less serious than, for instance, economic oppression.

In this regard, Fraser's (1998) recent article is relevant because in it she proposed the view that symbolic and cultural oppression are both serious forms of injustice. According to her, in our modern, liberal society, injustice can be characterized by two distinct categories: **distribution** and **recognition**. The **distributive injustice** is rooted in the political-economic structure of society, and thus is socioeconomic in nature. Examples are

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[8] According to Feinberg and Soltis (1992), Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron argue that "schooling produces certain deep-seated ways of understanding and perceiving that allow subordinate groups to be reproduced and the dominant class to maintain its status without resorting to physical repression or coercion" (p.62).

"exploitation (having the fruits of one's labour appropriated for the benefit of others); economic marginalization (being confined to undesirable or poorly paid work or being denied access to income-generating labour altogether); and deprivation (being denied an adequate material standard of living)" (Fraser, 1998, p.21). The other is **cultural** *or* **symbolic injustice**. Its root is "social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication" and we can find examples such as "cultural domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and/or hostile to one's own); nonrecognition (being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative practices of one's culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions)" (Fraser, 1998, p.22).

For the purpose of her analysis, Fraser distinguishes the two kinds of injustice, but she recognizes that the two are internally related to each other and mutually reinforcing; as such, both have to be remedied, though possibly through different approaches (Fraser. 1998). Of course, it would be less complicated if the two kinds of injustice could be addressed with one approach, but various approaches should be able to coexist so long as it is recognized that both kinds of injustice are serious.

Although critical educators in general emphasize economic and other types of social oppression over cultural oppression, this does not mean that they are not concerned with the latter type. Critical educators also recognize the significance of affirming cultural identity, as they try to "give voice" (Arnowitz and Giroux 1990; Giroux 1991, 1992) to students from marginalized groups. Critical pedagogues argue that:

Students from all social backgrounds, cultural groups, and abilities must be allowed to find their own voices, reclaim and affirm their histories, develop a sense of individual and collective identity, and learn how to act upon their commitments to personal and social well-being. (Gay, 1995, p.166)

Many critical educators indeed recognize the damaging effect of threats to collective identities such as race, ethnicity, gender, and so on as they propose to fight against sexism, racism, and other types of discrimination. For instance, Dei (1996) reports that his survey and in-depth interviews of Black/African-Canadian students reveal prevailing experiences of disengagement at least partly due to the lack of role models and "inclusive curriculum" that these students can relate to. The concern for persisting stereotypes, which is a form of cultural oppression, is a major concern for critical educators (Suzuki, 1984; McLaren, 1993; Ng, Staton, & Scane, 1995). It is also clear that critical educators and mainstream multiculturalists share a similar concern about negative influences of modernity. In this context, it appears to be more plausible to consider the two camps as dealing with similar concerns through different paths than as completely opposing each other.

Indeed, more and more critical and multicultural educators are engaging in a dialogue in search of common ground. For example, Nieto (1996), a proponent of multicultural education, maintains that multicultural education *is* antiracist education and critical pedagogy (pp. 307-322). Noting the empirical studies of cultural and racial minority students whose academic achievements suffer partly because their cultural and linguistic resources are not utilized effectively, she states: "This focus [on the experiences and resources possessed by students, their families, and their communities] is by its very nature multicultural because students arrive at school with a variety of experiences and resources. It is also consistent with critical pedagogy because it challenges students to take responsibility

for their own learning while at the same time supporting and respecting their cultures,

languages, and experiences" (Nieto, 1995, p.204).

Of course, this does not mean that mainstream multiculturalism and critical

educational theory are identical or should be integrated. We need to ask what the crucial

differences are between the two groups of theorists in spite of their similar concerns. In

order to further clarify similarities and differences between critical educators and mainstream

multiculturalism, I would now like to turn to Paulo Freire's educational philosophy, which

has had an enormous influence on the development of contemporary critical education

theory.

(III) Paulo Freire's Liberating Education

Freire's educational theory was developed through his own experience of economic

deprivation in youth and his encounter, after he started work, with the economic oppression

in his native country, Brazil, mainly due to the colonial legacy.[9] At the root of his

philosophy of education lies compassion for the oppressed, whom he met and worked with in

developing countries like Chile and Guinea-Bissau, as well as in developed countries such as

the United States. Although his educational theory is not without its criticisms, some of

which will be mentioned in the following sections, many educators in North America and

other places have enthusiastically embraced Freire. Gibson (1994) observes that "[m]uch of

the discourse on education throughout the world makes reference to him" and declares that

"by the sweep of his fame alone, academic attention to Freire is deserved" (Chapter one).

Misgeld also comments as follows:

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[9] For a more detailed bibliographic reference for Freire, see Facundo (1984), Mackie (1981).

Freire's pedagogy is not only eminently practical ... and expressive of its moral and political commitments, it is also philosophical ... Freire presents a thorough mediation of emancipatory-philosophical ideas and pedagogical steps in his design of an educational practice of freedom. (Misgeld, 1985, p.105)

Freire's philosophy of education has been especially influential in the development of critical pedagogy in North America. In his long and illustrious career as an education practitioner and theorist, Freire wrote numerous articles, essays, and books, and also delivered many lectures. Many of his writings have been translated into English as well as other languages and are read all over the world. He has also co-authored numerous books and articles with critical educators in North America (e.g., Freire and Macedo, 1995; Giroux, 1988; Macedo, 1994; McLaren, 1993; McLaren and Lankshear, 1994; McLaren and Leonard, 1993; Shor, 1987, 1988; Shor and Freire, 1987). Freire's influence on these critical educators is apparent as they invoke Freire's words in their writings on numerous occasions.

Freire's educational philosophy is extensively expressed in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, his first work to be translated into English and originally published in the United States in 1970. In this book, Freire argues that the mind of a single revolutionary leader by herself/himself could not transform social structures and end economic oppression. Rather, we have to focus on the consciousness of each oppressed individual. When he encountered oppression, he realized that the key to ending oppression and to transforming this dehumanizing reality lies in oppressed people's capacity to become aware of their own oppressed situation. He observed that the oppressed live in a "culture of silence," which is a culture imposed by oppressors. The oppressed accept their oppression as the way it is and oppression becomes the reality. They cannot come up with any idea to improve their lives or

to work together to end oppression, because they are not conscious of their own oppression. As Freire states, "[u]nder the sway of magic and myth, the oppressed ... see their suffering, the fruit of exploitation, as the will of God—as if God were the creator of this 'organized disorder'" (Freire, 1970, p.48).

Oppressed people's uncritical acceptance of reality can further lead them to accept their inferiority vis à vis the oppressor. Freire sees this as the internalization of the reality created by the oppressors. Since the oppressors have the power to define the reality, it is distorted to serve their interests, and the oppressed are made to accept it. Thus the oppressed suffer from the ambivalence of their own identity: since they accept their inferiority, they long to be like the oppressors; however, the oppressed are living in a world defined by the oppressors.

From the discussions thus far, we can see that Freire draws on the classical anthropological conception of culture. For instance, the oppressed have a culture of silence and the oppressors live in their own culture, justifying the culture of oppression. However, unlike earlier anthropologists who supported cultural relativism, Freire does not celebrate these cultural and social differences. He rather recognizes the power relations among different cultures.

Freire is a rationalist and a realist, who believes in humanity's capacity to distance itself from the immediate reality and reflect upon it.

Freire states:

Men, ... because they are aware of themselves and thus of the world—because they are conscious beings—exist in a dialectical relationship between the determination of limits and their own freedom. As they separate themselves from the world,

which they objectify, as they separate themselves from their own activity, as they locate the seat of the world and others, men overcome the situations which limit them: the "limit-situations." (Freire, 1970, p.89)

Although Freire recognizes that human beings are social beings and are socialized to existing world views, he also argues for the possibility of rising above these world views, transforming them and creating a new one. For Freire, the cultures of the oppressed—of peasants, illiterates, and so forth—are not something to be valued and respected, since he sees these cultures as imposing "distorted" reality on the oppressed. Such reality has to be transformed, since oppression is dehumanizing and not the way human beings should live.

In order to fight the oppressed reality, Freire proposes liberating pedagogy to help the oppressed develop critical consciousness. Liberating education does not just tell the oppressed (students) that they are oppressed and need to transform their world. Such a method would be merely a transmission of information, which Freire criticizes as "banking" education (Freire, 1970). In liberating education, a teacher has to pose problems that are relevant to students' lives and engage in dialogue with students so that they can think *for* themselves. Therefore, a teacher does not merely "educate" students: rather, teachers are expected to *facilitate* students' learning process. During this process of engaging in dialogue, reflections of students emerge and they can break out of the culture of silence.

What, then, is empowerment according to Freire? Freire argues that liberation—the empowerment of the oppressed, the end of oppression—cannot be attained merely by reflection. Reflection has to be followed by action, which results from oppressed people's commitment to transforming the world. This is the praxis, which leads to *conscientizacao* or *conscientization*. Conscientization is socio-historical awareness and deep commitment to

create a better society. Although Freire (1975) claims that he did not invent this term, it is a

Freirean concept that is difficult to define. For our present investigation, the passage below

should help us to illuminate what Freire means by this term:

> The mere fact of finding oneself oppressed will move a step ahead and become a
> process of liberation only if this discovery leads to a historical commitment that
> means an involvement. For involvement is more than commitment: it is a critical
> insertion into history in order to create it, to mold it. And so, when an oppressed
> individual sees he is oppressed, if he does not set out to do something to transform
> the concrete oppressing reality, he is not historically committed, and thus he is not
> really conscientized. (Freire, 1975, p.3)

In short, conscientization is, first of all, awareness that human beings are social and

historical beings, situating themselves within a particular social and historical context.

Second, by becoming aware of this human beings' limitations, we will embark on the process

of creating a new history, a new society. This process of conscientization, for Freire, is

liberation, the empowerment of the oppressed that also leads to the liberation of all human

beings.

(IV) Two Different Approaches to Empowerment

A "culturalist" could criticize Freire by arguing that he is merely a rationalist who

does not recognize the significance of culture. For instance, Burger (1974) argues that Freire

wrongly assumes a "cognitive and ontological hierarchy" which sees cultural leaders' (and of

course, Freire's) consciousness as superior to oppressed, dehumanized, and peasant

consciousness. Freire claims that his is the right consciousness, while that of the peasants

has to be discarded. This assumption indeed resembles that of the Enlightenment thinkers' universalism, which champions Western rationality and pays little attention to the non-Western cultural values. For Burger, Freire's consciousness-raising named conscientization is nothing but an imposition of the oppressors' arrogance on the oppressed:

> "Consciousness raising" is a project of higher-class individuals directed at a lower-class population. It is the latter, not the former, whose consciousness is to be raised. What is more, the consciousness at issue is the consciousness that the lower-class population has of its own situation. Thus a crucial assumption of the concept is that lower-class people do not understand their own situation, that they are in need of enlightenment on the matter, and that this service can be provided by selected higher-class individuals. (Burger, 1974, p.113)

We should ask ourselves: Who are we to judge the illiterate as oppressed, when there have been many cultures without any writing system but instead with rich oral traditions?

However, this does not mean that critical educators ignore the culture of learners. In proposing dialogic methods of teaching, Freire and other critical educators are trying to recognize students' cultures. As Misgeld (1985) states, Freire's educational philosophy has contributed to organizing education "in such a way that the cultural realities of the learners are brought into play" (p.105). For instance, from the experience of applying Freire's pedagogy to English as a Second Language teaching, Graman (1988) suggests that ESL teachers should choose topics of ESL students' interests. For Graman's students who are migrant farm workers, the words that reflected students' realities of leaning included "bonus" and "short-hoe" which is "used to weed fields" (Graman, 1988, p.437). Graman shows that, by engaging in critical dialogue using these terms, students can move on to use more abstract ideas, analyze their working conditions, and learn English.

Moreover, Burger's interpretation of Freire's educational philosophy seems to be extremely narrow. In Burger's critique, non-Western cultures and Western cultures are positioned to exhibit a sharp contrast, as if non-Western cultures necessarily reject rationalism to maintain their cultural purity. He seems to assume that non-Western cultures do not accept "the Western values" such as autonomy and critical reflection at all. However, this kind of assumption wrongly assumes that all values are relative to cultures and leads to confirm the culturalist view that non-Western cultures remain static, pure, and have to reject Western influences to maintain their cultural authenticity. This is exactly what liberals have criticized as cultural essentialism.

Therefore, the criticism of Freire and other critical educators that they are rationalists who put non-Western cultures below Western culture is not very significant. This way of putting critical educators and mainstream multiculturalists at opposition also seems to be misleading. Rather, as Fraser (1998) proposes, the crucial difference between mainstream multiculturalism and critical educational theory is in their approaches to cultural injustice. According to her, as a remedy for cultural injustice, mainstream multiculturalists demand *affirmation*, whereas critical educators want *transformation* (p.35). Mainstream multiculturalists' formula to redress cultural injustice is focused on "surface reallocations of respect among existing groups," which tend to "support group differentiation," whereas critical educators aim at "deep restructuring of the relations of recognition," which tends to "destabilize group differentiations" (Fraser, 1998, p.35).

For instance, the similarity between Taylor and Freire is they are both concerned with the consciousness of oppressed individuals. Taylor states:

Their [the oppressed people's] own self-depreciation ... becomes one of the most potent instruments of their own oppression. Their first task ought to be to purge themselves of this imposed and destructive identity. (Taylor, 1994, p.26)

As is Freire, Taylor is concerned with the problem of internalization as the means of oppression and is seeking a way to tackle this oppression. But for Taylor, the problem of consciousness is not central. Rather, the problem is already obvious for the oppressed. Therefore, unlike Freire, Taylor does not elaborate on oppressed people's process of becoming aware of the imposed reality.

What further differentiates Taylor and Freire is their *style* of how to end oppression. For Freire, liberation means creation of a new world—a culture of non-oppression. In his writings, he uses the term "transformation" frequently to describe this dramatic (even utopian or idealistic) image of a new community. It is a community that resists any type of oppression.

For Taylor and also for Kymlicka, empowerment of the oppressed mainly means to restore or affirm the cultural identity and heritage of marginalized groups. They certainly do not call for transformation as critical educators do. However, although mainstream multiculturalists emphasize the significance of assuring a culturally secure environment for everyone, this does not mean that mainstream multiculturalism is the kind of "culturalism" that proposes to preserve and maintain any cultural traditions. Taylor has suggested that cultural traditions should be maintained forever, drawing on the concept of authenticity. However, we found this argument hard to be supported.

Our question, then, is: Why do the two groups prefer different styles to realize a more ideal, democratic, multicultural society?

(V) Mainstream Multiculturalism, Critical Education Theory,

and Liberalism

The differences of approach between critical educators and mainstream multiculturalists seem to reflect two different assumptions underlying each theoretical position. The former, similar to liberal critics, tend to trivialize the significance of cultural identity; they promote deconstruction of existing cultural norms, preferring a "border" and "hybrid" identity to a mono-cultural one. They are, just like liberals, trying to propose a universal principle. For critical educators, this is a principle of empowerment. Mainstream multiculturalists, on the other hand, recognize that there are certain cases where cultural support is necessary for healthy identity development. They resist the universal application of empowerment principles.

As we have seen in Freire's arguments, critical educators in fact share a very similar assumption with liberal critics of multiculturalism, which is a view that individuals should and can achieve autonomy in spite of social influences. They are both embedded in a Western philosophical tradition, ranging from the Enlightenment to critical theory, that considers educational goals as emancipation, autonomy, and critical reflection, detached from tradition. It is assumed that "[a]utonomy and self-responsibility [are] values for education because without them there could be no development of critical faculties" (Misgeld, 1985, p.92).

For Freire, in the context of pervasive colonialism, the conception of liberation meant detachment from the immediate cultural context. When Freire saw oppressed communities—peasant villages, in particular—within colonial rule, he saw oppression but

not culture, because oppression limits the possibilities of human beings. The peasant culture was not something to be maintained, as mainstream multiculturalists would argue, but something to be transformed. The peasant culture was dehumanizing, oppressive, and imposed by oppressors. Within this context, any individuals oppressed by a dominant social group due to their membership in certain social groups would have to come to conscientization, the commitment to transformation. This could mean discarding all traditional cultural values.

In this way, critical educators tend to trivialize the necessity of affirming cultural identity as a source of empowerment just like the liberal critics of multiculturalism. We should also remember that one of the critical educators' main concerns about multiculturalism is its afferent affirmation of monolithic cultural identity, a concern they again share with the liberal critics. For instance, McLaren criticizes "left-liberal multiculturalism" for its tendency to "essentialize cultural differences ... and ignore the historical and cultural 'situatedness' of difference" (McLaren, 1993, p.105).

Instead of this "multicultural" approach, they prefer to deconstruct and critically examine any cultural form or source of identity. Some critical educators have recently developed the concept of border pedagogy as an application of critical and "insurgent" multiculturalism (Kanpol & McLaren, 1995). They recognize, just as some liberal critics do, the danger of treating culture as something static and stable. In order to affirm every student's voice, regardless of ethnicity, race, gender, and other social backgrounds, insurgent multiculturalism has to interrogate and deconstruct the history, memories, and views of the dominant culture as well as any cultural beliefs. They propose to reject any simple dichotomy of us versus them or self versus others, and become "border crossers." Giroux

(1995) states that we need to "develop a language that challenges the boundaries of cultural and racial difference as sites of exclusion and discrimination while simultaneously rewriting the script of cultural difference as part of a broader attempt to provide new spaces for expanding and deepening the imperatives of a multicultural and multiracial democracy" (pp.109-110). Giroux envisions a transformed public space including schools where everyone can engage in critical reflection on his or her own constructed identity and become liberated. In this transformative picture, mainstream multiculturalism cannot be accepted. Mere affirmation of cultural differences is rejected. Just as some liberals have argued, critical reflection is prioritized over the affirmation of cultural identity. In Giroux's (1995) words:

> In the absence of a critical encounter with the past and a recognition of the importance of cultural diversity, multiculturalism becomes acceptable only if it is reduced to a pedagogy of reverence and transmission rather than a pedagogical practice that puts people in dialogue with each other as part of a broader attempt to fashion a renewed interest in cultural democracy and the creation of engaged and critical citizens. (p.116)

For critical educators, schools and communities cannot remain monocultural. There is no exception for any kind of marginalized group. They insist that everyone should be included:

> Those involved in democratic schools see themselves as participants in communities of learning. By their very nature, these communities are diverse, and that diversity is prized, not viewed as a problem. Such communities include people who reflect differences in age, culture, ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic class, aspirations, and abilities. These differences enrich the community and the range of

views it might consider. Separating people of any age on the basis of these
differences or using labels to stereotype them simply creates divisions and status
systems that detract from the democratic nature of the community and the dignity of
the individuals against whom such practices work so harshly. (Beane and Apple,
1995, p.10)

Coupled with this recognition of plurality and internal complexity of culture,
critical educators promote the conception of identity as hybrid and non-static (McLaren,
1993, 1995), just as Waldren (1996) does. Peters (1995) also argues that the age of
essentialized or fixed identity of difference is over:

> The process of identity formation is now seen as a contingent and relational
> construction; a political process that takes place in complex settings. The new
> politics of identity, founded on more understanding of difference, provides the basis
> for building new intersubjectivities and solidarities, and offers the hope of
> reinventing through struggle the promise of participatory democracy. (Peters, 1995,
> p.55)

Of course, this does not mean that the criticisms of liberal critics and critical
educators are essentially the same in this respect. Critical educators caution that this has to
become a source of genuine social transformation, rather than mere celebration of plurality,
which tends to be supported by liberal-conservatives. By this critical educators mean that
they do not promote a relativistic acceptance of cultural diversity that actually hinders critical
intercultural encounters because each culture is "incommensurable." Rather, they emphasize
that we are stepping outside traditional cultural boundaries and entering into a new form of
political engagement. Critical educators emphasize that we have to go *beyond*. They agree
with Bhabha when he says as follows:

Political empowerment, and the enlargement of the multiculturalist cause, come
from posing questions of solidarity and community from the interstital perspective.
Social differences are not simply given to experience through an already
authenticated cultural tradition; they are the signs of the emergence of community
envisaged as a project ... that takes you 'beyond' yourself in order to return, in a
spirit of revision and reconstruction, to the political *conditions* of the present.
(Bhabha, 1994, p.3)

Critical educators argue that we have to avoid simple acceptance of any authentic
culture. Every culture has to be recognized as internally conflicted and has to be critically
analyzed to reveal how power relations are at work inside each culture. For McLaren, border
identity enables us to achieve a new *mestizaje* consciousness, which "is not simply a doctrine
of identity based on cultural bricolage or a form of bric-a-brac subjectivity but a critical
practice of cultural negotiation and translation that attempts to transcend the contradictions of
Western dualistic thinking" (McLaren, 1993, p.124).

How can mainstream multiculturalists respond to these arguments? As mentioned
earlier, no one can deny that traditional cultural boundaries are being obscured and are losing
their original meaning. We should also be aware that power relations exist within a single
cultural group. However, mainstream multiculturalists argue that there are certain cases
where a culturally secure environment is necessary before the transformation advocated by
critical educators can take place. For instance, critical educators' proposals for teachers to
become transformative intellectuals and re-organize school culture and curriculum to
implement genuine transformative elements would be enthusiastically accepted by many
marginalized social groups, but critical aboriginal educators, for instance, would also argue
that they nevertheless need cultural autonomy or cultural recognition (Hampton, 1995;

Regnier, 1995). If many schools had already accepted the type of curriculum reconstruction that critical educators propose, critical aboriginal educators might not claim their need for cultural recognition. However, that simply has not happened. Similarly, although some critical educators promote border identity, we do not all have such identity, especially the dominant group, whereas the marginalized have always been asked to cross their cultural borders, often at the cost of denying any worth to their native cultures. [10] Therefore, it is rather the dominant culture, not cultural minorities, who have to develop a border identity.

As a matter of fact, many of the marginalized are already aware that affirming culturalistic perspectives is not enough for their children's education. As Hampton (1995) states:

> The recognition of Indian education as distinctive indicates a legitimate desire of Indian people to be self-defining, to have their ways of life respected, and to teach their children *in a manner that enhances consciousness of being an Indian and a fully participating citizen of Canada or the United States*. (Hampton, 1995, p.10, emphasis added)

Of course, it has to be pointed out that mainstream multiculturalism in general lacks focus in challenging the perception of the current situation that tends to marginalize cultural differences. For instance, we have seen that Taylor's project of realizing an ideal multicultural society could end up creating a society that is as liberal as the dominant one. Kymlicka also promotes culturally distinctive collective goals as if such a consensus should already exist within each cultural community.

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[10] I will discuss the bicultural identity formation process in more detail in the next chapter.

However, as we have already seen, mainstream multiculturalism does not promote uncritical acceptance of cultural values or traditions. Although Taylor seems to suggest that cultural traditions should be preserved forever, we have found that such a claim cannot be accepted in our ideal multicultural society. Rather, we recognize that cultural stability and security should be assured to develop the autonomy of people from culturally marginalized groups. In a similar vein, cultural stability and security should be recognized, at least for certain cases, as a source of encouragement to engage in critical reflection and dialogue with other members of a larger society.

For critical educators, accepting mainstream multiculturalism is inconsistent with their approach to realizing a just society. Critical educators have argued that power relations transcending cultural differences should be given priority. In other words, critical educators have proposed a universal principle for dealing with economic and social oppressions, even though symbolic oppression is also recognized.

However, mainstream multiculturalists should be critical of critical educators' universal application of their approach to achieve transformation and empowerment as if we were all on the same starting line. Does this leave mainstream multiculturalists and critical educators in opposition to each other? I do not think so. Since critical educators acknowledge the socially and historically constructed nature of our identity and recognize the significance of relating students' culture to the learning process, they should be able to accept the theory of mainstream multiculturalism that there are certain cases that need more identity affirmation in order for students to engage in critical reflection. Just as in the case of liberal critics, critical educators need to be more flexible in applying their principles in practice.

It has been shown that empowerment drawing on mainstream multiculturalism may not be transformative, but does not deny critical reflection as some critical educators (and liberals) have claimed. As I have already argued, mainstream multiculturalism does not support an indoctrination that imposes an uncritical acceptance of one's native culture. Rather, it maintains that a culturally secure environment should be preserved for students from any cultural or social background. Thus, the criticism of mainstream multiculturalism that it does not seriously challenge the oppressive forces of a larger society is mistaken. Mainstream multiculturalism should be supported because it is necessary at this historical moment in order to realize a more ideal and just society.

(VI) Conclusion

I have thus far shown that critics of multiculturalism, both liberal and critical, often characterize multiculturalism as something very different from what the proponents of mainstream multiculturalism are proposing. From the examination of arguments for and against mainstream multiculturalism, it has become clearer that it does not intend to promote cultural particularism or fundamentalism in the ways its critics suggest. Mainstream multiculturalists are rather clear that they do not support such chauvinism or conservatism. They are, like liberals and critical educators, seriously concerned with the situation of culturally marginalized peoples and wish to help realizing a more ideal, democratic, multicultural society. In their approach, mainstream multiculturalists are concerned that the marginalized should be guaranteed that their ancestral culture is not devalued in the public sphere and should have access to a culturally secure environment, just as the majority do. Mainstream multiculturalists recognize that marginalized social groups continue to suffer

from systematic oppression due to their cultural background, which often damages cultural identity as a result of past socio-historical influences.

Since both liberals and critical educators assume that individual autonomy and the ability to think critically should be achieved without cultural affirmation, both tend to reject the cultural recognition thesis as an approach to achieving these educational goals. However, we have seen that they cannot entirely reject mainstream multiculturalism, precisely because they are very much concerned with the development of autonomy and critical reflections. We have seen that mainstream multiculturalism can and should be supported because there are at least certain cases in which a culturally secure environment should be assured.

The position of mainstream multiculturalism in various types of multiculturalism is, then, more complex than is usually assumed. Mainstream multiculturalism is not a culturalism that is in exact opposition to liberalism or critical education theory. Rather, it shares similar concerns with both liberal and critical theorists, although it advocates a different approach.

Below I present a simplified map of the locations of multiculturalisms. The dividing lines among the various multiculturalisms are, of course, not as clear as the diagram indicates. In this map, we can see that mainstream multiculturalism shares its oppositional origin with the transformative multiculturalism advocated by critical educators, but seeks to enter at the heart of official multiculturalism through liberal principles. Mainstream multiculturalism does not deny the importance of developing autonomy and critical reflection; however, since it emphasizes the significance of culture as a means to these two educational goals, it has often been characterized as merely culturalism. However, since

mainstream multiculturalism overlaps with the various other types of multiculturalism, I do not see how they can reject it, at least for certain contexts.

Figure 1

The mainstream multiculturalists' assumption is firmly supported by a number of empirical studies, some of which will be reviewed in the next chapter, indicating that the cultural identity of the marginalized is constantly devalued in larger societies with very harmful consequences. The critics of multiculturalism are all quick to deny the cultural recognition thesis, namely, that culturally marginalized people should be guaranteed a culturally secure space in which to develop a sound cultural identity, because their cultural identity is under systematic threat. However, considering the historical and political contexts cultural minorities are in and systematic cultural oppression they still have to face today, there exist at least certain cases where the cultural recognition thesis cannot be easily dismissed, especially in the context of children's education. Identity threat against minority

students is not a thing of the past, and we must not continue to ignore this reality and let this unfair treatment of culturally marginalized children prevail.

Of course, mainstream multiculturalism has not yet defined culture in a manner that clearly excludes the possibility of cultural determinism/essentialism. Taylor's reliance on the concept of authenticity seems to be especially problematic in this regard. But I have tried to show that it is not the protection of culture per se with which mainstream multiculturalism is concerned but rather the maintenance of a cultural context for choice and critical reflection. Not all cultures, however, are entitled to such protection. In this sense, mainstream multiculturalism cannot be universally applied. Mainstream multiculturalism applies to certain cases where socio-historical contexts have threatened cultural identity and continue to do so. The type of education appropriate in such contexts may be called **culturally relevant pedagogy**[11], in order to distinguish it from other types of multicultural education.

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[11] At this point, I do not give a specific definition of this notion. It should only be noted that this pedagogy acknowledges that there exists oppression against students from certain cultural groups and is committed to provide an educational environment in which these students can feel safe to reveal and discuss their ancestral cultural heritage.

Chapter 5

The Practice of Mainstream Multiculturalism

(I) Introduction

This chapter examines how we can put the theory of mainstream multiculturalism into practice, especially when it translates into educational policies for minority students. First, we go over Kymlicka's arguments and narrow down the conditions in which mainstream multiculturalism should be applied. Noting that Kymlicka's proposal cannot be applied to all minority groups without a careful consideration of the socio-historical conditions unique to each minority group, I would like to consider the cases of the indigenous peoples in Canada and the Korean minority in Japan. Using these case studies, I show that the socio-historical context and the developmental process of assertive bicultural identity are compelling arguments in these cases for applying mainstream multiculturalism especially at the level of educational policy. I conclude that mainstream multiculturalism can be reasonably applied to at least some minority groups in a liberal, democratic, and multicultural society, if we pay attention to the conditions unique to each minority group.

(II) Kymlicka's Principles of Applying Mainstream Multiculturalism

At the beginning of this dissertation, we had only a vague definition of mainstream multiculturalism. But from the discussion in the previous chapters, it has become clearer that mainstream multiculturalism is supported when it increases the meaningful life choices for all members of a cultural group, without jeopardizing individual autonomy. The cultural

recognition thesis of mainstream multiculturalism, which is that cultural identity is crucial for leading a meaningful life and that cultural security should be ensured, are plausible in such a context.

But how do we determine that in a particular case we should apply the argument of mainstream multiculturalism while in another case we should not? As we have briefly seen in Chapter 3, Kymlicka (1995) notes that there are certain conditions that could help our decisions on this matter. Here, I would like to present Kymlicka's arguments a little more fully.

Kymlicka suggests that we should distinguish two types of minorities: national and ethnic minorities. While national minorities are coerced into the current political system, most of the ethnic minorities are voluntary immigrants, who chose to live in the current society. According to Kymlicka, due to this different orientation, in general the two groups have different sorts of claims regarding approaches to recognizing their cultural distinctiveness.

Kymlicka argues that national minorities in general tend to demand self-government rights that assure their cultural autonomy, whereas ethnic minorities demand polyethnic rights, which help them to be integrated into the mainstream culture. According to Kymlicka, the crucial difference between the two groups is that, while the demands of national minorities are not just a temporary measure but to assure their cultural autonomy as a permanent right, immigrant groups demand integration into the mainstream culture.

Kymlicka further notes that these demands cannot be applied to just any minority group. These demands are not legitimate if they lead to the imposition of cultural norms against the will of individual members of a group. For instance, the demands of religious

fundamentalists to be allowed certain cultural autonomy cannot be considered as reasonable. However, when it is clear that giving collective rights increases individual autonomy, the demand for cultural autonomy should be allowed.

As a political principle, Kymlicka's theory remains controversial, especially regarding the distinction between national and ethnic minorities. This distinction, however, is helpful for our discussion because national minorities often represent clear cases where education according to the needs of a particular cultural group is justified, which may not be so with ethnic minorities. For instance, as I will describe below, aboriginal peoples' demand to have certain forms of autonomy over public education (e.g., to have a distinctively aboriginal curriculum or to ensure the administration reflects the community's needs) should be accepted as a clear case were mainstream multiculturalism should be applied. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the distinction between national and ethnic minorities is absolute. As Kymlicka (1995) himself notes, this distinction, by definition, fails to include the case of African Americans, who are a distinct minority. They were involuntarily incorporated into the current political system, but did not originate from a single culture; and at present, there is no state where African Americans are the majority, unlike the case of the Quebecois/ses.

Kymlicka also notes that his framework is not an abstract one that can single-handedly resolve all controversies concerning accommodation of minorities. He recognizes that the two kinds of rights do not exclude each other, but do not have to go together either. One disadvantaged group may demand polyethnic rights, even if they could demand self-government rights, as a result of ongoing contacts with the dominant culture. Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to assess fully Kymlicka's arguments, this much can be

stated clearly: some controversial issues such as the plausibility of self-government rights or whether or not the status of national minorities should automatically ensure cultural autonomy as their *permanent* right, greatly depend on the unique socio-historical circumstances in which each minority group is embedded, whether it is principally an ethnic or a national minority group.

Therefore, it is necessary to consider each case carefully in order to determine if the demand of a cultural group is legitimate or not. In the section below, I would like to look at the situation in which indigenous peoples in Canada are situated, briefly going over their historical backgrounds and examining implications for educational policies. Then, I will undertake a case study of the Korean minority in Japan, examining what kind of educational policies they can reasonably demand according to their collective and unique circumstances.

(III) The Case of Aboriginal Peoples

When aboriginal peoples initially came into contact with European settlers, their right "to choose an appropriate educational system for their children" (Henderson, 1995, p.245) was not legally given up, because it was supposed to be protected under the prerogative treaties between First Nations and the imperial Crown. For instance, in 1871, the central article of the treaties made during Queen Victoria's reign reads, "And further, Her Majesty agrees to maintain a school on each reserve hereby made *whenever* the Indians of the reserve should desire it" (Treaties 1 and 2, cited and emphasis added by Henderson, 1995, p.249). It was in spite of these legally binding treaties that education for aboriginal peoples was turned into education for assimilation to the white men's world. As early as 17th century, when European missionaries were trying to educate aboriginal peoples in Canada,

what they meant in part by "education" was to convert them to Christianity to save and civilize them (Barman, Hébert, & McCaskill, 1986).

This trend of treating aboriginal peoples as the target of assimilation through the disposition of their own culture was accelerated after the Confederation of Canada in 1867. The federal Department of Indian Affairs was established in 1880 and thereafter the federal government came to control educational policies of aboriginal peoples. In 1879 a report conducted by the federal government stated a preference for creating large-scale residential schools away from aboriginal students' homes. In 1894 the new act came into effect, which "gave the governor in council authority to establish industrial or boarding schools for Indians, and gave justices or Indian agents authority to decide on the sending of Indian children to school and to transfer the children's annuities and interest moneys to the schools" (Henderson, 1995, p.253). Since then, the aboriginal education right has been severely undermined.

As documented by many researchers (e.g., Barman, Hébert, & McCaskill, 1986; Jordan, 1988; Kirkness and Bowman, 1992), the impact of residential schools on aboriginal children was quite devastating. They were prohibited from speaking their mother tongue, and their culture was perceived as a problem and as needing to be replaced by Western cultural values and identity. Residential education was, in short, the practice of systematic assimilation. However, this method apparently did not work well to achieve its goal of westernizing aboriginal peoples. Rather, "the graduates of [residential] schools ... became marginalized beings, lacking the necessary skills of both White and Indian cultures, confused over their identity, and left to their own devices after their failed school experience" (Wilson, 1986, p.83). Academic achievements, if gained, remained at the level of basic literacy

because of teachers' low expectations and poor resources (Barman, Hébert, & McCaskill, 1986).

Federal control over Aboriginal education was strengthened further by revisions of the Indian Act in 1927 and 1951. In particular, the 1951 revision legally put an end to aboriginal education control, terminating "the chief's and band council's authority to frame rules and regulations for education, leaving the minister of Indian affairs with the exclusive authority" (Henderson, 1995, p.253). This trend continued well after the post-World War II era. As it became clear that the federal government could not but face the failure of their initial approach of assimilating aboriginal peoples, the revised policy of integration was introduced in 1948, which proposes that aboriginal students should attend provincial schools with non-aboriginal students. However, this initiative by the federal government, without consultation of aboriginal communities, parental involvement, or curriculum assessment, did not promote aboriginal students' academic achievement or their integration into the larger society. The integration program "has not been one of true integration where the different cultures are recognized; rather it has been a program of assimilation where First Nation students are absorbed into the dominant society" (Kirkness and Bowman, 1992, p.14).

The misperceptions of aboriginal peoples based on the Eurocentric view came to be finally challenged in the late 1960s, as the First Nations demanded "Indian control" over education, which was in a critical condition. In 1972, their efforts bore fruits in the form of a policy statement written by the Indian rights organization, the National Indian Brotherhood, known as 'Indian Control of Indian Education.' The main claims of the statement are expressed as follows: "What we want for our children can be summarized very briefly:

... to reinforce their Indian identity.

... to provide the training necessary for making a good living in modern society.
We want education to give our children a strong sense of identity with confidence in their personal worth and ability" (The Indian Brotherhood, 1972, cited in and emphasis added by Jordan, 1988, p.198).

The policy was accepted by the federal government and since then, the number of federal schools has dramatically decreased while that of band schools has increased. The number of band schools was 53 in 1975, 187 in 1983, 326 in 1991, and 481 in 2000. In 1991, there remained only 52 federal schools and in 2000, they decreased further to 8 (Kirkness and Bowman, 1992, p.1; Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 2001). Other initiatives, such as developing appropriate curriculum and teacher education programs for aboriginal children, have also started (Kirkness and Bowman, 1992).

The application of 'Indian Control of Indian Education' alone could not reverse the devastating effects of past injustices, but there are signs of improvement in academic achievement. For instance, it has been reported that more aboriginal students are attending and returning to schools (Barman, Hébert, & McCaskill, 1987). However, according to Hampton, current educational systems and procedures are still not meeting the needs of culturally unique Indian peoples in Canada. "Indian children face a daily struggle against attacks on their identity, their intelligence, their way of life, their essential worth. They must continually struggle to find self-worth, dignity, and freedom in being who they are" (Hampton, 1995, p.35).

In this context, where it is evident that the systematic devaluation of aboriginal peoples' cultural identity has existed, the implementation of Indian control over education

does not diminish individual aborigine's autonomy or the capacity of critical reflection. The historical records clearly show the inability of the dominant group to recognize aboriginal people's culture, and the misguided (and failed) attempts to deny their cultural values. It should be clear that the initiative of aboriginal peoples does not necessarily impose the purity or superiority of their cultural traditions or deprive children of their autonomy. As the statement in the Indian Control of Indian Education indicates, they would like their children to have positive cultural identity and develop the ability to contribute to the larger society. In this context, it should be clear that Aboriginal peoples' autonomy in all aspects of education, e.g., pedagogy, curriculum content, teacher education, administration and so forth, helps restore their cultural identity and self-esteem so they may be better able to succeed in their cultural communities as well as the larger society.

This conclusion is still controversial at this point as it is not likely to be accepted by critics of multiculturalism. For instance, these critics are likely to claim that the promotion of mono-cultural identity is not acceptable in diverse societies. Such criticisms will be discussed later in the chapter. However, it should be noted that the existence of the systematic assimilation that had dispossessed the dignity as aboriginal peoples is a crucial condition for requesting the application of mainstream multiculturalism.

With most cases of national minorities, the systematic devaluation of one group's cultural identity is clearly noticeable. But how about a case where it is difficult to determine a group as a national minority? In what follows, I will examine the case of demanding educational justice for the Korean minority group in Japan, who are not recognized as a national minority.

(IV) The Case of Korean Ethnic Schools in Japan

Japan has long been considered a culturally or ethnically "homogeneous" country

whose permanent residents exhibit little diversity of any sort. Compared to other developed

countries such as the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom, Japan is indeed much

more culturally homogeneous. However, the perception of Japan as homogeneous does not

correctly reflect the reality of the society, where minorities such as the Ainu, people in

Okinawa, and North and South Korean descendants have long been permanent residents

(Maher, 1997; Sharma, 1995; Suzuki & Oiwa, 1996). The "myth" of Japan's homogeneity is

increasingly challenged as we entered the 21st century (Weiner, 1997). The long-time

minorities such as Korean descendants, often called 'oldtimers' as opposed to 'newcomers'

(e.g., Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999, p.111), are becoming more "visible." For instance, in 1997

the Ainu people gained recognition that they are culturally distinctive members of Japan and

that their cultural heritage should be protected.[12] As the country experienced an economic

surge and faced a shortage of labour, the number of guest workers from various countries

increased dramatically between 1987 and 1991, from 2,865 to 145,614 (Tanaka, 1991). The

immigration policy is also being relaxed. For instance, because of the revision of the

Immigration Act in 1989, descendants of Japanese nationals who had migrated to so-called

third world countries such as Brazil are now able to stay and work in Japan with few

regulations (Tanaka, 1991).[13] In public schools, the number of students whose mother

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[12] On May 8, 1997, the House of Councillors passed the "New Ainu Law." Although the law does not guarantee the Ainu rights as an indigenous people, many see it as a step toward the full recovery of their rights.

[13] It could also be argued that the act was revised to shut out illegal guest workers in Japan, since it made it "almost impossible for unskilled foreigners to gain work-permit visas" (Okano&Tsuchiya, 1999, p.129).

tongue is not Japanese is increasing.[14] Also, there are more Japanese students who spend a

part of their lives abroad and return to Japanese schools bringing their non-Japanese cultural

values and customs with them when they return.[15] Responding to this increasing cultural

diversity, many have begun to recognize that it is necessary to develop social and educational

approaches that consider the needs of culturally diverse children in Japan (Finkelstein, 1997).

In this changing landscape of contemporary Japanese society, it is meaningful to

examine the case of a long-time ethnic minority, Korean permanent residents, who are called

zainichi-Kankokujin (zainichi Koreans[16]) in Japanese, in order to envision the possibility of

forming a Japan that respects its residents' cultural heritage. They are the single largest

ethnic minority group in Japan, numbering about 700,000 to 2 million (Kow, 1996;

Nakajima, 1985).[17] The topic is timely, as in 1998 the Japan Federation of Bar Associations

(*Nichibenren*) submitted a report recommending the government assess certain

discriminatory treatments of Korean ethnic schools ("Discrimination against ethnic

education," 1998, www.korea-np.co.jp/nas-edu/nas-edu980220.htm). In the same year, a

Korean youth, representing Korean minority youth in general, appealed to the United Nations

about the educational discrimination zainichi children are facing (Kow, 1996, pp. 225-228).

As English references on this topic are still limited, by discussing this case here, I can

introduce information that is not easily accessible in English.

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[14] According to the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture [*Monbusho*; hereafter the Ministry of Education] (1996), the number of students who do not use Japanese as their mother tongue is 11,542 in elementary and middle schools.
[15] The Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture (1996) reports that 49,740 Japanese children at the level of elementary and middle schools are living outside of Japan.
[16] I will explain the definition of zainichi Koreans in the next section.
[17] The smaller number represents only Koreans whose nationality remains non-Japanese, while the larger one is an estimation including Koreans who are naturalized.

As we have seen in the previous chapters, liberals and critical educators are not likely to give full support for the idea of Korean ethnic schools since they are designed exclusively for zainichi Korean students. For the critics of mainstream multiculturalism, recognizing Korean ethnic schools would indicate that they support cultural particularism, separatism, and cultural fundamentalism. However, mainstream multiculturalists would support single ethnic schools for zainichi Koreans if these schools help zainichi Korean youth to critically and autonomously make meaningful life decisions. We need to examine whether the mainstream multiculturalists' position is reasonably supported in this concrete example.

Before I discuss the case of Korean ethnic schools in general, I will briefly present the necessary background information on Japan-Korea relations. Then I will examine if the demand to have Korean ethnic schools can be reasonably supported following the principles of mainstream multiculturalism.

(1) Japan-Korea Relations

The Korean peninsula is the closest territory to the islands of Japan; it is very unfortunate that the historical relationship has often been characterized by Japan's attempts at imperialistic domination, which go back to the end of the 16th century. Although it is commonly assumed that Japanese imperial rule over Korea started with Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, which lasted until Japan's World War Two defeat in 1945, it is more accurate to state that imperial Japan's domination had started in 1876 when the *Kokato* Treaty was ratified. Recent historical studies reveal that many Korean workers, probably at least a few thousand, had been already working in Japan before 1910 after the Japan-Russia

War (1904-05) (Fukuoka, 1993, p.22). The number dramatically increased after 1910, as a result of Japan's control of Korean resources such as land and rice. By the end of 1938, about 800,000 Koreans were living in Japan (Fukuoka, 1993, p.23; Lee, 1991, p.140). Some estimate that, by the time Japan was defeated in World War Two, the number of Korean residents had further increased to about 2.3 million as a result of forced immigration during the war (Fukuoka, 1993, p.23; Lee, 1991, p.141).

These historical records indicate that the immigration of Koreans to Japan was not voluntary after the ratification of the *Kokato* Treaty, even if they were not literally forced to immigrate (Lee, 1991, p.145). Before 1938, many Koreans were forced to come to Japan because they lost their jobs due to the unequal treaty of 1876. As soon as the war was over, most Koreans who were forced labourers are believed to have gone back to Korea. According to Lee (1991), a Korean government report states that more than 1.4 million Koreans came back to Korea by the end of 1946 (p.141). However, about five to six hundred thousand Koreans chose to stay in Japan. We can only speculate on the reasons for their decisions, but it might have been due to the economic confusion of Korea and/or the following Korean War (1950-53). Lee (1991) states that the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers in Japan allowed Koreans to bring only as little as 1,000 yen, which discouraged them from going back. With that amount of money, one could not "buy more than a few cartons of cigarettes in Korea" (Lee, 1991, p.142).

Japan's nationality is based on the principle of ancestry (ius sanguinis), not territoriality (ius soli). Therefore, the second and later generations of Korean nationals are not automatically naturalized. Yet, as the third and fourth generations are becoming the majority of the Korean minority, the exact number of "Korean-Japanese" is becoming

difficult to grasp. Every year about 5,000 Koreans apply for naturalization. It is reported that 102,544 Koreans had been naturalized in Japan by 1980 (Lee, 1991, p.142). Marriage between Korean and Japanese nationals is also increasing. In 1970, among the 6,892 marriages of zainichi Koreans, 42.4% were intermarriages with Japanese nationals, whereas 56.3% were with zainichi Koreans. But in 1991, out of 11,677 Korean marriages only 16.8% were with zainichi Koreans (Fukuoka, 1993). Because of these factors, it is estimated that about one to two million people with at least some Korean heritage are living in Japan as permanent foreign residents and their descents [zainichi] (Fukuoka, 1993; Nakajima, 1985). Zainichi literally means "residing in Japan." Permanent foreign residents and their descents are usually called zainichi in Japan. There are, for instance, zainichi Chinese as well as zainichi Koreans. Because of the complexity associated with nationality, in this dissertation **zainichi Korean** refers to permanent residents of Korean heritage.

As permanent foreign nationals, zainichi Koreans face systematic discrimination at personal as well as political levels. They have to file taxes, just as other Japanese residents do, because tax is an obligation for every adult resident (Tezuka, 1995, p.187). However, many basic rights are available only to Japanese nationals. For instance, non-Japanese lack the right to vote or to work as a public servant, especially at the national level (Tezuka, 1995, pp.183-187). They have also faced more discriminatory obligations in the past, including carrying alien registration cards all the time and being fingerprinted for registration as permanent foreign nationals. Many laws concerning social welfare were restricted to Japanese nationals, although this situation was greatly improved in 1982, when the Japanese government ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Nanmin no chii ni kansuru joyaku) (Tezuka, 1995, p.241-266).

In spite of these inconveniences, many zainichi Koreans retain their Korean nationality. This is not because it is impossible to do otherwise. As mentioned above, some Korean nationals do become naturalized every year. However, many zainichi Koreans perceive naturalization as a process to completely become Japanese, accepting the dominant social norms in Japan (Bae, 1989, p.86). As mentioned earlier, since Japan relies on blood-ties to determine her citizen's nationality, foreign nationals seem to feel that if they were to be naturalized there would be a very strong pressure to assimilate to mainstream Japanese culture. Further, Japan does not allow its nationals to have more than one nationality.

Some of Japan's extremely assimilationist policies have been revised in recent years. For instance, the strong recommendation to "Japanize" names in the naturalization process was revised in 1984 (Tanaka, 1991, p.157). However, such revisions are relatively minor if we consider the impact on minorities of Japan's myth of cultural homogeneity. For instance, as late as 1980, Japan officially declared that there are no ethnic minorities in Japan whose cultural backgrounds are different from the Japanese one (Maher, 1997). This means that Japan lacks the presence of what Berry (1997) calls the "ideology of multiculturalism." which is "the widespread acceptance of the value to a society of cultural diversity" (Berry, 1997, p.11). It appears quite reasonable, then, for non-Japanese to perceive the naturalization process as a sign of denying one's own cultural heritage.

Demographically, zainichi Koreans are quite assimilated to the dominant Japanese culture. There are some areas where the zainichi Korean population is concentrated (e.g., Osaka), but many zainichi Koreans live in areas where Japanese are dominant.

(2) The Origin of the Current Situation of Korean Ethnic Schools in Japan

Educational discrimination against zainichi also has deep roots in the modern history of Korea and Japan. During Japanese colonial rule, in Korea as well as in Japan, the Japanese government systematically suppressed Korean culture and language through *Kominka seisaku* (the Policy of Subordinating People as Vassals of the Emperor). Korean names were forcibly replaced by Japanese ones, and the teaching of Korean language, history, and geography in schools was prohibited. After Japan's colonial rule ended in 1945, zainichi Koreans established many schools, hoping to restore their oppressed culture and history. It is reported that, in about a year after the end of the war, zainichi Koreans had founded a great many *minzoku gakko* (ethnic schools): 525 elementary schools, 4 middle schools, and 12 schools of higher education (Kow, 1996, p.85; Tanaka, 1991, p.62).

However, during the occupation period, these "grass-roots" schools established by Koreans were ordered to follow the curriculum set by the Ministry of Education, except for the Korean language class. Then in 1948 the Ministry of Education decided that Korean children should attend Japanese schools with other Japanese children. This decision of the Ministry of Education was forced on zainichi Koreans even though their children were not guaranteed equal educational opportunity between 1952 and 1965. During this period, zainichi Korean children were admitted only when space and facilities were sufficient to accommodate them. When admitted, they had to pledge that "they do not disturb the public order" (Lee, 1991, p.144). Eventually, between 1948 and 1955, many of these schools were forced to shut down (Lee, 1991, p.144). After 1965 (the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty), the governments of Korea and Japan formally agreed that all zainichi Korean children should attend public schools, together with Japanese children.

The decision of the Ministry of Education to allow zainichi Korean children into Japanese schools may not sound "unjust" or "oppressive." It could be interpreted that zainichi Koreans gained "equal opportunity" with Japanese, analogous to the decision of the *Brown* v. *Board of Education* case in the United States. This case ended segregated schooling based on racial difference and was a form of liberation for African-Americans. It guaranteed the same educational opportunity for them as for Whites, striking down the argument that segregation does not necessarily mean inequality ("separate but equal"). The case was, as Kymlicka (1989) summarizes,

> a major impetus behind the removal of other segregationist legislation in the 1950's, the passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts in the 1960s, and the development of mandatory busing, 'head start', and affirmative action programs in the 1970s; which in turn were the catalyst for similar programmes to benefit other groups—Hispanics, women, the handicapped, etc. (Kymlicka, 1989, p.141).

However, zainichi Koreans were furious about the decision of the Ministry of Education in 1948 (Kow, 1996, p.88). They saw it as another strategy of the Japanese government to disrespect Korean cultural heritage. In Yamaguchi, Okayama, Hyogo, Osaka, and Tokyo prefectures, zainichi Koreans tried to resist to the order of the Ministry of Education (1948) to shut down their schools (Kow, 1996, pp.89-89). There was only one occasion during the occupation period when a state of emergency was declared, and that was when zainichi Koreans were fighting against the closure of their schools in the *Hanshin* (Osaka and Hyogo) area (Kow, 1996; Tanaka, 1991). Eventually, between 1948 and 1955, many of these grass-roots schools were forced to shut down (Lee, 1991, p.144).

It should be clear, then, that the approach of the Ministry of Education is not analogous to the *Brown* v. *Board of Education* case in the United States. Rather, this case is more similar to when individualistic liberal principles were proposed to replace the existing special treatment of aboriginal peoples in Canada. When "liberals" proposed that collective rights that allow aboriginal peoples to have certain cultural autonomy should be abolished, it was "immediately applauded by the media, even by opposition parties, as a triumph for liberal justice. Indians, on the other hand, were furious, and after six months of bitter and occasionally violent Indian protest, the policy was withdrawn" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.144).

It should also be clear that the Japanese government has consistently discouraged the maintenance of Korean ethnic identity, before and during the war as well as during the occupation period. The oppression of Korean ethnic schools has been an attempt to continue supporting Japanese government's strong assimilationist policy.

In spite of the various forms of oppression, many zainichi Korean schools were re-established after 1955. At present, there are about 100 Korean ethnic schools in Japan (Tezuka, 1995, p.275). The quality of education and the curriculum these ethnic schools provide are not very different from that of regular Japanese schools. The schools focus more on the teaching of Korean language, history, and geography, but these are not taught at the expense of teaching Japanese language, for instance. Kow (1999) observes that Korean ethnic schools are no different from Japanese ones in terms of years of schooling and number of classes and students. Now that the majority of zainichi Koreans are likely to continue living in Japan, ethnic schools are committed to raising children who can contribute to Japanese society.

However, the Ministry of Education does not recognize ethnic schools as regular schools (*ichijoko*, schools recognized by the first article of the Education Law). Instead, they are viewed as non-academic schools (*kakushu gakko*), a category which includes cooking and sewing schools (the notification of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Education regarding education of zainichi Korean children, issued in 1965, cited in Kim, 1992, pp.248-9). The critical difference between regular schools and non-academic schools is that graduates of the former automatically qualify as applicants to higher education institutes, while those of the latter do not (the notification of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Education regarding education of zainichi Korean children, issued in 1978, cited in Kow, 1996, p.20). As a result, just to *qualify* as applicants to universities and colleges, the graduates of ethnic schools have to either graduate from regular Japanese schools or pass the examinations for qualifying as applicants to universities and colleges (so-called *Daiken*, short for *Daigaku Nyugaku Shikaku Kentei*). It has been reported that many students at Korean ethnic schools are forced to obtain a regular school diploma by taking correspondence high school courses (Kow, 1996, pp.21-25; Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999, p.114).

A few Korean ethnic schools are recognized as regular schools (Kow, 1996, p.54). However, the regulations of the Ministry of Education are very strict, and in order to be recognized as regular schools, they have to follow very rigid curriculum guidelines. In consequence, regular Korean ethnic schools cannot teach enough Korean language to enable students to become bilingual. Korean history cannot be taught as they wish, either. This is one of the reasons that the majority of Korean ethnic schools do not seek recognition as regular schools in spite of the existence of the disadvantages.

In 1991, the Foreign Ministers of South Korea and Japan exchanged a convention which stated that Japan respects zainichi Koreans' will to maintain Korean identity, retaining Korean tradition and culture (Kow, 1996, p.136). The Ministry of Education does not *prohibit* ethnic education, either, "as long as these types of education are not harmful to the Japanese society" (The notification of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Education regarding education of zainichi Korean children, issued in 1965, cited in Kim, 1992, pp.248-9). However, it should be clear that the Ministry of Education at many levels supports the assimilation policy, discriminating against zainichi Koreans. As stated above, the Ministry of Education actually discourages student enrolment in Korean ethnic schools by disqualifying their graduates as applicants to many universities and other higher education institutes. It should also be noted that at regular schools, there are no official policies for respecting Korean culture or language, although there are some ethnic classes (minzoku gakkyu) that support Korean cultural activities. However, such classes are limited to the areas where zainichi Koreans are concentrated. They certainly cannot develop bilingual students as the ethnic schools can.

(3) Toward a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan

In this context, what kind of schooling can zainichi Koreans reasonably demand? According to Kymlicka's principles, it is questionable whether zainichi Koreans qualify as a national or ethnic minority. As already mentioned, because they are not originally "natives" of Japan, as aboriginal peoples are, zainichi Koreans are scattered over the country. The third and fourth generations of zainichi Koreans especially are no different from their

Japanese peers. Also, as we have already seen, "inter-national" marriages between the zainichi Koreans and Japanese are also increasing.

At the same time, although some Korean "immigrants" came to Japan voluntarily, the historical and political contexts indicate that their migration to Japan was overall involuntary (Nakajima, 1985). It is clear that Japan's annexation of Korea forced the Koreans to move to Japan. As Okano and Tsuchiya (1999) states, "[t]he presence of the oldtimer Koreans in contemporary Japan is a direct result of Japan's colonisation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945" (p.112). Especially zainichi Koreans' protests against the decision of the Ministry of Education to adhere to "the equal treatment" indicate that their status in Japanese society is more like national minorities than immigrants.

Therefore, although zainichi Koreans did not originally own land or have sovereignty in Japan, their historical circumstances seem to indicate that they are more like national minorities than ethnic ones. However, they may also be labelled as ethnic minorities in terms of demographics.

Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, whether zainichi Koreans are national minorities or not is not a crucial issue for the purpose of our current analysis. In spite of the fact that their roots are as involuntary settlers in Japan, practically speaking zainichi Koreans are not likely to demand the creation of separate sovereignty. But even as an ethnic minority, zainichi Koreans are entitled to "rightfully insist on maintaining some of their heritage, and dominant institutions should be adapted to accommodate those differences" (Kymlicka, 1995, p.97). These kinds of demand may be more persistent than for other newcomers because of zainichi Koreans' historical roots as involuntary settlers. If we recognize the historical context within which the Japanese government had tried to suppress Korean culture

in a systematic manner, their demand for recognition as Koreans appears to be quite reasonable. It is clear that "[t]here remains a legacy of the colonial period when the dominant Japanese *defined* Koreans as an inferior and second-class group of people, and deliberately discouraged the maintenance of their language and ethnic culture" (Okano & Tsuchiya, 1999, p.112, emphasis in original).

Zainichi Koreans are not likely to demand a cultural autonomy that keeps them separated from the dominant culture. Rather, they are likely to demand education that recognizes their distinct presence in Japanese society. This would allow certain autonomy to teach Korean history, culture, and language. And if the dominant educational structure does not have the flexibility to accommodate zainichi Koreans' demands, it seems to follow that Japanese society has to recognize the existence of Korean ethnic schools. At this point, it remains unclear what types of educational practices zainichi Koreans are entitled to. However, this much can be clearly said: Considering the legitimacy of such demands supported by mainstream multiculturalism, the situation Korean ethnic schools are facing in the current Japanese society is far from the ideal of a multicultural, democratic society in even the most modest sense. It is simply discriminatory for the Ministry of Education to justify the disqualification of many zainichi enrolled in ethnic schools as applicants for higher education. Mainstream multiculturalists as well as their critics would probably agree that this justification is implausible, especially when the quality of education is no different from the Japanese regular schools.

The discriminatory treatment of ethnic schools becomes more apparent when we consider that in certain cases, Japanese higher education institutes are allowed to accept graduates of overseas schools as applicants based on the Education Law, not the notification

of the Ministry of Education (The School and Education Law, Article 69(5), cited in Kow, 1996, p.20). In 1994, it was also reported that the Ministry of Education was considering treating graduates of a German school as regular school graduates, even though the school is recognized as *kakushu gakko* (Kow, 1996, p.226). However, the Ministry of Education insists that such treatment cannot be applied to Korean ethnic schools (Kow, 1996, p.227). This is simply illogical.

It is also inconsistent for the Ministry of Education to continue imposing an assimilationist educational policy, denying the benefits of ethnic schools. For instance, the Ministry of Education takes special care of Japanese children living abroad. There are Japanese schools (*Nihonjin gakko*) which aim to assure the same education as the Japanese regular schools in Japan. There are also supplementary schools (*hoshu ko*) for Japanese students attending regular schools abroad in order to provide an opportunity for them to continue learning with Japanese educational materials, outside regular school hours (after school and on Saturdays). For Japanese schools, the Ministry of Education sends qualified teachers and provides students at no extra charge, making sure Japanese children abroad have access to the same quality of education as their peers in Japan (Kow, 1996, p.168-173). The Ministry of Education does not expect these "ethnic Japanese schools" to be denied approval as academic regular schools according to educational policy abroad.

The official policies of the Ministry of Education toward Korean ethnic schools are obviously oppressive to many ordinary Japanese people. Some universities and colleges have come to accept the graduates of ethnic schools, and the number of such higher educational institutions is growing. They are accepting these graduates based on the Education Law, not the notification of the Ministry of Education. The Education Law, article

56 (69), states that those who qualify as applicants to universities and colleges are 1) graduates of regular high schools, 2) those who have finished 12 years of regular education, and 3) those who can be recognized as having the same ability as students who qualify under 1) and 2) (Tezuka, 1995, p.276, my translation). However, national universities (*kokuritsu daigaku*), many of which are considered the most prestigious in Japan (e.g., the University of Tokyo and the University of Kyoto), continue to follow the notification of the Ministry of Education.

We cannot be too optimistic that the situation will improve, but at least we can see that public pressure on the Ministry of Education to treat Korean ethnic school graduates equally is increasing. For instance, on July 8, 1999, it was reported that the Ministry of Education decided to allow people who did not finish obligatory schooling to qualify as applicants to *Daiken*, including national universities ("Qualification for Daiken," 1999). This means that students attending Korean ethnic regular schools do not have to attend regular schools to qualify as applicants to *Daiken*. The situation is still discriminatory when compared with that of the dominant Japanese students. Graduates of regular high schools do not have to take this exam to apply for universities. However, it certainly shows that the Ministry of Education is facing the challenge of accepting a more diverse body of students into Japanese society in general.

The critics of separate schools may still argue that respect for cultural diversity should be assured differently. They may object to a separate schooling policy on the ground that it would lead to mono-cultural identity based on ethnicity, thus promoting separatism. They may argue that educational reforms aimed at more democratic schools for all students, the Japanese majority, and minorities should be promoted rather than separate schools.

Indeed, these criticisms have been common in mainstream Japanese discussion. Korean schools are often not encouraged because they are seen as developing only Korean ethnic identity. For instance, the notification of the Ministry of Education issued in 1965 states as follows: "ethnic Korean schools do not have positive meanings to recognize as regular schools for the benefits of our Japanese society, since ethnic Korean schools intend to nourish ethnicity and nationality as Koreans" (cited in Kim, 1992, pp.248-9; Kow, 1996, pp.268-270). Similar criticisms are likely to be raised for the case of aboriginal peoples. It may be argued that, even if aboriginal peoples experienced systematic efforts of the dominant society to destroy their culture, they cannot be taught to embrace only their native cultural identity. The critics would argue that education that promotes such mono-cultural identity is not suitable for our increasingly multicultural societies.

Hostility toward the descendants of North Koreans is very strong in Japan, reflecting the historical and political relations between the two countries. There is a fear among the Japanese public that zainichi North Koreans are teaching "anti-Japanese" ideology at their ethnic schools (Kow, 1996, p.49). For instance, when it was suspected that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons, female students who went to Korean ethnic schools wearing *chima chogori* (traditional Korean clothing for females) were the targets of as many as 160 assaults in 1993 and 1994 (Kow, 1996, p.44).

As if to support the liberal criticisms, it is reported that many zainichi Koreans actually prefer not to express their Korean identity, completely assimilating to the Japanese dominant culture (Kyoto Daigaku Hikaku Kyoikugaku Kenkyushitsu, 1990). Most zainichi Koreans cannot speak Korean. Many of the descendants of South Koreans do not identify with South Korean citizens, even though zainichi Koreans acknowledge that they are

different from "the ordinary Japanese" (Fukuoka, 1996). We may further question the

plausibility of ethnic schools for young Koreans when we note that, in reality, less than 20

percent of them go to ethnic schools (Okano and Tsuchiya, 1999, p.113). How can we

possibly argue that zainichi youths would benefit from official recognition of ethnic schools

when the overwhelming majority of these youths are not associated with these schools?

In order to answer these questions, we need a more detailed account of zainichi

youth identity formation process. We need to know whether or not they are paying a price

for assimilation in spite of the entrenched history between their ancestors' country and Japan.

If they are facing problems, how they are coping with them? We need to know these details

in order to determine if they are disadvantaged or not compared to the majority Japanese

students.

(4) The Complex Process of Zainichi Youth Identity Formation

Many researchers have assumed that the contemporary zainichi youth, who are now

third and fourth generation immigrants, have no trouble assimilating to the dominant

Japanese culture, since they are accustomed to the culture from birth. However, recent

studies indicate that such an assumption may be largely mistaken. For instance, Fukuoka

(1996), who has conducted in-depth interviews with zainichi youth, reports that we can

distinguish various types of identity development among young zainichi. Drawing on his

studies, I would like to examine whether or not the process of young zainichis' identity

formation has any implications for the arguments for supporting ethnic schools.

(a) Assimilationist Type

According to Fukuoka (1996), many zainichi Korean youth develop a split (sometimes ambivalent, sometimes positive) self: the "assimilated" self and the "dissimilated" self. The former internalizes Japanese ways of life, without critically questioning acculturation to the dominant culture. The latter, in contrast, emerges when a zainichi Korean youth realizes that she is not "exactly" the same as the most Japanese peers. Because of this duality imposed on the self, zainichi Korean youths are bound to develop "strategies" to cope with their identity problems.[18]

The first strategy discussed here, the assimilationist type, represents those who develop the assimilated self more than the dissimilated self. Many zainichi Korean students attending Japanese schools use Japanese style "pass names" (pseudonyms), *tsumei* in Japanese, in order to "pass" as Japanese. Zainichi Koreans who follow the assimilation strategy are usually isolated from other Korean families or friends. Away from the cultural bond of their origin, they cannot be easily distinguished from other Japanese. Some third and fourth generation zainichi Koreans do not realize their Korean heritage until their parents tell them, even if they are not naturalized. For instance, Korean students interviewed by Fukuoka told him that they came to know about their Korean origins around 5-8 years of age, when their close relatives or family members told them (Fukuoka, 1996). As they grow, they often experience ethnic harassment from their peers, who find it amusing to say things such as "you are actually Korean, aren't you?" Having been living as Japanese, many are not strong enough to confront this kind of harassment and fight back. Some continue to try to hide their origins and pass as Japanese, especially when they have only Japanese friends.

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[18] We have long known about the formation of this type of dual self-consciousness among minorities. The classic example is "double consciousness" proposed by DuBois (1903/1970).

They feel more attachment to Japanese culture than to Korean or even zainichi Korean

culture. In spite of their awareness that they are not totally Japanese, they seek to overcome

this discrepancy by completely assimilating to the dominant social norms. This orientation

toward one's self can continue throughout life. As Fukuoka (1996) says, "[t]heir core agenda

is to 'become Japanese'" (p.5).

(b) Pluralist Type

Those who develop the pluralist type identity share similar backgrounds with the

assimilationist type. Generally, they have tried to pass as Japanese, using pseudonyms, and

they do not have many zainichi friends. However, in later years, they feel the urge to free

themselves from this constraining self.

> ... through their interactions with Japanese friends while in disguise, they [zainichi
> Korean youths] begin to question their own being whilst under this disguise, and
> feel that their self-expression is distorted. The reproach against the disguised self
> is often sublimated to an emancipation of their real selves, i.e., the acceptance of
> themselves as different from others as something positive (Fukuoka, 1996, p.2).

Those who develop the pluralist type identity are zainichi Koreans who happened to

have a chance to learn the socio-historical contexts of zainichi Koreans and changed their

strategy from the assimilation to the pluralist. There are various types of incidents that

changed them to the pluralist outlook, but they include: an encounter with other zainichi

friends at zainichi meetings; an encounter with Japanese teachers who are eager to accept

their ethnic backgrounds; and most typically by joining *Mintohren* (*Minzoku Sabetsu to*

Ttakau Renraku Kyogikai, National Council for Combating Ethnic Discrimination). As a

result, they generally try to embrace their identity as *zainichi Koreans*, not as Japanese or Korean. Depending on their situation, their relationships with other zainichi Koreans vary. But even if they function virtually only in the dominant culture, they are aware of their unique ethnic heritage in their identity and are not devaluing their cultural heritage. Therefore, one of their life goals is "the realization of a society based on the recognition of ethnic differences but free of ethnic discrimination" (Fukuoka, 1996, p.3).

(c) Individualist Type

Some have followed a more individualistic strategy, arguing that it is of no use to rely on one's ethnicity as Korean as a source of self. Just as liberal critics of mainstream multiculturalism argue, they emphasize identity as individual, not as a member of a certain ethnic group. They are, of course, against ethnic discrimination. However, at the same time, they also believe that ethnicity should not be exaggerated to the extent that their abilities as an individual attract lesser attention. In other words, zainichi Koreans of this identity type would like to think that the best way to overcome their devalued status as non-Japanese is to rely purely on meritocracy.

As Fukuoka (1996) describes, zainichi Korean youth of this identity type are a young, "elite" type, who want to climb up the social ladder according to their own individual abilities. Their typical life goals are to attend higher education institutes in the United States, or to join an elite life in Japan, going to prestigious universities and entering prestigious corporate giants.

(d) Nationalist Type

This type is generally found among zainichi youth educated in ethnic schools. They also usually come from the community where zainichi Korean families are densely settled. They have a positive sense of self as zainichi Koreans from the earlier days of their lives, and they naturally know their ethnicity, unlike many other zainichi who try to pass as Japanese. In other words, they do not consciously develop as assimilated self, but rather a dissimilated self without internalizing ethnic inferiority. Most youths falling into this type have closer ties to their ethnic community, at the personal as well as the social levels.

Those who fall into this identity type are usually bilingual because of their education. They pride themselves that they can speak Korean. Also, they are often clear that their home country is actually Korea, not North- or South- but unified Korea. According to Fukuoka (1996), their "core agenda is to contribute to the 'development' and 'unification' of Korea" (p.4).

(V) The Bicultural Identity Formation Process

The assimilation strategy that tries to "invisiblize" a minority imposes a limitation as an approach to envisioning a society that respects cultural differences, since those who follow this strategy are forced to accept an inferior self-image as members of an ethnic minority. As Fukuoka (1996) states, this strategy actually does not resolve the problem associated with dual identity:

> Since the "invisiblization" of minority groups is based on negative values that the majority unanimously attach to groups with foreign elements, such an attitude cannot be broadly applied as a solution of minority problems. To be more precise,

it would not establish any positive relationship between the majority and the minority members who are "visible" or apparently foreign, or who appeal for their different existence in society to be accepted. Unless minority groups make their best efforts to be as close as possible to the ways of the majority, they will continue to be despised, ostracized, or discriminated against (Fukuoka, 1996, p.10).

Especially if we consider the historically unequal power relations between Korea and Japan, it is clear that the assimilated self is developed as a result of various kinds of cultural oppression against zainichi Koreans. They are forced to choose Japanese schools, to use Japanese names, and to assimilate to the Japanese culture since their options for not doing so have been extremely limited because the larger society has supported systematic discrimination and refuses to accept a pluralistic view of itself.

The individualist type, on the other hand, seems to succeed in maintaining a sense of self that does not accept the devalued image of the assimilated self. This type seems to be able to overcome the problem of dual self-image without internalizing the dominant's negative image against zainichi Koreans. However, this strategy is limited to the extremely few zainichi who are able to enter the "elite" world. As far as Fukuoka's study shows, this individualist type is generally seen among a handful of top grade scoring zainichi Koreans. As Fukuoka (1996) points out, this would contribute very little to resolve fundamental problems of the unequal relations between the Japanese and zainichi Koreans.

From the perspective of the ideal "majority-minority" relations, Fukuoka (1996) argues that promotion of segregation (that develops the nationalist type identity) is not desirable, and that mutual understanding (based on the pluralist identity) must be supported. I have nothing against Fukuoka's conclusion. However, at this point, it would be too quick to conclude that ethnic schools only promote segregation.

Although the identity formation process of zainichi Korean youths is indeed complex as indicated above, the four identity formation patterns actually represent the typical results of intercultural encounters. For instance, Darder (1991) identifies four types of bicultural identity formation process: alienation, dualism, separatism, and negotiation. The first type, alienation, is quite similar to the assimilation type Fukuoka suggests. The examples of this type include "refusal to speak Spanish, belief in the inferiority of the primary culture, and denial of the existence of racism" (Darder, 1991, p.55). Darder's dualist type seems to be analogous to Fukuoka's individualist type. She states that a typical example of this type can be found "among members of an all-Black social club who espouse the dominant culture's elitist bourgeois ideology" (Darder, 1991, p.56). Similarly, the third type, separatism, parallels to Fukuoka's nationalist; and the negotiation type, lastly, to Fukuoka's pluralist type. Indeed, in spite of the complexity associated with the acculturation process of non-dominant cultural groups, the four types of acculturation were observed in the earlier studies of intercultural encounters (Bochner, 1982) and continue to be confirmed in many recent studies of immigrant integration (e.g., Berry, 1997).

Therefore, according to many empirical studies, it is rather clearly indicated that the four types of identity formation are typical among students of minority status. Instead of simply assimilating to or being marginalized from the mainstream society, cultural minority students typically follow four types of identity development: **separation/traditional, marginalization, integration/bicultural** and **assimilation** (Garrett, 1996; Berry, 1997). The separation/traditional type is rather isolated from the mainstream society, more fluent in their mother tongue; the marginal type may be fluent in both mother tongue and an official language, but is not necessarily accepted by the mainstream society or within her/his own

cultural community; the integration/bicultural type speaks both languages and is accepted by

the mainstream society, without losing the tie to her/his cultural community; the assimilation

type may speak both languages and be accepted by the mainstream society, but the tie with

her/his cultural community is weak, and s/he chooses to embrace only the mainstream

culture.

There exist many variables affecting how minorities come to choose one over the

three other categories (Berry, 1997). However, one collective experience of non-dominant

cultural groups is collective "identity threats" (Breakwell, 1986), lack of "recognition"

(Taylor, 1994), or, simply, discrimination (Fernando, 1993). It is of foremost importance to

recognize that collective identity threats influence children's lives on a daily basis even in a

'liberal' society. Darder (1991) summarizes a typical school experience of bicultural

students in the United States as follows:

> ... students of color are silenced and their bicultural experiences negated and
> ignored, while they are systematically educated into the discourse of the dominant
> culture—an ethnocentric ideology that perceives the discourse of the other as
> inferior, invaluable, and deficient in regard to the aims of American society. This
> manifests itself in various forms of cultural invasion that, consciously or
> unconsciously, teach bicultural students to deny their lived cultures and their
> bicultural voice, and to take on uncritically the ideology of the dominant culture.
> (Darder, 1991, p.68)

This collective experience of identity threats has traditionally resulted in marginalization,

forcing members of non-dominant cultural groups to internalize the dominant's demeaning

image of them.

In schools, the continuing effects of these systematic and collective threats to children are observed in their academic achievement. In the zainichi Korean case, there is no detailed report available on dropout rates or grades. There are mixed views concerning zainichi Koreans' academic achievements. According to Kim (1995), comparing the length of formal education, we can find no distinctive differences between zainichi Korean and Japanese students. However, Lee (1991) reports distinctive academic disadvantages experienced by zainichi. Okano and Tsuchiya (1999) also report that although some zainichi Korean students are very successful academically, some statistics show a clear gap in academic achievement between zainichi Koreans and the Japanese (pp.113-114).

We can at least say, however, that zainichi Koreans' relative academic success supported in Kim's study is the exception rather than the rule. Students from culturally marginalized groups continue to suffer from academic disadvantages all over the world. In particular, Ogbu's series of studies on minority students[19] have shown us that the historical and social backgrounds of minority students greatly influence their academic achievement. Ogbu argues that we cannot explain minority students' poor academic performance simply by cultural differences or poverty. Although it had been assumed that such factors are the main causes of minority students' poor academic achievement, the cultural difference explanation contradicts the fact that Asian Americans do significantly better than African Americans (Ogbu, 1991). No adequate research data was available to determine whether poverty is the cause of lower academic achievements either.

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[19] As mentioned earlier, the term minority refers to "a group occupying a subordinate position in a multiethnic society, suffering from the disabilities of prejudice and discrimination, and maintaining a separate group identity" (Gibson, 1991, p.358).

With intensive ethnographic studies and international comparisons of case studies, Gibson and Ogbu (1991) found that whereas immigrant minority students usually succeed in schools, nonimmigrant minority students do not. Immigrant minorities are characterized by their (or their ancestors') motivation in coming to the new social environment in order to pursue a better life. They have positive reasons to leave their country and have a new life. By contrast, nonimmigrant minorities have a subordinate status involuntarily. They have not come to live in the present country to seek better economic opportunities. They are most likely to live in the current environment as a result of colonization and slavery. Gibson and Ogbu (1991) argue that these contrasting psychological mind-sets, together with the degree of persisting discrimination due to broad historical and social factors, are sufficient to explain the different academic achievements among minority students. We should note that this distinction between nonimmigrant and immigrant minorities parallels Kymlicka's one between national and ethnic minorities.

(VI) Implications for Minority Education

Given the foregoing discussion, what kind of roles can and should education play in a "multicultural" society that has yet to achieve its ideals? Based on a study of zainichi Koreans' identity formation, Kim (1997) argues that some forms of education that recognize and respect Korean culture are effective in developing a positive bicultural identity. Kim conducted a survey of men and women maintaining South Korean citizenship in Japan, whose ages were between 18 and 30. He established that more than 60 percent of the participants experienced a negative sense of self-esteem as Koreans (Kim, 1997, p.5). According to Kim's analysis, the determining factor for such "identity threats" was

discriminatory experiences, and the most memorable ones occurred between the ages of 9

and 12. Kim's study also indicated that the factor effective in overcoming the threat is ethnic

education. According to Kim, ethnic education helped youths to regain the confidence to

cope with their identity threats in a positive manner. Okano and Tsuchiya (1999) also report

a narrative of a zainichi Korean girl, Suja (pseudonym), who went through 12 years of ethnic

education and state that "[e]thnic education seems to have given Suja a sense of confidence

in herself, although she does not seem to have realised this until encountering Korean youths

who had undergone mainstream schooling" (p.120).

Darder states that it is necessary to develop assertive bicultural identity among

students from subordinated cultures, considering the harsh reality these students face. In this

environment, students from subordinated cultures need to develop a capacity to critically

encounter the dominant view of them and to "awaken the bicultural voice" (Darder, 1991,

p.69). Without developing such a capacity, students lose their bicultural voice to the

dominant culture. Darder argues as follows:

> The development of voice and social empowerment go hand in hand as bicultural
> students peel away the layers of oppression and denial, undergo a deconstruction of
> the conditioned definitions of who they are, and emerge with a sense of their
> existence as historically situated social agents who can utilize their understanding of
> their world and themselves to enter into dialogue with those who are culturally
> different. (Darder, 1991, pp.69-70)

Similarly, Cummins (1996a) proposes a pedagogy that places the development of

assertive identity at the centre of education. He states that involuntary minority students tend

to fail because "this devaluation of identity played out in the interactions between educators

and students convinces many students that academic effort is futile. They resist further devaluation of their identities by mentally withdrawing from participation in the life of the school" (Cummins, 1996a, p.3).[20] Stating that "human relationships are at the heart of schooling" (Cummins, 1996a, p.1), he reminds us that identity is constantly negotiated, as Taylor and Mead argue, in schools just as in the larger society. He argues that by positively recognizing their cultural values, which are devalued in the larger society, we can empower nonimmigrant minority students and lead them to academic success.

Freeman's (1994) ethnographic study analyzing the success of Oyster Bilingual School, a two-way Spanish-English bilingual public elementary (pre-K-6) school, illustrates the pedagogical framework of Cummins (1996a) well. Based on classroom observation and interviews of policy makers, administrators, teachers and students, Freeman found that the Oyster approach is very different from traditional pedagogy for minority students. The traditional approach sees the problem as a deficit in minority students: They have Limited English Proficiency (LEP) or need an English as a Second Language (ESL) program. However, at Oyster, the educational policy is formed on the perception that "the problem for language minority students in general (including LEP students, speakers of languages other than English, and speakers of varieties other than standard English) is mainstream U.S. educational and societal discrimination against minority languages and minority peoples" (Freeman, 1994, p.6). This framework leads to establishing educational policies and an environment which provide minority students with a space for re-evaluating their native culture and language. As a result, the Oyster program is a successful way to "maintain and

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[20] Children become consciously aware of cultural differences when they are as early as three years old and their ability to perceive and categorize the differences increases until they are six years (Ramsey, 1987). This is the time when children's lives are beginning to revolve around school activities.

develop the native language and culture, acquire standard English, and participate and achieve without being discriminated against" (Freeman, 1994, p.8).

From Fukuoka's studies and interpretations, one may conclude that ethnic school experiences for zainichi Koreans do seem to enhance a social life segregated from the dominant Japanese, developing strong social ties with other zainichi. Critics may, for instance, argue that zainichi should not associate only with other zainichi and that the pluralist identity type is more desirable than the nationalist type. However, many studies reviewed above indicate that the bicultural identity Fukuoka would like to promote does not develop by simply encouraging participation in the larger society. Fukuoka (1996) also reports that zainichi youths of the pluralist identity are those who have had a chance to learn zainichi Koreans' history and culture. The current educational opportunities for zainichi Koreans to learn their own history, language, and culture are quite limited because of the current approach of the Ministry of Education. We saw that the Ministry of Education tries to discourage zainichi Koreans from attending ethnic schools by recognizing them only as non-academic schools. At regular schools, however, there are no official policies for respecting Korean culture or language. In this context, it seems reasonable that separate schools should be recognized as a right of zainichi Koreans, if they wish to establish them.

Berry (1997) also confirms Kim's findings and conclusions, based on an extensive literature review of empirical studies on the acculturation process of immigrants. He notes that supports for maintaining links to one's own culture, as well as to the host society, can maximize the chance of successful adaptation.

These empirical studies confirm the cultural recognition thesis of mainstream multiculturalists. As seen earlier, Kymlicka (1989; 1995) recognizes that assuring cultural

stability enables members of minority cultures to make meaningful life choices, which is the liberals' major concern. The failure to provide such protective measures would diminish such opportunities, disadvantaging cultural minorities. The findings of Kim, Berry, and many others clearly support the arguments of Darder and Kymlicka.

Critics may still argue that Fukuoka's study indicates that zainichi who went to ethnic schools came to develop the nationalist type identity and therefore cannot be supported in a liberal society. As mentioned earlier, the fear of the dominant Japanese that Korean ethnic schools teach "anti-Japanese" ideology is very strong. Indeed, this concern for ideology education may be the most persuasive argument against the conception of separate schools in Japanese society. Fukuoka's (1996) observation that Korean youths of the nationalist identity type in general do not have a strong attachment to the Japanese society may seem to confirm the view that ethnic schools promote separatism.

We have to try to eliminate any kind of ideology education in a liberal democratic society, in the sense of an education which does not respect individuals' autonomy or capacity for critical reflection. For instance, education that merely idealizes North Korea cannot be regarded as zainichi Koreans' educational right. However, this is not likely the main purpose of contemporary Korean ethnic schools. With "ethnic democratic education," zainichi North Koreans would like their students to learn Korean language and culture while also learning to contribute to Japanese society, if they continue to live there, or to North Korean society, if they wish to go back (Park, 1980, 1987). As the majority of zainichi Koreans are composed of those who were born in Japan, they are likely to continue living in Japan (Kow, 1996, p.45). They would like their children to develop a positive sense of self, in a society that has been very reluctant to accommodate their cultural distinctiveness.

Moreover, the nationalist type does not mean that they are exclusively nationalist. since they do speak Japanese and are acculturated to the dominant Japanese cultural norms. In this context, the fear of chauvinistic nationalism is not sufficient to argue against the benefit of Korean schools for zainichi as well as for the Japanese in general.

Indeed, underlying the arguments of most of the proponents of single culture separate schools is the theory of *biculturalism*, not cultural fundamentalism. Kymlicka (1995) acutely points out that "it is often majority cultures which have insisted on the 'purity' of minority cultures" (p.104) and reminds us of the fact that many indigenous peoples are no longer strictly following traditional ways of life from many generations ago. This trend is also reflected in the recent development of conceptualizing "Indian Education" in contemporary contexts. Although tradition is cherished, rather than marginalized, it is clearly indicated that "this continuity with tradition is neither a rejection of the artefacts of other cultures nor an attempt to 'turn back the clock'" (Hampton, 1995, p.29). Rather, "[t]he recognition of Indian education as distinctive indicates a legitimate desire of Indian people to be self-defining, to have their ways of life respected, and to teach their children in a manner that *enhances consciousness of being an Indian and a fully participating citizen of Canada or the United States*" (Hampton, 1995, p.10, emphasis added). Burtonwood (1985) also notes that the Muslim community in Britain is not homogeneous, and some scholars on Islam argue that the Islam culture is quite compatible with the surrounding English culture (Hedayatullah, 1977).

In addition, contrary to the general assumption of the liberal critics of multiculturalism, it has been shown that in many cases, separate schools are effective in developing positive self-esteem *and bicultural identity*, which will ensure the more positive

integration of minorities. This is because ethnic schools are able to provide a safer space for students from culturally marginalized groups, maximizing their chance of developing a positive sense of self-worth. The failure to have this kind of opportunity is shown to be damaging to the identity of zainichi Korean youth. Especially in Japan, the support for Korean ethnic schools is important because it would mean a first step to recognizing its cultural diversity as a liberal democratic society. As the various forms of discrimination continue to affect zainichi Koreans and the official recognition of minority rights is virtually non-existent, it is urgent to support Korean ethnic schools. To support ethnic public schools would be beneficial to everyone in Japan, as they would resolve unnecessary tension between Korean and Japanese residents, who actually share a common language and many similar social and cultural values. The failure to do so would mean that Japan has no desire to protect the rights of every child residing in Japan. This contradicts the fact that the Japanese government has ratified the Convention on the Children's Rights (Kodomo no Kenri Joyaku) in 1989, which confirms that children's cultural identity, language and values have to be respected (Article 29, 1(c)).

(VII) Discussion

If some students' cultural identity is threatened because of persistent devaluation of their culture by the dominant society and it is shown that overcoming the threat requires education which affirms their cultural identity, it seems difficult to deny that culturally relevant education should be guaranteed for such students in a society committed to justice and the well-being of all of its peoples.

As Kymlicka (1989) summarizes below, "unequal circumstances" justify special treatments of peoples from marginalized cultures. Relying on the case of aboriginal peoples in Canada, he states:

> Unlike the dominant French or English cultures, the very existence of aboriginal cultural communities is vulnerable to the decisions of the non-aboriginal majority around them. They could be outbid or outvoted on resources crucial to the survival of their communities, a possibility that members of the majority cultures simply do not face. As a result, they have to spend their resources on securing the cultural membership which makes sense of their lives, something which non-aboriginal people get for free (p.187).

In this context, it should be clear that people from minority cultures are not advocating cultural nationalism or fundamentalism. They are simply asking for freedom from systematic cultural misrecognition—stereotypic reductionism and discrimination—which is constantly threatening their cultural identity in the present society. This is what they mean by a "culturally secure environment." When mainstream multiculturalists argue that their version of multiculturalism does not imply chauvinistic exclusionism, they are suggesting that in a society still hostile to the culturally marginalized, their demand to feel safe should be guaranteed by the larger society. They argue that if we cannot provide a public space where the culturally marginalized can feel secure, the society is not just.

The worries about cultural fundamentalism further become groundless when we realize that the culturally marginalized will not remain monocultural but will become *bicultural*. People from marginalized cultures have to participate in activities based on bureaucratic state structures which demand competencies in the dominant culture.

Mainstream multiculturalists do not deny the structure of the nation-state, or the necessity of certain cohesion within a society as a political unit. Taylor, for instance, as noted earlier, is arguing for the unity of Canada, not the independence of Quebec (Taylor, 1996b). Mainstream multiculturalists' argument is that the affirmation of the cultural identity for some of minority groups is necessary in order for them to contribute to both the currently dominant and the cultural communities. The affirmation of cultural identity is the basis for leading a meaningful life, which enables all of us to engage in critical and reflective thinking while accepting and appreciating our ancestors' wisdom.

A few people from subordinated cultural groups may actually demand education that imposes their traditions, denying students' freedom to become bicultural. For instance, an American-Indian may argue that her/his children should become *American-Indian*, not bicultural American-Indian. Although such claims are easily noticed, they do not seem to represent the view of American-Indian communities in general. Kymlicka states as follows:

> While indigenous peoples do not want modernization forced upon them, they demand the right to decide for themselves what aspects of the outside world they will incorporate into their cultures, and many indigenous peoples have moved toward a more urbanized and agricultural lifestyle. And they demand the right to use their traditional resources in the process. (Kymlicka, 1995, p.104)

We should note that it is dangerous to idealize our cultural past and try simply to preserve our cultural heritage, since such an approach could end up inventing traditions and supporting cultural fundamentalists. However, when mainstream multiculturalists state that our cultural heritage should be protected, they are saying that we have to protect it from the misrecognition and misrepresentation it has suffered. They may be idealizing the suffering

culture to some extent, but as long as they argue that a secure environment is necessary for critical and reflective thinking, such idealization cannot be the reason to deny mainstream multiculturalism. We all idealize our past to a certain extent, and it is the capacity to critically assess such tendencies that is most essential for future generations to acquire.

It should also be noted that mainstream multiculturalists are not supporting the determinism that many believe such a conception of culture implies. They are aware that such determinism cannot be sustained in our modern context. In other words, it is not the entire conception of culture but its deterministic implication that has to be problematized, since we do still see cultural diversity on the surface of our planet. It should be noted that I do not deny the possibility of a cosmopolitan, plural identity by supporting mainstream multiculturalism. As will be discussed in a next chapter, it is increasingly important to recognize the existence of multiple perspectives. The deterministic conception of culture is also a problem to be handled. However, mainstream multiculturalists are not supporting such a conception of culture per se. Although mainstream multiculturalism is easily interpreted as supporting a deterministic view of culture and ethnic stereotypes, it cannot be blamed for circulating such views, considering that the chief mainstream multiculturalists, such as Taylor and Kymlicka, are not advocating it.

Moreover, stereotyping was perceived as a problem as early as the 1930's (e.g., Katz & Braly, 1933), and we have yet to come up with a very effective method of reducing it. It would be very difficult to show that multiculturalism has "promoted" a superficial understanding of ethnicity and culture since the tendency has always been with us.[21]

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[21] Moreover, stereotyping has come to be perceived as "the product of explicitly normal cognitive processes *common to all individuals*" (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994, p.7,

Multiculturalism does rely on a rather classic conception of culture, which was explained in Chapter 2, in order to show the need for recognition of people's cultural heritage. But even if there were evidence that multiculturalism promotes stereotyping to a degree, it can never mean that cultural differences need no assessment. Even if multiculturalism has to rely to some extent on the "superficial" labelling of cultures, it would not be plausible to dismiss multiculturalism on this ground. Rather, it would be necessary to recognize that stereotyping and other types of "ethnic harassment" persist in our multicultural society, and we all need to work together to reduce such a discriminatory tendency.

Children should have access to educational settings that do not devalue their ancestral heritage yet do not enforce uncritical acceptance. In educational settings, by affirming their cultural heritage, students from marginalized groups can have an opportunity to engage in critical and reflective educational activities, without becoming passive consumers of either their past cultural heritage or the dominant one. It is in this context that the mainstream multiculturalists' claim is supported and if this is so, liberal criticisms of multiculturalism are not strong enough to refute mainstream multiculturalists' major argument.

Mainstream multiculturalism as it is applied to the educational context supports culturally relevant pedagogy (hereafter CRP) for cultural minorities who have experienced systematic symbolic injustice. CRP is clearly applicable to the case of most national minorities, since systematic cultural destruction has almost universally been promoted in the past toward such groups. However, in the a case of ethnic minorities, or groups such as zainichi Koreans where it is difficult to determine whether they can be categorized as

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emphasis in original) rather than a pathologic deficiency. I will elaborate on the concept of stereotype in the next chapter.

national or ethnic minorities, the demonstrated existence of past and present systematic symbolic injustice becomes a basis to demand CRP.

The definition of bicultural culturally relevant pedagogy remains controversial at this point. Certainly, merely including authors of "colour" in a reading list cannot achieve biculturalism. Questioning the legitimacy of CRP, McDonough (1997) notes an example of a failed case of CRP. As noted earlier, He suggests that there can be two explanations for Donna Deyhle and Karen Swisher's failure to engage Pomo Indian students with their ancestral story about Slug Woman: one is that the children may be feeling ambivalent about their ancestral cultural identity; and the other is that the story is not at all a part of their culture any more. However, the Pomo Indian children's deep ambivalence about their traditional culture is quite possibly the result of a collective identity threat from the larger society. Further, it is also possible to speculate that this shows rather that simply implementing a story of ancestral culture is not a good example of CRP, if we remember the success stories of bicultural CRP. Successful bicultural CRP attempts generally adapt to the learning styles unique to children of certain cultural backgrounds and pay attention to the socio-historical contexts in which minority children are embedded (Osborne, 1996).

Ultimately, CRP boils down to the widely-accepted (but not always followed) educational principle that we should start where students are. Students with different cultural backgrounds bring their cultural knowledge to school; it simply makes sense to take this as a starting point. In Osborne's (1996) words, CRP should start with "what they [students] know about their own lives and how they see them" (p.293). They should be able to utilize home languages, whenever possible and appropriate. They should be able to talk about their cultural background, without fearing that they will be considered demeaning or of no value.

Minority students' cultural background often differ from teachers', which is why it is so

crucial for teachers to question their own assumptions and try to avoid labelling students

according to their cultural background. Ladson-Billings (1995b), from an African-American

perspective, suggested that culturally relevant pedagogy is not only necessary for helping

minority students' academic achievements but "also helps students to accept and affirm their

cultural identity while developing critical perspectives that challenge inequities that schools

(and other institutions) perpetuate" (p.469). I would like to term that culturally relevant

pedagogy opens up a space for minority students at various levels of education, e.g.,

individual teachers' practices at classrooms, ensure educational rights to have separate

schools, and son on, where they can affirm their cultural identity so that they can develop

autonomous and critical perspectives. In a sense, our response to culturally relevant

pedagogy should be: "But that's just good teaching!" (Ladson-Billings, 1995a).

(VIII) Conclusion

The issue of how to determine when mainstream multiculturalism should be applied

in the educational context, that is, when one should support CRP that is aimed at developing

biculturalism, remains controversial. However, it should be clear that dismissing CRP in the

process of theorizing multicultural education because it is "secessionist" and "separatist" is

inappropriate. This parallels the earlier argument that mainstream multiculturalism should

not be dismissed simply because of the criticisms made by liberals and critical educators.

Moreover, we can identify certain conditions that can call for education drawing on

mainstream multiculturalism, which include: the existence of past systematic discrimination;

some evidence of such conditions continuing to the present day; the desire of a cultural

community to have a culturally secure place for their children; some environmental supports to realize such collective wills, for instance, a demographic concentration; and finally, a cultural community's commitment to respect children's autonomy and to help them participate in the larger society based on the principle of biculturalism. When these conditions are present, we can reasonably predict that there is a necessity to have an option to develop schools that accommodate the special needs of a minority group.

Chapter 6

Mainstream Multiculturalism and Engaged Dialogue

(I) Introduction

I have thus far shown that mainstream multiculturalism is not aimed at promoting

separatism, cultural fundamentalism, or determinism. Mainstream multiculturalism is, rather,

intended to promote biculturalism, building on the positive self-assertion of cultural

minorities. In this theoretical framework, mainstream multiculturalism does rely on a

somewhat stable conceptualization of culture. However, cultural differences do exist

between different cultural groups, if only in temporary ways, and therefore it is appropriate to

offer supports on the basis of cultural differences, as proposed by mainstream

multiculturalism. Moreover, mainstream multiculturalists usually recognize the dynamic and

non-static nature of culture, as they promote the peaceful integration of cultural minorities

with the mainstream society. As we have already seen, the underlying principle of effective

CRP, which draws on mainstream multiculturalism, is biculturalism, not monoculturalism.

However, the vision of mainstream multiculturalism does not end here. It may

appear that the focus of mainstream multiculturalism is exclusively on minority groups, but

this is not actually the case. Since "integration is a two-way process" (Kymlicka, 1995,

p.96), mainstream multiculturalists are aware that we need to pursue how the dominant as

well as non-dominant groups can work toward the realization of an ideal multicultural

society.

This chapter explores how dialogue across differences is possible and appropriate in a contemporary, liberal, democratic, and multicultural society, examining relevant concepts such as understanding, competence, stereotyping, and dialogue. I would like to present the view that mainstream multiculturalists supports what shall be called "engaged dialogue" across differences, which should be encouraged in schools. I also note, however, that this dialogic engagement cannot replace the arguments of mainstream multiculturalism presented in the previous chapters as some critics of mainstream multiculturalism suggest. This is not contradictory for mainstream multiculturalists. Mainstream multiculturalists maintain that merely promoting dialogue is not appropriate at this socio-historical moment because power relations are not balanced out between different cultural groups. Mainstream multiculturalism simply suggests that we should provide minority groups with secure space and at the same time try to promote engaged dialogue across cultural differences.

(II) Mainstream Multiculturalism and Intercultural Understanding

Thus far, our examination has focused on one aspect of mainstream multiculturalism that is relevant for minority groups, namely, the cultural recognition thesis. However, this is not the entire vision of mainstream multiculturalism. Mainstream multiculturalists promote a culturally secure space for certain minority groups but also support the idea of encouraging intercultural interaction.

I already argued that mainstream multiculturalism does not rest on the classic anthropological conception of culture that promotes cultural determinism. For instance, we have seen that Charles Taylor may appear to assume that each culture is so distinct that intercultural understanding is extremely difficult, if not impossible, when he proposes the

deep diversity model of a multicultural society. The argument behind this is that, due recognition from the majority is very hard to gain, even though such recognition is crucial for a multicultural society to function properly. His strong opinions about the need to protect minority cultures from the pressure of assimilation by the dominant culture are evident in his statement that the goal of the politics of equal dignity is "not to bring us back to an eventual 'difference-blind' social space but, on the contrary, to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever" (Taylor, 1994, p.40). Taylor's view that the dominant often mis-recognize, or do not recognize, the cultural identity of minority groups may seem to indicate that he assumes irreconcilable differences between cultures. But he also argues elsewhere that intercultural understanding is important, even if cultural differences may be affected by interactions between cultures. He states that intercultural understanding has to be achieved "partly through transforming our standards" (Taylor, 1994, p.67), invoking Gadamer's famous concept of a "fusion of horizons."

We have already concluded that Taylor's claim that we need to protect the distinctive cultural differences of every cultural group is impractical and difficult to defend. But even if cultural differences are not to be protected forever, it may appear to be simply inconsistent for mainstream multiculturalists to argue that we need to ensure a culturally secure space for certain cultural minorities and, at the same time, encourage intercultural understanding. How mainstream multiculturalism proposes to overcome difficult questions inherent in intercultural understanding such as: How should we communicate across cultural differences? Is it ever possible?

These questions are raised because the recognition of and respect for cultural diversity has often promoted the view that each culture is so unique that intercultural

understanding is almost impossible. This view, which I shall hereafter call **the incommensurability thesis**, has been a very common conception of the nature of cultural difference and in particular has been widely accepted among philosophers. Davidson (1984) summarizes this trend as follows:

> Philosophers of many persuasions are prone to talk of conceptual schemes. Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. There may be no translating from one scheme to another, in which case the beliefs, desires, hopes, and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no true counterparts for the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another. (Davidson, 1984, p.183)

The incommensurability thesis, then, is a theory behind cultural relativism, which was discussed in Chapter 2. We have seen that cultural determinism assumes that people's world views, values, behaviours, and so forth—'conceptual schemes' in Davidson's words—are distinctive to cultures, and people from different cultures see the world differently. It is concluded that, thus, different cultures are incommensurable. Anthropologists and some philosophers call this notion of a conceptual scheme simply 'culture' but others may use the term 'paradigm,' which has become popular after Kuhn (1970) published his famous work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Bernstein (1983) describes the widespread acceptance of relativism confronted by philosophers, and social scientists as follows: "we seem to be confronted with incommensurable paradigms, theories, conceptual schemes, or forms of life" (p.3). No matter what the names are, the main question we are faced with is how we can recognize and respect cultural differences without confirming the

incommensurability thesis. Other questions regarding intercultural understanding include: How can we overcome our stereotypes and misrecognition of cultural others, making the "dialogue across differences" possible in a multicultural society? What kind of intercultural understanding can be sought in an ideal multicultural society?

In an attempt to answer these questions, first, I will consider the limitations of understanding. Recognizing the difference between understanding and competence and examining the nature of stereotyping, I will draw on the theories of Gadamer and Davidson which propose that dialogue is the key to understanding. I will then explore how dialogue is possible and how it can be encouraged in classrooms. I will also examine how this approach fits the framework of mainstream multiculturalism presented in the previous chapters, in order to assess the view that it is inconsistent for mainstream multiculturalism to promote the assurance of secure a space for minority groups and engaged dialogue at the same time.

(1) Understanding and Competence

Many researchers from various fields—e.g., communication, psychology, history, and philosophy—have been fascinated by the topic of understanding across differences, especially cultural differences, and have tried to illuminate the nature of intercultural understanding. In the field of education, too, intercultural understanding has become one of the key goals of education in our contemporary societies. For instance, in Japan, education for international understanding (*kokusai rikai kyoiku*) has emerged as one of the major educational goals to be pursued in elementary and secondary schools in the late 1980s (Minei, 1996). And yet, the concept of understanding often remains vague and unexplained.

"Understanding" is actually a very general term, and we need to clarify what kind of understanding is possible and appropriate in our contemporary multicultural societies.

First, I would like to support the view that understanding does not necessarily mean competence. As Feinberg (1995) argues, although understanding and competence are related, they are not exactly the same. Competence means that one has the ability to function in a completely foreign culture, being capable of behaving and talking just as native members of the cultures do. On the other hand, understanding means that one is capable of making sense of what is happening in a foreign culture, making connections to whatever knowledge one happens to possess. Feinberg (1995) explains the distinction as follows:

> Whereas the goal of cultural competence is to enter the standpoint of the other as if this standpoint were unmediated by one's original way of life, cultural understanding is always undertaken with one's home culture in mind ... In contrast to the striving for cultural competence, the goal of understanding is not to reach the point of learning through the other. Rather the categories through which learning occurs are important because, among other things, they can help to provide a critical sense of the possibilities and limitations that other ways of life make available. (p.212)

Some theorists, e.g., Winch (1958, 1964/77) and Dilthey (1962, 1976), argue that understanding is more similar to what Feinberg calls competence. For Winch, it is impossible to understand a foreign culture without completely discarding one's own cultural framework. Winch argues that social ideas cannot be separated from the society in which they emerge. In order to understand a society different from one's own, one has to be aware that the social or intellectual *being* of 'things' in character "depends entirely on their belonging in a certain way to a system of ideas or mode of living" (Winch, 1958, p.108).

Therefore, "[i]t is only by reference to the criteria governing that system of ideas or mode of life that they have any existence as intellectual or social events" (Winch, 1958, p.108). Indeed, it is nonsensical for a Western scholar, who is familiar with the custom of baptism, to conclude that non-Western people also practice baptism by simply observing that a baby is splashed with water (Winch, 1958). Even if a Western scholar is inclined to interpret the event as baptism, since "[t]he pagans too had lustral water, and they used it for purposes of purification" (Pareto, cited by Winch, 1958, p.105), it is a mistake to do so. He continues to explain that such interpretation is an imposition of one's standard on the other. What we can do to avoid imposing our own standards on cultural others is, according to Winch, to disconnect ourselves from our own standards. In his words, we need to "jettison" our own standards:

> It is extremely difficult for a sophisticated member of a sophisticated society to grasp a very simple and primitive form of life: in a way he must *jettison* his sophistication, a process which is itself perhaps the ultimate in sophistication. Or, rather, the distinction between sophistication and simplicity becomes unhelpful at this point. (Winch, 1964/1977, p.179, emphasis added)

Dilthey holds a very similar view to that of Winch with respect to understanding the other, also stating that we have to give up our own standards to understand the other (e.g., Plantinga, 1992, pp.117-8). For Dilthey, "[w]hat understanding requires instead [of love] is an acceptance of the other as the centre and source of rationality, intelligibility, and meaning in relation to his expressions of life" (Plantinga, 1992, p.155). This view of understanding actually reflects classic historicism, which assumes that historical understanding is achieved

only if one is able to completely eliminate one's biases and create the neutral standard from which every historical event and figure could be judged fairly.

Although Winch and Dilthey's theory of understanding is extremely sensitive to cultural differences and shows sincerity in respecting the other's way of life, it is difficult to sustain. First, this view entails conceptual and cultural relativism. If we have to jettison our perspectives, presuming that they are unique to our culture, in order to make sense of a cultural other's perspectives and ideas, it would follow that we cannot make any criticism or have any opinions with respect to the culture we are observing; this would mean the imposition of our own standards. If we argue that different ways of life require different standards and that to understand another culture we need to learn the conceptual scheme of the culture, we cannot escape the charge of relativism. Other problems associated with relativism have been already discussed in Chapter 2. Second, it is not clear *how* we can jettison our ways of thinking in interpreting a foreign one, if it is so different from ours. If our concepts depend on our ways of viewing the world, how can we escape them and accept other ways of viewing? Is it not contradictory to suggest that we should bracket our own biases to understand a foreign culture and, at the same time, claim that concepts are relative to their cultural contexts? In other words, Winch and Dilthey's theory is supported by the incommensurability thesis, and the problems with the incommensurability thesis are not resolved in their theory.

(2) Stereotyping and Understanding

Second, it should be noted that to completely eliminate stereotypes is not a practical educational goal. In the 1970's, following Tajfel's conceptualization of stereotyping as "the

product of explicitly normal cognitive processes *common to all individuals*" (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994, p.7, emphasis in original), many researchers attempted to explain stereotyping from the perspective of normal cognitive functioning, moving away from the previous notion that stereotyping itself is a problem (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levingston, and Sanford, 1950; Katz & Braly, 1933). At least among social psychologists, stereotyping has been defined as a necessary function for human cognition, rather than a pathologic deficiency. A stereotype is, for instance, "a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people" (Stroebe & Insko, 1989, p.5), which, in itself, does not imply a negative conception.

Cultural essentialism sometimes receives similar treatment to stereotyping. For instance, Appiah (1992) proposes the view that an essentialized conception of race, which he calls racialism, is a presupposition of racism, but he maintains that racialism itself is not immoral. According to him, racialism is the view "that there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, which allow us to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all the members of those races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with members of any other race" (Appiah, 1992, p.13). If it is believed that the racial essence determines certain moral qualities or race itself entails certain moral characteristics, independent of racial essence, this is racism that cannot be tolerated. But Appiah maintains that racialism itself is a matter of limited cognitive capacity rather than an ethical problem.

However, neither should this mean that our tendency to essentialize cultural others never presents problems and could never be overcome at least to a degree. Major psychological studies on stereotype formation have developed to test the contact hypothesis.

Researchers have studied whether the increased duration and intensity of social contact with members of other racial or ethnic groups would result in breaking down previously held stereotypes. Although it has become clearer that mere increase in contact does not necessarily entail favourable results, in more recent years it has been reported that "cooperative learning" is very effective for blocking the formation of essentialized views of culturally different social groups (Brewer and Miller, 1984; 1988). Therefore, although complete elimination of stereotyping is not a practical goal of a multicultural society, we should encourage overcoming negative stereotyping.

(3) Gadamer's and Davidson's Theories of Interpretation

Within this framework of intercultural understanding, whose goal is not to achieve competence to function in different cultures or to eliminate stereotyping, the interpretation theories of Gadamer and Davidson become quite relevant. Gadamer recognizes that Winch and Dilthey's approach to understanding is often very unrealistic. For Gadamer, completely discarding one's own cultural contexts and somehow magically getting inside of a cultural framework radically different from one's own is difficult. Rather, understanding is more like a conversation, continuously going back and forth, comparing our own perspectives with those of others. Gadamer's view is that "human understanding is not to be conceived as an act of psychological transposition, but is rather like a conversation in which a shared understanding (agreement) is reached that resists reduction to either of the interlocutors privileged intentions" (Ingram, 1985, p.41).

Gadamer argues that "prejudice" should not be considered as something negative, which has to be completely discarded. While Winch and Dilthey claim that understanding

texts or the other means giving up our own standards and cultural frameworks, Gadamer

argues it is not understanding if one is completely taken up by the other. The attitude of

'openness' to the other is necessary, but for Gadamer this should not lead to completely

discarding our own frameworks. If we are serious about understanding the other, our

subjectivity becomes apparent as we engage in dialogue with the other. However, during this

process, one need not become completely assimilated to the other. Rather, one readjusts her

prejudices through dialogue with the other. As Blacker (1993) states, "[t]he interpretive

challenge is to maintain simultaneously the attitude of openness toward the text or person

while also permitting, as best one can, one's own prejudices to rise to the surface so as to 'put

them at play'" (p.2).

Gadamer's concept of horizon is introduced in this context. Horizon is "the range

of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point"

(Gadamer, cited in Bernstein, 1983, p.143). We can consider that it is a standpoint of one's

conceptual scheme, paradigm, world view, or culture. However, although these terms imply

a static, monolithic nature, Gadamer defines horizon as something "limited and finite, but ...

essentially open" (Bernstein, 1983, p.143, emphasis in original). So, when we encounter

other horizons, we do not try to eliminate our own horizons and be entirely absorbed with

other horizons. As Bernstein states, "what we seek to achieve is a 'fusion of horizons,' a

fusion whereby our own horizon is enlarged and enriched" (Bernstein, 1983, p.143). For

Gadamer, "the medium of all human horizons is linguistic, and ... the language that we speak

(or rather speaks through us) is essentially open to understanding alien horizons. It is

through the fusion of horizons that we risk and test our prejudices. In this sense, learning

from other forms of life and horizons is at the very same time coming to an understanding of ourselves" (Bernstein, 1983, p.144).

Therefore, Gadamer does not alarm us by warning that it is extremely difficult to understand cultural others because they are so radically different. Rather, supporting the view that cultural boundaries are not rigidly fixed but essentially open, he encourages the encounter with the other and engagement in open dialogue that sparks "the fusion of horizons" where perceived differences can be challenged and negotiated. Agreeing with Gadamer, Taylor (1995/97) states that understanding a foreign culture requires altering and enlarging one's own understanding. He recognizes that our ethnocentrism may never be overcome completely but does not deny intercultural understanding. On the contrary, he states that such understanding is becoming increasingly important and hopes that we advance to pursue this direction (Taylor, 1995/97, pp.146-164).

Davidson's theory of interpretation also emphasizes this dialogic interplay between us and cultural others when we try to understand them. According to Davidson, when we interpret something—texts or a person—where a special effort is required, what we can do is assume that we share a general agreement on beliefs. This is, in Davidson's term, we form a prior theory, which is the starting point for any interpretation. Then, we must be able to sense anomalies as a consequence of holding a prior theory. When we do, we will be forced to modify our prior theory, and then form a passing theory, which becomes a tentative theory for interpretation. By repeating this process, we try to optimize agreement, ensuring the existence of communication lines. He calls this whole process interpretive charity, that is, preferring an interpretation which maximizes an agreement about the meaning exchanged. For Davidson, there is nothing more to be done in understanding others:

Since charity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory, it is meaningless to suggest that we might fall into massive error by endorsing it. Until we have successfully established a systematic correlation of sentences held true with sentences held true, there are no mistakes to make. *Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters.* If we can produce a theory that reconciles charity and the formal conditions for a theory, we have done all that could be done to ensure communication. Nothing more is possible, and nothing more is needed (Davidson, 1984, p.197, emphasis added).

Davidson's interpretation theory offers a picture of the process of a thoughtful endeavour to understand others in a similar way to Gadamer's. Davidson also stresses that the process is never static but is always evolving, requiring us to modify our own previous assumptions as we continue to maximize the understanding of the other through communication. Therefore, the understanding is always partial, never complete, but to that extent is certainly possible. Starting from an objectivistic stance proposing similar belief systems between people from different cultures, but emphasizing the concepts of interpretive charity and prior and passing theory, Davidson succeeds in maintaining a position which can assess stereotyping and promote understanding, but not necessarily achieve competence.

(4) Dialogue

Within this framework of understanding, then, an ideal multicultural society should be characterized by commitment to engaged dialogue between culturally and socially different groups of people. In a commitment to a dialogic engagement, there is hope that we

can escape from essentializing our own culture and essentializing and marginalizing what looks strange and foreign to us.

In our ideal multicultural society, dialogic engagement is used to resolve controversies due to cultural conflict, thus enabling our culturally (and politically and socially) diverse society to function together, rather than separating. When seeking a solution in this situation, what we have to do is to respect each other and try to *understand* the nature of the problem presented to us. We cannot impose the majority's view simply because it is "the way it is." On the other hand, neither do we expect minorities to stick to their traditions. Rather, both sides have to be willing to compromise and search for common ground. As Zaw (1996) puts it, we have to "optimize the chances of finding a stable solution" if both sides "*want* to live together, and give up wanting to impose their will each on the other" (p.149, emphasis in original). And she adds, "What else is toleration?" (p.149). I would also add, what else is engaged dialogue? Gutmann also argues that, in a democratic multicultural society like the United States, schools have to "teach students how to *engage together* in respectful discussions in which they strive to understand, appreciate, and, if possible, resolve political disagreements, including those that may be partly rooted in cultural differences" (Gutmann, 1995, p.3, emphasis added).[22] This is the recognition and respect everyone deserves. As Gutmann states, "Mutual respect that rests only on the *recognition* of cultural diversity is an incomplete democratic virtue. Recognition needs to be accompanied by a willingness and ability to deliberate about politically relevant disagreements (Gutmann, 1995, p.3, emphasis in original). This recognition accompanied by dialogic engagement goes

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[22] This is what Gutmann calls deliberation, a necessary characteristic for citizens in democratic society (Gutmann, 1987, pp.50-52).

beyond the mere acceptance of cultural diversity, since it commits us to critically reflect on our horizons and be willing to expand them.

Through these efforts to engage in dialogue with people with different perspectives, Zaw and Gutmann envision the possibility of constructing new "multicultural culture." Both of them are aware that abstract universalism common to the Enlightenment project and atomistic liberalism actually subordinate those who do not share this universal humanity. In order to resolve this problem, they propose to create "a *new* public morality from all the culturally different moralities active in the state" (Zaw, 1996, p.142, emphasis in original). Gutmann's view of democratic society is characterized by the citizens' commitment to constantly revise the society, in which schools play a significant role. As she states:

> We are committed to collectively re-creating the society that we share. Although we are not collectively committed to any particular set of educational aims, we are committed to arriving at an agreement on our educational aims ... The substance of this core commitment is conscious social reproduction. As citizens, we aspire to a set of educational practices and authorities of which the following can be said; these are the practices and authorities to which we, actually collectively as a society, have consciously agreed (Gutmann, 1987, p.39).

The commitment to engaged dialogue can ensure that an ideal multicultural society does not merely celebrate diversity but promotes mutual respect and understanding, avoiding the marginalization of the other. This commitment alone does not guarantee the realization of such a society. However, it is certainly a direction we can take, if we seriously want multiculturalism to work and can give due recognition to cultural differences.

How, then, can deliberation contribute to realizing multicultural culture if intercultural conflict exists? Can we in practice solve conflict by deliberation, settling the matter on mutual ground? Gutmann (1995) uses an example of "the affair of the scarf," a controversy over the wearing of chadors by Muslim adolescent girls in their public high school in Creil, France, trying to show answers to these questions. The controversy started when the principal of the public high school told those girls that they could not wear chadors at school since, in France the wearing of religious symbols is prohibited in the public schools. This incident triggered multiple reactions. The majority is against the wearing of chadors, but there are two reasons for this. One is simply because that has been the way it is. But the other is a little more complicated. They see chadors as a symbol of women's oppression and, therefore, they argue that religious toleration cannot be permitted if it interferes with liberal principles of equality and democracy. Muslims and people who support the mainstream multiculturalists' argument sought religious toleration. They argued that if majority public schools cannot tolerate religious practices, publicly funded denominational schools should be available for Muslims and other religious groups.

This is a complicated situation, but Gutmann considers that "[t]he French public schools could have made an educational opportunity out of the girls' wearing of the scarves in school in order to express a democratic commitment to educate all students, regardless of their gender and the religious convictions of their parents" (Gutmann, 1995, p.7). Gutmann would like to tolerate the wearing of chadors in public schools, but at the same time, she would also like to show that gender equality is one of the commitments of the larger society. In this way, we can respect Muslim tradition but also provide these Muslim girls with an opportunity to think about gender equality. If we respect religious tradition, we will not be

able to impose liberal values on Muslim girls or order them to take off their chadors. But we can try to understand how these girls relate to their religion, while at the same time trying to articulate how and why we value gender equality.[23]

Zaw (1996) gives another example of how we can solve problems typical in a culturally diverse society using dialogic deliberation. She also cites a conflict between Muslim parents and a schoolteacher in a contemporary liberal society (the United Kingdom). The parents of a Muslim girl request that their daughter not participate in certain curriculum activities that require her to work physically close to boys. The teacher would like to respect the girl's decision, which is to participate in activities like other students. However, this may lead to the least desirable outcome for both the teacher and girl, that is, the girl's entire withdrawal from the school when the parents find out about the situation. How should this issue be resolved respecting cultural values as well as the school's commitment to educate every child?

Zaw argues that in order for the two sides, the parents and the teacher, to find a practical mutual ground, they have to try to understand each other. The parents have to try to understand how and why the school values its activities as they are currently practiced. The parents also have to understand the girl's wish to participate in school activities. The teacher has to understand the parents' concern for their daughter and their cultural values. Through this process, we can reasonably hope to find a *modus vivendi*. Zaw states:

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[23] These goals can be achieved, for instance, through an activity of role-playing in which students try to understand Muslim girls' perspectives by considering various political views (those of the headteacher, the Chair of the Board of Governors, the Imam at the local mosque, a teacher at the school, The Minister of Education, and the editor of a national newspaper) that influence the decision over whether or not the girls are allowed to wear chadors at school (Hill, Pike & Selby, 1998, pp.81-84).

Achievement of mutual understanding might enable the parents to value the school activities enough to cooperate in the effort to find ways of allowing their daughter to participate, while the school tries to see how to modify the organization of its activities in such a way that she could participate without offending the parents. (Zaw, 1996, p.151)

Zaw notes that mutual understanding does not always occur, constrained by many factors involved in the process. However, she further notes:

the effort to reach agreement is potentially a source of new moral insights into the strengths and weakness of one's own morality ... It is, moreover, a way open to anybody, not just to highly educated experts. Thus the modest aim of finding a *modus vivendi* is a step on the road to the wider political objective of achieving a shared public morality. Perhaps it is the road itself. (Zaw, 1996, pp.151-2)

If we succeeded in creating a "new multicultural culture," within which minorities as well as the majority are committed to engaged dialogue and find mutual ground, there would be no need to be over-protective of minority cultures. This new multicultural culture is similar to what Zohar & Marshall (1994) call the "quantum society." Drawing on the quantum theory that light is *both* particle-like *and* wave-like *at the same time*, which departed from the Newtonian thinking that tried to explain phenomena of the physical world using only particle-like static atoms, they argue that this *both/and* thinking, instead of *either/or* thinking, can better explain our society, identity, and everything around us. They claim that our identity is also dual, private *and* public, and although we are all unique individuals and belong to different cultural groups, we are engaged to the public sphere where the connectedness that underlies all humanity can be felt and explored (pp.181-202).

They say that this public sphere is not neutral, as liberal-individualists would say, but each of us has to participate to add a new dimension (pp.192-193). In the quantum model of pluralism, individuals are perceived as dancing to the same tune of music but moving differently. In this new, dynamic, shared sphere, "the sharp, mechanist boundary between self and other gives way to a more fluid overlapping and entwining of constantly shifting dynamic patterns. The mechanistic perception of the other as threat gives way to a perception of the other as one who evokes my own latent possibilities. The quantum other is both (an aspect of) myself and my opportunity—my opportunity to grow and to evolve, my opportunity to realize my own potential self" (Zohar & Marshall, 1994, p.193). Although such an ideal culture is still in the making, it is important that engaged dialogue be encouraged to help realize an ideal multicultural society.

(III) Pedagogical Implications

(1) How to Encourage Engaged Dialogue

Of course, intercultural deliberation has to be cultivated with effort and, naturally, education has to play a major role in this project. As Feinberg (1995) states, "[u]ltimately what is involved in multicultural education is much the same as what is involved in the development of a democratic public. We are learning how to listen and how to discourse about our differences where the rules of discourse—both our own and others' rules—are part of what we are listening for" (Feinberg, 1995, p.209).

In order to foster practices of committed dialogue, we certainly have to encourage the virtues necessary for dialogic engagement. For instance, virtues such as toleration and sympathy, as suggested above, should be encouraged not merely as aims in themselves but

also as virtues which encourage and enable engaged dialogue across differences. It would be difficult to complete a comprehensive list of such virtues, but they must include the following:

> tolerance, patience, respect for differences, a willingness to listen, the inclination to admit that one may be mistaken, the ability to reinterpret or translate one's own concerns in a way that makes them comprehensible to others, the self-imposition of restraint in order that others may 'have a turn' to speak, and the disposition to express one's self honestly and sincerely (Burbules and Rice, 1991, p.411).

Burbules and Rice argue that these "communicative virtues" are not abstract universals, and can be acquired best in actually participating in dialogue with someone who possesses these virtues (Burbules and Rice, 1995). In a similar vein, Feinberg hopes that "[e]ducation can ... further attitudes of patience and openness towards the other by advancing the reflective insight that contrasting groups are joined in the simple fact that their different norms and behaviours are historically and culturally constructed (Feinberg, 1995, p.214).

However, as we are also concerned with the problem of essentialization, I would like to emphasize that we have to nurture attitudes and consciousness to pay attention to socio-historical contexts. We have to be especially conscious of making efforts to critically assess our own assumptions. We should note that we have a much longer history of treating any kind of "difference" in other ways. As Lorde puts it,

> ... we have *all* been programmed to respond to the human differences between us with fear and loathing and to handle that difference in one of three ways: ignore it,

and if that is not possible, copy it if we think it is dominant, or destroy it if we think it is subordinate. But *we have no patterns for relating across our human differences as equals.* (Lorde, 1984, p.115, the latter emphasis added)

And it is on this unpaved path of relating across differences that dialogic engagement and, ultimately, one type of ideal multicultural society is trying to proceed.

We have to remember that "[i]t is through the fusion of horizons that we risk and test our prejudices" (Bernstein, 1983, p.144). This authentic dialogical encounter that leads to the fusion of horizons is,

> [i]n terms of self-other relations, ... exposure to an otherness which lies far beyond the self (without being totally incommensurable); it signals an alternative both to imperialist absorption or domination and to pliant self-annihilation (a surrender to an 'essentialized' other) (Dallmayer, 1996, p.xviii).

What we need in this engagement of encountering the other is "a willingness to 'risk oneself,' that is, to plunge headlong into a transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are continuously renegotiated" (Dallmayer, 1996, p.xviii). Without this risk taking, our horizon would never actually meet other horizons but continue to marginalize and essentialize them.

In order to risk ourselves, we apparently need to fight against our fear of the other. Fear is an instinct for survival all human beings possess. Stephan and Stephan (1985), for instance, identify intergroup anxiety as a fear based on the anticipation of negative consequences in interacting with individuals from a different social group. Many factors including the amount and nature of previous contact, knowledge of culture, ethnocentrism, historical relations, and so on, affect the level of anxiety. Stephan and Stephan conducted a

survey of 83 Hispanic college students and the results showed that the amount of contact, assumed dissimilarity, and stereotyping were significantly related to anxiety, but not intergroup knowledge and ethnocentrism (Stephan and Stephan, 1985). This is relatively small-scale research, and it would be difficult to generalize the results to apply to our concerns, but we can acknowledge that such anxiety can affect the quality of dialogic encounters. We should be ready to critically assess this initial response to cultural others through dialogue with them.

(2) A Lesson in Fostering Intercultural Deliberation

Engaged dialogue requires certain conditions to be met if we want to achieve an ideal multicultural society based on this principle. Among many such conditions, I have thus far emphasized the willingness to recognize differences without imposing our standards on others and to create a new mutual ground and critical assessment of our biases. I have shown that we can do this by applying Davidson's interpretation theory in each intercultural encounter. But it may still not be clear what exactly it means to encourage engaged dialogue in education. What kind of education is promoted when we say we are committed to promoting dialogue?

In this regard, Gutmann's example of teaching deliberation is illuminating. She shows us how deliberation can be taught citing an example of dialogical teaching in an American history class in a Brooklyn high school. The example is a unit on the United States' atomic bombing of Japan during World War II. In the United States, it is a widely-held view that the atomic bombing of Japan was justified for the purpose of preventing a fascist, militant country, Japan, from total destruction and to hasten Japan's surrender. Of

course, this does not mean that other views are excluded in public discourse in the United

States. It has been argued that the atomic bombing itself is a violation of human rights

(Lifton, 1970) and, moreover, some historians argue that the United States' atomic bombing

cannot be justified by the official view, since Japan had already begun to prepare for the

surrender when the United States decided on the bombing (e.g., Bernstein, 1995).

Nevertheless, these are by no means widely accepted views in the United States. In other

words, this is a controversial topic in U.S. history teaching.

When teaching a topic of this nature, one can either teach the traditional view and

marginalize the alternative views or teach many views somewhat equally. The former is an

approach typical of the traditional (Euro-Anglocentric) history curriculum, and the latter of

the multicultural, "inclusive" one. However, Gutmann suggests that there is an alternative to

these two approaches, citing Ravitch's observation of the Brooklyn high school class.

> The lesson was taught in a Socratic manner. Bruckner [the teacher] did not lecture. He asked questions and kept up a rapid-fire dialogue among the students. "Why?" "How do you know?" "What does this mean?" By the time the class was finished, the students had covered a great deal of material about American foreign and domestic politics during World War II; they had argued heatedly; most of them had tried out different points of view, seeing the problem from different angles. (Ravitch, cited by Gutmann, 1995, p.4)

Gutmann, after this citation, continues as follows:

> Like this small but significant lesson in deliberation, a multicultural curriculum dedicated to teaching deliberation would encourage students to respect each other as equal citizens ... and to take different points of view seriously when thinking about

politics. The practice of morally informed deliberation engages students in according each other the mutual respect and moral understanding that is too often lacking in contemporary politics (Gutmann, 1995, p.4).

This pedagogy encourages various perspectives, trying to support dialogue as much as possible. It does not presume a legitimized answer from an authority about any topic, especially a controversial one. With this pedagogical approach, we bring controversies into the classroom. We teach controversies as controversies. We may find new answers to our questions. As we engage in dialogue, therefore, we are committed to actively participating in reconstructing traditions—ours as well as those of cultural others.

These principles are not limited to controversial issues in history or to occasions when cultural conflicts emerge. They can be applied to many other aspects of teaching, for instance, to basic skills such as reading. In this pedagogy, reading does not merely mean decoding skills. Any cultural work is a work in progress, the meaning and application of which is constantly re-discovered by generations of new readers. Otherwise, what is the use of reading classics in the contemporary world? As Rorty states:

> Although it also essentially involves perspectival perception, a cultural work is not best understood on the model of representation or presentation. It is a struggle to integrate, reconcile, propitiate and attack the past; it is a response to contemporary colleagues and enemies; it is an attempt to form the future. What we have deplorably come to call 'texts,' and treated as runes and ruins are, in truth, activities. They are private and collective, artistic and political 'workings through.' Reading these works requires participating in them, re-enacting the process by which the emerged, locating the problems that impelled their expression and construction. (Rorty, 1995, p.221)

'Committed pedagogy' (short for pedagogy committed to dialogue and deliberation) is, simply, good pedagogy for all students. If so, it is entirely reasonable to construct a curriculum around the principles of this pedagogy. At this point, we may wonder: if we agree to work on this pedagogy, we have to encourage everyone to participate in this project. Indeed, everyone is required to participate; as Zaw says, "we must want to live together" in a multicultural society. However, I have defended a separate, secure educational environment for students from culturally marginalized groups in some cases. Should we not pursue committed pedagogy together? Should we not give up the idea of "separate" schools entirely if we want to envision ideal multicultural society together?

(IV) Power Relations and Pedagogy of Engagement

Critics of mainstream multiculturalism, who do not see the necessity of supporting any culturally distinctive schools, have supported committed pedagogy. As we have seen above, Gutmann (1987, 1995) is a proponent of democratic education dedicated to deliberation, and it is clear that she does not support any special treatment for students from culturally marginalized groups. She states that "[p]ublic schooling in a democracy should not ... forswear the aim of increasing the self-esteem of disadvantaged students" (Gutmann, 1995, p.2). Rorty (1994; 1995) also supports "active reading" mentioned above as opposed to "multicultural education" that nourishes a particular cultural identity.

However, I would like to argue that committed pedagogy should not and cannot replace providing a restricted educational space for culturally marginalized students, at least in some cases. The reasons are: first, as I have already argued, we need to ensure secure settings for all children, so long as this can be achieved without inappropriately "boosting"

the self-esteem of minority students; second, dialogue can never be imposed if we aim for authentic encounters with the other.

I will not elaborate too much on the first reason, since I have argued this matter in previous chapters. I have shown that Gutmann's (1995) and Rorty's (1994; 1995) representation of multicultural education, or, more precisely, culturally relevant pedagogy (CRP) as merely promoting cultural fundamentalism and separatism is not accurate. As a matter of fact, many programs of CRP are based on biculturalism, not on the exclusive imposition of cultural identity. CRP is often demanded not to "boost ethnic pride" but simply to secure the environment for students whose cultural identities need special cares. There exist compelling empirical studies which show that such care for minority students are effective for promoting biculturalism among them.

My second point is that when we promote dialogue, it is crucial that we do not *force* it to occur. People need to "want to live together" and be willing to compromise their situations in order to find a *modus vivendi* (Zaw, 1996). We surely need to cultivate mutual respect, which cannot be learned if we merely confirm culturally particular public spaces (Gutmann, 1995). However, there are often necessary conditions for ideal dialogue to occur. One condition that is often ignored by proponents of dialogue is appropriate power relations between the parties to the dialogue. The powerful have to realize that good intentions often perpetuate their power and enable them to dominate in dialogue, no matter how critically and carefully they proceed.

In a recent article, Jones (1999) describes her students' responses toward her strategy to divide students on the basis of ethnicity in her ethnically diverse third year university class. According to her, the responses of the Maori and Pacific Islander student

group were overwhelmingly positive, while Pekaha[24] students were, overall, disappointed. Jones analyzes this situation recognizing historical and political power relations between the Maori and Pekaha. She points out that the will of the dominant (Pekaha) to understand the subordinate (Maori) often simply forces the latter to speak, when the latter are tired of explaining their culture and history. For the Maori, they were first forced to assimilate to the Pekaha culture; now they are forced to explain and engage in dialogue with the Pekaha. As Jones describes it:

> Border crossing and recognition of difference turns out to be *access for dominant groups to the thoughts, cultures, and lives of others*. While marginalized groups may be invited—with the help of the teacher—to make their own social conditions visible to themselves, the crucial aspect of this process is making themselves visible to the powerful. To extend the metaphor: In attempting, in the name of justice, to move the boundary pegs of power into the terrain of the margin-dwellers, the powerful require them to "open up their territory." The imperialist resonances of this phrasing are uncomfortably apt. (Jones, 1999, p.308)

We can also notice that in the discourse of promoting dialogue, dialogue is often described as a means to achieve a *better us*. We say, for instance, that without dialogic encounters with the other, we cannot critically examine our prejudices; as Gadamer says: "Only through others do we gain true knowledge of ourselves" (Bernstein, 1987, p.144). *We* need to engage in dialogue in order for *us* to understand *ourselves*. *We* have to fuse *our* horizons, not merely use dialogue as a means of enriching ourselves.

Of course, the above description of dialogue is distorted. Engaged dialogue as examined earlier is not intended to be used solely for our benefit. However, the point is that

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[24] A Maori word for white settlers in Aotearoa New Zealand.

when one side is more powerful than the other, it is often difficult to prevent the power

relation penetrating the engagement. As Ellsworth (1989) notes: "Dialogue in its

conventional sense is impossible in the culture at large because at this historical moment,

power relations between raced, classed, and gendered students and teachers are unjust"

(Ellsworth, 1989, p.316).

However, I do not think we should conclude that dialogue should simply be given

up. The warning that dialogue can be distorted by our political and historical power relations

does not mean that dialogue across differences is impossible, as Ellsworth (1989) seems to

suggest. In the classroom, we can first learn about the imbalance of power then try as far as

possible to overcome this problem as we engage in dialogue with each other. We should

especially be aware of "crimes of the active-past," which are "those whose thoughts and

memories [which] are still fresh and which still have strong influences on both the aggressor

and the aggressed and their descendants" (Ekennia, 1996, p.89).

These attempts still may not be enough. Political "forgiveness and reconciliation"

(Ekennia, 1996) are hard to practice. Thus, dialogue may fail. Nevertheless, unless we try,

there will be no success. And there can be success, as suggested by the examples presented

by Gutmann (1995) and Zaw (1996) of addressing conflicts surrounding Muslim girls living

in a society where non-Muslim values are dominant.

However, enforced dialogue is not engaged dialogue. As Bohm (1996) says, in

order to engage in dialogue, participants need to be able to 'suspend' their opinions when

encountering different opinions. Dialogue is different from discussion or persuasion: "In a

dialogue, there is no attempt to gain points, or to make your particular view prevail ... a

dialogue is more of a common participation, in which we are not playing a game against each

other, but with each other" (Bohm, 1996, p.7). If either party about to engage in dialogue feels threatened and coerced, this means the two are not ready for dialogue in Bohm's sense. If so, we may need to go our separate ways for a while, without losing our hope of understanding each other. When minority groups advocate separate schooling to protect their particular cultural (or racial) identity, they may be doing so precisely because they see threats—collective identity threats—from the larger society, which are not perceived by the majority. A culturally secure environment should be provided, then, not to discourage but to *encourage* dialogue later. If we respect the other, we should also respect their silence. We can learn so much from silence. Why don't they want to engage in dialogue with us? What is the purpose of dialogue? Silence can provide opportunities to dialogue with ourselves.

(V) Conclusion

In attempting to realize an ideal multicultural society, putting the cultural recognition thesis of mainstream multiculturalism into practice is not enough. It is also necessary to encourage intercultural understanding in order to resolve conflicts due to cultural differences.

Intercultural understanding is certainly hard to achieve but it is not impossible; it requires a process of engaged dialogue, continuously assessing one's own preconceptions about cultural others rather than trying to achieve competence in other cultures or eradicate one's prejudices. Engaged dialogue can be promoted in classrooms by introducing various perspectives on a controversial issue to students.

It may be claimed that mainstream multiculturalism is unfair to minority groups because they are required to be competent—not just understanding—in the culture of the

majority whereas the majority is not asked to be competent in minority cultures. This indeed seems to indicate the limit of mainstream multiculturalism, that is, it does not offer an ultimate solution to the existing power relations. However, assuring certain measures to have a culturally secure space for a minority is one step toward realizing an ideal multicultural society; promoting engaged dialogue is another. Mainstream multiculturalism is not a revolutionary theory of realizing utopia. It should be recognized, rather, as a practical theory to realize a more ideal multicultural society in the context of a contemporary liberal society.

If we go beyond the boundaries of nation-states, we can notice that a minority in one country is the majority in another. Such awareness is just beginning to emerge and the majority may recognize the necessity of becoming competent in other cultures. But in order to discuss this theme, another dissertation has to be written.

The promotion of engaged dialogue does not have to oppose the cultural recognition thesis of mainstream multiculturalism, as proponents of engaged dialogue tend to believe. This does not suggest that mainstream multiculturalism is inconsistent. It shows, again, the flexibility—phronesis—of mainstream multiculturalism as it pays attention to the socio-historical contexts of minority groups. Mainstream multiculturalists suggest that both approaches should be taken together, without excluding each other. Dialogue can never be forced upon us. We can learn something even from silence.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

(I) Summary of the Study

Multiculturalism is a controversial topic, and will probably remain so for a long

time. However, based on the analysis of the theory of mainstream multiculturalism

developed by Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka and close examination of the criticisms of

the theory, it has been shown that mainstream multiculturalism is a legitimate approach to the

challenge of cultural diversity in a liberal democratic society. Resisting the universal

application of liberal and empowerment theories, mainstream multiculturalism supports the

cultural recognition thesis. Mainstream multiculturalists argue that cultural recognition of

members of minority groups is indispensable for the development of a healthy and assertive

identity for members of minority groups and that this should be understood in the public

sphere of the larger society.

It is further argued that, under certain conditions, appropriate measures to ensure a

secure space for minority groups need to be supported in the public sphere. Although the

socio-historical background of each minority group is unique and it is hard to generalize, the

case studies of aboriginal peoples in Canada and zainichi Koreans in Japan indicate that such

conditions should include: the existence of systematic devaluation and deprivation of a

minority's cultural heritage and identity; a minority's explicit commitment to respect its

members' autonomy and critical reflection.

The implication of mainstream multiculturalism for educational policies regarding students from minority groups is that, under these conditions, minority groups' demand to have schools that promote bicultural culturally relevant pedagogy should be recognized as legitimate.

It is also noted that mainstream multiculturalism is committed to promoting intercultural understanding, encouraging engaged dialogue between the majority and minority groups. It has been shown that, for engaged dialogue to be promoted in classrooms, it is important that various perspectives be welcomed and that students be encouraged to question widely accepted views on various issues, but especially controversial ones.

(II) Significance of the Study

The study contributes to clarifying the much-debated theoretical foundations of mainstream multiculturalism and CRP and to suggesting their implications for educational policies, especially for students from minority groups.

This study is also significant because I offer the perspective that discussion of the theoretical foundations of multicultural education cannot ignore evidence available from various empirical studies. Many researchers have proposed a theoretical framework of multicultural education; however, in most cases such attempts have been either purely theoretical or limited to the categorization of existing multicultural education programs. This dissertation contributes to the development of a theoretical framework that utilizes some of the accumulating ethnographic and socio-psychological research data.

(III) Questions Regarding the Entire Framework of Mainstream Multiculturalism

Some questions may be raised now that the framework of mainstream multiculturalism has been presented.

First, there may be a question whether or not mainstream multiculturalism should be discussed in the framework of liberalism. Underlying the framework of my analysis is the assumption that mainstream multiculturalism is an extension of existing liberalism as advocated by Kymlicka (and to some extent, Taylor). This may beg questions such as: Am I not undermining the value of non-Western cultures? Is this mainstream multiculturalism an authentic multiculturalism when Western values such as autonomy and the capacity for critical reflection are used as the standard of mainstream multiculturalism?

There is no question that liberalism is a political idea rooted and developed in the Western discourse. However, an idea cannot be rejected based solely on its origin. It may be true that ideas travel because they originated from the part of the world which currently dominates the world in political, economic, and social aspects. But there is at least another reason, too, which is that some ideas have relevance for every community on this planet. The "Western" values such as autonomy and the capacity for critical reflection are increasingly recognized as important in non-Western societies.

Moreover, it is problematic to assume that non-Western cultures are static and against the idea of autonomy. As already mentioned, this is to discriminate against non-Western cultures based on the once dominant Western perception that Western 'civilization' is superior to other cultures, which are not capable of evolving.

The second question regarding the entire project of mainstream multiculturalism may be whether or not it could be applied to a much wider context. If the logic of

mainstream multiculturalism is applied to the international context, it could promote

nationalism. Let's look at Japan, for instance. Applying the logic of mainstream

multiculturalism, people in Japan could argue that Japanese identity needs to be protected

and secured in order for the Japanese to make contributions in international contexts.

This argument is already becoming popular in Japan, for instance, in the official

documents of the Ministry of Education (e.g., Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and

Communication, 1998). It could be argued that Japan is, in a sense, a cultural minority in the

international society because Japanese is not spoken outside Japan. However, such an

application of mainstream multiculturalism seems to require an extra caution. Since

mainstream multiculturalism is analyzed in the framework of liberalism, more examinations

need to be carried out to determine whether or not this international version of mainstream

multiculturalism would promote the development of autonomy and critical reflection among

the Japanese. It also raises the question whether Japan is a cultural minority at all in the

international context. Japan is a country whose economic power ranks second to the United

States in the entire world. How do we define minority here? There are so many elements

that require examination and analysis before we can determine the validity of mainstream

multiculturalism in a wider context than a single nation-state.

Third, one may wonder how mainstream multiculturalism sees the relation between

cultural, national, and global identity development in schools. My analysis has shown that

CRP promotes biculturalism among minority students. Since the proponents of cosmopolitan

identity oppose the practice of CRP, it has been argued that CRP cannot be replaced by

cosmopolitan education. However, in this age of globalization, should not the goals of

education—CRP or any other type of education—be expanded to promote global identity?

I do not see any objection to going in this direction. Indeed, some educational researchers have discussed the link between multicultural education and global education (Banks 1994; Lynch, 1992; Merryfield, 1995). It is expected that, in the future, further studies on the definition of global identity and how it actually develops, among many other issues surrounding global identity, will help us clarify the connections between cultural, national, and global identity.

(IV) Multiculturalism: A Global Phenomenon

Multiculturalism is just like "democracy." Democracy is also difficult to define, measure, and apply in different socio-historical contexts. In our complex world, democracy cannot simply mean ensuring the right to vote to every citizen. In order to assess whether a country is truly democratic or not, detailed interrogation of policy making processes is required. Multiculturalism does not simply imply cultural diversity. We need to know in what situation the term is applied and how it is intended to resolve certain issues.

Multiculturalism, just like democracy, is spreading to the world beyond the "West." The impact multiculturalism could have on other countries partly depends on Western countries' efforts to recognize its legitimacy and limitations.

I finish writing this dissertation hoping that meaningful dialogue on multiculturalism will continue in the societies where it originated as well as in various parts of the world.

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