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The Socially Disadvantaged and Crime:

A comparison of Canada and United States.

by

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Abstract

The social dislocations of disadvantaged inner city residents is increasing rather than decreasing among Aboriginal Canadians and African Americans. Only a few studies have presented information describing the forgotten 'truly disadvantaged' in Canada. Through the complicated triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data, this thesis documents the importance of human capital, social capital, cultural capital and capital disinvestment for understanding the social disorganization of inner-city poor and crime. While cities and inner-cities may be high on certain social indicators, many neighborhoods in Canada and United States are still suffering from severe social problems, especially among Aboriginal Canadians and African Americans. The comparison of Canada and United States clearly demonstrates that it is only a matter of degree of social disorganization, low human capital, low social capital, capital disinvestment, subcultural adaptations, violence, hopelessness and despair which separate the circumstances of concentrated urban poverty residents in both countries. The fact that both countries are suffering from similar social ills indicates that specific structural developments in both countries are the key for further understanding and research.

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Chapter 1 . Social Disadvantage and Crime: An Introduction.

The isolation of disadvantaged inner city residents is increasing rather than decreasing among Aboriginal Canadians and African Americans. Minority poverty is not white poverty. Many of the causes of poverty are the same, but there are differences— deep, corrosive, obstinate differences—radiating painful roots into the community, the family, and the nature of the individual (Massey and Denton 1993). The criminogenic pathologies of the ghetto community perpetuate themselves through the cumulative ugliness, deterioration, and isolation which strengthen Aboriginal Canadian's and African American's feelings of worthlessness. The likelihood of a child growing up in a disadvantaged neighborhood becoming involved in crime and being placed in jail is much greater than a child living anywhere else. According to Peterson and Harrell (1992), incarceration has become one of society's most important signaling devices—years later the experience of serving jail time makes it even far more difficult to find legitimate work. Literature suggests that people from the most disadvantaged areas of society, usually referred to as the new urban poverty, are most likely to be over represented in prison populations (Laprairie 1994). However, as Jencks (1992) comments while "the poor commit more crimes than the rich, they do not commit these crimes solely because they have low incomes (Jankowski 1995: 83)"

The consequences of low human, social, cultural capital and capital disinvestment in neighborhoods are more devastating in those neighborhoods demarcated by high levels of poverty. A neighborhood that is poor but employed is different from a neighborhood

that lacks any form of capital and is poor. Many of today's problems in concentrated urban poverty neighborhoods—crime, family dissolution, welfare, low levels of social organizations, and so on—are fundamentally the consequence of low human and social capital accumulation and capital disinvestment.

The concepts of human, social and cultural capital identify the connection of processes between the individual, the community, and their interdependent organization. All parts of capital accumulation play a contributing role which encourages capital investment in a community. Essentially, social capital simultaneously involves investment and integration of individuals into larger social settings. Overall, social capital refers to the areas of structured groupings which increase capacity for action to the achievement of group and individual oriented goals. Social capital is utilized to successfully endow children with forms of cultural capital which will significantly amplify their future life opportunities. Societal, community, and individual investment all interact as groups and individuals acquire their assets in the pursuit of selected objectives (Hagan 1995: 69). Human capital refers to the skills and knowledge learned by individuals through education and training which increase successful employment opportunities. Within concentrated urban poverty areas are products of capital disinvestment processes (concentrated urban poverty, residential segregation, race-linked inequality) which discourage societal and community development of conventional social capital. Processes of capital disinvestment are destructive of the conventional maturation of social and cultural capital and they may create subcultural adaptations. In turn, these

adaptations. which can be described as a form of recapitalization, are efforts to reorganize available resources. even if illicit, to accomplish planned goals.

In disadvantaged community and family settings without large amounts of human and social capital. and capital disinvestment, parents are less able to provide or transmit such later life chances to their children. Survival is often a struggle and families must adapt to the lower circumstances and opportunities they encounter. These forms of adaptation and capital formation can sometimes manifest themselves subculturally meaning that. in a sense. the cultivation of attitudes and actions diverge from, or are in opposition to. more routine and conforming societal norms and values. These subcultural life adaptations. i.e. oppositional culture. are often criminal and are the only or best choices presented which may become a powerful influence on future life outcomes.

What creates low capital accumulation? According to Wilson (1996) the public debate concerning this question is not productive since it seeks to assign blame rather than "recognizing and dealing with the complex and changing realities that have led to the economic distress" and social isolation of many individuals. Explanations and proposed solutions are often ideologically driven. The concepts of liberal ideology have encompassed issues such as social structure, including race. Social structure refers to the "ordering of social positions and networks of social relationships that are based on the arrangement of mutually dependent institutions [education, religion, family] of society." Race reflects both the sense of an individual's social status (defined by skin color) and the network of relationships in society. The conservative ideological perspective emphasizes the importance of values, attitudes, habits, and styles in explaining the different

experiences, behavior, and outcomes of groups. Based on this ideology, group differences are reflected in the culture. "To act according to one's culture is to follow one's inclinations as they have been developing by learning or influence from other members of the community to which one belongs or with which one identifies (Wilson 1996: xiv). A broader vision which includes all of the above discussed major ideologies must be incorporated in order to determine the experiences and life chances of urban concentrated poverty residents.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the importance of human capital, social capital, cultural capital and capital disinvestment for understanding the experiences of inner-city poor and crime. Grounded in the ecological study of the structure of communities, it will be argued that patterns of residential inequality artificially create social isolation and ecological concentration effects of the truly disadvantaged (Sampson and Wilson 1995). Within this setting, structural inequality distorts the accumulation of human capital, social capital, and capital investment. Through this structural distortion, negative cultural adaptations (i.e. oppositional culture) develop, social organization and social cohesion disintegrate, in turn, violence increases. This has the combined effect of further preventing the disadvantaged and subordinate groups from settling into the mainstream of society.

In order to clearly demonstrate how human capital, social capital, cultural capital and capital investment occupy a central place in the social organization of any society, two nations of similar cultures and origins will be compared—Canada and the United States. As Lipset (1990: xv) justifies the comparison of these two countries, "nations can

only be understood in a comparative perspective. And the more similar the units being compared, the more possible it should be to isolate the factors responsible for the differences between them. Looking intensively at Canada and the U.S. sheds light on both of them."

Since Canadians and Americans are similar in language and in culture, it is generally assumed that English-speaking Canadians, at least, cannot be told apart from Americans. Some people also claim that it is very easy to compare our two countries by just utilizing the "rule of 10:1" which implies that Canada is equal to $1/10^{th}$ of United States. (Appendix 1, Table 1) When observing the output, employment, or population of the United States, this method does appear to work. However, there are many indicators which illustrate that we are different. An extreme example would be murder. The number of murders in the United States exceeds Canada by 32 times (Sauve 1994). Thus, despite our similarities there is also much diversity between our two countries . One distinct area of difference is the level of violence and social disorganization among the disadvantaged resulting from the negative consequences of the inequality of social structure. Thus through the comparison of these two nations, the importance of human capital, social capital, cultural capital and capital disinvestment for understanding the experiences of inner-city poor and crime will be revealed.

Human Ecology

Before proceeding with a discussion of the situation of the disadvantaged, a brief description concerning the form and development, or adaptation, of system structure (one dimension of social organization) will be presented. 'Ecology' usually refers to the study of the interaction between the organism and its external environment. Drawn from this concept. human ecology focuses on the interaction between man and his external environment. The central purpose of contemporary ecological inquiry is to comprehend how a population organizes itself in adapting to a constant dynamic yet restrictive environment. Adaptation is viewed as a collective phenomenon, resulting from the population "developing a functionally integrated organization through the accumulative and frequently repetitive actions from a large amount of individuals. (Hawley 1971: 11)" The foundation of the ecological approach contends that once a population becomes an effective organization. it increases the chance of survival in its own environment (Berry and Kasarda 1977).

Different from the traditional human ecology emphasis on competition, contemporary ecological inquiry is concerned with interdependence. Interdependence is conceptualized along two axes-- the symbiotic and the commensalistic. Symbiotic interdependence is created from structural differentiation and integration of specialized roles and functions within the system. Varying by degree of differentiation and frequency of exchange among the specialized parts in complementary activity, symbiotic interdependence occurs at all levels of social groupings ranging from families to total societies. Based on supplementary similarities, commensalistic interdependence occurs

when a certain system task is greater than an individual can undertake. Thus, through the co-action of similar units, great power may be assembled and various undertakings can be accomplished. For instance, labor unions, Neighborhood Watch, and common interest groups have developed on the basis of commensalism. From the ecological perspective, symbiotic and commensalistic interdependencies are the principal elements of social system structure (Berry and Kasarda 1977: 12).

Another element of the contemporary ecological inquiry is that it is mostly, though not exclusively, macrosocial in its perspective. A basic assumption of the ecological approach is that "social systems exist as entities *sui generis* and exhibit structural properties that can be examined apart from the personal characteristics of their individual members." These structural elements are determined by the pattern of organized activities which develop from the routine interaction of many functions and roles conducted within the system (Berry and Kasarda 1977: 13).

According to the macrosocial perspective, contemporary ecology analyzes the structure of organized activity without consideration of attitudes and beliefs that individuals may incorporate in their roles. As part of the aggregate, organizational structure is perceived as transcending the personal characteristics of individual actors. Empirically, this can be illustrated in bureaucracies, communities, and societies where "individuals of quite different personal characteristics periodically replace others in particular roles without disrupting the observable pattern of organized activity." This is an important area of social systems which allows their stability and perseverance in development over time (Kasarda and Berry 1977).

A third characteristic of the ecological approach is the postulation that through continuous interaction of structural component parts, a social system tends to move towards a state of equilibrium. It is necessary to note that equilibrium is more of an analytical construct occurring in closed social systems existing within a stable environment than a social reality. Under the rare circumstances of equilibrium, the system will continually adjust until it has accomplished maximum efficiency in coping within current environmental conditions. When complete adjustment happens, complete equilibrium has been accomplished. and demographic and structural change ceases. The population size and organizational structure of the system will remain stable until disrupted by a change in the system's social or physical environment.

Human ecology offers a macrosocial perspective which transcends individual personality characteristics through the study of aggregate organizational systems. Each social system, such as a community, adaptively seeks resolution by achieving homeostatic equilibrium with its present external environment. Competition, symbiotic and commensalistic interdependencies all contribute towards reinforcing successful equilibrium through the integration of individuals within the social structure. However, formal structure only constitutes one dimension of social organization. Social organization also contains economic, cultural, spatial and behavioral dimensions which must be incorporated into the ecological framework. If a fuller understanding of one's adjustment to the environment is to be achieved, as Hagan's (1994) and Coleman's (1988, 1990) concepts of human capital, social capital, cultural capital, and disinvestment of capital demonstrate.

Human, Social, and Cultural Capital

Similar to the concepts of traditional ecology, the human community is perceived as a dynamic adaptive system where competition serves as the primary organizing agent. Under the pressure of competition, each individual and group develops residential and functional niches. i.e. human, social, and capital, in which they would best survive and flourish within the social structure (Berry and Kasarda 1977). The concepts of human, social and cultural capital identify the connection of processes between the individual. the community, and the interdependent organization. All parts of capital accumulation play a contributing adaptive role in maintaining successful symbiotic and commensalistic interdependence which encourages capital investment in a community. However, in disadvantaged communities, where poverty and inequality are rampant, the allocation of capital is distorted. Due to the concentration effects of social dislocations among urban poverty neighborhoods, interdependent networks and social cohesion deteriorate. In turn, society disinvests capital from the community, abandoning the residents in a climate of prevalent social isolation, disorganization and despair.

Besides the familiar concept of physical capital, i.e. tools, machinery and other forms of productive equipment, the further idea of human capital has been conceived. Human capital refers to the skills and knowledge learned by individuals through education and training. Even though human capital is not as tangible as physical capital, both terms revolve around the creation of resources or power through a transformative process so that "just as physical capital is created in making changes in materials so as to form tools and facilitate production, human capital is created by changing persons so as to

give them skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways (Coleman 1990:

304)."

More important than human capital is social capital. The establishment of social

capital involves the accumulation of capabilities through socially structured relations

mediated between individuals and groups. Coleman (1990: 305) uses Figure 1 (see

Appendix 1) to show how family social capital is utilized by the parents to develop the

skills and capabilities which become the human capital of their children (Hagan 1994).

The nodes labeled by capital letters in this illustration represent human capital, while the

connecting lines constitute social capital. The following describes Coleman's (1988;

1990) three person structure (Appendix 1, Figure 1):

> Coleman reasons that for parents B and C to further the cognitive
> development of the child A. there must be capital in the nodes *and* the
> links of the diagram. That is, the human capital of parents B and C must be
> passed on to child A through the social capital represented in the social
> structure of the connecting links between A and B, or between A and C,
> and for overall maximum effect between A, B, and C. Coleman refers to
> the last of these possibilities as the closure of social networks, and this can
> more generally refer. for example. to not only the functioning of intact
> nuclear and extended families but also well-integrated neighborhoods,
> communities. and even nation states (Hagan 1994: 67)

Based on the characteristics of their environment, groups and individuals must

adapt themselves to current and persisting accumulations of capital. Adaptations to the

environment are expressed through various forms of cultural capital. When social capital

is high in the community and family, cultural adaptations encompass the accumulation of

education. and even involvements in high culture, such as participating in the fine arts

and supporting their institutions. In such communities, social capital is utilized to

successfully endow children with forms of cultural capital which will significantly amplify their future life opportunities.

On the other hand, in disadvantaged community and family settings that are deprived of social and cultural capital, parents are less able to provide later life opportunities to their children. Hagan (1991b) continues:

> So while many parents who are well situated within secure and supportive social networks may be destined or driven by their capital positions and connected inclinations to endow their children with forms of social and cultural capital that make success in school later in life quite likely, the children of less advantageously positioned and less driven and controlling parents may often drift or be driven into and along less-promising paths of social and cultural adaptation and capital formation.

These forms of adaptation and capital formation can sometimes develop subculturally, or are in opposition to, conventional societal norms and values. These subcultural life adaptations are often the only or best choices in order to survive against the perpetuating cycle of poverty. When these selections are made within groups, they can gain added prominence. As Hagan suggests, the ironic reversal of purpose to which social capital can be interpreted in this context when Coleman (1990) noted that "any organization which makes possible such oppositional activities is an especially potent form of social capital for the individuals who are members of the organization (303)."

Oppositional Culture

In the inner-city areas of low economic status, where crime rates are high, according to Shaw and McKay (1969: 171, 172), these areas are characterized by wide diversity in norms and standards of behavior. These moral values vary over a spectrum ranging from those which are strictly conventional to those in direct opposition to

conventionality as symbolized by common mainstream institutions, such as the family, the church etc. Hence within the same community, theft may be defined as proper behavior in some groups and as immoral in others. In some groups wealth and prestige are conveyed through acts of skill and courage in the criminal world, while in neighboring groups attempting to achieve distinction in this way may result in extreme disapprobation. Generally present are two conflicting systems of economic activity which have differing opportunities for employment and promotion. Evidence of success in the criminal world is shown by the adult criminals whose clothes and automobiles indicate unmistakably that they have prospered. The values missed and risks taken are not so clearly apparent to the young. Thus different to a relatively consistent and conventional pattern of values, children are exposed to a variety of contradictory standards and types of behavior. The development of divergent systems of values and standards requires a type of situation in which traditional conventional control is either weak or inconsistent (Shaw and McKay 1969: 188). Liebow (1967) believes that lower-class values were recreated as individuals time and again experienced the same structural conditions. Kornhauser (1978: 20) further critiques cultural theories by stating: "The 'culture' thus constructed is not an authentic subculture, nor are its 'values' objects of genuine commitment. It is a pseudoculture. Its function is ideological: to rationalize failure. It neither commands allegiance nor guides behavior, rather it follows behavior." Based on her perspective, violence is not valued but is instead a situational response to the structurally imposed environment of social disorganization (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994: 63).

Sampson (1987, 1995) surmised that there is nothing inherent in black culture that is conducive to violent crime. Rather it systematically stems from the structural linkages among unemployment, economic deprivation and family disorganization in the urban environment of black communities. Further he noted that the effects are independent of race, income, region, age, composition, density, city size, and welfare benefits, which are similar to the effects of white family disruption on white violence.

Thus due to situationally induced violence. Wolfgang and Ferracuti explain that in particular areas and for certain subgroups of the population, criminal violence among the disadvantaged is the product of their commitment to subcultural values and norms that condone violence as appropriate means of resolving interpersonal conflict. As these authors contend. pro-violence values and norms are shared among all members of the subculture of violence or shared among most males ranging from late adolescence to middle age. Individuals in the subculture of violence develop favorable attitudes towards the utilization of violence through the process of differential learning, association, and identification. Moreover, many advocates of the subculture of violence theory believe that the disadvantaged are socialized in an environment in which the acceptability of violence as a way of solving interpersonal conflict is intergenerationally transmitted. Therefore most advocates of this theory surmise that for members of the subculture of violence. non-violence is a counter-norm and that "violation of the expected and required violence is most likely to result in ostracism from the group." (Oliver 1994: 10)

Another description of the subculture of violence theory is provided by Miller in his article "Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency." Miller

claims that disadvantaged delinquents and criminals appear to adhere to focal concerns, or values and norms, which stress trouble, toughness, sexual conquest, manipulation, autonomy, and excitement. Even though Miller is not mainly concerned with explaining interpersonal violence, advocates of the subculture of violence theory contend that the internalization of these values and norms and "the subsequent definition of manhood in terms of these behavioral guidelines are a potent factor in the disproportionate rates of criminal violence" among the disadvantaged. (Oliver 1994:10)

Through an application of subcultural theory to the victim-offender dyad, Singer (1981) proposes that the existence of a subcultural normative system increases the possibility that an individual will alternate between the role of offender and victim. This especially occurs when the victim of a crime may become the offender because of norms that value retaliation. On the other hand, offenders may become victims since they hold values which advocate the initiation of violence to resolve conflicts. Overall, subculture of violence theories suggest that offending behavior may affect the risk of victimization and that victimization experiences may influence the occurrence of offending (Sampson and Lauritsen 1993: 31).

Similar with the concept of subculture of violence, Anderson (1992) surmises that an oppositional culture against the mainstream has formed within low-class areas due to their structurally denied situation. Within this context, some individuals invest their personal resources in the existing oppositional culture by rejecting the means for achieving status sanctioned by the mainstream while accepting the dominant culture's goals of material success, such as money, gold, clothes, sneakers, cars, etc. The youth

seem to often develop a contempt for the wider society since they perceive the society has contempt for them. In these circumstances a racist reality largely consumes their minds. Feeling that their opportunities for conventional advancement are not attainable, young people in the inner-city are drawn to gaining things they see that others have. Anderson (1992: 175) continues, "After growing up buffeted between an unreceptive conventional world and the street, they drift. Here they are easily drawn into the receptive street wisdom and physical prowess which are high valued. With these resources, they negotiate and compete fiercely for very scarce coin: respect and wealth." According to Jankowski (1995). due to the absence of material possessions amongst the underclass, respect and honor are all that remains as evidence of social status within their community. In turn, these qualities become possessions that must be defended. Honor and respect are usually used interchangeably, but they are not sociologically the same. Honor not only incorporates only one individual, but the person's entire family. Then when a family member's honor is threatened the whole family is threatened. Thus an attack on a person's honor usually results in a violent confrontation. This situation occurs among low-income people who, since they use their honor to claim status and favors within their communities, thus treating honor as a precious commodity requiring protection. Respect also plays a functional role for individuals who live in low income areas. Many inner-city residents cultivate respect since it can act as a deterrent effect against those who might victimize them. This is particularly true for gang members, however it also applies to others in the inner city communities. Individuals who form the middle class also utilize respect in the same manner, yet they have more resources to draw upon.

Capital Disinvestment and Social Structure

As described above (Hagan 1994), it is important to stress that disadvantageous social and economic processes at societal and community levels can commonly develop divergent and oppositional adaptations and formations of social and cultural capital according to particular environments. Within these disadvantaged environments are products of capital disinvestment. Processes of capital disinvestment are destructive of the conventional maturation of social and cultural capital and they usually create subcultural adaptations. In turn, these adaptations, which can be described as a form of recapitalization. are efforts to reorganize available resources, even if illicit, to accomplish planned goals. Hagan (1994) identifies three overlapping capital disinvestment processes which discourage societal and community development of conventional social capital—concentrations of poverty. residential segregation, and race-linked inequality.

Similar to certain aspects of class inequality, poverty is a consequence not only of differential allotment of economic and political privileges and resources, but of differential access to culture as well. In an industrial society "groups are stratified in terms of material assets or resources they control, the benefits and privileges they receive from these resources, the cultural experiences they have accumulated from historical and existing economic and political arrangements, and the influence they yield because of those arrangements." Correspondingly, group difference in lifestyles, norms, and values are associated with variations in access to organizational channels of privilege and influence (Wilson 1991: 1). The concept of the underclass, which is not directly synonymous with economically deprived population, incorporates certain behavioral

characteristics conflicting with mainstream values: joblessness, out-of-wedlock births, welfare dependency, school dropout, illicit activities. Moreover there is usually a spatial criterion included. The underclass is believed to reside in segregated, disadvantaged neighborhoods where social epidemics are highly concentrated, resulting in mutually reinforcing contagion effects through imitative behavior and peer pressure (Kasarda 1990).

In regard to concentrated urban poverty, one cannot imply that minorities and whites share a similar environment-- blacks are differentially exposed to different criminogenic structural conditions. For instance, the majority of poor blacks in the United States live in communities characterized by high rates of disruption, whereas poor whites, even ones from 'broken homes' dwell in areas with relative rates of family, or community, stability. This combination of urban poverty and family disruption concentrated by race is exceedingly severe. Racial differences concerning poverty and family disruption are so strong that the most severe urban contexts in which whites live are considerably better than the average context of black communities (Sampson 1987). These patterns describe what W.J. Wilson (1987) has referred to as concentration effects, i.e. the effects of living in a neighborhood that is overwhelmingly impoverished. These concentration effects, reflected in a spectrum of outcomes varying from degree of labor force attachment to social deviance, are "created by the constraints and opportunities that the residents of the inner-city neighborhoods face in terms of access to jobs and job networks, involvement in quality of schools, availability of marriageable partners, and exposure to conventional role models" (Sampson and Wilson 1995: 42).

The main concern of the concentration of poverty is that it plays a key role in further intensifying the connection between weak labor force attachment and crime. Wilson continues:

> I believe that there is a difference, on the one hand, between a jobless family whose mobility is impeded by the... economy and the larger society but nonetheless lives in an area with relatively low rate of poverty, and on the other hand, a jobless family that lives in an inner-city ghetto neighborhood that is not only influenced by these same constraints but also by the behavior of other jobless families in the neighborhood (As quoted from Hagan 1995: 76)

Thus the jobless family living in the inner-city not only confronts the difficulties of their own situation, but also the compounding effects of the environment that surrounds them.

These higher concentrations of poverty reinforce the connection between the minorities and underclass behaviors associated with poverty, such as crime, family disruption, and welfare dependency. Segregation increases and reinforces racial stereotypes in a small number of extremely visible neighborhoods, thereby hardening prejudice, making discrimination more likely and maintaining the motivation for segregation (Massey 1990). Generally, minority vulnerability stems from the fact that segregation "intensifies and magnifies any economic setback these groups suffer and builds deprivation structurally into their social and economic environments (Massey 1990: 355)." Fainstein, an American sociologist, states the case bluntly:

> Racial discrimination is omnipresent in the economy, built into the routine decisions of employers: the way they organize the division of labor; how they allocate men, women and blacks, and whites among jobs; what they decide to pay different kinds of workers; and the explicit and implicit criteria they utilize in hiring and promotion. Combined with virulent racism in housing markets, which keeps blacks concentrated in residential ghettos in central cities and increasingly in suburban jurisdiction, outright discrimination along with more subtle forms of channeling in labor

markets goes a long way towards explaining black economic disadvantage (Johnson and Oliver 1991).

The most salient consequence of concentrated poverty areas is sheer demographic collapse caused by extreme population loss and/or selective out-migration from the neighborhood. 'Hollowing out', or removal of an important 'social buffer' (Wilson 1990), of many inner city centres can lead to further deterioration and decline, which, through feedback processes may increase violence and disorder (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994). Bursik (1986: 64) suggests that the process of suburbanization may have left minorities 'stranded in high crime areas." Hagedorn further describes the negative consequences of the high turnover rates in the inner-city:

> The more successful East Los Angeles natives continuously migrate out to the suburbs, and the gang members that remain tend to be 'leftovers' from unsuccessful families and/or children of men and women who return to the barrios after a period of imprisonment (As quoted in Hagan 1994: 87)

As Clairmont (1974) describes it, the greater process which we have referred to recapitalization works this way: "minority group members, if oppressed and discriminated against, often find a mode of adjusting to their situation by performing less desirable and sometimes illegitimate services for the majority group." According to Sullivan, recapitalization is not an intergenerationally transmitted expression of cultural preferences but instead, cultural adaptations to restricted opportunities for the redistribution of wealth. As Hagan (1994) applies this concept to youth crime, these individuals have substituted investments in a mainstream culture that offer little structural and cultural investment in their futures. Their subcultural adaptations involve investments for short-term economic profit. By drawing on the analysis of Paul Willis (1977),

Sullivan states that this youth participation in crime temporarily achieves a 'penetration of their condition'. Sullivan comments on the life course consequences of these involvements:

> Over time, this penetration becomes a limitation, binding them back into (the social) structure as they age out of youth crime and accept...low wage, unstable jobs...Alternatively, some will die; others will spend much of their lives in prisons or mental health hospitals. For these young individuals, problems connected to crime are continued into adulthood.

Thus court appearances and following confinements remove these youth from any chance for closure of job referral networks. Further, incarceration might provide and place them within prison and community-based crime networks which further isolate these individuals from legitimate employment (Hagan 1994: 80, 81).

Blau and Blau (1982) contend that when social inequality is associated with an attribute such as race they create "a situation characterized by much social disorganization and prevalent latent animosities" which leads to feelings of 'diffused aggression.' The problems arising in a situation are made more salient by the physical attribute of race, "pronounced ethnic inequality in resources implies that there are great riches within in view but not within reach of many people destined to live in poverty. (119)" The products of racial inequality are socially structured and objectively accumulated subjective emotions of resentment, frustration, hopelessness, and alienation. Blau and Blau believe that these emotions consequently lead to widespread social disorganization and violent crime. Race linked inequalities, as Hagan (1994) concludes, are an expression of capital disinvestment in certain groups which mostly incorporate black Americans, with results that often are unplanned and violent.

The result of the combination of segregation. inequality, and concentration effects, such as poverty and disruptive families. leads to a dramatic deprivation of all types of capital. from physical and financial to social and cultural. For instance, the hyperghettos studied by Wacquant and Wilson (1989) in Chicago discovered the extreme of social isolation: only 1 in 10 lived in a home-owning household, and only 1 in 3 in a household with a car that runs; whereas 2 of 3 households had a female head, 1 in 2 families relied on public assistance. and more than 1 in 2 adults were without a job. Particularly when aggregated and concentrated. the absence of financial capital is connected to the loss of social capital. and "all and all then. poverty concentration has the effect of devaluing the social capital of those who live in its midst." The results are devastating because through this process "...the social ills that have long been associated with segregated poverty—violent crime, drugs, housing deterioration, family disruption, commercial blight and educational failure—have reached qualitatively different proportions and have become articulated into new configuration that endows each with a more deadly impact than before." (Hagan 1994: 77)

As mentioned beforehand, Blau and Blau claim the connection between race and lack of access to rewarding long term jobs as resulting in "prevalent disorganization" and as catalyzing "diffuse aggression", while Sampson and Wilson claim that related concentrations of poverty cause a "dislocation" and disorganization" of social control. These theoretical frameworks, as Hagan describes, share with other current sociological approaches a common concern with connecting economic and political processes of

change to the dislocations produced in community settings. Sampson and Wilson (1995)

suggest that:

> Boiled down to its essentials, then, our theoretical framework linking
> social disorganization theory with research on urban poverty and political
> economy suggests that macrosocial forces (e.g. segregation, migration,
> housing discrimination, structural transformation of the economy) interact
> with local community-level factors (e.g. residential turnover, concentrated
> poverty, family disruption) to impede social organization. This is a
> distinctly sociological viewpoint, for it focuses attention on the proximate
> structural characteristics and mediating processes of community social
> organization that help explain crime, while at the same time recognizing
> the larger historical, social, and political forces shaping local communities.

Diffuseness of aggression and dislocation or disorganization of social control and

accompanying social networks are very prominent in related community based

quantitative research (Hagan 1994: 90). In a study of 150 U.S. cities in 1980, Sampson

(1987) found that the low amount of employed black men relative to black women was

directly associated with the occurrence of families headed by females in black

communities, and that black family disruption was also significantly related to rates of

black murder and robbery, particularly by juveniles. In order to provide further

clarification of the dynamics of social disorganization, the major concerns of disorder

and its criminogenic impact on communities will be discussed.

Social Disorganization

The structural concept of community social disorganization refers to the

prevalence and inter-dependence of social networks within a community, and the amount

of collective supervision that the community focuses towards local problems. Social

disorganization is reflected in informal networks (such as the density of acquaintanceship,

intergenerational kinship ties, mutual guardianship) and formal institutions (such as organizational density, institutional stability) (Sampson 1993: 154).The foundations of social disorganization are established in what Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) refer to as the systemic model. In the systemic model, the local community is perceived as a complex system of friendship and kinship networks, with a formal and informal associational connection rooted in family life and current socialization processes (see also Bursik and Grasmick 1993). From this perspective, social organization and social disorganization are conceptualized as opposing ends of the same continuum with respect to systemic networks of community social control. When viewed in this manner, the idea of social disorganization is clearly separable not only from the processes that may cause it (e.g., inequality), but from the amount of criminal behavior that may result.

Wilson and Kelling (1982) claim that disorder undermines the processes by which communities maintain social control. In places where disorder problems become frequent and no one takes responsibility for public displays of unruly behavior, the sense of 'territoriality' among residents decreases to include only concern for their own households while untended property is open for plunder and destruction. Moreover, a neighborhood's reputation for tolerating disorder invites outside troublemakers. Since these areas offer opportunities for crime, criminals are attracted to them. Extremely disorganized neighborhoods that tolerate, or cannot effectively counter, rowdy taverns, sex and drug - oriented paraphernalia shops, public drinking, prostitution, littered streets, general dilapidation and similar disorder, will certainly be overcome by the growth of crime. Where disorder is common and surveillance capacities are minimal, criminals feel

confident that their chances of being reported to the police is low. In turn "gambling and

drinking lead to robberies and fights; prostitution and drug sales attract those who prey

upon consumers of vice." (Skogan 1990: 10) Thus, a concentration of supposedly

'victimless' disorders and unstable families can soon flood an area with serious

victimizing crime.

According to Skogan (1990), one of the major concerns of disorder is its impact

upon neighborhood decline. Most neighborhoods are considered as ideal stable systems,

sometimes for generations. At different times, this stability may be threatened, yet old

patterns persist. Analytic models of such stable systems display 'negative feedback

loops' which are mechanisms that react to destabilizing events, set things back on track,

slow change, and keep most problems within bounds. In residential neighborhoods, these

feedback mechanisms include both unconscious and conscious efforts endeavoring to

promote community renewal. Through individual initiatives and collective action,

residents of stable neighborhoods tend to find methods to fight unwanted change and

preserve their community's character (Skogan 1990:11). However, when stabilizing

mechanisms fail, other forces are unleashed which accelerate further changes. These

changes do not necessarily always increase crime or lower the quality of life in these areas

(e.g. gentrification). Yet when changes go wrong, neighborhoods can decline quickly.

Once a community enters into the cycle of decline, feedback processes instantly are

engaged. The problems that emerge appear to be self generative and feed upon

themselves—disorder begets more disorder. Wilson and Kelling (1982: 31) provide an

example:

> (I)f a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken...(O)ne unrepaired broken window is a signal to others that no one cares, so breaking more windows costs nothing. (It has always been fun.)... Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun and plunder...

Disorder results in feelings of anger and demoralization by the residents. Anger arises from being crowded out of community life. People living in disordered neighborhoods find it "uncomfortable or even dangerous to be in parks, in shopping areas. or even on the streets near their homes. This seems unfair, and they are indignant about it." Residents also realize the demoralization in others. Individuals interviewed by Skogan frequently noted that 'no one cares,' and displayed a certain degree of hopelessness about their situation. These people were clearly frustrated by their apparent inability to do anything against the mounting disorder (Skogan 1990: 47).

Fear is also a frequent response to social disorder, as reported by Skogan (1990). People who conduct themselves in a disorderly manner in public are considered unpredictable by everyday standards, and some are potentially violent—"those seemingly crazed by drugs or drink might do anything." Predators may dwell in abandoned buildings. corner gangs can be menacing, particularly for women and the elderly. Another reason for fear is that some disorder develops from inter-group conflict which has the potential for violence. At times, this conflict is racial, between generations, homeowners and renters, landlords and tenants, or others with conflicting economic interests. Furthermore. parents fear the possibility of themselves and their children possibly being victims of violence. targets of drug pushers, or being blatantly exposed to commercial sex and public drinking (Skogan 1990: 47).

Since people associate visible physical decay and social disruption with crime, feelings of fear are consequently aroused. Similar to many noticeable social disorders, signs of physical decay are considered as environmental cues for crime. Besides indicating the presence of crime, disorder also alludes to the decay of community self-controls which protect residents and visitors. A witness provides an example: "There was a mother less than ten feet away, and one of her kids walks up to an old woman. There was an old woman working in the front yard and the kid walks up to her, and – this is where the sidewalk is higher than the yard—the kid proceeds to pee on the old lady.(Skogan 1990: 48)" Thus if an area loses its ability to solve even the most seemingly small problems, its overall character becomes suspect. Lewis and Salem (1986) describe the importance of moral reliability from the perspective the residents:

> When the moral reliability of a community dissolves, local residents are no longer sure that the behavior of their neighbors will conform to what in the past were uniformly acceptable standards, and fear of crime appears... Because of the heterogeneity of the population, city life puts a premium on moral reliability. City dwellers learn to distinguish between those they can trust and those they cannot. The trustworthy, those who share our values, serve as the building blocks of our lives, while the untrustworthy are to be avoided. Thus people can be relied on to the extent that they share expectations about each other's behavior and can be disciplined when those expectations are violated. Those people whose behavior is not subjected to the moral order are dangerous both because they cannot be relied upon and because they will not accept discipline (Skogan 1990: 48).

Therefore, even though disorders are not by themselves life-threatening, fear is a rational reaction to them.

Finally, disorder also has implications for the future of a neighborhood through its impact on non-residents or future investors, since it stigmatizes both the location and the people who live there. Confidence is hardly "bolstered by the spread of boarded-up

buildings, burned-out store fronts, poorly maintained homes and lawns, garbage spilling out of waste cans, and junk and trash strewn about" (Skogan 1990: 49). To the further detriment of the community, these areas will not attract shoppers or potential employers. Basically, when things begin to deteriorate, the economic factors that underlie neighborhood stability can also 'take a turn for the worse.'

Skogan (1986) also provides some insightful points concerning 'feedback' processes which may further increase levels of crime: 1) physical and psychological withdrawal from community life, 2) weakening of the informal social control processes which inhibit crime, 3) a decline in the organizational life and mobilization capacity of the neighborhood, 4) deteriorating business conditions, 5) the importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance, and 6) further dramatic changes in the composition of the population. For instance, to the degree that people avoid their neighbors and local facilities due to fear of violence, fewer opportunities exist for friendship networks and neighborhood organizations to form. As Skogan reminds us, "fear does not stimulate participation in collective efforts to act against crime; rather, it often has the effect of undermining commitment to an area and interest in participation." For instance, predatory street violence is usually accompanied by commercial decline and business relocation. Also, the existence of violence itself may lead to the weakening of friendship bonds, informal social control, and the mobilization capacity of communities (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994: 76).

A key concern is the role of ecological proximity in crime and disorder. Based on a study conducted by Fagan et al. (1987), the correlation between victimization and

offending was found to be spurious, that is, a function of the locations in which victim and offenders live. Basically, they maintain that the link between victimization and offending may be confounded "by the convergence of correlates of criminal events and offenders in urban areas." For instance, areas of low-income, where the offender pool is large, can increase victimization risk, regardless of an individual's propensity to engage in crime. Even though they did not investigate the independent effect of offending on victimization, Fagan et al (1987) discovered that violent victimization was significantly associated with drinking problems, peer delinquency, and neighborhood family violence. In particular, this study reveals that controlling for ecological proximity to violence may decrease the individual-level relationship between offending and victimization (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994).

Similarly, the 'principle of homogamy' in lifestyle theory claims that people have a higher likelihood to be victimized when they disproportionately interact with offenders. Even though this concept is defined in individual level terms, it also has relevance at the community level. Garofalo (1987) maintains in a recent revision of lifestyle theory that the structural constraint of residential proximity to criminal behavior has a direct effect on victimization that is unmediated by individual lifestyle. Specifically, Garofalo (1987) contends that constraints of the housing market largely determine where people live. Even though "individual lifestyles may thus predict variations in victimization within a given environment, the base level of risk that they face is 'heightened by sheer proximity to – and hence exposure to – potential offenders.'" A crucial point, however, is that for serious offenses such as homicide and aggravated assault, offenders tend to commit these

offenses relatively close to their home. Thus areas of high violent crimes have high numbers of offenders residing in these disorganized locations (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994: 41, 47).

Furthermore, Sampson (1987) has illustrated that the risk of violent victimization by strangers is significantly and positively associated with neighborhood levels of family disruption, percent of single female households, and residential mobility (when age, marital status, sex, and neighborhood socio-economic status and unemployment rates are controlled). Therefore, regardless of individual - level factors stressed in past research, the data suggests that community (and presumably situational) contexts of anonymity correlates (e.g., single-person households) directly increase the occurrence of stranger violence (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994: 42).

The decaying forces of physical and social disorganization flourishing in disadvantaged neighborhoods are further accelerated by factors which increase the occurrence of violent stranger victimization. Large offender populations, family disruption, single female households and residential mobility are some of many identified contributors of increasing the probability of high victimization rates in concentrated poverty areas. The downward spiral of decay also slowly dismembers social cohesion and control especially within families, thereby further facilitating social disorganization.

Social Cohesion and Control

A related dimension of social organization is social cohesion. Similar to friendship networks or organizational participation, social cohesion is a "macro-level

concept that has a parallel at the individual level in the form of estrangement and alienation (or 'anomie')." However, " the cohesion of the social order is not merely the aggregation of individual properties.(Sampson 1993: 155)" For instance, the individual experience of alienation and isolation is ideologically different from community level variations in the amount of people who are active in helping behavior. Ultimately, social cohesion refers to the extent to which communities have the ability to maintain homeostatic moral and social order. Further. social cohesion relates to the dimension of moral or social integration more so than to networks of affiliation and association.

Similar to social disorganization. cohesion can be best conceptualized as a theoretical continuum. The cohesive end of the model would represent communities which are characterized by helping/caring functions, mutual guardianship and trust. and collective socialization of the young. On the other end , disintegration would be reflected in social cleavages that divide a community (e.g., racial, ethnic), social disorder and predatory morality (e.g. hustling, conning), alienation (mutual distrust and estrangement). disengagement from political participation, and public incivilities which signals the decline of cohesion. Even the disintegration of commercial trust which may be illustrated through prohibitive lending practices and symbolic and real barriers between businesses and residents (e.g., 'a city of iron gates') may indicate the social disintegration of a community (Sampson 1993: 155).

Sampson and Laub (1993) conceptualize social control as the "capacity of a social group to regulate itself according to desired principles and values, and hence to make norms and rules effective." They further stress that the role of "informal social controls

that emerge from the role reciprocities and structure of interpersonal bonds linking

members of society to one another and to wider social institutions such as work, family,

and school. (18)" Overall, they claimed that delinquency flows from the social processes

of the family. school, and peers. Low amounts of parental supervision, inconsistent.

threatening, and harsh discipline, and weak parental attachment are strongly and directly

related to delinquency. Furthermore, independent of family processes, school attachment

has great negative effects on delinquency. In addition. attachment to delinquent peers has

a significant positive effect on delinquency regardless of family and school process. In

spite of the finding on peer influence, subsequent analyses of delinquent siblings and

attachment to peers reveals that family and school processes seems most important in the

causal chain. Essentially. Sampson and Laub (1993) find that when "bonds linking youth

to society—whether through family or school—are weakened. the probability of

delinquency is increased. Negative structural conditions (such as poverty or family

disruption) also affect delinquency, but is largely indirect through family and school

process variables. (247)"

Families and Crime

Structural conditions indirectly set the stage for deviance by providing low quality

schooling and concentrations of single female households. Through the concentrations of

poor single female households, it can be stated that there would be large amounts of

families with low amounts of parental supervision, inconsistent, threatening, and harsh

discipline, and weak parental attachment thereby creating increased amounts of juvenile

delinquency in these areas. Not only are disadvantaged areas marred by individual broken

bonds with the external social environment, the basic supportive institution of the family is also fading.

When considering the interaction between families and crime, criminologists have the tendency to mirror developmental theorists in defining childrearing as a dyadic or interpersonal activity which occurs within individual families. Even though this concept is not incorrect, it is incomplete and "ignores the fact that parenting styles are an adaptation to considerations outside the household, especially the social disorganization of the community (Furstenberg 1993)." Thus central to the integration of families and community is the accumulation, or investment, of social capital (Sampson 1993: 157).

One of the most essential parts is the connectedness of social networks among family and children in the community developing social capital. Involving a system of parents and children, communities that are characterized as a set of obligations, expectations, and social networks joining the adults are better able to facilitate the control and supervision of children. This concept assists us to understand that parent-child relations are not 'just under the roof'. For instance, when closure (connectedness) occurs through a child to two adults whose association transcends the household (such as friendship, work related acquaintances) the adults have the opportunity to "observe the child's actions in different circumstances, talk to each other about the child, compare notes, establish norms" (Sampson 1993: 158). The type of relation can also offer reinforcement for disciplining the child, as expressed in communities where parents have dense networks and high stability to assume responsibility for the supervision of all youths.

Closure of community networks can offer the child norms and sanctions which could not be instilled by a single adult alone, or even married-couple families in isolation (Sampson 1993: 158). However, disadvantaged areas have large numbers of female headed households which lowers social capital and social control within the community. It is not that single female householders do not have the ability to raise children properly, it is the combined external concentration effects of poverty, structural inequality and crime which further exacerbates social disorganization. Through these external concentration effects parenting skills are more difficult to implement due to the community's overall decay of supportive networks (e.g. neighbors, positive role models) and social control.

Conclusion

The explanations above lead to a theoretical distinction, outlined by Sampson (1993: 159). between social capital at the individual and community levels. At the individual level, social capital affects informal social controls (e.g., monitoring and supervision, intergenerational ties) exhibited by families. The "analog at the community level is aggregate patterns of informal social control and cohesion (e.g., collective supervision, neighborhood monitoring) found in areas of high social organization." By integrating social disorganization theory with literature concerning delinquency, social capital. and family management, Sampson develops two sets of conclusions: (1) at the macro level (community) the "effect of structural disadvantage and concentrated urban poverty on delinquency rates is accounted for by intervening dimensions of social disorganization" and; (2) based at the micro level (individual), both " neighborhood

social cohesion and family social capital inhibit delinquent outcomes independent of individual-level constructs and family background (e.g. income, broken homes)." More specifically, social cohesion exhibits indirect contextual effects on the controls of delinquency by facilitating social capital available to families—especially the establishment of adult-child-peer networks and effective parent supervision. (Sampson and Lauritsen 1993: 137)

The theoretical framework of combining social disorganization theory with social capital enables one to conceptualize the effects of community family structure and crime. It is well established in literature that, in individual-level research, non-intact homes do not have much influence upon delinquency. Yet the structure of family relationships in a community may have essential contextual or threshold influences. For instance, high levels of disruptive families in an area may facilitate crime or may assist crime by lowering community networks of informal social control, such as taking notice of strangers, watching neighbor's properties, supervising youth activities, intervening in local disturbances.

Individuals are not born equal. Poverty drains a family's assets and exploits its vulnerabilities with terrible human consequences. It contributes to familial disintegration and dislocation, leaving a legacy of broken homes and emotional instability among its young, defenseless victims. Lack of human and social capital created by structural barriers undeniably leads to poverty—the barometer of developing social inequalities. Inequalities producing deprivation, marginalization, isolation, and exploitation place millions at risk of social and economic disadvantage throughout their lives. Families who, by virtue of their

economic status, command wealth and income, endow their children with material and cultural advantages that strongly influence their life opportunities. Poor children begin their life with many disadvantages, and the difficult quality of life in which they grow make them highly vulnerable in a variety of ways: where they live, what they eat, their education, and their physical and mental health (Kitchen et al. 1991).

Within the deprived neighbourhood environment of the underclass, individuals are surrounded by inequality and despair leading to frustration. Being disadvantaged minimizes the selection of the place of residence, thereby creating areas concentrated with families facing similar adversities associated with poverty (e.g., domestic violence, social disorganization, crime). Due to the exacerbating concentration effects and capital disinvestment within these disadvantaged communities, there is a lack of symbiotic (e.g., family cohesion) and commensalistic (lack of assistance from others e.g., collective supervision of children) interdependence. The lack of interdependence within the community, greatly diminishes the success of its physical and social environment and other routes must be created. Since the functionality of the disadvantaged is distorted due to the lack of access to the mainstream, the healthy competition which develops one's societal niche within the environment is also withdrawn. Within these disadvantaged communities, survival is often a frustrating struggle and families must adapt to the meager circumstances and opportunities that they encounter. Thus through collective subcultural adaptations to the environment established by structural inequality (e.g. lack of human/social capital, capital disinvestment), these individuals develop methods which redefine success. This street-oriented subculture is often violent, however it reconstructs the pathways of social, cultural

and human capital accumulation-- the thriving underground economy offers disadvantaged youth a mixture of success, along with a certain thrill, power and prestige. In some cases, structurally confined conditions also mutate frustration into violence—the extreme social decaying component of a neighbourhood.

Poverty, crime, domestic violence, family disorganization and antisocial behavior are all powerful decaying forces. Interpersonal trust and moral cohesion which once existed are undermined by an atmosphere of distrust, alienation, fear, and as crime finally permeates the area, further deteriorating social organization. Rampant criminal activity in a neighborhood is the ultimate accelerating factor of complete physical and psychological withdrawal from community life, deteriorated informal social control processes, and decline in organizational life which all lead to complete societal break down.

Based on the human ecology perspective of the structure of communities, patterns of residential inequality artificially create social isolation and ecological concentration effects of the truly disadvantaged in Canada and United States. Within this setting, structural inequality distorts the accumulation of human capital, social capital, and capital investment. Through structural distortion of capital accumulation, negative subcultural adaptations develop, social organization and social cohesion disintegrate, in turn, violence increases. This has the combined effect of further perpetuating the condition of the truly disadvantage and subordinate groups from integration into the mainstream of society.

Before we determine the linkages between crime, concentrated poverty, and structural inequality within the disadvantaged and subordinate groups, the ideological

elements of both nations must be considered. One area of extreme diversity in both countries are the patterns of values, beliefs, assumptions and expectations concerning our social world, including the nature of society and human nature, the value of the individual relative to the collective, the meaning of liberty and equality—the entire culture of our lives. These concepts of dominant ideology are utilized to maintain social organization within a country. According to many authorities (Stivers 1994; Yankelovich 1994; Messner and Rosenfeld 1994; Poponoe 1994; Lipset 1990), the apparent high volume of street crime, the erosion of civility, loss of respect of authority, increased hedonism, and the extinction of the concern for the commonwealth all contribute to the ideological deterioration of the social fabric of society. Through a discussion of each nation's concepts of: each other; monetary success; individualism/collectivism; pursuit of happiness; morality; and ethnic tolerance, a clearer perception of how each country creates and maintains its social fabric will be illustrated.

Chapter 2: Cross- National Comparisons

Ideology is ideas or representations which may be utilized to maintain social organization. Within this concept of social reality, wealth and poverty are real conditions, as are power and lack of it. There are other methods by which the population organizes itself which are not formally organized institutions, such as interest groups, classes. The dominant ideology within a country creates the rules of thumb, it is the foundation that holds institutions together, "the medium that allows members of the population to interact, predict events, understand their roles, perform adequately, and perhaps above all, strive to achieve the kinds of goals most appropriate to the maintenance of any particular social organization. (Marchak 2:1988)"

According to Althusser, ideology refers to the "imagery relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence (Burke 1993: 95)." Seen through the perspective of Althusser's model, ideology is a system of social reality in its own right—it has a considerable amount of autonomy and can affect areas of social structure. Ideology is the structure of thought and consciousness in which one thinks, acts, and experiences the world and oneself. 'Ideological state apparatuses' including religion, identity, law etc., develop and reproduce values, beliefs and ideas which form our culture. Ideology operates by shaping the social identities of individuals, by forming them (Billington et al. 1992: 24).

Through ideological comparison of United States and Canada, the different aspects of conventional wisdom identified may play an integral part in explaining the different levels of decay in social organization and government reaction to social problems. The discussion   of   each   nation's   concepts   of: each   other;   monetary   success;

individualism/collectivism; pursuit of happiness; religion; and ethnic tolerance, will provide

a clearer perception of how each nation diversely react to crime.

National Differences in self-identity

As Northrop Frye (1987) claims, Americans have been conditioned since infancy

to think of themselves as citizens of one of the world's great super power in the pursuit of

life, liberty, and happiness. Whereas Canadians are conditioned from infancy to think of

themselves as citizens of a country of uncertain identity, a confusing past, and a

hazardous future whose government's defined objectives are peace, order and good

government. Fulfilling the objective of order in Canada and of liberty in the United States

has had consequences for both. As Pierre Berton, a popular Canadian writer, indicates:

> The other side of the coin of order and security is authority. We've
> always accepted more governmental control over our lives than
> [Americans] have-- and fewer civil liberties...[But] the other side of the
> coin of liberty is license, sometimes anarchy. It seems to us
> that...Americans have been more willing to suffer violence in...[their lives
> than we have for the sake of individual freedom. (Lipset 1990: 44)

Throughout history, Americans have defied authority, demanded their rights, and

favoured weak government, whereas Canadians have complained less, been less

aggressive, and desired a solid paternalistic government. Reported in a 1930 study, the

prevailing stereotype of Americans in Canada depicts the American as boastful, excitable.

materialistic, inclined to law-breaking and divorce, and very ignorant of Canada (Dickey

1964). Even though this study was conducted over 60 years ago the same sentiments can

be still found today. In contrast, Berton's conclusions describe Canadians as law-abiding,

deferential toward authority, cautious, prudent, elitist, moralistic, tolerant of ethnic

differences, cool unemotional and solemn. Canadians are constantly exposed to this self-

image to the extent that it creates a set of organizing principles to which they are socialized. A variety of compiled descriptions by Lipset (1990: 45) of Canadian - United States comparisons by leading Canadians, as well as expatriates, provide insight into each nation's character. Novelist Margaret Atwood states, "Americans love success, worship success," while Canadians are suspicious of success." Journalist Peter Newman emphasized that "Canadians defer to authority," that "we are more laid back up here. there is not the push and drive you see down in the States."

Sidney Gruson of the New York Times commented, "My Canadian background made me look on crises with less heat than if I were an American." Sondra Gottlieb, wife of a past ambassador of the United States, noted, "Canadians have the image of moderateness...They are solid, reliable, decent...[but] a little bit dull." Further, Pierre Berton told his viewers, "We don't have the superpatriotism you see south of the border. We don't express ourselves emotionally. We are more phlegmatic than the Americans." On the contrary, polls conducted by Gallup in 1991 revealed surprising high rates of patriotism from both countries-- 89 percent of Canadians were very proud to be Canadian compared to the 96 percent Americans proud of their country. Despite the Americans' high amount of pride for their own country, they don't come out to vote, believe in their health care system, and have little confidence in most of their institutions (Appendix 1, Table 2).

Further, in a 1989 Maclean's Decima survey Canadians and Americans were asked to describe each other by using one word (Appendix 1, Table 3). The three most popular words used by Canadians to describe Americans were "snobs" (11 percent),

"good" (9 percent), and "friendly" (8 percent). In contrast, Americans chose "friendly"

(28 percent), "nice" (9 percent), and "neighbours" (6 percent). Further the trait which

Canadians liked least about Americans was their "superior attitude" (25 percent), whereas

the largest group of Americans could not think of anything they did not like about

Canadians (37 percent).

Most Americans know little about Canada—only 16 percent of Americans can

locate Canada's national capital on the map and the other half probably still think that

most Canadians live in igloos. Drawn from a 1992 Gallup survey, 93 percent of

Canadians could correctly name George Bush as the president of the United States,

whereas only 13 percent of Americans could name Brian Mulroney as the Prime Minister

of Canada, even though he had occupied that office for six and one-half years. Almost the

identical results were found for identifying the other country's capital and being aware

that Canada is United States largest trading partner. Furthermore while 8 in 10 Canadians

were aware of the North American Free Trade Agreement—only half of Americans were

aware. Margaret Atwood has made the point that the world's longest undefended border

should be replaced by a more accurate metaphor—the world's longest one-way mirror.

Canadians continually press their noses to the glass, observing with equal parts of

amazement, admiration and outrage at the antics of the great republic, while Americans

remain serenely oblivious to everyone but themselves (Axworthy 1987: xi).

Due to the dominating presence of the United States, Dickey (1967) crassly

claims: "a Canadian is more apt to know the States well than an American is to know

Canada well. Thus an American writing to Americans about Canada may appear to

Canadians to be writing for ignoramuses; he is likely to display his ignorance at some point. No American should ever write about Canada, just as no English Canadian should write about French Canada; not if he wants to come out with a whole hide. The underdog has always the sharper tongue; lacking other weapons he needs it. (p.9)"

Axworthy (1987) described that one of the essential characteristics of every Canadian is a "fierce ambivalence, one might almost say a schizophrenia, about the United States." However, these attitudes may have been cultivated by Americans indifference to 'harmless' and 'boring' Canada. Axworthy (1987: x) tells of one account in 1985 which described American's disinterest or inattention to Canada:

> I have left public life in Ottawa to take up an Harvard appointment as the visiting Mackenzie King professor of Canadian Studies. I was soon introduced to that famous local institution, the Cambridge dinner party. This one was an especially international affair and the hostess made animated conversation with each guest in turn. The conversational juices flowed from terrorism in Iran to the Royal Family in Britain to auto parts in South Korea. Finally the spotlight shone on me.
> "And where are you from?" she inquired eagerly.
> "Canada," I replied in a cheerful voice.
> But a painful silence enveloped the crowd. Spirits sank. Foreheads knotted as people tried desperately to find some interesting connection. The hostess finally blurting out, "Oh, yes, you're clean and quiet like North Dakota, aren't you?" It was with relief that the table turned to something more palatable, such as human rights violations in Guatemala.

Due to its dominating presence, every society is influenced by the ebb and flow of American politics, only Canada owes its very existence to a conscious rejection of the American Dream historically and culturally-- without the United States to rebel against there would be no Canada. As Frank Underhill stated, Canadians are the world's oldest continuing anti-Americans. Right from the beginning, starting from the loyalists defeated leaving after the American Revolution to form British North America, the fate of Canada

has been linked inextricably with the course of American politics (Axworthy 1987). An

example of Canadians' beliefs about Americans and themselves illustrates the way

northerners justified themselves:

> The typical American, in Canadian eyes at least, was brash and arrogant,
> with little respect for law and order and even less respect for the sanctity
> of marriage. This tells us little of what Americans were really like but it
> tell us a great deal of what the Canadians think of themselves...
>   It is noteworthy that the qualities which seemed to distinguish
> Canadians-- and to reveal their superiority-- were qualities which clearly
> reflected conservative attitudes. The emphasis was on respect for
> traditional institutions...Rugged individualism was not necessarily seen as
> a sin but it was closely tempered by the values associated with...social
> conformity...
>   The subject matter in Canadian schools...suggested a respect for
> inherited traditions...[The American myth of a new and unfettered society
> in the new world never appeared in the Canadian textbooks. (Lipset 1990:
> 54)

Although Canada resembles America in economic structure, they continue to

differ along the lines that flow from their distinctive traditions. According to Lipset

(1990), the changes in the two nations "resemble movement along railway tracks on

parallel lines; the gap between them remains, even though the movement in behaviour

and values over time has been enormous' (Lipset 1990: 37). In comparison to Great

Britain and much of Europe, Canada and the United States share the same values, yet in

Canada they are kept more tentatively. Even though "equality of respect and of

achievement are valued in both societies, in Canada the emphasis has been somewhat less

than in the United States, and therefore the contrast remains one of degree"(Lipset 1990:

4). Canada's closer ties to its European origins have assisted in perpetuating elements of

an older set of beliefs and more conservative behaviour. However the United States still

is considered to be more religious, more patriotic, more populist and anti-elitist, more

dedicated to higher education for the majority and accordingly to meritocracy, more

socially egalitarian. In terms of public effort, benefits and employment, it remains the

least statist western country. Cross national polls indicate that Americans favour large

welfare programs and government assistance within the economy less than Canadians and

Europeans. On the other hand, Americans seem to favour private efforts in welfare as in

industry: they lead the world in philanthropic giving.

Morality

According to Lipset (1990: 77), Americans are described as utopian moralists who

are determined to "institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and to eliminate wicked

institutions and practices." They seem to interpret social and political conflicts as

morality plays, as battles between God and Satan, so that compromise is practically

inconceivable. Many attributes and functions of the church can be found in their nation

and its creed. These characteristics are reflected in the American 'civic religion,' which

has offered "a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life including the

political sphere." The United States is held as the new Israel. "Europe is Egypt; America

the promised land. God has led his people to establish a new sort of social order that shall

be a light unto all nations" (Lipset 1990: 78).

Utopian orientation in the United States greatly influences the way the country

interprets events and solves problems. Thus if the country is perceived as slipping away

from the controlling obligations of the covenant, it is viewed as on the road to hell. The

need to mitigate a sense of personal responsibility for such failings has made Americans

principally inclined to support movements for the eradication of evil-- if necessary, by violent and illegal means. An excellent example of America's moralistic reactions can be illustrated in their high rates of incarceration which can be attributed to their exceedingly harsh treatment of people convicted of lesser crimes (war on drugs).

On the other hand, Canadian religion, dominated by church (Anglican and Catholic) and ecumenical (United Church) traditions, does not emphasize moralism. Reginald Bibby explains that variations between these countries are respective to their revolutions. Canada has been moulded by its gradual, non-violent separation from Britain and its ability to create agreements among disparate cultures rather than assimilate them into one, whereas Americans defiantly severed their connection with England and set out to rebuild a distinctive nation. Their 'charter myth' included the idea that their country had been founded by God to give leadership to the world. As John Conway adds, " Canada has...lacked a sense of mission of divinely inspired singularity, which has been part of the American consciousness since the time of John Winthrop. (Lipset 1990: 79)" These variations illustrate one of the basics of the American and Canadian perspectives. Americans are more than likely to understand conflicts as reflecting moral concerns. Canadian activities are affected by the ideology of the permanent imperfection of man, of Original Sin which undermines the possibility of instigating a crusade against an immoral enemy, an 'evil empire.'

Americans appear to dwell upon the punitive aspects of religion. Almost double the number of Americans surveyed believe in the devil and in hell than do Canadians. This preoccupation with the extremes of good and evil makes it difficult for Americans to

practise the art of compromise and cooperation (Sauve 1994). Furthermore, Canadians appear to have more acceptance of alternative ways of thinking and behaving, especially concerning issues of euthanasia, gays in the military, premarital sex, and sexual freedom in general. Despite these differences, Canadians and Americans emphasize importance upon family values and the reintegration of more traditional values (Appendix 1, Tables 4, 5, 6).

Success

No other nation displays as much vigour in socio-political hopes, expectations, and desires of its people as the United States. Creating the basis of the public's high expectations and dreams, the Declaration of Independence illustrates ideals which are rooted, directly or indirectly, in the American cultural phenomena:

> We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness (Saney 1986: 48).

Continually the topic in all facets of life, ranging from the media to the church, these concepts are embedded into the American psyche and influence the way the average citizen interprets and reacts to reality. Of course, America is not an Utopia -- the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is not accessible to all. Some individuals, or groups, are confronted by deep-rooted disadvantages which make the attainment of the enumerated "unalienable" rights extremely hard. However, the expression of these goals in various official documents has been no idle effort-- these ideals create the outer boundaries of people's hopes and expectations. As a European observer comments:

America...has the most explicitly expressed system of general ideals in

reference to human interrelations. This body of ideals is more widely understood and appreciated than similar ideals are anywhere else. The American Creed is not merely-- as in some other countries-- the implicit background of the nation's political and judicial order as it functions...These principles of social ethics have been hammered into easily remembered formula. All means of intellectual communication are utilized to stamp them into everybody's mind. The schools teach them, the churches preach them. The courts pronounce their judicial decisions in their terms (Saney 1986: 49).

The free enterprise system in America flourishes on the ability and willingness of people to purchase and consume products constructed by various companies. In several other societies the highest aspiration is to provide only the basic needs for their families. Yet in America, many social needs have supplemented the basic biological requirements-- their satisfaction is believed to be necessary, almost like a legal right. The public's strong and enduring desire to consume is so essential for the persistence of the economic system that the appetite for consumption for novel products must often be "whetted by various means and the desire artificially created and intensified." The American socio-economic system focuses upon creating new products and the response of the public is to crave more advanced products. It appears that the nonfulfillment of not being able to purchase affluent materials can generate frustration. The cultural emphasis in America on individual rights and liberties in the absence of corresponding duties and responsibilities, the belief in free expression, and the strong urge to achieve success can lead to deviant and criminal behaviour (Saney 1986: 52). Writing generally, Margaret Atwood claims:

> Americans worship success, Canadians find it slightly in bad taste...One could sum up the respective stances by saying the typical American is...unthinkingly and breezily aggressive and the Canadian...peevishly and hesitantly defensive. (Lipset 1990:121)

Individualism

Americans truly believe in the folk ideology of the Protestant work ethic and a

naive faith in individualism. According to Sniderman and Hagen, individualism is "a

bedrock belief in the ethic of self-reliance." From this ethic "(I)ndividuals must take care

of themselves. They must not pretend to be victims of circumstance, or ask for special

favours, in an effort to get others to do for them what they should do for themselves...." In

their words the authors continue that individualism as an "ungenerous idea (since) it

refuses to acknowledge that some are in fact handicapped and must overcome obstacles

that are not of their making and that others do not face. In this sense the individualist

lacks empathy for those disadvantaged by race or by poverty or by gender..." Further

"there is something extraordinary... about the individualists' understanding of equal

opportunity." They show surprise that people believe in the Protestant work ethic and

claim that this occurs because they do not understand the problems certain people face.

Sniderman and Hagen continue that "so far as the individualist can make out...everyone

can get ahead, regardless of whether he or she is black, female, or poor." (Roth 1994:

129) James Curtis and Ronald Lambert revealed that Canadians are more likely than

Americans to believe that the government should take responsibility for the needy. It was

also found that Canadians were less inclined to contribute resources to charity. As a study

by the Canadian Task Force reports:

> Corporate giving in the United states as a percentage of pretax income has
> been roughly double the level in Canada over the past decade, and is now
> close to three times the current level in Canada...The different levels of
> corporate giving...are dramatic enough to suggest that fundamental cultural
> and attitudinal forces may be at work which by their very nature will
> permit change in Canadian giving habits to come very slowly. It may well

be that the tradition of private support for worthy endeavours is far more deeply imbedded in the American psyche than in the Canadian. We Canadians appear to rely more on government than on voluntary efforts to finance such causes. (Lipset 1990: 143)

The willingness to donate considerable amounts to charity in America is unmatched by the rich in other nations. Authorities on philanthropy in the U. S. stress that the underlining reason for private charity is sustained by American individualistic ideology and suspicion of government control.

United States is well known to be the world's most individualistic society. Presently, America displays all the symptoms of an overly individualistic society with "failing families, rising crime, declining interpersonal and political trust, growing personal and corporate greed, deteriorating communities, and increasing confusion over moral issues." Apparently, the average American citizen has become more fearful, anxious, and unsettled. Patience has become shorter, life's small goals less frequent, and the "emotional feel of life less secure." Poponoe contends that these trends are ingredients for social disaster. The strong determination for self-fulfilment, when brought to the extreme, leads not to "personal happiness and freedom, but to social breakdown and individual anguish. (Poponoe 1994: 90).

Poponoe (1994) further elaborates that societies which are individualistic also tend to have high rates of individual deviance, juvenile deviance and crime, loneliness, depression, suicide, and social alienation. Within the United States, a 'radical' or 'expressive' individualism which is devoted to 'self-aggrandizement' has developed and become apparent. In this type of individualism people tend to be narcissistic, hedonistic, and self-oriented, displaying concern for groups and for the commonwealth only as far as

these matters directly affect their own well-being. Consequently, the traditional collectivities which make up civil society, neighbourhoods, local communities, voluntary associations, religious organizations, become weakened. In brief, individualistic societies have a larger population of free and independent citizens, yet a weaker social order. For instance, "there is far more social disorder in the United States... than in the relatively more collectivist nations of northwestern Europe, and more disorder in European nations than in the still more collectivist societies of East Asia. (84)"

As mentioned before, America's main problem is cultural disintegration, the decaying of the ties that bind. The values of individualism and self-fulfilment have become too overpowering-- Americans have become an 'over-optioned society'. Poponoe states that two factors can be attributed to generating over-individualistic breakdown in United States: extreme cultural heterogeneity and great personal wealth. Of all the developed nations, the United States is considered to be the most culturally heterogeneous and intricate on basically all measures. Like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the U. S. was a nation formed by immigrants from various European countries. Yet two areas of cultural complexity present in the United States are unique among advanced nations: close proximity to the third world nations of Latin America and the large presence of African Americans. America was a grand social experiment of cultural pluralism enriching the country's life. However, over time the deteriorating of the sense of common culture and national identity, and increasing trends of radical individualism have also been fostered. When people cannot decide what values they share, and which social authorities they should respect, they naturally fall back on more individualistic

perspectives and lifestyles" (Poponoe 1994: 90).

Secondly, personal wealth in the United States is high since more wealth remains in private hands-- America ranks the lowest among developed nations, for instance in government receipts as a percentage of gross domestic product. Such high personal wealth increases the drive to pursue individualistic, privatized lifestyles, apart from the community-- "Through advocating a social structure in which consumer choice and pleasurable consumption are the highest values, through promoting high rates of mobility, a gambler's mentality, income inequality, and materialism, the market is certainly no friend of civil society (Poponoe 1994: 92)."

David Poponoe attempted to account for the severe urban crisis in America through comparison of higher quality of life in certain European nations and Canada. After the comparison, he found that the differences in fewer slums, less poverty, and relative absence of urban sprawl displayed in the compared countries could not be explained by reference to an American underclass or to greater social heterogeneity. Thus he attributed the differences to 'political culture'. In comparison with the selected European countries and Canada, the United States reflected a much "weaker sense of collective responsibility, and... an exaggerated sense of personal liberty, making it one of the most anti-government of all advanced societies." Poponoe claimed that these cultural attitudes influence the quality of urban life, meaning:

> the lack of community planning at all levels, the political justification of welfare payments not on humanitarian but on economic grounds, the aversion towards public housing and the inadequate system of public transportation. (Lipset 1990: 220)

The 'libertarian impulse' suggest that Americans overlook

> those societies which have the most successful cities...are at the same time, compared with the United States, socially coercive societies. They do not provide their citizens the range of personal liberties and private property rights found in America. (Lipset 1990: 220)

Thus America basically lacks the ideological sources, found in any highly free-enterprised society as Switzerland, required to solve its urban crisis or underclass.

Ethnic Tolerance

Canadian and American conflicting orientations towards minority cultures are unmistakably reflected in the mosaic and melting pot ideologies. The cultural mosaic has become an important cultural and political symbol for Canadians. One of the concepts of the mosaic is that minority groups are encouraged to maintain their cultural distinctiveness, whereas minority groups in America are pressured to abandon their traditional cultures and 'melt' into the broader society (Reitz and Breton 1994: 5). Thus, if American minorities are unable to master the mainstream culture they are at a distinct disadvantage (Grove 1985: 232). Basically, Canadians exhibit tolerance for diversity and even favour it. Consequently, minority groups in Canada "more freely participate in traditional cultural practices, and maintain ethnic community institutions and activities, than do minority groups in United States. (Reitz and Breton 1994: 5)" Arthur Davies elaborates:

> (E)thnic and regional difference...have been more generally accepted, more legitimized (in Canada) than they have been in our southern neighbour. There has not been as much pressure in Canada for "assimilation" as there has been in the United States...Hutterite communities unquestionably are granted more autonomy in Canada than in the United States. Likewise, the Indians of Canada, however rudely they were shunted into reservations, were seldom treated with such overt coercion as were the American Indians. (Lipset 1990: 174)

The maintenance of ethnic diversity would not be a valuable asset in a society if it had taken place under the context of inequality, or if it caused inequality. A second Canadian ideology is that tolerance for cultural diversity does not mean isolation from the mainstream society. Instead, minorities are not stereotyped as the disadvantaged in the pursuit of a livelihood, or utilization of government programs such as housing or community services. Canadians offer a greater amount of equality of opportunity to minorities than Americans do, regardless of participation in minority community life. By this reckoning, equality of opportunity is a distinctive Canadian strength, in comparison to the American tendency to discriminate against minorities, especially those who fail to assimilate into the mainstream culture (Reitz and Breton 1994: 6).

In the recent decades, incidents of racial conflict have focused world attention on the issue of race relations in the United States. Besides indicators of violent crime, dealing with political problems violently, i.e. riots, considerably exceeds the rates in Canada. Data presented by Lipset (1990: 96) illustrates that Canadians were much less likely to engage in protest demonstrations or riots between 1948 and 1982 (See Appendix 1, Table 7). Even though the United States population is much greater than Canada (approximately 10:1), the political comparisons range from two to four times as large (e.g. 20:1, 40:1). Generally, Canadians appear to conclude that the presence of this problem shows not only that racial conflicts in the U.S. are deeply rooted, but that Americans have a higher likelihood than Canadians to practise racial discrimination. A poll conducted in 1986 discovered that 72 percent of Canadians believed that Canadians

exhibited higher racial tolerance than Americans. Gordon Fairweather, the former chief commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission and recently, the chairman of the Immigration and Refugee Board establishes the following observation (Reitz and Breton 1994: 11):

> Discrimination against [B]lacks in the United States, another country of immigrants, has unique historical roots. No region of Canada has (had) an economy dependent on the labour of slaves on the scale of the United States. For this reason, the past and present experiences of the [B]lack community in the United States may not be directly useful in interpreting the present situation of multiplicity of racial and ethnic groups in Canada.

The assumption above is that the United States' history of racial polarization may create a disadvantage to the racial-minority immigrant in the United States. Since Canada did not experience such a history, opportunity for minorities in Canada maybe better.

Actually, racial discrimination in America may have no connection with the country's history of racial conflict. As described by the 'perceived threat' hypothesis, discrimination against a minority group increases in relation to the size of the group. Tienda and Lii contend that discrimination against Blacks in the U.S. is related to the fact that they are a large group. Other research suggests that the conflict between Blacks and Whites in the United States may be caused by competition between racial groups in racially split markets-- "disadvantaged whites may harbour greater hostility than other whites towards blacks since they have a competitive social and economic relation with blacks. Also, discrimination can occur against minority groups who have increasing political clout and bargaining power.

What is required is evidence of how Canadians and Americans react to

comparable interracial situations. When contrasts involve visible minorities other than

Blacks, the similarities overcome the differences (Reitz and Breton 1994). For instance

the treatment of Native people in Canada is somewhat different from the American

treatment of Indians. Attitudes towards Natives can be illustrated by Gaile McGregors

comparison of North American fiction. Here she notes that Canadian literature appears to

deal with Indians more sympathetically than Americans:

> comparison with his relatively infrequent appearances in "serious" modern
> American writing, the Indian has...become one of the more important
> personae in the Canadian...In Canada, in Atwood's words, Indians are not
> valued because "they are good or superior, but (because) they are
> persecuted." The Indian...is the 'archetypical' victim. (Lipset 1990: 175)

John Hagan substantiates that Canada's Indians were treated differently than were the

Natives in United States which can be attributed to the lower violent crime rates north of

the border. He notes: "America's treatment of both its black and Native minorities was

extraordinarily violent. Canada...has not been nearly so violent. It seems unlikely that this

difference...would not have behavioural consequences." This does not mean to conclude

that Canada's behaviour towards minorities is perfect. Throughout history minorities have

suffered from neglect and racial discrimination in both countries. In most measures of

mortality and social morbidity, Natives usually show up at the bottom (Lipset 1990: 176).

Other example of malicious treatment of racial minorities in Canada was the treatment of

the Chinese railway workers in the nineteenth to early twentieth century, the present

restrictions on Asian immigration, and the denial of the franchise to some groups at

particular times. These events do not exhibit a striking US-Canadian difference in racial

tolerance, which may by indicated by concentrating only on black-white relations.

Many Americans who acknowledge the seriousness "of black grievances nevertheless point to black socio-economic and political advancement as testimony to a strong American commitment to racial justice and reform. (Reitz and Breton 1994: 13)." The American concept of equality for all and the 'American dream' of material success for minorities are part of the national mythology which are as important as the mosaic is in Canada.

Sniderman and Hagan claim that Americans' commitment to individualism and self-reliance is an essential reason why many oppose government action for Blacks. Thus "individual opposition to government regulation might offset individualistic support for meritocracy and universal competition (Reitz and Breton 1994: 17)." Anything that hints towards preferential treatment of groups, such as hiring people based on race or gender, is so unacceptable to Americans that it has developed into a divisive political issue. One explanation for different attitudes between blacks and whites concerning quotas is mistrust on both sides rather than racial prejudice. Whites believe that with quotas less qualified minorities will have good jobs; blacks believe that without quotas, less qualifies whites will get the good jobs (Yankelovich 1994: 32).

Goldberg and Mercer (1986) state, that too much emphasis should not be placed upon ethnic tolerance since it is essential "to admit the possibility that if non-whites were as significant an urban minority as they are in the U.S. urban contexts, one might then find less willingness among Canadians to admit them [visible minorities] as near-neighbours." Yet these researchers concluded, after conducting a study of urban life in North America, that "values tolerating ethnic and racial diversity and values which

contribute to a less violent milieu play a role in maintaining the superior liveability of the Canadian central city." In agreement, urbanologist Alan Artibise provides similar interpretation in discussing the extensive ethnic changes in Toronto, noting that "probably no other North American city has undergone so much change in only thirty years...What is even more remarkable about this transformation is that it has taken place with no major violence or disorder...Toronto has managed to maintain general social tolerance among its people" (Lipset 1990: 113). Canada is accepting international immigration rates two to three times higher than the United States (Appendix 1, Figure 2). The 1991 census measured about 16 percent of the Canadian population as being foreign born compared to 8 percent of the American population. Two-thirds of immigrations to Canada appeared to originate from Asia, South America and Africa in 1991. These three areas compose only 50 percent of immigration to the United States.

Conclusion

Social decline in the United States can be attributed to a pathological pursuit of individualism, or happiness, to the neglect of social responsibility. America's screaming contrasts of obscene luxury and pitiful poverty, are justified in the individualistic pursuit substantiated by the Protestant work ethic. Further, the remaining American dream is now reduced to the size of consumer goods—this dream is made affordable by petty crime, looting or credit cards. The dominant ideology today in America rejects the notion of culpability, as is evident in its response to the phenomena of poverty and crime. America today no longer accepts these phenomena as social problems but either disregards them, as in case of the increasing poverty rate, or suppresses them with more and more repressive

means (as in the case of crime). Peters (1996) claims that the real and actual danger for America does not "rest in the revolutionary potential, which could collect in a sediment of poverty and crime, but it rests in the moral corruption that accepts these natural ills (221)." The dominant ideology of individualism before equality in the United States reveals a destructive potential towards the nation's social fabric.

Success, individualism, and equality are all base qualities which permeate the American social structure. According to Messner and Rosenfield (1994: 8), the American Dream of equality and success have been highly beneficial for the United States. The commitments associated with this concept has developed the motivational dynamic for economic expansion, extraordinary technological motivation and high rates of social mobility. However, a dark paradoxical quality arises from the American Dream-- "...a cardinal virtue, 'ambition', promotes a cardinal deviant vice, 'deviant behaviour'(Merton 1968: 200). The cultural onus on achievement, which facilitates productivity and innovation, also creates pressures to succeed at any cost. The pursuit of individualistic interests, which strengthens ambition and mobility, drives people apart and weakens the collective sense of community. Finally, the preoccupation with monetary rewards severely restricts the achievements and self reward to which people are motivated to aspire.

The ideological elements of America— personal freedom, individual self-realization, security before the law and by the law, civil rights, prosperity-- are unquestionable. Yet they are precisely at risk of destroying themselves in their own excesses of freedom, individualism, and money orientation (Peters 1996). All these

elements disallow the government from assuming a more assertive role to assist the disadvantaged because of distorted perceptions of individualism before equality (Bellah 1985) and America being the 'land of opportunity'.

One question to be addressed in comparing United States to Canada is whether a country's ideological elements, such as individualism or collectivism, actually contribute to the accentuation, or diminishment, of their social ills. The government interpretation and reaction. or an individual's ideological constructs, can possibly effect the linkages between crime, concentrated poverty and structural inequality. However, to what degree can ideological elements effect these linkages? Incorporating human capital, cultural disinvestment. and community level factors, the structural comparison of Canada and the United States will demonstrate the diverse circumstances of the disadvantaged and subordinate groups. It is proposed that the United States preoccupation with individualism before equality, monetary success, and its pathological pursuit of happiness will reinforce the criminogenic environment in disadvantaged areas. As discussed above, the basic ideological elements in the United States actually encourage individuals to develop subcultural adaptations of capital accumulation. Thus it is anticipated that the United States will have a higher level of subcultural or oppositional culture development than   Canada.

Chapter 3: Methods and Data

Introduction

We seek to illustrate the linkages between crime, concentrated urban poverty, and structural inequality within the disadvantaged and subordinate groups which occupy a central place in the social organization of any society. Conceptualized from the human ecological perspective of the structure of communities, it will be illustrated that patterns of residential inequality artificially create social isolation and ecological concentration effects of the 'truly disadvantaged' in Canada and United States. Within this setting, structural inequality distorts the accumulation of human capital, social capital, and cultural disinvestment (inequality, concentration of poverty, residential segregation). Through this structural distortion, negative cultural adaptations develop which are more tolerant to violence (e.g. homicide, suicide and domestic violence), social organization and social cohesion disintegrate, in turn, violence increases. This has the combined effect of further perpetuating the spiral of decay of the disadvantaged and subordinate groups thereby denying them access into the mainstream of social structure.

Procedure

The method of research utilized to best illustrate the situation of the disadvantaged and subordinate groups (i.e. Canadian Natives and African Americans) will involve a triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods. As a major source of social science data for researchers, descriptive population statistics are primarily drawn from national samples provided by various government documents. Government documents provide

reliable and valid descriptive information since all statistics are drawn from census and

departmental (e.g. Health Canada) data.

The utilization of secondary sources affords the most comprehensive portrait of the

urban concentrated poor. As Marshall (1968) justifies the usefulness of secondary sources:

> Sociologists must inevitably rely extensively on secondary authorities,
> without going back to the original sources. They do this partly because life is
> too short to do anything else when using the comparative method, and they
> need data assembled from a wide...field, and partly because original sources
> are very tricky things to use...It is the business of (scholars in different
> fields) to give to others the results of their careful professional assessment.
> And surely they will not rebuke the sociologists for putting faith in what
> (they) write (Lipset 1990:xv).

With regards to the illustration of oppositional cultural adaptations, and domestic violence,

secondary sources also supply information useful for providing an ethnographic picture of

life in the inner city. Through the combination of primary, secondary, and ethnographic

sources. an all encompassing description of the influence of the linkages between

concentrated poverty. structural inequality and crime will be presented .

Independent Variables

Geography and Population. Since the population of interest in this thesis is the ecological

concentration of the disadvantaged and subordinate groups in urban areas, we need

to present levels of population in these urban areas. Population levels will provide a

basis for analyzing the metropolitan dynamics of social structure.

Human Capital. Human capital is the skills and knowledge learned by individuals through

education and training. Through the accumulation of human capital, individuals can

functionally participate within social structure thereby increasing the community, or

societal, outgrowth of social and cultural capital. In order to collect data concerning human capital, the following measures were created: level of education, unemployment and general level of employment. Level of education will describe the amount of education and training which the individual or subordinate group has received. Levels of long-term unemployment will be utilized as a measure of lack of skills or means to enter the job market. Finally level of employment will reveal amounts of the population with low skilled labor. It is anticipated that populations living in disadvantaged areas will have low human capital—low levels of education, employed in jobs which require only low skilled labor, and high levels of unemployment.

Capital Disinvestment:

General Levels of Poverty. Government statistics illustrate the general population levels of poverty by income level in both countries.

General Levels of Inequality. Inequality measures the amount of unequal distribution of wealth amongst the population. Inequalities of wealth present a strong social problem since economic and political power is consequently denied to a large portion of the population. The national levels of inequality will be presented through the discussion of the Human Development Index, the Gross Domestic Product, the Gini Coefficient, and ratio of household aggregate incomes.

Ecological Concentration of Poverty. According to Sampson and Wilson (1995: 51) social isolation is fostered by the ecological concentration of urban poverty which deprives residents not "only of resources and conventional role models, but also of

cultural learning from mainstream social networks that facilitate social and economic advancement in modern industrial society." Through the presentation of secondary sources, the existence of urban neighborhoods concentrated with poverty will be identified by describing the poor population distribution in various metropolitan locations.

Residential Segregation. Related to the ecological concentration of poverty, the poor population distribution will identify the location of disadvantaged neighborhoods. It is proposed that the disadvantaged are usually concentrated in poor neighborhoods isolated in the central city, often in crowded neighborhoods in close proximity to one another.

Housing Market. The dynamics of the housing market is a likely factor in reinforcing suburbanization of employment and augmenting the growth of the concentration of the poor and subordinate groups in the inner city. Guided by secondary sources, the discussion of urban renewal, government subsidized housing, gentrification, slumlords, warehousing, racial discrimination, and monopolization will reveal the influence of the housing market upon residential segregation and concentrated urban poverty.

Race Linked Inequality or the "truly disadvantaged". Similar to inequality, race linked inequality measures the distribution of wealth among subordinate groups (Canadian Natives and African Americans). The high prevalence of racial inequality reinforces social disorganization and prevalent latent animosities which leads to feelings of diffused aggression by subordinate groups. The data collected to

measure this variable are: income, employment, poverty rate. Compared to the general country's population, it is proposed that these subordinate groups will have significantly lower income, employment, and high levels of poverty—overall high levels of inequality.

Community-level Factors:

Social Mobility/ Turnover Rates. High rates of mobility, or turnover rates, increase the cohesive and organization instability of disadvantaged neighborhoods. In order to measure levels of social mobility/ turnover rates, the discussion of the amounts of population entering and exiting poverty and chronic poverty will be presented. Since this information is presently unattainable in Canada, the frequency of Aboriginals off the reserve changing dwelling will be discussed.

Feminization of Poverty. The fact that a large amount of female parent house holders are exposed to the negative consequences of poverty, significantly decreases the transmission of later life chances to their children. The feminization of poverty will be measured by: levels of female householders below the poverty level; divorce rates; teenage pregnancy rates; and levels of government assistance.

Dependent Variables

Crime. Provided by various secondary sources, international comparison of crime rates among selected developed countries; costs of crime; levels of fear; juvenile delinquency and victimization in Canada and United States will be discussed. It is proposed that the country with the most poverty and structural inequality will have

higher international crime rates, costs of crime, fear of crime, and prevalence of juvenile delinquency.

Racial Divide in Crime. Crime rates of the subordinate groups (Canadian Natives and African Americans) will be provided. It is proposed that since subordinate groups are amongst the most disadvantaged of each of the nations, they will be over-represented in the justice system.

Police and Minorities. The issue of over policing inner-city neighborhoods which may distort the subordinate group crime rates will be discussed through a review of secondary sources. Also, an ethnographic account concerning the attitudes between minorities and police, and police brutality will be presented. It is proposed that individuals who are stereotyped as being from the most disadvantaged or socially disorganized segments of society will be the focus point of law enforcement strategies.

Suicide and Homicide Rates. Provided by government documents and secondary sources, the topic of suicide and homicide rates and their links with severe forms of inward or outward aggression against stressful social environments will be discussed. It is proposed that these elements of aggression are found to be highly tolerated amongst disadvantaged subordinate groups.

Racial Discrimination. Racial discrimination plays an important role in increasing the likelihood for maintaining the motivation for segregation. Minority vulnerability stems from the fact that segregation intensifies and magnifies any economic setback which these groups suffer and builds deprivation structurally into their social and

economic environments. Literature contends that the barrier of racial discrimination plays an integral role in subordinate groups adapting capital accumulation subculturally. Through the presentation of ethnographic material, the degree of the confining levels of racial discrimination from subordinate groups will be revealed.

Oppositional Cultural Adaptations. Drawn from various ethnographic sources, the development of subcultural, or oppositional, adaptations of capital accumulation of inner city individuals will be provided. It is proposed that through criminogenic structural conditions, the combination of low human capital, capital disinvestment, and negative community-level factors all create barriers to access mainstream institutions. Through structural inequality and poverty the allotment of all sources of capital are distorted, thereby creating criminogenic factors (independent variables) which encourage the development of often criminal subcultural alternatives for capital accumulation. Further, the development of oppositional culture creates an environment of groups which tolerate the utilization of aggression, such as suicide, homicide and domestic violence.

Family Disruption/ Domestic Violence. Violence within the household perpetuates mechanisms of brutalization, desensitization, retaliation, learning, imitation, and identification with the aggressor within the household may transform victim into the victimizer. Areas of concentrated poverty are very unstable communities where individuals take out their repressed frustration on each other. Moreover, due to the development of oppositional cultures, these disadvantaged areas have higher tolerance levels towards violence. Family disruption/ domestic violence in urban

poverty tracts will be measured by statistical information provided by secondary sources and ethnographic vignettes.

It is proposed that the combination of low levels of human capital, high capital disinvestment, and community level factors will increase levels of structural inequality and distort capital accumulation and contribution of capital. Through the cumulative impact of these variables, social organization and social cohesion disintegrate, high levels of *crime* flourish and the adaptation development of an *oppositional culture* amongst the truly disadvantaged and subordinate groups in concentrated urban poverty areas will be present in both countries. However, due to higher levels of urban populations in the United States it is expected that these factors will only differ by matter of degree.

Chapter 4: The Dynamics of Social Structure

A synthesis of the theoretical literature allows for the identification of a number of variables required to help explain the linkages between crime, concentrated urban poverty, and structural inequality among the disadvantaged and subordinate groups in Canada and United States. The following independent variables will be examined in this chapter. *Population and geography* will be presented in order to illustrate levels of population in urban areas and to provide a basis for analyzing the metropolitan dynamics of social structure. The accumulation of *human capital* indicates the number of individuals who are functionally participating within social structure thereby increasing the community, or societal, outgrowth of social and cultural capital. In turn, the dynamic processes of *capital disinvestment* further effects the success of community integration into the mainstream social structure—inequality, concentrated poverty, residential segregation, housing market. Finally two influential *community level factors* which greatly influence social cohesion and informal social control will be discussed—turnover rates and the feminization of poverty.

Geography and Population

In order to provide a fuller understanding of the levels of social disorganization within each country, the geography and population with each country must contend must first be considered. Both Canada and United States are relatively large countries in terms of land mass. In terms of population, Canada is relatively small. The 1991 census reported 27,297,000 Canadians, whereas Americans residing in the United States was 252,177,000 (Appendix 1, Figure 3). Since 1976, Canada's population has grown by 17 percent, only incrementally higher than the United States' 16 percent population increase

in growth. Basically, Canada is a small country in terms of population—it ranks 32nd after Argentina's 33 million. The United States ranks third in the world behind China's 1.1 billion and India's 900 million (Sauve 1994).

It is not easy to believe that California now has a larger population than all of Canada, or that metropolitan areas of New York or Los Angeles are more populated than all of the metropolitan areas in Canada combined. A ranking (Appendix 1, Table 8) of Canadian provinces and American states illustrates that Ontario is the eighth most populated behind California, New York, Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Ohio. Quebec ranks 11th. In the 30th spot is the next most populated province, British Columbia, followed by Alberta in the 36th and Manitoba in the 46th position. The remaining provinces have a population base less than a million. In United States, Wyoming is the least populous state at 460,000, whereas Prince Edward Island is the least populous province at 130,000. Canada's Yukon and Northwest Territories have a combined population of 81,000. The outlying areas of America include 3.5 million people in Puerto Rico, also 325,000 more in American Samao, Guam, the Virgin Islands and Northern Mariana Islands.

Most citizens live in metropolitan areas (Appendix 1, Table 9). In 1994, 61 percent of Canadians (8:10) and 78 percent of Americans lived in Metropolitan centres. The largest metropolitan area is New York with over 19 million people, followed by Los Angeles with approximately 15 million. Toronto's population of 4 million ranks just before Dallas, whereas St. John's and Charleston are the smallest metropolitan areas in Canada and US respectively.

According to Gwyn, ecological factors such as Canada's "northernness" and its

pattern of urbanization as far South as possible are more extensive than in United States.

He also indicates common characteristics held with other northern countries: "reticence.

pragmatism, wariness of public display and social democratic liberalism." The urban

factor mentioned here may not appear unique, yet as Gwyn claims:[there] is nothing

like...[Canadian cities] in the United States. Most Canadians live in them, while the

dominant American pattern is the suburb...Canadians have figured out how to make their

cities work for them; Americans work in their cities and live outside them." The suburban

pattern of urbanization in America allows the average citizen and most social institutions

to ignore the severely disadvantaged areas in the inner-city, thereby permitting further

societal decay. Elaborated by Goldberg and Mercer (1986), there are many differences

between cities north and south of the border. Ranging in degree of crime rates, the

incidence of slums, cleanliness all reflect variations in national "values and attitudes."

(Lipset 1990: 51)

Poverty

Why are social problems in disadvantaged neighborhoods so bad? Crane (1991)

claims that as neighborhood quality decreases, there would be a sharp increase in the

probability that an individual will develop a social problem. Health problems associated

with poverty are well known. Children who grow up in poverty show almost three and one-

half times the number of conduct disorders, almost twice the chronic illnesses and over

twice the rate of school problems, hyperactivity and emotional disorders as children who are

not poor.(The Health of Canada's Children 1994) They also include a greater likelihood of,

inadequate nutrition, childhood death, long-term disability and injury. The influence of poverty on family life goes beyond the lack of money for good housing or a varied sufficient diet. The hardship of poverty increases family stress, and reduces the ability of families to cope, which in turn threatens the emotional health of children. Lack of subsidized child care prevents parents, especially lone parents, from being able to access the education, training and job experience they may need for steady employment. Children whose families do not have access to early quality care because of lack of resources, do not receive the stimulation and learning opportunities necessary to reach their full potential in later life. The evidence suggests, however, that it is inequity, marginalization and powerlessness, rather than economic deprivation, that aggravates poor families' distress.(Steinhauer 1996) For 67 year old Mary S., poverty is as follows:

> If you're really interested, I'll tell you what it's like being an old woman alone who's only got the government pension to live on...It's wearing out your second hand shoes going from one store to another trying to find the cheapest cuts of meat. It's hating to buy toilet tissue or soap or toothpaste, because you can't eat it. It's picking the marked-down fruits and vegetables from the half-rotting stuff in the back of the stores that used to be given away to farmers to feed their animals. It's hunting the thrift shops and Salvation Army stores for half-decent clothes.
>
> Emergencies come up; grand children have birthdays; clothes wear out; cleaning products run out; bus rates go up. How do we manage? We pay our rent and utilities and we eat less.
>
> We live in fear. Fear of the future, of more illness, less money, less pride. Fear that the cheque won't arrive and we won't be able to work our way through the red tape in time to pay our rent. Fear that we will run out of food before the next cheque comes in.
>
> So fear holds you in line. It is our punishment for getting old and sick.
> (National Council of Welfare 1979: 12 - 13)

Subjectively, poverty is "doing without, it is fear, it is worry, it is malnutrition and ill health, depression perhaps and isolation, scrambling to live and maybe wanting to die...(Synott 1996: 100)."

In disadvantaged community and family settings with poor accessibility to institutions, services, or support, parents are less able to provide or transmit later life chances to their children (i.e. intergenerational effects). Research shows that, in addition to income and father's occupation, family background characteristics, such as parents' low education, single parent families, and high number of siblings, significantly lowers the likelihood of a child's success in life (Danziger et al 1994). Other studies have suggested that disadvantaged neighborhoods are characterized by loosely defined and enforced norms of risky sexual behavior and violence. These features of disadvantaged life make it difficult for parents to regulate successfully their children's behaviors. As a consequence, residents of ghetto neighborhoods are expected to initiate sexual intercourse at earlier ages and to have higher rates of accidental premarital pregnancy than other teens (Hogan and Kitagawa 1985). Survival in the inner-city is often a struggle and families must adapt to the lower circumstances they encounter.

The impact of poverty is pervasive. The constraints of poverty shape the opportunities available to the families of the disadvantaged. The ignorant conclusion that individuals inflicted with poverty are ones who lack the ability and are lazy is unjustifiable since all children do not start out equally in life's beginning (Kitchen et al 1991). The National Council of Welfare claims (1975: 1):

> To be poor is to face a greater likelihood of ill-health in infancy, in childhood and throughout your adult life. To be born poor is to face a

lesser likelihood that you will finish high school, lesser still that you will
attend university. To be poor is to face a greater likelihood that you will be
judged delinquent in adolescence...To be poor is unfair to kids.

Compared with most countries, Canada and United States have a very high poverty rate

(Appendix 1, Table 10), especially among single parent families (Appendix 1, Figure 4).

Most OECD countries, including Canada, have exhibited slightly declining rates of child

poverty. On the other hand, the child poverty rates in the United States have shown a

large increase (Appendix 1, Figure 5). Over four million Canadians live in poverty today,

including 1.2 million children—one in six children (Appendix 1, Figure 6). In 1991, out

of the 3.1 million population increase since 1981 there were half a million more poor

children. In 1991, poor couples with children had income that was typically less than 70%

of the poverty line (The Health of Canada's Children 1994). This encompasses a poverty

rate of 20% for seniors and 62% for lone mothers. There are approximately one and a half

million Canadians unemployed and about three million are on welfare. Poverty is

widespread in Canada and the rate of poverty remains unchanged from 20 years ago

(Synnott 1996: 99).

In 1993, persons at the poverty level and below 125 percent poverty level

compose 15.1 percent of the population (39.3 million) in the United States. The poverty

rates for particular demographic groups, such as minorities, elderly widows, children

living in mother-only families, are as high as today as they were for Americans in 1949.

In the past two decades, this lack of progress for both countries – the poverty rate

remaining unchanged in Canada and increasing in the US—represent an anomaly. Drawn

from extensive research comparing international poverty rates during the 1980s,

Smeeding (1992) claims that the poverty rate (40 percent or less of the median income) in

the United States is extremely high in comparison with other countries with similar standards of living. In America, for the first time in recent history, a generation of children "has a higher poverty rate than the preceding generation, and a generation of adults has experienced only a modest increase in the standard of living (Danziger and Weinberg 1994:18)."

Inequality of Wealth

Poverty and inequality are interrelated. The distribution of wealth and income defines who in a society lives without the customary amenities of life. A society with a wide gap of income and wealth will have more people living below the expected living standards than a society where the income distribution is more closely clustered around the population's average income. The inequalities of wealth present a powerful social problem since economic and political power is consequently denied to a large segment of the population. Opportunities for capital accumulation translate into control over individuals who depend on employment for their livelihood. Wealth also has more influence on the political agenda of governments in terms of the balance between the protection of private capital and the provision of economic security to the labour force (Kitchen et al 1991).

Economic indicators, such as unemployment and inequality, can definitively illustrate social decline. According to Peters (1996), federal subsidies and tax breaks, especially in the United States, provide inadequate relief for families with children, this results in many families living in an isolated atmosphere of despair and poverty. By briefly discussing various economic indicators of inequality, employment, and poverty,

the social health of the population in Canada and United States can be determined.

The United Nations Development Programme has constructed a composite measure referred as the Human Development Index (HDI) which assesses an international health and equity comparison amongst developing countries (Appendix 1, Figure 7). The HDI measures a country's achievements among three areas: life expectancy, educational attainment, and income. In the most recent HDI rankings, Canada and United States currently lead in the world. However, when the HDI is adjusted fpr gender inequality, Canada's ranking slips to 9th and the United States slips to 5th position.(Appendix 1, Figure 8)

Another measure that is commonly utilized in order to compare standards of living among countries is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Similar to the HDI ranking, Canadians and Americans appear to enjoy a high standard of living when compared to other countries (Appendix 1, Figure 9). Even though the GDP offers a general measure of the money available within the country's border, it does not reveal how that money is used. Many studies demonstrate that the more equitable the distribution of wealth, the healthier the population. Basically, while the total amount of money in society is informative, it is more important that the available income is distributed equitably among the population. Based on Appendix 1, Figure 10, among the industrialized nations, Finland and Sweden have the most equitable distribution of wealth. Although slightly less than Australia, Canada has more income inequality than most developed countries. Since the 1970s, Canada's rate of inequality after taxes and transfers has remained relatively constant. In the United States, the gap between the rich

and the poor is the highest among most developed countries and is widening over time.

In 1980, the top 20 percent of Canadian households had aggregate incomes 10 times larger than the poorest 20 percent (Appendix 1, Figure 11 and Table 11). By 1992 a slight reduction in inequality occurred with the ratio of the richest to poorest in Canada down to 9.5 times in 1992. In the United States, inequality has worsened over the years. By 1992 the richest 20 percent of American households had aggregate incomes 12.3 times larger than the poorest 20 percent. The top 20 percent of total household incomes before taxes took in 42.1 percent of Canadian income reported in 1980. By 1992, their share had risen to 43.6 percent. In the United States, the richest group increased their share even faster, moving up to 46.9 percent from 44 percent in 1980. The middle 40 percent of households had 37 percent of the wealth in Canada, compared to 33 percent in the United States. The bottom 40 percent had only 19 percent of the wealth in either country.

A prominent feature of poor households in Canada and United States is that they have considerably less formal education than non-poor households (Ross and Shillington 1989). According to Perry et al (1993: 13) Canadians are not prepared for better new jobs. In 1986 Employment and Immigration Canada estimated the number of jobs requiring only a high school diploma at 45.3 percent, which will drop to about 32.8 percent for the period 1986-2000. Further, low skilled jobs for the adult population with no high school education and for drop-outs are dwindling and producing high unemployment amongst these groups. Not only are there fewer low skilled jobs, but many of these jobs tend to be more unstable (i.e. casual, part-time, contract work) rather than permanent (i.e. good pay, fringe benefits, unionized) in nature.

Similarly with other economic indicators, unemployment rates fluctuate from time to time. When compared with other OECD countries Canada's unemployment rate has remained relatively high (Appendix 1, Figure 12). The United States rate of employment relatively mirrored Canada until 1985 and then remained around the OECD unemployment rate average. Joblessness decreases both output and the demand for goods and services that lost incomes would otherwise generate. Unemployment represents hardship for many. Canadian and American unemployment rates have traditionally tracked along very closely. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the jobless rate averaged 5.9 percent in Canada and 5.5 in United States. This relationship persisted as both countries entered the 1980s. After 1982, the spread between the mirrored joblessness trends widened dramatically. During 1993 the Canadian rate of joblessness was more than 4 percentage points higher than the United States. As Sauve suggests, the key factor behind this widening spread is the slower rate of job creation in Canada. Further, the most crippling difference is long-term unemployment (13 weeks or more) between Canada and United States, with the rate more than doubling in Canada and increasing by over 40 percent in the United States (Appendix 1, Table 12). The number of youth in the labour force have declined during the last 12 years. The size of the youth labour force has decreased by 18 percent since 1980 in both Canada and United States, while the amount of males over the age of 25 years has increased rapidly.

Concentrated Urban Poverty and Residential Segregation

The growth of concentrated urban poverty is disturbing because it does not only indicate extreme levels of poverty, but also extreme levels of a variety of social disorders

that may ultimately lead to social isolation and the perpetuation of poverty (Hajnal 1995: 498). In contrast to the prolific information provided concerning urban poverty in the United States. Canadian literature is almost completely devoid of any mention of the underclass or concentrated urban poverty (Hajnal 1995, Perry et al 1993).

With approximately 60 percent of the Canadian population concentrated in cities of 100.000 or more people, as Perry et al (1993) contend, a new urban poverty has been created. Drawn from the general data of Ross and Shillington (1989), urban areas concentrated with poverty are clearly identified. Through the utilization of two definitions of poverty outlined by Statistics Canada and Canadian Council on Social Development (CCSD), households and individuals defined as poor by either definition were regarded as poor in highly concentrated urban areas (Appendix 1, Tables 13 and 14). For the three years observed (1973, 1979, 1989) there has been an overall increase followed by a slight decrease in the number of low-income individuals and families in Canada. Generally both approaches revealed that the percentages in poverty urban settings has increased by 30.000 or more. Tables 13 and 14 illustrate by either definition that in 1986, between 45 percent and 56 percent of poor families and between 58.5 percent and 69.1 percent of poor individuals dwelt in metropolitan areas. Perry et al (1993) claim that immigration and the recession of the 1990s probably have further concentrated poverty today.

The distribution of poor families in the two most populous provinces, Ontario and Quebec, clearly exemplify the occurrence of concentrated poverty in Canada. In Quebec, 79.2 percent of poor families and in Ontario 80.2 percent were located in urban areas of 30.000 people or more. The larger proportion of the poor appear to live in cities of

100.000 people or more—69.8 percent and 69.2 percent respectively. According to the Centre for International Statistics, only Ontario's cities (e.g. Toronto 10.8 percent, Kitchener-Waterloo 7.5 percent, Windsor 10.3 percent) had lower poverty rates than the national average of about 14.6 percent.   Other cities (such as Montreal 19.8 percent, Edmonton 19.8 percent, Winnipeg 20.6 percent, and Victoria 17.9 percent) exceeded the national poverty rate. In 1990, the poverty rate for the two largest Canadian cities rose to almost one person in 4 experiencing poverty—15.21 percent in Toronto, and 22.17 percent in Montreal (Perry et al 1993: 11).

The poverty rate for urban children or for districts within the metropolitan area reveal alarming statistics. Overall, in 1989 14.4 percent of Canadian children were living below the poverty line. Yet when urban centres are considered the rates increase: Winnipeg- 26 percent; Edmonton- 22.8 percent; Halifax- 20.8 percent; Montreal- 20.4 percent; and Calgary- 17 percent. In 1990, the national poverty rate increased to 16.9 percent. yet the child poverty rate was even higher in Montreal at 23.83 percent. in Toronto at 21.54 percent, and in Vancouver at 19.1 percent (Perry et al 1993: 11)

Urban poverty in the United States is centered in the largest cities, especially those with the largest minority populations. According to Goldsmith and Blakely (1992), from 1970 to 1980 the poor population of the fifty largest cities grew nearly 12 percent, while the overall population within these cities declined by more than 5 percent. In 1980, 20 percent or more of the populations were considered poor in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, San Antonio, Memphis, Cleveland, Boston, New

Orleans, St. Louis, El Paso, and Atlanta. Poverty rates in the inner-cities and metropolitan

areas increased from the early 1970s until the late 1980s.

Poverty is concentrated in certain neighborhoods. Appendix 1, Table 15 illustrates

that there has been a substantial increase in the prevalence of poverty in central cities and

central city poverty areas, i.e. poverty areas are neighborhoods with at least one of five

households officially poor. Even though the metropolitan poverty rate in the United States

was at 12 percent, more than 37 percent of those living in poverty areas were poor.

Metropolitan areas with the highest rates of poverty (i.e. two of five households

categorized as poor) usually have larger segments of poor people crowded into high

poverty census tracts. New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia had the highest concentration

of poor people in such isolated districts— in 1980, each had over 100,000 poor people

living in high poverty tracts. These three, along with Newark and Detroit, demonstrate the

phenomenon which is wide spread throughout the country's largest metropolitan areas

(Goldsmith and Blakely 1992). In Cleveland, Hill and Bier (1989: 136) claimed that

poverty rose in poverty tracts in the 1980s:

> those areas with large portions of their work force employed in lower-
> skilled occupations associated with factory work were the spawning
> grounds for poverty at the end of the 1980s. This strongly suggests that
> change in the structure of the regional economy had a direct impact on the
> neighborhoods of the city and on sections of its close-in suburbs.

Due to the high poverty rates among African Americans, increasingly high

proportions of African Americans in 1990 still lived in overwhelmingly segregated

neighborhoods. As Appendix 1, Table 15 illustrates, throughout the 1980s, one-third of

African Americans lived in poor central city areas, and more than two-fifths who lived in central city areas were poor (Goldsmith and Blakely 1992).

Appendix 1, Table 16 further shows the greater number of poor African Americans relative to other poor Americans. In 1989, 40 percent of the United States' whites dwelt in poverty concentrated neighborhoods, whereas 71 percent of African Americans lived there . Even though the poverty concentration gap between African Americans and whites decline in the suburbs, the overall poverty rate for African Americans in the tract increases—poor African American suburbanites are three times more likely to live crowded together in poverty neighborhoods than poor whites (Goldsmith and Blakely 1992).

In 1990, approximately seven out of eight minority group members were living in metropolitan area ghettos (Jargowsky 1994). The number of African Americans in these ghettos increased by more than one-third from 1980 to 1990, by almost 6 million. A large proportion of this growth involved poor people. The poverty rate amongst African Americans who dwell in metropolitan ghettos increased while the rate of those who dwelt in nonghettos decreased. Since the 1980s ghettos census tracts have increased in a substantial majority of metropolitan areas in the United States (Wilson 1996). As Jargowsky describes the significance of the low density diffusion of ghetto areas in the metropolises (1994 :18):

> The geographic size of a city's ghetto has a large effect on the perception and magnitude of the problem associated with ghetto poverty. How big an area of the city do you consider off limits? How far out of your way will you drive not to go through a dangerous area? Indeed, the lower the density exacerbated the problem. More abandoned buildings mean more places for crack dens and criminal enterprises. Police trying to

protect a given number of citizens have to be stretched over a wider number of square miles, making it less likely that criminals will be caught. Lower density also makes it harder for a sense of community to develop, or for people to feel that they can find safety in numbers. From the point of view of local political officials, the increase in the size of the ghetto is a disaster. Many of those leaving the ghetto settle in non-ghetto areas outside the political jurisdiction of the central city. Thus, geographic size of the ghetto is expanding, cutting a wider swath through the hearts of our metropolitan areas.

According to Goldsmith and Blakely (1992), racial segregation in American cities is astonishing. Although statistics illustrate annual changes, apparent improvements basically reflect statistical effects of migration rather than true integration. Further, as Massey and Denton (1989: 389) indicate:

> not only are blacks in our largest cities disproportionately likely to share tracts with other blacks, they are very unlikely to share a tract with any whites at all. Moreover, if they go to the adjacent neighborhood, or to the neighborhood adjacent to that, they are still unlikely to encounter a white resident. These agglomerations of monoracial tracts are densely settled and geographically restricted, comprising a small portion of the urban environment closely packed around the center city.

Appendix 1, Table 17 illustrates the level of residential segregation in the largest metropolitan cities. For instance, 79 percent of the African American population in Los Angeles would have to move to whiter census tracts to even out the racial population distributions. Updating these statistics to 1990 (Goldsmith and Blakely 1992), the preliminary census estimates for United States' ten largest cities shows no difference. In Chicago, 71 percent of all African Americans live in one race census tracts, where at least 90 percent of their neighbors are also African American. In Detroit, 61 percent live in almost totally segregated areas, in Philadelphia, 53 percent. In Atlanta, Washington, D.C., New York, Houston, and Dallas, high proportions of the residents are similarly isolated,

ranging from 43 percent to 29 percent. In Boston, the measure of segregation is lower but

it is still 19 percent. Also in Los Angeles, 7 percent of the African American population is

completely segregated. Amazingly, in Detriot, Philadelphia, and New York from 1980-

1990 the degree of segregation actually worsened (Goldsmith and Blakely 1992: 50).

Severe residential segregation is not restricted only to the largest cities (Goldsmith

and Blakely 1992). Even though segregation decreases by city size, it remains constant

according to population density. The index of racial segregation (Appendix 1, Table 18)

maintains a high level of about 57 percent, which even remains constant in metropolitan

areas with a population less than 100,000. In cities which are not considered to have high

racial tension, isolation can also be severe. As Milwaukee city alderman Michael McGee

states, the 1980s produced not only wealth, but despair. "The upscale buildings,

restaurants and museums downtown 'look beautiful. The other world is looking good.'

But given manufacturing job losses, ghetto unemployment, welfare increases, and

isolation, just 'go a few blocks and it changes before your eyes.' (Goldsmith and Blakely

1992:51)."

The statistics in Appendix 1, Table 18 concerning geographic segregation, income

and race are very revealing, however they underestimate the levels of isolation. Especially

by race and ethnicity, segregation of smaller neighborhoods is higher thereby indicating

block by block separation. Segregation among social institutions (e.g. school, churches) is

also extremely high. Further, poor people living in the poorest inner-city neighborhoods

are increasingly disconnected from the labor markets. A large number of people in high

poverty areas do not have jobs. In 1980, about three-quarters of these adults were out of

the labor force. Another 8 percent of these adults were officially unemployed (yielding

an unemployment rate of 29.6 percent), leaving only about 20 percent actually

maintaining a job. Contrast this 80 percent high poverty area jobless rate with the rates

for African Americans in central cities (50 percent) and suburban rings (33 percent) in

Appendix 1, Table 19.   Only 38.1 families in these high-poverty areas had income

whereas 61.1 percent received public assistance (Goldsmith and Blakely 1992).

In 1990, in the ghetto census tracts of the United States' one hundred largest

cities, there were only 65.5 employed persons for every 100 adults who did not hold a job

in a typical week. In comparison, the nonpoverty areas had 182.3 employed persons for

every hundred of those not working. Basically, the ratio of employed to jobless persons

was three times higher in nonpoor census tracts (Wilson 1996).

Segregated ghettos are less conducive to employment and employment

preparation than are other locations in the metropolis. Wilson (1996: 24) further describes

the negative effects of segregation:

> Segregation in ghettos exacerbates employment problems because it leads
> to weak informal employment networks and contributes to the social
> isolation of individuals and families, thereby reducing their chances of
> acquiring the human capital skills, including adequate educational training,
> that facilitate mobility in a society. Since no other groups in society
> experience the degree of segregation, isolation, and poverty concentration
> as do African Americans, they are far more likely to be disadvantaged
> when they compete with other groups in society, including other despised
> groups, for resources and privileges.

Not only are poor African Americans living in very highly concentrated areas, but

they also comprise very large proportions of the poor. In 1989, African Americans made

up 42 percent of all poor in central cities and 56 percent of the poor in central city poverty

areas. The number of poor African Americans in 'high poverty' areas grew 58.6 percent

between 1970 and 1980, whereas poor white people in these areas increased by only 1.6

percent. The numbers of female householders and children living in these households also

are higher in poverty concentrated neighborhoods. Camilo Jose Vergara describes the

'new ghettos' in the worst areas (Goldsmith and Blakely 1992 : 52), where:

> group homes for children and battered women share buildings with
> homeless families; drug treatment centers, methadone clinics, shelters,
> soup kitchens and correctional institutions are also springing up... (T)he
> new ghettos are defined by what they lack...(P)eople...are too
> disconnected to have formed effective organizations. The transient
> character of the majority of residents leaves such urban areas unclaimed,
> and thus politically powerless.

Through the utilization of 1986 Canadian census and 1980 United States Census,

Hajnal (1995) provides a more revealing comparative picture of the levels and location of

concentrated poverty. Furthermore, Hajnal identifies the race/ethnic character and the

social (e.g. gender) and economic (e.g. employment, education) characteristics of

concentrated urban poverty areas in Canada and United States. The most significant

finding of this study was that concentrated urban poverty in Canada is extensive. As

Appendix 1, Table 20 illustrates, in the 25 largest Canadian cities there were 689,175

people living in areas where poverty concentrations surpassed 40 percent in 1986. Among

the 225 census tracts, 313,560 people, or 1.2 percent of the national population (were

found to be concentrated urban poverty tracts). In comparison with the United States, in

absolute numbers, concentrated poverty is a greater problem in the United States. In 1980,

in America's 100 largest central cities there were 3,673,585 people and 1,834,384 poor

people living in concentrated urban poverty in the United States. However according to

the national percentage of the poor population, Canada has more poor people living under the conditions of concentrated urban poverty (1.2 vs 0.8 percent) than the United States. As Hajnal (1995) highlights, even though Canadian and American data are not strictly comparable, it is clear that Canada suffers almost the same or higher levels of concentrated poverty as the United States. Considering the lack of attention to concentrated poverty in Canada, this is an extremely astonishing finding indicating that urban poverty in Canada is a potentially serious and hidden social problem.

Appendix 1, Table 21 illustrates a strong association between concentrated poverty and race/ethnicity in both Canada and United States. In Canada, while the British are greatly underrepresented in concentrated poverty areas, the French, Blacks, and Aboriginal people are grossly over-represented in these areas. Although the British constitute 32.2 percent of the total urban population, only 16.5 percent are concentrated urban poor. In contrast, 41.7 percent of French people live in concentrated urban poor areas, yet they only constitute 29.2 percent of the population. The numbers for Blacks and Aboriginals are even more disturbing. Blacks and Aboriginals only make up 1.5 and 0.8 percent of the population respectively, however these groups comprise 3.0 and 2.8 percent of the concentrated urban poor. With the exception of the Chinese, other ethnic groups are evenly distributed or underrepresented among concentrated urban poverty areas (Hajnal 1995: 512).

The United States show similar race/ethnic patterns in urban poverty neighborhoods in Canada. Whites make up 57 percent of the inner-city population, however they only comprise 12 percent of the urban areas concentrated by poverty.

Conversely, Blacks and Hispanics are largely over-represented in the inner-city areas concentrated by poverty. Asians representing 3.2 percent of the total population, only make up 1.7 percent of the concentrated poverty areas. Appendix 1, Table 22 further substantiates the claim that there is a strong association between race and concentrated urban poverty in both Canada and United States. In Canada, Aboriginals, Blacks and French are more likely to be located in urban poverty tracts than are British. Similarly drawn from the United states data, Blacks and Hispanics are much more likely to dwell in areas concentrated by urban poverty than are Whites or Asians. Aboriginal people in Canada and Blacks in United States are the most disadvantaged with 18.6 percent and 20.0 percent of their populations respectively living in urban areas concentrated with poverty (Hajnal 1995).

Appendix 1. Figure 13 illustrates that characteristics such as race, age, employment status and family status all have strong correlations with being chronically poor in the United States. Examining Figure 13, the characteristics of being Black (15.1 percent), Hispanic (10.3 percent), under 18 years (8.3 percent), and living in a female householder family (17.2 percent) all increase the likelihood of being chronically poor. Further, based on people interviewed over a 2 year period, 22.7 million people who were poor in 1992 remained poor in 1993. Since the numbers of people who exited poverty (6.3 million) and entered poverty (6.5 million), were relatively the same, there was no significant increase in the number of poor people between 1992 and 1993. Appendix 1, Figure 14 shows characteristics associated with high exit rates. For example, people in married-couple families were more likely to exit poverty than people in other types of

families—28.6 percent versus 12.2 percent, respectively. Blacks were less likely than whites to exit poverty, and children and the elderly were less likely than non-elderly adults to exit poverty. Appendix 1, Figure 15 reveals the newly poor as a percent of the population that was not poor in 1992. Characteristics which are associated with high entry rates are generally the same as those associated with low exit rates. For instance, Blacks (6.7%) were more likely to become poor in 1993 than whites (2.6%). Also, female-householder families were almost four times as likely (6.2%) than people in other types of families to become poor (1.6%) (Eller 1996: 5).

Areas of concentrated poverty are extremely negative phenomenon since the situation is further exacerbated by a number of associated negative social dislocations. Hajnal (1995: 516) demonstrates that there is a strong link between concentrated urban poverty and a variety of social and economic deficiencies in Canada. In Appendix 1, Table 23 concentrated poverty areas differ greatly from other areas in Canada on almost all economic and social indicators. Even though it is anticipated that economic conditions will be worse in concentrated poverty areas, the extent of the variation is astonishing. Males in concentrated urban poverty neighborhoods are more than 20 percent less likely to be employed and 10 percent more probably to be out of the labor force altogether. Median male earning decreases by about half in the concentrated poverty tracts. The numbers for females and young workers are not as high, however, concentrated urban poverty areas are worse off in every other category. The strong association of education and concentrated poverty should be noted. The majority of residents in these poor neighborhoods have not completed high school, indicating a low cultivation of human

capital. Table 23 also illustrates that the condition of housing stock decreases as the neighborhood is more poor. Interestingly, immigration status appears to bear little relation to concentrated urban poverty.

Overall, concentrated poverty does not only mean being poor, it also means extreme levels of a number of social and economic dislocations. Massey and Denton (1993: 118) claim that "concentrated poverty is created by a pernicious interaction between a group's overall rate of poverty and its degree of segregation in society. When a highly segregated group experiences a high or rising rate of poverty, geographically concentrated poverty is the inevitable result." Wilson (1996) contends that segregation *does not fully* explain why the concentration of poverty in particular neighborhoods of this segregated group should increase to about three times the group's overall poverty rate increase. Disproportionate concentration of poverty and segregation compounds the neighborhoods vulnerability, however to focus mainly on segregation to account for the growth of concentrated poverty overlooks the dynamic aspects of social and demographic changed, such as joblessness, and turnover rates. It should be noted that further analysis of the Canadian population is required before more definitive statements about the long term effects of concentrated urban poverty on either levels of social dislocation or social isolation can be advanced. In future research it will be necessary to undertake both a time series and ethnographic sketch of concentrated urban areas in order to determine if these residents are truly isolated and alienated from the rest of Canadian society (Hajnal 1995: 516).

Housing Market

Race and ethnicity appear to make a difference in household net worth in United States. In 1993, white households had an average a net worth of $45,740, about 10 times that of Black households ($4,418) and Hispanic households ($4,656). According to the United States Bureau of Census (1995), any household whose net worth falls between $0 - $12.852 is considered to be within the bottom quintile of the income ladder. This indicates that a large percentage of Black and Hispanic households are owned by disadvantaged persons.

One important indicator of the quality of living conditions is the proportion of a population that live in crowded dwellings. In 1992, only 3.9 percent of Canadian households were overcrowded, i.e. one or more persons per room, whereas 8.6 percent of consumer units were overcrowded in the United States. According to Cheal (1996) families with children constitute an overwhelming majority of households with serious overcrowding problems in Canada and United States. Families with children accounted for 75.9 percent of Canadian households in 1992 where the number of persons per room was more than 50 percent of the national median. In the United States, families and children contributed 80.6 percent of consumer units in which the persons per room was also more than half the national average. Further, based on the conventional standard of overcrowding, 7 percent of Canadian families were overcrowded, while only 2 percent of families without children were overcrowded. Despite the declines in overall percent of overcrowded Canadian dwellings, the rates for Aboriginal dwellings are still considerably higher than the Canadian figure and gaps are increasing. Hagey et al (1989) revealed that

the percent of Aboriginals living off the reserve that were overcrowded increased between 1981 and 1986, from 10.5 percent to 11.3 percent. Even though only 2.6 percent of United States families were overcrowded in 1992, as many as 19.2 percent of families with children were overcrowded. In Canada overcrowding is a problem only among families with three or more children. However in the United States, overcrowding occurs in families with two children, yet almost half of families with three or more children are overcrowded. Having several children is obvious a serious disadvantage in the U.S. housing market.

Drawing from various Urban Poverty and Family Life Study (UPFLS) surveys conducted in 1987, 1988, 1989 - 1990, and 1993, W.J. Wilson (1996) provides various insights from residents in Chicago's poor inner-city neighborhoods. The African American respondents expressed negative feelings about their neighborhood in their stated preference to live elsewhere. When asked if they would prefer to live in their neighborhood, another neighborhood in Chicago, in the suburbs, or somewhere else, only 35 percent of the respondents living in poverty census tracts generally stated that they would prefer to live in their own neighborhood. As few as 23 percent of the respondents in the ghetto poverty tracts indicated a preference to their own neighborhood.

A 27 year old West Side mother of three explained why she chose to live in a neighborhood that she dislikes, "it's the only place I could afford to live at the time when I moved in." She further commented: "At the time when I moved I had two children and I've been here eleven years. No, I don't like it. At the present time I can't afford to move out. (Wilson 1996: 11)"

The same underlying issue was also stated by a 24 year old welfare mother of four children from the same neighborhood: "The reason I moved over here is because of the rent: it's very low, and I don't have to worry about the gas and light bills. No, I just don't like it over here. it's too many people, living around, living on top of each other. It's too much overcrowded."

Finally a welfare mother of three children from the same neighborhood stated: "Taxis don't want to come over here to get you and bring you back either. You know, friends from other places don't really want to come here. And you yourself, you don't want to invite intelligent people here: there's markings and there's writing on the walls, nasty—whatever." The overall feelings of the respondents in the UPFLS can be summed up by a 33 year old married mother of three from the extremely poor West Side neighborhood:

> If you live in an area in your neighborhood where you have people that don't work, don't have means of support, you know, don't have no jobs, who're gonna break in your house to steal what you have, to sell to get them some money, then you can't live in a neighborhood and try and concentrate on tryin' to get ahead, then you get to work and you have to worry if somebody's breakin' into your house or not. So, you know, it's best to try to move in a decent area, to live in a community with people that works. (Wilson 1996: 11)

Public housing policies have been the most likely significant factor in reinforcing suburbanization of employment and augmenting the growth of the concentration of the poor and minorities in the inner city (Hirsch 1983, Hajnal 1995). The governments in Canada and United States both assisted the growth of concentrated poverty by subsidizing suburban home ownership and by concentrating low-rent public housing in central city areas (CCSD, 1977; McGeary, 1989; Hajnal 1995). As a consequence, 63 percent of

Canadians and 60 percent of Americans were home owners in 1983 (Goldberg and Mercer 1986). On the other hand, only 14 percent of the households in Canada's central city areas were owned (Ram et al., 1989). Bickford and Massey (1991) indicate that government funded housing in the United States is a permanent institution for the isolation of black Americans. Bursik (1989) further indicates that federally funded planned construction of public housing projects continually in the same areas further destabilizes already unstable neighborhoods. thereby increasing these areas' crime rates. By exacerbating the concentration effects of poverty through government funded projects. businesses disinvestment in these areas have further intensified residential segregation.

Despite the spread of the growth of residential segregation, Timmer et al (1994) claim that there is not enough low income housing for the economically marginal in the United States. Not only do disadvantaged minorities struggle to move out of concentrated poverty areas, the housing markets further limit their choices of where to live. Also. there has been an absolute loss of low income units. From 1970 to 1989 the number of rental units for the poor declined 14 percent to 5.5 million while the number of poor (income less than $10,000) renters increased from 7.3 million to 9.6 million (Gugliotta 1992:A6) It is estimated that by the year 2003 the gap between individuals requiring low income units and the number of available units will be 7.8 million.

Timmer et all (1994) and Hajnal (1995) identified several factors affecting low income housing in United States and Canada—urban renewal, gentrification, slumlords, warehousing, racial discrimination, monopolization. Urban renewal by the government and the combined efforts of developers make housing very precarious for nonwhites. The

first phase of urban renewal was to identify areas considered as blighted in order to receive federal funds to rehabilitate and redevelop the area. Once the areas were designated and funded, all structures were demolished. This huge expanse of rebuilding facilitated the development of airports, colleges, medical centers, sports arenas, etc. The second phase of federal urban renewal included building replacement housing for those who lost their homes to the bulldozers. However, funds were not appropriated for this phase. thereby further pushing the disadvantaged into poor concentrated areas.   Di Leonardo (1992: 33) further describes the impact of urban renewal:

> The housing destroyed by urban renewal was never replaced, and two-thirds of those displaced were black or Hispanic. The real estate speculation spiral of the 1970s and the '80s was the poison cherry on the arsenic cake for poor minorities' housing aspirations, pricing them out of the private housing market just as the federal government abandoned its commitment to providing low cost housing. We white middle-class Americans know what housing price inflation has meant in our lives—higher and higher shares of income siphoned off, being unable to buy a house or apartment, or being ridiculously house-poor that you can't afford a meal out. Just imagine, then, what it has meant for those not only poor or working class but also minority, since it's well documented that high percentages of banks, landlords, and realtors still discriminate by race.

Burns (1993: 45) revealed that a comparison of all blacks with all whites in the United States demonstrated that blacks spend more on rent than whites. Overall, racial discrimination in the housing market denies minorities, especially African Americans, equal access to rental or ownership opportunities, they pay more than whites for similar housing, or they are steered in to segregated housing markets.

Another process contributing to the diminishment of low income housing is gentrification. Gentrification is the process of converting low income housing into

condominiums or upgrading apartments for the middle and upper classes. Gentrification usually includes purchasing older and sometimes run down property in disadvantaged neighborhoods and upgrading the land for profit. Often, the original poor residents of the area are displaced since they can no longer afford the increased rents, purchaser prices, insurance and property taxes associated with the neighborhoods rising property values. According to Clay (1979) about half the fifty-seven neighborhoods from thirty cities gentrified were predominantly black. After gentrification, 80 percent of the neighborhood was occupied by whites, whereas only 2 percent were nonwhite.

Slumlords also contributed to the housing shortage and abandoned buildings in the inner-city. Slumlords purchase rental properties located in poor neighborhoods and purposefully fail maintaining them. Usually, slumlords are middle class whites and the tenants are poor blacks. Due to the lack of maintenance, serious housing code violations develop over time-- roofs leak, stairways deteriorate, plumbing fails, and electrical wiring become hazardous. Basically, slumlords exploit the poor by taking as much rent as they can in a minimal low income unit market. In the end, the city condemns the buildings, evicts the residents, and takes over the property for delinquent taxes and unpaid utility bills, further decreasing population low density, and leaving a hollow shell for crack dens and other criminal activity.

Another housing market mechanism which contributes to the urban housing crisis is 'warehousing'. Real estate investors purchase property on the edges of gentrifying areas and slowly empty them by lack of maintenance or not renting units when tenants leave. The final objective is to sell these properties once gentrification has reached the

neighborhood for a substantial profit. Developers only reinforce this method by being especially attracted to these properties since they do not have to deal with the difficulties of removing poor and working-class leaseholders.

Another factor explaining the increasing lack of affordable rental housing is the 'rent squeeze' created by the monopolization of ownership of rental housing in the US. For instance, in both New York and Houston five percent of all landlords control more than one half of the rental unit stock. When rent is controlled by few, rents have a tendency to increase. The relatively high cost of rental units is not the only reason why poor renters in the inner city have difficulty paying for their rent. Food and commodities cost more since supermarkets, outlet malls etc. have by-passed the inner-city neighborhoods to the suburbs. Since most inner-city residents lack transportation to these large marketplaces, they must depend on small independent grocery stores which gives them monopoly powers. Thus the poor pay more. For instance, the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs stated that groceries cost 8.8 more in poor neighborhoods than in middle class neighborhoods, whereas in Chicago the poor paid 18 percent more (Schwadel 1992).

The asymmetrical relationship between owner and tenant, which is controlled by the formal and informal organization of landlords and by the bias of the legal system indicates that supply and demand factors do not shape the urban rental opportunities. Urban renewal, gentrification, slumlords, warehousing, racial discrimination, monopolization all contribute to the controlling factors of the housing market. Through these processes, many minorities are confined to a limited market and, especially for the

poor are forced into disorganized concentrated poverty areas surrounded by despair and violence.

"The Truly Disadvantaged"

The statistics on Black Americans are very disturbing: as a group they are statistically characterized by significantly less education, double the U.S. rate of unemployment, over triple the poverty rate, much lower average incomes, and virtually no wealth accumulation (Appendix 1, Table 24 and Figure 16). The social fabric is also unsettling—two-thirds of Black children are born to unwed mothers. The situation for Hispanic Americans is similar on the economic front, but more stable socially.

The economic situation for Black Canadians appears to be better, at least relative to incomes. Incomes are 85 percent of the overall Canadian average, in contrast with under 60 percent for Black Americans. However, the statistics concerning Aboriginal Canadians are as disturbing as the Black American situation (Appendix 1, Table 25). Recent "horror stories", including suicide rates, portray the low quality of life existing on the reserves in Canada. Average incomes are only 70 percent of the Canadian average, with over half of Aboriginal adults earning an annual income of less than $10,000. Participation in the labour force is the lowest for Indians on the reserves—it is almost triple the national average.

Characteristics of Aboriginal people who live on reserve are generally well documented, however there is an increasing number who live off the reserves about whom little is known. According to McDonald (1991) Aboriginals who are living

primarily outside native communities have even lower levels of educational attainment, higher unemployment rates and lower average incomes than Canadians.

Generally. Aboriginal people in Canada have achieved lower levels of education than the total Canadian population. In 1986, 41 percent of off reserve aboriginals aged 15 and over had only achieved less than grade 9 education, and only 2 percent have finished university. In comparison. 17 percent of Canadians aged 15 and over had less than grade 9 education and 10 percent completed university. Further, close to the Canadian population of 21 percent, 17 percent of Aboriginal people had some non-university postsecondary education (Mcdonald 1991: 5).

In comparison with the Canadian population, Aboriginals living off the reserve have a lower probability of participating in the labor force. In 1986, 66 percent of aboriginal men and 45 percent of aboriginal women participated in the labor force. Whereas 77 percent of all Canadian men and 55 percent of Canadian women participated in the labor force. Amongst the people who did participate in the labor force, Aboriginals were more likely than Canadians to be unemployed. In 1986. the unemployment rate for Aboriginals off the reserve (28 percent) was about triple the rate for Canadians (10 percent). Even though unemployment and participation rates indicate activity in the labor force, they do not reveal individuals who have stopped looking for work. A higher proportion of the male (34 percent) and the female (55 percent) Aboriginal population were not in the labor force, than were Canadians overall (23 percent for men and 44 percent for women) (McDonald 1991: 5).

Non-aboriginal Canadians accumulate a much higher income than Aboriginals. In 1985. the average income of Aboriginal men living off the reserve was $14,300 whereas the average of all Canadian men was $23,200. Aboriginal women earned an average of $9.000 while non-aboriginal women made an average income of $12,900. A more revealing picture of income inequality is portrayed when median incomes are compared. In 1985. 50 percent of Aboriginal men living off the reserve were earning less than $9.800. compared with 50 percent of all Canadian men earning less than $20,800. Aboriginal women living off the reserve was $7,200 while for all Canadian women. the figure was $10.800. These gaps between Aboriginal and all Canadian (or non-aboriginal) median income indicate that Aboriginal incomes are more concentrated at the lower levels when compared with the total population (McDonald 1991: 6).

More specifically. the inner-city people sampled in Laprairie's (1994) research are poorer. less skilled. and less educated than other Canadians, aboriginal and non-aboriginal alike. For instance, 9 percent of people aged 15 to 49 years in the inner city sample had a post-secondary education, compared with 33 percent of the aboriginal, and 50 percent of the Canadian population in the same group range. The inner-city group also showed higher levels of unemployment—63 percent overall compared with about 25 percent for aboriginal and 10 percent for all Canadians. These differences are even more extreme when groups are identified by inner-city strata, for instance 85 percent of individuals experiencing chronic poverty are unemployed and 51 percent in the same group have grade nine or less education.

Due to poverty and out-migration from reserves, the concentration of native

people in the inner city cores of Canadian cities is increasing. Further life off the reserve is marked by instability. From 1982 to 1986, 61 percent of the Aboriginal population aged 5 and over had moved, compared with 44 percent of the general Canadian population (Mcdonald 1991: 3) Amongst the Canadian natives in the inner city surveyed by Laprairie (1994) loneliness and alienation were the most serious problems on arrival in the city, followed by employment and housing. The combination of the lack of skills and opportunities, often exacerbated by alcohol and other personal problems, makes the inner city the only available option. "Personal factors, including a lack of education and skills, living in a socially disorganized area and discrimination based on racial stereotypes (reinforced by the visibility of certain races in downtown areas of cities) create structural barriers to opportunities.(p.232)" Adaptations to this environment of inner city life in order to survive often creates situations which usually involves the criminal justice system.

The Feminization of Poverty

In comparison with other Western industrialized nations, single-mother American households, in relation to the average household, are the most disadvantaged. Provided by Garfinkel and Mclanahan (1994), the first column in Appendix 1, Table 26 illustrates that 53 percent of single-mother families in United States receive income less than 50 percent of the median family income. Respectively, the percentages for Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom are 45, 16, 25, 7, 6, and 18. Main contributors to single-parent households are divorces (Appendix 1, Figure 17) and out-of-wedlock births (Appendix 1, Table 27). On the average, the number of divorces

per year in Canada is 80,000 and 1 million in the United States. In the mid 1980s, 28

percent of Canadian marriages ended in divorce compared with 43 percent for Americans.

Recent data suggests that the percent of marriages expected to divorce in Canada is now

approaching 40 percent, whereas United States percent has remained relatively constant.

The typical American woman is bringing a fraction more babies into the world today than

Canadian women. However, the largest difference in child bearing is shown in the age of

the child-bearers. American women are having their children at an earlier age—the birth

rate for American teenagers is double the rate of Canadian teenagers (Appendix 1, Figure

18). Americans are more likely to have children while they are single. Approximately 30

percent of American babies are born to an unwed mother while only 25 percent of

Canadians fit this category The American ratio is under 20 percent for white women, and

over 60 percent for black women. The highest group rate for Canada is aboriginals at

about 50 percent. Among the off reserve Aboriginal families, 23 percent were headed by

lone parents, in comparison with 12 percent of all Canadian families. Female headed

households constituted 87 percent of the Aboriginal lone parent households, whereas all

Canadian lone parent families were headed by women (Mcdonald 1991: 4) According to

Hagey et al (1989) Aboriginal single parent households off the reserve are nine times

more likely than the national average to be headed by women than men. Due to gender

inequality, female householders find it difficult to co-ordinate parental responsibilities,

such as financially providing basic needs and adequate supervision. For instance in 1993,

a single Canadian parent needed to work 73 hours a week at minimum wage to bring the

family income up to the poverty line. This difficult situation of single parenting is further

amplified by young single mothers lacking the basic mature repertoire of raising a child since they are children themselves.

Due to America's false concern with discouraging dependence on government aid, about half of single poor mothers do not qualify to receive assistance from the government (i.e. AFDC, Food Stamps, Medicaid), whereas the other half that receive help, do not get enough to raise them above the poverty line. More importantly, many of the highly invested programs do not even aim to reduce poverty (Burtless 1994). Most programs are presumably tailored to assist certain demographic groups for specific purposes. However, most people who seek and need assistance are denied access. For instance, the form of national health insurance for families with children in America, Medicaid restricts almost all its benefits for families headed by single mothers receiving AFDC benefits. Since America is fearful of dependency, the United States is the only country in the world which does not offer cash allowances for all children. Instead, they provide a deduction of approximately $2,300 per child for the purposes of federal income tax liability. "The deduction is worth about $300 per year to taxpayers in the lowest bracket, about $700 to tax payers in the top bracket, and is worth nothing to families whose incomes are so low that they owe no taxes. (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1994: 210)"In contrast to aid families with dependent children (AFDC), social security insurance (SSI), Food Stamps, and Medicaid, which as an entitlement program, offers benefits to anyone who has the appropriate income, assets, and demographic criteria, housing benefits are extremely limited (Danziger and Weinberg 1994). As a result, the lack of government generosity for the disadvantaged in the United States is pushing the

poor further away from the American mainstream and into alienated homeless lives. In Appendix 1, Table 26, the international comparisons reveal that overly generous public aid does not have any effect on the prevalence of single parenthood. An interesting fact is that Canada and Germany in Table 26 have dependency rates which are close to the United States results, however they do appear to be dealing better with reducing economic insecurity. Even though the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have high rates of dependency, they are also more successful than the United States in reducing economic insecurity. Thus the United States must solve their dilemma of whether to minimize economic insecurity by increasing dependence on government aid.

America could learn a great deal from examining policies of other countries. Western European countries and Canada invest their welfare budget primarily on non-income-tested programs (e.g. daycare) than on income tested programs. Income tested programs account for 70 percent of the U.S. transfers to female headed households, compared with 53 percent in Canada, 55 percent in France, 34 percent in Germany, 63 percent in the Netherlands, 45 percent in Sweden, and 51 percent in the United Kingdom. Internationally, United States spends the least amount on day care of any industrialized nations (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1994: 210). France and Sweden do not have high rates of dependence because they invest heavily in daycare, which promotes work and discourages dependence. As a result, most single mother in these two nations invest their time working outside the home thereby contributing to their own economic support. (1994: 215) In order to encourage economic security and independence while "minimizing prevalence will require a much greater commitment of public funds than

Americans have heretofore been willing to make. In income security policy, as in most of

life. we get what we pay for (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1994: 225)."

Summary

Social structure plays a vital role in shaping the relationship among race, ethnicity,

poverty. and inequality. Canada and United States are both deeply characterized by

inequalities related to race, ethnicity and economics. Across both nations there is

persistent poverty, and minorities, especially among single parent females, are

disproportionately represented the poor. Canada's paternalistic tendencies offer greater

government assistance than the United States to partly alleviate the distressing conditions

of poverty.   However. economic changes in both countries have developed a new

phenomenon known as the new urban poverty (Walker 1996).

As Hajnal (1995) concludes. in contrast with other current research which

suggests discussed that income for Canada's CMAs is increasing or that Canada's inner-

cities are attracting higher income families (Stats Can, 1993; Ram et al., 1989). this

section has presented revealing information that a large. concentrated population is being

dismissed. While cities and inner cities may excel on certain social indicators, many

neighbourhoods in Canada's cities are still suffering. Across the nation in 1986, 689,175

Canadians were living in census tracts exceeding 40 percent of the poverty rate— just less

than half of this population (313,560) were both poor and living in a concentrated urban

area. This surprisingly indicates that as a proportion of the national population, that

Canada has more disadvantaged individuals in concentrated urban poverty than does the

United States. Nonetheless in absolute numbers, United States has larger areas

concentrated with poverty thereby further contributing to the degree of segregation. Another element revealed about concentrated urban poverty is that tracts which have been categorized as concentrated urban poverty neighbourhoods are not only poor but also are lacking in almost all senses—welfare dependency, educational deficiencies, labour force non-participation, domestic violence, and other social dislocations which may create a permanent cycle of poverty. Even for the residents who are not poor, the risk factors growing from this accumulated atmosphere of negative influences increases the chance of being caught in a cycle of poverty.

The housing market is another significant element which facilitates suburbanization of unemployment and increases the growth of the concentration of the poor and subordinate groups in the inner city. Not only do disadvantaged individuals have to contend with the negative influences which surround them, they are also virtually forced without any choice to live in these areas. The dynamics of public housing policies, urban renewal, gentrification, slumlords, warehousing, racial discrimination, and monopolization all manipulatively contribute to the spread of the disorganized growth of concentrated poverty and residential segregation in Canada and United States.

According to Massey and Denton (1994), race plays an integral part in increasing the probability of one's chances of living in concentrated urban poverty. For the small visible minority population in Canada and the minorities in United States race and discrimination appear to be of paramount importance. In particular, Blacks and Aboriginals in Canada, and Blacks and Hispanics in United States appear to be the 'truly disadvantaged'. Blacks in Canada are almost four times more likely to be found in

concentrated poverty areas than the British Canadians. About one out of every five

Aboriginals lives in concentrated poverty areas; whereas in the United States about seven

out of eight minority group members are living in metropolitan area ghettos. The problem

of concentrated urban poverty and its association with racial minorities is not unique to

the United States. The fact that both Canada and United States are suffering from similar

social structural problems (i.e. poverty, inequality, concentrated urban poverty,

unemployment, residential segregation etc.) indicates that specific structural

developments in both countries is the key for further understanding and research.

Chapter 5: Crime Comparisons Across Nations

Violent crime is a major decaying factor in localized areas of the inner city. Interpersonal trust and moral cohesion which once existed are undermined by an atmosphere of distrust, alienation, fear, and as crime finally permeates the area, further deteriorating social organization. Rampant criminal activity in a neighborhood is the ultimate accelerating factor of complete physical and psychological withdrawal from community life, deteriorated informal social control processes, decline in organizational life which all lead to complete societal break down. Within these disadvantaged communities, survival is often a frustrating struggle and families must adapt to the lower circumstances and opportunities that they encounter. As illustrated in the previous chapter, lack of human and social capital created by structural barriers undeniably leads to poverty—the barometer of developing social inequalities. Inequalities producing deprivation, marginalization, isolation, and exploitation place millions at risk of social and economic disadvantage throughout their lives. This environment of deprived opportunity leads individuals to reconstruct their methods for capital accumulation through crime. Through a discussion of crime, the racial divide in the justice system, policing, incarceration, suicide and homicide, and oppositional culture, the 'true' levels of societal decay among the disadvantaged and subordinate groups in the United States and Canada will be assessed.

General Cross National Comparisons of Crime

Compared with other industrialized nations with similar rates of crime, the United States leads the world by imprisoning 555 out of 100,000 of its citizens. The imprisonment

rate in the United States is about five times the rate of Canada and Australia and seven times the rate of most developed European nations (Appendix 1, Figure 19). It is often assumed that the United States has a high rate of incarceration because of a high crime rate, in reality the overall crime rate in the US is not extraordinary. The one exception is Homicide (Appendix 1, Table 28). Mainly due to the prevalence of firearms (Appendix 1, Figure 20), the United States has about 22,000 homicides per year, which is approximately 10 times the per capita murder rate of most European countries. Many comparable countries such as Australia and Canada actually have higher rates of victimization than America for certain crimes. For the crime of assault with force, 2.2 percent of Americans are victimized per year, in contrast with 2.2 percent of Canadians and 2.8 percent of Australians. For robbery, 1.7 percent of Americans are victimized yearly; in Spain it is 2.9 percent. For car theft, the US rate is 2.3 percent; Australia is 2.7 percent and England is 2.8 percent (Appendix 1, Figure 21). Further, van Dijk and Mayhew (1993) also reveal (Figure 22) that Americans are more fearful of street crime (41.0 percent) than are Canadians (20.0 percent). However, the percentage of houses protected by burglar alarms are similar (Appendix 1, Figure 23). The United States does not appear to have more crime than other industrialized countries, rather it has a *different character and perception of crime.*

Amongst industrialized countries, with the exception of homicide, the United States had the highest crime rate in only one out of fourteen offenses measured—attempted burglary. However, due to the prevalence of firearms on the streets, Americans lead internationally in the proportion of violent crime resulting in injury. Thus it is not the United States high violent crime rates which lead to their high incarceration rates—22,000

homicides per year can not account for the 1.5 million people imprisoned. Rather, American

rates of incarceration can be attributed to their exceedingly harsh treatment of people

convicted of lesser crimes (Appendix 1, Figure 24), such as the war on drugs (Danziger

1996).

Despite the United States victimization rates being non-extraordinary, Americans

have the highest level of fear. It is not the amount of crime, but rather the amount of

violence that adds to their fear. Statistically, only about 8 percent of victims of violent crime

in the United States went to the hospital emergency room. Most were released immediately

or on the same day. Of all the victims of violent crime only 1 percent are hospitalized for

one day or more (Danziger 1996: 12)

According to the Solicitor General, crime in Canada costs an estimated $14 billion

per year. Eight billion of this amount is invested into the visible costs of the justice

system. including police, prisons, the courts and legal aid, and six billion covers the

invisible costs of insurance claims, theft, shoplifting—not to mention the high costs of

human pain and suffering, and loss. "Crime is expensive, deadly and increasing. (Snydott

1996: 125)"

In the United States with ten times the population and three times the violent

crime rate, crime costs approximately 425 billion a year. This amount includes $90 billion

on criminal justice (police, the courts, prisons), $65 billion on private protection (security

systems, alarms, guards), $50 billion in urban decay (the cost of lost jobs and fleeing

residents), $45 billion in property crime (the loss of stolen goods), $5 billion in medical

care for victims of crime, $170 billion in shattered lives (the economic value of lost and

broken lives): total 425 billion (Synott 1996).

Youths (aged 12 - 17) are responsible for approximately one quarter of all recorded crime in Canada, including about 14% of all violent crime and 7% of the homicides. A total of almost 127,000 youth were charged in 1993. Only 8% of the population are aged 12 and 17, thus they are three times over represented as criminals. As with adult crime, most of the youths charged were male. However, female youths have higher charge rates than female adults. Youths are more criminal than adults now, however overall levels of violence appear to be rising: 17% of all youth charged in 1993 were accused of violence, almost doubling from 9% in 1986. Further, there appears to be a small minority of the population who are responsible for a majority of the offenses. For instance, in Canada about 13 percent of young males are charged with six or more offenses and are responsible for nearly half (44%) the total number of charges laid. Similar patterns have been noted in Philadelphia where only a small minority of offenders (18%) were held accountable for a majority (52%) of the offenses. As Syndott (1996) states this can be described as "the tyranny of the minority"

Even though African Americans have an overall higher rate of victimization than whites (Appendix 1, Figures 25, 26, 27), African American youth are at particular risk. In 1992, the violent victimization rate for African American males age sixteen to nineteen was double the rate for white males and three times the rate for white females. The majority of these incidents involved serious violent crime—rapes, robberies, and assaults. One out of every fourteen African American males age twelve to fifteen was the victim of a violent crime in 1992; for those aged sixteen to nineteen the rate was one out of six; for those aged

twenty to twenty four the rate was one out of eight. The large majority of these incidents were intraracial events in nature (Walker 1996, O'Brien 1987).

Further, young black males had a higher likelihood of being victims of crimes involving weapons, particularly handguns (Appendix 1, Figure 28). From 1987 to 1992 the average annual rate of handgun victimization in the United States was 39.7 per 1,000 for African Americans age sixteen to nineteen age group, 29.4 for those in the twenty to twenty four age group. The comparable rates for white males were 9.5 for sixteen to nineteen year olds and 9.2 for those age twenty to twenty four (Rand 1994).

The Racial Divide in Crime

Despite the historical events experienced by Blacks in Britain and the United States or Aboriginal populations in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, readings concerning the effects of culture and socio-economic marginality reveal an underlining motif within these groups. Literature suggests that people from the most disadvantaged areas of society are most likely to be over represented in prison populations (Laprairie 1995). These people who are desperate are not always rational, and they take chances ordinary criminals would not risk, thus negatively impacting the public's sympathy and increasing racial discrimination for their condition. A white American police officer offered the following insight of how the public views poverty: "See, this is a mostly black neighbourhood. And I have a belief that if you took this problem [substance abuse and poverty] and didn't change a thing with it and put in the middle of an all-white neighbourhood, you would get a much larger reaction to the problem. It would be much more extensive. Because to a large extent white people in the city don't care if black

people use crack. As long as they don't come into their neighbourhood and rob them, they (whites) don't give a shit. I believe that. Because it's here where there's a lot of poor people and a lot of black people, nobody cares. Or damn few care. (Anderson 1992: 252)"

In Canada, Aboriginals face a similar disadvantaged situation although less extreme to American Blacks. Nearly every problem related to criminal justice issues involves matters of race and ethnicity. Walker et al (1996) and other authorities provide some examples of the current crisis:

In the United States....

- Despite the fact that Blacks represent only 12 percent of the American population, half of all prisoners in the United States (50.2 percent by 1993) are African American. Appendix 1, Figure 29 and Table 29 illustrates the racial disparity in imprisonment in the United States. Drawn from the Sentencing Project, the incarceration rate for blacks by the end of 1993 was 1,947 per 100,000, compared with 306 per 100,000 for whites— a disparity of more than 7 to 1.

- Hispanics were 17 percent of all prisoners in 1991 (up from only 12.6 in 1986), even though they are only 9 percent of the population.

- Even though African Americans and white Americans use cocaine and marijuana at roughly the same rate (Appendix 1, Figure 30), African Americans suffer five times the number of arrests of whites for these drugs (Figure 31) (Donziger 1996, US Department of Commerce 1995).

- About 40 percent of the people currently on death row and 53 percent of all the people executed since 1930, are African American (Appendix 1, Figure 32).

- The riot that devastated Los Angeles in May 1992, leaving over 50 people dead and over $750 million worth of property destroyed was an expression of outrage over perceived racial injustice: an all-white jury had acquitted four white police officers of beating Rodney King, an African American.

- A disproportionate number of African Americans are shot and killed by police. Young African American men are the primary victims of "police brutality."

- Since the mid-1960s, crime has been a central issue in American politics. For many white Americans, the crime issue is an expression of racial fears: fear of victimization by African American offenders, fear of racial integration of neighborhoods.

In Canada....

- Even though Indians only compose about 2 to 3 percent of the population in Canada, native males constitute 10.8 percent and female natives constitute 19.8 percent of the prison population (Sacco and Kennedy 1994). The imprisonment rates are disproportionately high: 25 times higher for Indian men than non-Indian men, and 88 times higher for Indian women than for non-Indian women (Synott 1996).

- Furthermore, Indians perpetrate 17 percent of the murder incidents in Canada (Kennedy and Silverman 1992)

- Alcohol abuse levels of Natives, highly associated with violence, are estimated to be between 35% and 40% of the adult population and 10% to 15% for adolescents (Synott 1996). According to Laprairie (1994) about 64% of offenses committed by Natives involve alcohol.

- Disadvantaged Natives from the inner-city are involved in the criminal justice system at an early age and have been victimized more frequently and more seriously than other Canadians. In the inner-city sample, 92% of males and 68% of females have been charged with a Criminal Code offense at some time in their lives, 41% had two or more charges, and 21% had one or two charges (Laprairie 1994).

- According to Laprairie (1994), the majority of inner-city Natives surveyed across Canada described treatment by the police as being rude (males 15%, females 24%), verbally abusive (males 18 %, females 13%), or/and physically abusive (males 29 %, 13% females).

In the United States, and in Canada, race plays an important part in crime. The issue of race developed through the disproportionate incarceration of Blacks in the U.S. and Aboriginals in Canada and their shared economic marginality (Laprairie 1994: 172). However little exploration of race and crime has commenced since:

> ...the discussion of race is mired in an unproductive mix of controversy and silence. At the same time that articles on age and gender abound, criminologists loathe to speak openly on race and crime for fear of being misunderstood or labelled as racist. The situation is not unique, for until recently scholars of urban poverty also consciously avoided discussion of race and social dislocations in the inner city lest they be accused of blaming the victim. And when this is breached, criminologists have reduced the crime debate to simplistic culture versus social structure argument which criminologists have, with few exceptions, abdicated seriously scholarly debate on race and crime (Sampson and Wilson 1993: 1 - 2).

Police and Minorities

The police represent society's formal and legitimate means of social control. Their role can be described as protecting law-abiding citizens from dangerous situations, by both

preventing crime and targetting likely criminals. Precisely how well the police do in

fulfilling the public's expectations is strongly related to how they view the neighborhood

and the people who live there (Anderson 1992). The police play a far more visible role in

minority neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods. An African American or an

Aboriginal is much more likely than a white to see or have personal contact with a police

officer. Although some research indicates that a person's demeanour is often more

significant in determining police action than social status as measured by age, race,

gender, or social class, Norris et al (1993: 4) suggests that the quantity and quality of law

enforcement that citizens receive, both as victim and suspect, reflects the underlying

pattern of social stratification in society. The importance of this issue for an inner-city

population is critical because this group represents the most socially, politically, and

economically powerless group in society. As Comack (1993: 32) suggests: when an

individual's life chances are poor regardless of race, their likelihood of coming into

contact with the law will be increased (Laprairie 1994: 63)

Walker et al. (1996: 90) identifies several reasons why police departments routinely

assign more patrol officers to minority and low-income neighborhoods. First, the principles

of police management require officers to be assigned to certain areas on the basis of the

number of reported crimes and calls for service. Second, racial minority neighborhoods

appear to have higher crime rates. According to the National Crime Victimization Survey

(NCVS), African Americans are robbed about two and a half times as often as whites, the

victims of rape are almost twice as frequent, and the burglary rate is about 30 percent

higher.

Third, race, ethnicity, and poverty interact with respect to victimization. The robbery rate is about three times higher (9.6 versus 3.3 per 1,000) and the burglary rate is about twice as high (80.8 versus 41.4 per 1,000) for every poor compared with the advantaged population. Since racial minorities are disproportionately represented among the poor, they are most likely to be victims of crime as a result of their economic status.

Fourth, minorities and low income people are more likely to call the police for both crime and non crime events. The NCVS data show that African Americans report 37 percent of all crimes, in contrast to 34 percent for white Americans. Even though this is a small difference, the public opinion polls might lead one to expect African Americans to report less to the police. Meanwhile, low income people, "regardless of race, are heavy users of police services for non-crime situations. (90)" They are more likely to call the police for assistance with family problems, medical emergencies, and other difficulties than are middle class Americans. However Anderson (1992) illustrates a different perception which African Americans have towards the police: "On the streets, colour coding often works to confuse race, age, class, gender, incivility, and criminality, and it expresses itself most concretely in the person of the anonymous black male... he is usually an ambiguous figure who arouses the utmost caution and is generally considered dangerous until he proves he is not." Through this generalization, police scrutinize and harass young black men and blacks in the neighborhood are suspicious and are particularly wary of the police.

Anger, frustration, and a sense of hopelessness and despair at being rejected and unprotected by the dominant society dictate much of daily life and personal activity. It is not surprising that contacts with police, the ultimate authority figure, are often fractious.

But these contacts are not necessarily without consequences for those perceived to resist

police authority. Norris et al (1993: 27) suggest that those who challenge police authority

are 'taught ' that the consequences of non-compliance are brusque and belittling

treatment. Bayley (1994) provides a broader analysis of what underlies police action in

certain situations in the United States. Police believe that the disrespectful ones need 'to

be taught a lesson;' they 'can't be allowed to get away with it.' This is particularly true if

such people fit the stereotype of the chronic offender-- young, black, male. Police talk

quite openly about people who 'flunk the big A,' meaning the attitude test. People with a

'bad attitude' are not only threatening to police individually, they constitute a symbolic

attack on law itself (Laprairie 1994:63). A 22 yr old inner city Canadian male provides

some insights:

> The police were polite and respectful to me until they saw my band card in
> my wallet. They called me 'savage,' asked me if I thought I was tough.
> Three cops came in and beat me in the holding cells. They had leather
> gloves on and I had handcuffs. They kept calling me 'savage,' hit me over
> the head with flashlights, broke my nose, cut my head open with the
> flashlights-- I needed stitches in my head. They wanted to charge me with
> 'assaulting a police officer' but my lawyer saw what they did to me and
> they reduced it to resisting arrest. I knew they were going to beat me
> because they were wearing leather gloves and when I was picked up
> before... they wore leather gloves when they beat me. (Laprairie 1994: 424
> - 425)

Canadian inner-city natives, especially individuals from the most disadvantaged

segments, offer a contrasting perception concerning their own victimizations and about

reporting these to the police. Since many of the inner city Natives are offenders one day and

victims the next, their relationships are often tenuous with the police. They do not believe

that police serve them nor that they have access to police protection. They often feel labeled

as offenders, thereby leading to the assumption that their victimizations will not be taken seriously. Even worse, they believe that reporting will make them vulnerable to further victimization (Laprairie 1994: 86). Moreover, inner-city natives did not report victimizations either because they did not think the offence important enough, did not want to 'rat', wanted to 'settle own scores', (one mother of four said that if her daughter was molested she wouldn't go to the police--she would kill the person or nearly beat him to death), or were afraid of retribution. A 46 year old native with a long history of serious injury victimizations said he did not report because: " If you report someone to the police you are called a 'rat' and could end up dead. If I report I'll get it worse. You know what a rat is eh? I might have ended up in the river." (Laprairie 1994: 34, 35)

According to Chambliss (1994: 191, 192) a police officer's career and even his annual income is based upon the number of 'good collars' he makes. A 'good collar' is defined as an arrest for a serious violation of the law that results in a conviction. Drug arrests qualify. They are among the easiest convictions, the most difficult to defend, and usually result in the longest prison terms as a result of mandatory sentencing. However, these convictions are only organizationally effective if the person arrested is relatively powerless. Arrests of white middle class offenders are guaranteed to cause the organization and the arresting officers strain, since individuals with political influence and money hire attorneys for their defense. Arrests of poor minorities create rewards for the organization and the officer as the cases are quickly processed through the justice system leading to incarceration. Organizations reward role occupants whose behavior maximizes rewards and minimizes strains for the organization. Thus in a class society, "the powerless, the poor, and

those who fit in the public stereotype of "the criminal" are the human resources needed by

law enforcement agencies to maximize rewards and minimize strains." It is not surprising

then, that increasing the number of police officers has: tripled the number of individuals in

prison and jail, filled these institutions with minor offenders, exacerbated the

disproportionate imprisonment of minorities, and institutionalized racist beliefs (which is

further reinforced by the media) that make being a young African American or Native

synonymous with being criminal.

Thus through these negative conceptions towards policing disadvantaged

neighborhoods, the controversy of policing and over-policing racial minority, and/or

disadvantaged neighborhoods arises. The famous American novelist James Baldwin wrote,

"The only way to police a ghetto is to be oppressive... [the officer] moves through Harlem

like an occupying soldier in bitterly hostile country." However, as argued by other African

Americans, there are not enough police assigned to their neighborhoods; police do not

respond quickly to their calls; and police do not take crimes against African Americans

seriously. In 1993, 74 percent of African Americans believed that police protection in their

neighborhoods was worse than in white neighborhoods. Also, 41 percent of whites agreed

that black neighborhoods received worse protection. In a Gallup poll in 1993, 41 percent of

blacks and 43 percent of whites 'strongly favored' putting 'more police in the street.' Only

14 percent whites and 15 percent blacks opposed the idea (Walker et al 1996: 91).

Then why does there appear to be a contradiction between simultaneous complaints

of too little and too much policing? According to Walker et al. (1996: 91), complaints of

overpolicing or harassment are usually made by young males who are more likely to be

stopped, questioned, frisked, and arrested on the street. Complaints of too little policing are voiced by individuals who experience domestic violence in which officers fail to arrest. Police officers are more likely to perceive young men on the street as "threats to their authority and need to be 'controlled'." Whereas women involved in a domestic violence situation are more likely to be viewed as powerless victims whose problems can be overlooked. Generally, this contradictory role of the police in disadvantaged neighborhoods can be explained in terms of contextual discrimination—certain contexts produce excessive police response (e.g. a group of young males on a street corner), while others generate an equally discriminatory inadequate response (e.g. domestic violence).

Extreme Acts of Aggression—Suicide and Homicide

In Canada suicide is a major social problem-- 3,709 people committed suicide in 1992, giving a rate of 13.3 per 100,000 (see also Appendix 1, Table 27). Suicide is the fourth leading cause of death (life time risk) in Canada for individuals between the ages of 15 and 69 (5 percent of the population), however it is the second leading cause of death for young males (15 - 34 yrs) and females (15 - 29yrs). In the United States, 30,484 people committed suicide in 1992, giving the rate of 12.0 per 100,000. Suicide is the 8th leading cause of death for all ages in America, however following homicide, it is the third leading cause of death for individuals between the age of 15 to 24 years. One may think that homicide is far more a serious problem than suicide, yet there were 'only' 630 homicides in Canada in 1993—one-sixth the total number of suicides. In the United States the overall rate for homicide was 10 per 100,000, and suicide was 12.0 in 1992. Even though suicide and homicide are different acts of violence both can be considered as

expressions of frustration aggressive.

According to Linsky et al. (1995), the stressfulness of the social environment was found to be linked to suicide and homicide, which are perhaps the ultimate forms of inward or outward acts of aggression. When the analyses were replicated for specific types of homicide, they found that socially generated stress created by structurally blocked opportunities (see Merton 1964) was a principle factor for family and acquaintance homicide, but not for homicide among strangers. Economic deprivation and social control were both able to explain stranger homicide. However, social stress was the principle theoretical indicator that was significantly related to all methods of killing and self destructive behaviour.

With regard to the Indian population (Royal Commission on Aboriginal People 1994). Lafromboise and Bigfoot (1988) offer an American graphic description of suicide:

> It reflects the hopelessness of trapped and imprisoned souls. It is an unwillingness to continue suffering... According to many American Indians, whose lives have been affected by the governmental goal of assimilating them into general ethos of American life, suicide can be construed as the ultimate act of freedom. It is an act that defies governmental control and challenges dominant society to face up to its irresponsibility in meeting treaty agreements for health, education, and welfare.

Appendix 1, Figure 33 illustrates the suicide death rates by race/ethnicity in the United States. The picture shown here is one that is quite different from Appendix 1, Figure 34. American Indian suicide rates are the highest average between 1968 to 1977 when compared with the White or the Black population, with whites barely surpassing them after 1978. The Black population has consistently maintained the lowest annual suicide rate of the three racial/ethnic groups. As stated by Bachman (1992) these figures illustrate

an interesting juxtapositional image. It seems that the Black population has the highest rate of turning aggression outward in the form of homicide. On the other hand, whites have a higher tendency to turn their aggression inward in the form of suicide. Consistently over time American Indians have the highest rates of both internal and external aggression. In addition, Appendix 1, Figure 35 illustrates that homicide victims in all ethnic/race groups have a higher probability of being acquaintances.

In order to further illuminate the above statement, in Appendix 1, Table 30, Bachman quantified the three racial/ethnic groups propensity to commit suicide/homicide [suicide rate/(suicide rate + homicide rate)]. For instance, the larger the ratio, the greater the incidence of suicide for a population category, whereas a small ratio score indicates a greater incidence of homicide. A ratio of .5 shows no difference in the propensity to commit homicide or suicide. Over time, this table clearly shows that whites are more likely to direct their frustrations inward in the form of suicide than homicide. Conversely, Blacks had the lowest ratio scores therefore indicating that they are more likely to commit homicide than suicide. Since the American Indian ratio scores hovered around the .5 level, it appears that this population has a nondiscriminating tolerance for both internal and external acts of violence. Drawn from these findings, it appears that each racial/ethnic group, which may be both linked historically or to their present quality of life, are culturally more tolerant of particular acts of violence.

According to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1995), the suicide rate for Aboriginal people in Canada has been higher than the general population throughout the last 30 to 40 years. In the past 10 to 15 years, the suicide rate has been on

average approximately 3 times higher. Presently, statistics place the suicide rate for registered Indians at 3.3 times the national average and for Inuit at 3.9 times the national average. Figure 36 shows the consistency of the gap between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal rates. Appendix 1, Figure 37 illustrates an approximation of the Canadian Indian murder rate compared with the total murder rate in Canada. Drawn from this figure, the murder rate for Canadian Indians climactically rises between 1961 and 1975. In 1978 and 1979 the rate peaks at more than ten times the national population rate-- above 30 per 100,000. Further, Silverman and Kennedy (1993) claim that Canadian Indians are more likely to commit murder in nonmetropolitan areas (20.9 percent) than metropolitan areas (5.7 percent). Since about 65 percent of Canadian Indians live on reserves, these figures indicate that these murders are more likely to be interracial in nature. Through rough comparison of Appendix 1, Figure 36 and 37, one can also conclude that similar to the American Indians, Canadian Indians have a nondiscriminating tolerance for both internal and external acts of violence.

Qualitative Dimension of Crime: Reconstruction of Capital Accumulation.

The human community is viewed as a dynamic adaptive system where competition serves as a primary organizing agent. Under the pressure of competition, each individual or group must develop residential and functional niches in which they can best survive and flourish. Thus by individuals increasing their human capital through education and employment, the communities' social capital also evolves through the integration of individuals into larger social settings. Through structural inequality the allotment of capital

accumulation is distorted, thereby creating the setting for some individuals to subculturally adapt the development of residential and functional niches in order to survive. Thus through the ironic reversal of capital accumulation, a new cultural capital is formed— an oppositional culture.

Due to the structurally denied situation of the disadvantaged, certain subgroups form an oppositional subculture against the mainstream. This street-oriented subculture is often violent, however it reconstructs the pathways of social, cultural and human capital accumulation— the thriving underground economy offers disadvantaged youth a mixture of success, along with a certain thrill, power and prestige. While research describing inner city areas, especially concerning subcultural adaptations, are notably absent in Canada, there is a large body of American literature on the relationship between inner-city life, crime and oppositional culture. Through the presentation of United States literature describing the dynamics of oppositional culture within inner city areas, a clear foundation will be established for identifying similar recapitalizing aspects, provided by Laprairie (1994), in Canada.

Structural Confinement and Recapitalization through the Underground Economy

Through observation of the socio-economic position of Natives in Canada, one can find that similar conditions of poverty are unknown to the majority of Canadians. According to A. Borovoy (Nagler 1974: 107):

> The poverty of the Indians staggers the imagination of the white man. It simply drains our mental resources to conceive of how technological Canada have Indian homes that are devoid of such elementary facilities such as septic tanks, flush toilets, running water, and telephones...

Similar to the U.S. inner-city ghettos, the typical atmosphere of disadvantaged aboriginals is characterized by inactivity, unemployment, social disorganization, and poverty. Gordon MacGregor continues (Nagler 1974: 109)

> so-called welfare case load dramatizes the negative character of the change experience upon child training and development. A high proportion of Indian children within the welfare group are growing ill-nourished in poverty stricken homes with disorganized family life. Child care is frequently inconsistent and irregular. Such home environment produces anxious, insecure personalities, frequently suffering from deep and complex problems early in life.

Being differentiated by discrimination in many instances, visible minorities also lack choice (College 1993, Feagin 1986, Evans 1993):

> They are born what they are and can rarely divest themselves of their affiliation. Furthermore, the prejudice of the rest of society stamp them as inferior...As a result their own loyalties are mixed with resentment. They may be proud of their colour (identity), but they cannot help but regard it also as a badge of shame (Nagler 1974: 106).

Partly through racial discrimination, low-skilled minorities remain in low paying jobs. Thus as these low paying jobs become less appealing, the vast urban underground economy enables many of those displaced from the mainstream economy to survive. Especially for minorities who lack educational, technical, or interpersonal skills for employment in mainstream institutions, the inner-city ghetto may offer the only environment in which they can survive. However, large concentrations of those who have become dependent on the urban underground economy create negative community externalities (crime, drug or alcohol use, loitering, vandalism) that dissuade businesses from locating nearby and push out more economically stable families and others who

disagree with such behaviors (Kasarda 1990). Fox and Szanton (1977) indicate the

fundamental nature of the problem:

> The most debilitating factors contributing to economic deprivation of
> black Chicagoans seem to be structural in nature—i.e., factors whose
> effects are continuous, in a single direction, long-term, and generally
> reflecting a basic set of social institutional arrangements and/or processes
> (Orfield 1992;190)

Since the inner city communities and families do not have the social networks and

capital to assist youths in job finding and preparation, youths have less hope in finding

stable core sector jobs which will allow them to "traverse the gap from adolescence to

adulthood. (Hagan 1994: 91)" In addition, most young black males have been negatively

impacted not only by deindustrialization, but also by increased expansion of job growth

beyond central city boundaries (employment deconcentration) which have formed in

varying degrees of intensity in the suburbs, exurban areas and non-metropolitan

communities. These new employment growth nodes are areas which were historically

inaccessible to blacks due to discrimination in housing and remain so today as a result of

the recent escalation of home prices (Oliver and Johnson 1992). Through the increasing

level of discrimination in the housing market, segregation increases which further

perpetuates the minority low incomes and occupational status (Massey 1990). Thus

capital flight, in coincidence with plant closing in the inner-city areas, has essentially

denied blacks access to what were formerly well paying, unionized jobs. As Massey

(1990: 329) continues, "segregation creates the structural niche within which a self-

perpetuating cycle of minority poverty and deprivation can survive and flourish."

The persisting inequalities in the labor market are the product of systematically unequal development of human capital among racial groups; employment preferences for some groups possessing lower human capital than blacks; and geographic barriers to learning about and obtaining work in the most rapidly growing urban centres which are located in the white suburbs. Hence school segregation and inequality, housing segregation and unequal access to employment and job information are the principal elements perpetuating this system (Orfield 1992).

Chicago businesses face a shortage of skilled or trainable labor, not due to lack of manpower, but to the inadequate training of those entering the labor market. Most employers believe that the city schools are continuing to deteriorate. In condemning the poor performance of city schools, the firms condemn the only schools available to a great majority of black and Latino students in the region. Through segregation, Blacks, and Hispanics have been severely isolated from other students, thereby concentrating them in the very school district that is viewed so skeptically by employers. This separate and unequal schooling is linked to inequalities in employment in various ways (Orfield 1992).

The pattern of isolation and inequality for the growing population of minority students means that an ever expanding share of young people are not offered the opportunity to develop their true potential. They are enrolled in schools with less competition, less prepared teachers, with a narrower curriculum instructed at a lower level, and with very little effective counseling for college or career endeavors. The isolation is so extreme that such schools usually have weak contact with the labor market, providing students with basically no information about growing suburban employment

opportunities. For instance, these are basic reasons why inner city youth often express

high occupational aspirations that unfortunately turn out to have no relationship to what

happens to them later:

> These students do not realize that their schools have not prepared them.
> They do not understand the tremendous obstacles they will face after high
> school graduation. They think that they are ready for college, but they are
> not. They say they plan to go to college, but few say that they have applied
> for the aid that they would need (Orfield 1992: 170).

Students who are in the worst schools have access to the worst kind of information and in

return many believe that the education they are receiving is far better than it actually is.

At a certain point, the system of ghettoization becomes so powerful that its victims have

no way of comparing their experiences to those of the rest of society.

The current school system in the inner-city was described, by one secretary of

education, "the worst education system of the nation," and what one investigation referred

to as "daytime warehouses for inferior students, taught by disillusioned and inadequate

teachers." Thus these students disinvest in schools that made little investment in them,

and instead reinvest their identities in cultural symbols and day- to- day business realities

of stealing cars and running, dealing, and distributing drugs. As Fagan (1992) describes,

the drug industry offers hope, even if illusory, of self-determination and economic

independence, as contrasted with petty humiliations and daily harassment faced in

secondary service sector jobs. (Hagan 1994: 83, 84, 97) As exploitive and corrosive as

criminal activities may be in the long term, their short-term benefits are usually difficult

for neighborhood residents to resist:

> First, since neighborhood residents benefit from the redistributive aspects
> of drug selling, this undercuts their efforts at formal and informal social

control. Residents may be less willing to disrupt drug selling since some directly benefit, and especially when economic alternatives do not compete well or the risks are not acute or immediate. As suppliers of a commodity to others in the city, funds flow into the neighborhood and are recirculated to some extent before accumulating individuals. What will happen if this circulation is interrupted? Unless risks increase from drug selling or living in its milieu, it is unreasonable to ask people to act against their economic well-being. (Fagan 1992)

In the end, as Hagan (1994) states, these are the types of dilemmas that continuing social inequality and capital disinvestment provoke.

Black education and employment situations are becoming worse, with no evidence that it will be resolved by existing programs or the normal working of the business cycle. Further, many become involved in drug crime which is the major expanding employer in these communities. As Mike Davis observes: "With 78,000 unemployed youth in the Watts-Willowbrook area, it is not surprising that there is now 145 branches of rival Crips and Blood gangs in south L.A., or that the jobless resort to the opportunities of the burgeoning 'Crack' economy (Orfield 1992: 181)." From the perspective of the Black community, the expansion of the prison system creates a constant flow of ex-offenders who return into a depressed labor market with hardly any retraining programs for ex-offenders and small prospects of private employment. These elements feed the cycle of a destructive illegal economy. As a local parole officer informed the Chicago Tribune, "It's an inescapable fact of life in North Lawndale that eventually you'll become a victim or an offender" (Orfield 1992: 182). The men with which the parole agent worked with "don't have any skills, they're hard to train, and they're committing crimes at a younger age." Not only do the citizens of these communities have few legal job options, but those attempting to stay out of the illegal

economy usually become prey for those who join in, losing their valuables, security, and even their lives.

A number of different conditions appear to work against the employability of black males. These consist of their lack of work experience, employers' preference for Hispanic workers, the pressure to participate in illegal economic activity and the imprisonment that follows such activity, and the overall urban pathologies resulting from joblessness, family, residential instability, and crime.

The pressures in today's inner-cities are also apparent in considering gangs and schools. The problems are revealed every time a young person walks to school, which usually requires crossing gang turf. People who are not part of a gang are prey for the gang-- openly affiliating with the gang and wearing its insignia provide the greatest security in the area. But becoming safe outside the school means becoming marginal in the school's academic efforts. Gaining personal security also means beginning criminal activity as committing a crime is often part of the process of getting into a gang. Gangs constantly accept members who have served time for convictions and have been more deeply socialized into a criminal culture through their prison experience. However the issue of gangs exceeds the scope of this paper.

American Experience with Oppositional Culture: Street Research

The street-oriented subculture is often extremely violent. According to Anderson (1992) and Oliver (1994), the dominant value is physicality and a willingness to settle disputes through violence. Thus authority is asserted by conflict—shouts, bites, punches, knife cuts, and gunshots are traded here. It is essential to be bad because to be mean is to

be cool and respected. It is also very important not to be perceived as 'square' or convey behavior associated with the dominant society. Violence is a fact of daily life for many people in the inner city. A Black American male describes how violence is considered as an important value: "The violence. Violence was my stock and trade then. It was the only thing I did good. I didn't work. I didn't do anything else besides hustle and shit. But fighting was what I did best. It was what I liked the most. That's what I enjoyed doing more than anything else.(Oliver 1994)" Violence as normative behavior, and the disadvantaged context of violence offers the framework within which these phenomenon can be explored. Violence is not confined within a one dimensional model, especially in adulthood. Individuals in disadvantaged areas may be victims of violence one day and perpetrators the next. According to Laprairie (1994), the degree of violence exhibited in the inner city is directly linked to the degree of social and economic marginalization and family disruption. Victimization and victimizing does not occur as an isolated problem, but within a social context conducive to violence. In closed societies, such as the inner city ghettos, competition over resources, and "frustration at exclusion from the mainstream society and/or community resources" creates the environment for violence. Especially in inner cities, "marginalization, poverty, substance abuse problems and personal dysfunction are often synonymous with violence" (Laprairie 1994: 439)Greene (1993) states that young individuals growing up in poverty and surrounded by violence are very angry about what appears to be everyone's inattention to their plight. To others, living in the inner city represents a deepening of despair.

Exhibiting superior physical prowess is one way to achieve esteem or status in one's local community. As a predatory influence, the street culture creates enormous problems for the rest of the inner-city population. Youths who are not strongly connected in the conventional world are at risk of being preyed upon. The prevalence of drugs. poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunity and other social problems besetting the community, mean that well-meaning parent(s) find it difficult to instill conventional values in their children (Anderson 1992). Within this environment the potential for frustrated violence to become intergenerational, learned and normative behavior is extremely likely to be transmitted (Laprairie 1994: 398).

According to studies conducted in the United States, ghetto neighborhoods are characterized by loosely defined and enforced norms of sexual behavior and age and sex composition conducive to juvenile deviance (Anderson 1992, Oliver 1994?). These traits of ghetto life create difficulties for parents to successfully regulate their children's behavior:

> First, large family size is quite strongly associated with overcrowding and socio-economic disadvantage. Secondly, there is probably less intensive interaction and less communication between parents and the children in large families if only because parental time has to be distributed more widely. Thirdly, parental discipline and supervision may be more difficult when a lot of children to look after. Fourthly, some of the children may have been unwanted. Fifthly, in some cases the lack of family limitation may reflect general parental qualities of inadequate foresight and planning.

As a consequence, residents of ghetto neighborhoods are expected to initiate sexual intercourse at earlier ages and to have higher rates of accidental premarital pregnancy in their teens (Hogan and Kitagawa 1990). The disadvantaged male youth's

peer group places a high value on casual sex. Even though sex is considered to be casual in terms of commitment with the partner, it is usually taken quite seriously as a measure of the boy's worth. Thus a primary goal of the young man is to find as many willing females as possible. Not only does the young man treat females as objects of a sexual game, he must also prove his exploits—pregnancy. However, when pregnancy does occur, a sudden reality is introduced into the relationship. According to the male peer group's values, the ethic in this situation is 'hit and run'. Opposite to the young male's point of view, are the female's dreams of being a middle-class housewife as portrayed on television. Thus when she is approached by a boy, the young woman's faith in the dream clouds her view of the situation. Thus the romantically successful male acts according to her dreams, wins his game, and leaves her alone and pregnant (Anderson 1992). Anderson describes these young women facing a sea of destitution and the difficulties of them recapitalizing their lives. They often do so by developing 'baby clubs' which invest in being pregnant or new mothers: "in effect, they work to create value and status by inverting that of girls who do not become pregnant." (126) Anderson continues:

> ... in cold economic terms, a baby can be an asset, which is without doubt an important factor behind exploitative sex and out-of wedlock babies. Public assistance is one of the few reliable sources of money, and for many, drugs are another. The most desperate people thus feed upon one another. Babies and sex may be used for income; women receive money from welfare for having babies, and men sometimes act as prostitutes to pry the money from them (136).

In these areas of depleted economic and social capital, where young black women have the weakest opportunities of all, even babies have short term asset value in the recapitalization process. The long-term consequences of early parenthood are a much different matter (Hagan 1994: 83)

In actuality, as Anderson (1992:138) suggests, conventionality and the street culture "wage a constant battle for the heart and minds of the younger residents and this dichotomy has become an organizing social principle" in the underclass communities. The residents in these communities basically divide their neighbors into those who are 'decent' and those who are associated with the street. The culture of decency refers to close and extended families, a low income financial stability, deep religious values. a strong work ethic to succeed and a strong disapproval of drugs and teenage pregnancy. The street culture is characterized by hipness, an emphasis on accomplishing and maintaining status on one's person (not one's achievements as in the dominant culture), and a contempt for conventional values and behaviors, "which are easily discredited by whites; these can include doing well in school, being civil to whites, and speaking standard English. (175)."

Since the conventional culture is perceived as profoundly unreceptive by many blacks in the inner-city the oppositional culture is very alluring (Anderson 1992). Youth observe the unsuccessful legitimate models around them , and many find them unsuited to emulation. Legal hard work seems not to have rewarded the old, and youths observe the relatively few hardworking people in their area struggling to survive. From their elders and peers they are told repeated stories of racist treatment, and by now have already experienced it. While at the same time, through street oriented role models, "a thriving underground economy beckons to them, in which enormous sums are promised, along with certain thrill, power, and prestige. Streetwise and impoverished young men easily find places in the drug trade" (Anderson 1992: 176).

Unemployment, crime, drug use, family disorganization and antisocial behavior have become powerful social decaying forces. Interpersonal trust and moral cohesion which once prevailed are undermined by an atmosphere of distrust, alienation and as crime pervades the area, further deteriorating social disorganization. One of the ghetto community's most important institutions has disappeared due to these changes—the relationship of the 'old heads' and young boys. Traditionally, the 'old head' was a wiser and older person (who often acted as a surrogate parent) of stable means who believed in hard work, family life, and the church. The young man would find confidence in the old head's ability to instill useful wisdom and practical advice about life (Anderson 1992a) . Since meaningful employment has become a scarce resource, the expansion of the drug industry offers opportunity for quick money and the old head has been instead losing prestige and authority. Replacing him a new role is emerging:

> The embodiment of the street, he is young, often a product of a street gang, and indifferent at best to the law and traditional values. If he works at the low-paying jobs available to him, he does so grudgingly. More likely he is involved, part time or full time, in the drug trade or some other area of the underground economy. He derides conventional family life: he has a string of women but feels little obligation toward them and the children he has fathered. His displays of self-aggrandizement through fancy clothes and impressive cars make their mark on young men... (Anderson 1992b:176)

Many inner-city ghetto residents clearly see the social and cultural effects of living in impoverished neighbourhoods. A 17 year old black male who works part-time, attends college and resides in a ghetto poverty neighborhood comments:

> Well, basically, I feel that if you are raised in a neighborhood and all you see is negative things, then you are going to be negative because you don't see anything positive....Guys and black males see drug dealers on the corner and they see fancy cars and flashy money and they figure: "Hey if I get into drugs I can be like him."

Interviewed several weeks later he continued:

> And think about how, you know, the kids around there, all they see, OK,
> they see these drug addicts, and then what else do they see? Oh, they see
> thugs, you know, they see gangbangers. So, who do they, who do they
> really look, model themselves after? What is their role model? They have
> nothing but the thugs. So that's what they wind up being, you
> know...They (the children in the neighborhood) deal with the only role
> model that they can find and most of the time that be pimps, dope dealers,
> so what do they do? They model themselves after them. Not intentionally
> trying to but if, you know, that's the only male you're around and that's
> the only one you come in close contact with, you tend to want to be like
> that person. And that is why you have so many young drug dealers (Wilson
> 1996:56)

According to Oliver (1994), compulsive masculinity, i.e. physical prowess, sexual

behavior, is symbolically displayed more than it is enacted out through violence. The term

symbolic display refers to the "use of verbal and non-verbal cues to signify an

individual's commitment to a particular idea, value, norm, or role." Beside the purpose of

symbolic displays (such as tough-talk, verbal announcements, tall stories) to demonstrate

their commitment to compulsive masculinity, it may also serve as a catalyst for violent

confrontations between black males. Furthermore, these symbolic displays occur in

particular structures social settings and situations. Implicit in this concept is the belief that

individuals who overtly regularly demonstrate their adherence to compulsive masculinity

role orientation risk being socially condemned, physically victimized and/or imprisoned.

In turn, many lower-class blacks rely on symbolic displays in order to communicate their

commitment to compulsive masculinity (Oliver 1994: 19).

By enforcing conformity to external displays of masculinity, the oppositional

culture "ravages the individuality of those who fall victim to it, eroding their sense of

personal identity" and responsibility as well. According to Anderson (1992b) many of Cleckley's (1955) symptoms of psychopathology can be seen in individuals from the street culture: "superficial charm and 'good' intelligence, unreliability, untruthfulness and insincerity, lack of remorse and shame, poor judgement and failure to learn by experience, lack of feeling for other people." This reality illustrates the serious implications for society as a whole and for social policy.

Attempts to maintain the normative ideals of the oppositional culture have a substantial effect on the routine activities and lifestyles of black males prone to engage in violent confrontations. The logic of the lifestyle-routine activity theory maintains that criminal and deviant lifestyles may directly increase victimization due to the nature of the offending behavior itself. According to Jensen and Brownfield (1986), offense activity can be perceived as an attribute of lifestyles or a type of routine activity which increases the risk of victimization "because of the vulnerability and culpability of people involved in those activities." For instance, gang membership involves close proximity to fellow offenders and criminal events (such as gang fights) in which rival groups are present. Stated by Zimring (1981) it is also established that delinquency occurs in groups—" assaults in particular, often take place in contexts where retaliation probability is high (e.g., bars, social clubs, parties)." Furthermore, by definition, assaultive behavior requires more than one person, thereby meaning that the victimization potential of fighting is at a maximum (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994: 31).

As a product of structural constraints, blacks have less access to socially approved settings than white males. Consequently, bars (e.g. taverns, nightclubs, lounges and

discos) and bar settings (e.g. various after hours joints, greasy spoon restaurants, poolrooms, street corners, alleys, parking lots) have become one of the most essential social settings in the black community with respect to masculine role socialization and the enactment of compulsive masculinity role orientation. The importance of black bars is that many black communities substantially lack social institutions which offer the opportunity to socialize and engage in status-enhancement activities. The bar is the center of black social life because of the significant link between bar participation and enhanced social status and self esteem. In the bar setting many activities occur, such as: the maintenance of heterosexual relationships; overall interaction and socialization between blacks: messages are left and received. such as availability of drugs or stolen merchandise. According to Lewis (1955) and Samuels (1976), in terms of the pronounced role the black bars plays in the social organization, the black bar can be interpreted as equal to the black church. Further, Lewis and Samuel believe that the bar setting exerts a significant impact on self-concept behavior, and lifestyle of a large portion of the lower-class black community. Even though the bar setting "provides lower-class blacks with an opportunity to engage in time out activities, participating in these activities does not occur without reputational implications." (Oliver 1994:22)

The Canadian inner-city experience

The fact of not being able to share a common sociological group identity is perhaps the fundamental difficulty which explains the position of those of native ancestry in the Canadian social structure. The attributes that are considered to pervade Indian culture are in essence abstractions of significant social and cultural forms which are

sometimes observed among various groups of Indians. While Indian culture was once a finely patterned mosaic, today it appears to be nothing more than a patchwork of meaningless and unrelated pieces. This disintegration is primarily the result of alien ideas and values. (Nagler 1974:20) Urbanization and adjustment may be particularly difficult for native people at the lowest socio-economic levels because their social distance from middle class values is the greatest. Graves (1973) cautions that the acquisition of middle class personalities without access to middle-class goals, creates problems for lower class people. For lower-class native people, the class and culture value conflicts are considerable. as data on crime and disorder in inner cities would suggest. Explaining the persistence of the over-representation phenomenon involves the concept that, for a number of reasons, acculturation is not occurring for the group most vulnerable to involvement in the criminal justice system. These reasons include: the inability of those at the low end of the social scale to enter the labour market in any long-term way; the internalization of the ethos of cultural separation; and the retention of cultural values. The nature of cities and the place of native people in them is essential to understanding migration, acculturation and deprivation. (Laprairie 1994: 19, 21)

Canadian cities are in fact full of urban refugees from the neglect, domestic violence and sexual abuse of community life on many reserves. (McDonnell 1993: 29) As a Canadian inner-city Native describes: "The reserves are only good for some people. The 'have-nots' from the reserve end up in cities-- treated like second class citizens in our own communities. All reserves are like this-- under self government the rich get rich and the poor get poorer. (Laprairie 1994: 48)" For some the reserve was an escape from a life

in the inner city. For others, the city was an escape from the reserve.

Some come with families, or were moved to foster homes in cities, or are trying to escape their pasts. Some are pushed from communities because they are different, cause problems. are not accepted. Others are pulled into cities by the excitement, the availability of alcohol, or friends. As a 29 year old Micmac male comments: "People leave reserves because they're going around in circles on reserves and know there won't be no new jobs. Also hear good things about city life-- the fun and glamour and not what it's like living on streets and alcohol problems. (Laprairie 1994: 49)" Once in, loneliness and the alienation in large cities drive newcomers into the inner-city lifestyle. Once in, it is difficult for them to get out; there are considerable pressures to stay and few options for leaving. The deterrents to getting out of the inner city are the same problems that brought them in -- lack of skills, limited education, no experience. For many, the inner city is both a trap and a haven. A young Canadian inner city male claims: "People don't even bother looking for jobs-- they know they won't find one because they have no education... no skills. Sometimes all they can do is go out all night looking for bottles to pick up or... maybe panhandle. (Laprairie 1994: 46)" Furthermore, people who were raised off reserves, for a variety of reasons, have a difficult time returning, feeling alien and being resented for leaving or accused of being 'white'. One such 22-year-old raised off the reserve said: "The biggest problems natives have is their sheltered lives on the reserves and seeing life as 'them' and 'us'-- we're our own worst enemies. Natives want other natives to be miserable like them and if people try to get out, are accused of being 'too white' (Laprairie 1994: 61)."

Laprairie (1994) found that drinking was a continuing topic of discussion among native people in the inner city and the majority of the sample has, or had a drinking problem. People spend years trying to escape alcohol abuse only to slip back when lonely, facing a crisis or loss. Sometimes alcohol lures people to leave their communities and draws them to cities. Alcohol abuse also keeps many in the inner city and causes fights and violence. Drinking 'to forget things' is a common lament. One person said drinking "blocks out reality-- it's like going to sleep for awhile and pulling a blanket over your head." another mentioned that: "you drink when you have no job and nothing to do." Trying to quit is almost as problematic as drinking. One woman claimed: "I tried to quit once but my husband got real mad at me. He had some friends over and I wanted to drink ginger ale. They kept saying 'let's have a drink for old times sake.' Every time I left the room he filled my glass with alcohol. He said I was trying to be better than him when I tried to quit." (Laprairie 1994: 30) According to an inner-city Canadian native, alcohol was not the only substance that provided escape: "When natives first come to the inner city they're naive about how everything works. May be different for those with skills but once into the inner city they become like everyone else. Native people in the inner city are very convincing and start natives using drugs-- then they're gone and become just the rest... You never know what's going to happen in the next half hour or the next day. There's lots of solvent abuse, lysol drinkers. (Laprairie 1994: 51)"

Violence is also a feature of inner-city life, especially in cities with clearly demarcated inner-city areas. Seeing himself as the protector of the weak and defenseless, one inner city Native defines crime: "[It] depends on how you define it. From my

perspective it's a way of life-- from newspapers and politicians it's crime. What it's all about is an industry. Poor, powerless people keep the industry going...(Laprairie 1994)" According to a 46 year old Metis crime in the inner city is rampant: "It's all crime here. When you get only $400 a month what else can you do? So many people take so much until they explode-- violence brings jail time and death. (Laprairie 1994:54) Due to the high prevalence of violence in the inner city, a 40 year old Male Edmonton resident explained the need to establish respect and honor: "You have to keep up an act all the time to protect yourself but sometimes it's a pleasure to knock someone in the head when you watch someone bugging someone else. (Laprairie 1994: 50)" A 30 yr old Cree Female further describes the violent procedure of gaining respect: "If you are not from Alberta people want to see how good a fighter you are. I got into a lot of fights and sometimes I was really hurt bad. I was used to fighting with my old man but not with strangers. If you don't fight you're called a failure. (Laprairie 1994: 51)" The most violent and notorious parts of the inner city are usually the bars which are frequented by many, a 35 year old Western Woman comments: "Near where I live there is a place called the ˈslaughter houseˈ where lots of stabbings, fighting, drinking takes place... When people start fighting they start pulling shanks out. Native women on the streets are picking on new people and fighting with knives too. (Laprairie 1994: 406)"

In terms of actual victimization, nearly two-thirds reported a victimization outside their home community and of those, 84% reported a violent victimization. For many, violence is a way of life. A 36 year old man claimed he saw: "violence everywhere-- in drop-ins, on the street, in my rooming house." One woman described that: "fighting in the

inner-city is usually over money, drinks, and men jealous of their wives or girlfriends. (Laprairie 1994: 34)" The violence many respondents encountered in the inner city and in their own lives in the inner city approximated what they experienced in childhood. In urban areas, especially in inner cities, marginalization, poverty, alcohol problems and personal dysfunctions are often synonymous with violence. In both settings the potential for violence to become generational, learned and normative behaviour, is high.(398).

According to Laprairie (1994:77, 78) inner city natives' lives are characterized by despondency and hopelessness, and many have hard-core alcohol problems: "I'd heard about 'the drag' but I didn't know people would be shitting themselves, puking in the streets and dying." Furthermore, "People get too close and only see others like them. You give up easily yourself if you see people with the same problems all the time—it's like looking in a mirror and seeing your own reflection." In contrast a male describes being accepted on the street: "You bully your way in, not a rat or a coward, and stand up and fight if you're going to live. Lots of people fall by the wayside." They are also the least well educated, least employed and employable, and the most victimized as children in terms of being in foster homes, or victims of family violence or instability. They have fewer parental influences, and are more alienated from families, reserves and other people as adults. Inner city Natives in Canada, especially the males, are the most involved in the criminal justice system usually beginning at an early age. Violence is normalized and members of this group (males) appear to view their abuse-- whether by family, strangers, or police-- as re-affirmation of their own 'badness.' To one extent or another, violence is a fact of everyday life for many native people in the inner city. Victimization and violence

in adulthood is little different from victimization and violence in childhood. For both men and women, the difference between childhood and adulthood violence is simply the exchanging of one perpetrator for another. However violence is not one-dimensional, particularly in adulthood. Native people in the inner city may be victims of violence one day and perpetrators the next. Violence occurs not as an isolated problem but within a larger context conducive to violence.

Domestic Violence

> We try to deal with one problem here because you can't fix them all. Here we try to put back together lives that have been destroyed because of family violence. You know you have so many problems here that is overwhelming. I believe almost everyone on the reservation is affected by alcoholism either directly or indirectly. If you are talking about actual addiction to alcohol— maybe 70 percent are addicted. And unemployment is a comparable percentage (around 80%). As a result, there is a lot of violence here and a lot of it is directed inside the family structure itself. And in many cases we are not just talking about slaps; we are talking about severe violence, knifings, and shootings. (director of a battered women's shelter located on a midwestern reservation as quoted in Bachman 1992: 89).

As the quality of life in the area appears to decay, their friends, associates, and relatives often wonder why they still live in the inner city or reservation when it seems such a social and physical wasteland (Anderson 1992) Even in their households, the family and home environment is impermanent and unpredictable. It is almost impossible for children growing up in unstable families to define themselves except in relation to the world of substance abuse and violence that surrounds them. The wider kin network which might rescue them from a violent orientation only reinforces it and assists to isolate the individual further from the mainstream influences (Dunlap1992: 204).

Carter and Parker (1991:106) revealed that 80% of Indian families in the inner city had a history of domestic violence including incest, sexual abuse and battering. Surveyed by the U.S. federal agencies offering services to Indian children found 67% of the sample was sexually/physically abused or neglected. These trends of abusive households are also similar to the Black inner city populations in the United States. In order to illustrate how violence and substance abuse permeates family interaction and lifestyle, several inner-city people offer insights to their household. A 32 year old male believed that he would never live to adulthood: "My father broke my back when I was small. He tied me up with a dog leash and made me sleep in the dog house. Once when I couldn't remember something he broke my cat's neck. My father wasn't drinking. He gave us away to people who beat us and sold my sister when she was a baby. Two of my brothers are in jail now and two are in mental institutions." In some households physical and sexual abuse also played a part of growing up, a 44 year old Blackfoot mentioned that: "Once my father beat up my mother-- he gave her a bloody nose. But us older children were hit at anytime-- we were beaten with a green switch, and electric cord, whatever he could find. Got sent into a dark basement for hours. We were used as punching bags. One of my uncles sexually abused me when I was 3 to about 7. I think my step-sisters were abused by my father and my brothers. When I was 10 at a drinking party at my parents house I was passed around and several men sexually abused me(Laprairie 1994)." Apparently, as an American Black female claims, a good family consisted of the following: "My stepfather treated us good, he never molested me or nothin' or my sisters. He and my mother fussed, but he never beat on her. He was on dope but I never knew it...

He started shootin' up and leavin' his works and blood all over the place. I'd go to the bathroom and blood'd be everywhere. But my mother didn't shoot nothin', she smoked weed, snorted a little coke, *you know how it is*, and they both smoked crack (Fagan 1992)."

From these brief documentations it is not difficult to understand how patterns of violence set in childhood are carried into adulthood. Neither is it difficult to see how the mechanisms of, as Fattah (1993: 28) describes, brutalization, desensitization, retaliation, learning, imitation, identification with the aggressor within the household transform the innocent victim into a victimizer. Hull (1983: 35) suggests that areas of concentrated poverty "are seldom stable communities, but more often resemble colonies in which residents take out their pent-up frustrations on each other." Substance abuse, poor parenting, childhood turmoil and instability, delinquency and general disorder are often referred to in researching contemporary inner-city areas. As a result many individuals have been in a long-term downward spiral before even trying to achieve their adult aspirations to the middle class world.

Summary

According to Laprairie (1994) there is a large amount of United States literature on the relationship between inner-city life and crime (Skogan, 1990; Schwendinger and Schwendiger, 1993; Blau and Blau, 1982; Byrne and Sampson, 1986; Wacquant and Wilson, 1989). It is only a matter of degree of social disorganization, slum housing, family disruption, unemployment, alcohol and drugs, hopelessness, and despair which separate inner cities.

In most victimization rates, it appears that there is little variation between Canada and United States. In both nations, expressions of violence are vital indicators of extreme social disorganization especially amongst race/ethnic groups. Even though United States has an extremely high homicide rate, Canada's suicide rate exceeds that of the United States. These rates both illustrate that particular groups have a high tolerance for such acts of aggression and are lacking the vital coping skills and are resorting to violence in order to deal with socially generated stress created by blocked opportunities. Homicide and suicide are violent expressions of retaliation against physical and social isolation. However instead of the government institutions assisting the situation, the racial divide in the criminal justice system facilitates the isolation, thereby compounding the problem. Many minority citizens are subjects of a double victimization as a result of failure of criminal justice policy. They are victimized by the high incidence of crime, by being arrested and incarcerated at rates far higher than their level of criminality can justify. As a result of the treatment of young offenders many inner-city areas or reserves are filled with people with criminal records. Once engaged in the criminal justice system, poor youth have a high probability of becoming literally entangled for the rest of their lives.

When young African Americans or Canadian natives enter the labor market, they are forcefully confronted with their marginality as they face persistent and often blatant discrimination in their search for jobs. By the time they reach young adulthood, they have received ample feedback from every major institution in society that they are inherently unequal; "that they cannot fully avail themselves of this society's rights and privileges; and that they will be characterized as gatekeepers of society and by the mass media which

guard those gates as 'disadvantaged, deprived, deviant, disturbed and dumb' (Gibbs 1988)." Labeled as second class status by these self-fulfilling stereotypes, some African Americans and Canadian Natives realize fairly quickly that they will be denied access to the mainstream channels of economic and social mobility, such as good schools, high-salaried jobs, attractive neighborhoods and investment opportunities. At some transition between early adolescence and young adulthood, many subordinate groups face the dilemma of either challenging these barriers with only a small chance of success or of finding alternate illegitimate routes of mobility, which are filled with violence (Newburn and Stanko 1994). In Canada and United States it has been illustrated that both low income subordinate groups are captives of their impoverished environments, developing strategies of adaptation, survival and even empowerment.

In observing minority crime, the underlying causes must be addressed. Race links, but is not the cause of crime. Crime is a complex phenomenon which derives from a combination of personal choice, family circumstance, economic condition and much more. As Donziger (1996) suggests, the criminal justice system should not be expected to solve all or even any of society's social problems. One can not expect the criminal justice system to develop strong families, deliver jobs, or provide hope to young people—its only function is crime control.

Besides general issues of national crime rates, a distinctive racial divide in the criminal justice system is revealed in both nations. The fact that so many minority men are in the criminal justice system raises profoundly disturbing questions. To the extent that the high incarceration rate of these minorities are the result of racial bias, then that bias must be

rooted outside the criminal justice system. Thus the root, or structural, causes of crime in both nations result in the over-representation of minorities in the criminal justice system (Donziger 1996). For instance, the high tolerance of suicide and homicide in particular race/ethnicity groups are indicators of high levels of socially generated stress.

Through the presentation of these two nations, a compelling motivic theme of variation resounds. Despite the countries' different ideologies, they still face similar social problems that exceed most developed nations. Inequality, unemployment, poverty, homicide, suicide, are all socially deteriorating qualities in both affluent countries. Perhaps the both nations should not be so blindly proud, and start attending to their forgotten citizens, the disadvantaged.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Despite cultural differences, the dark criminal milieu that flourishes occurs in both nations' poverty-ridden neighbourhoods where proper facets of opportunity are not structurally available. Through violence and the underground economy, underprivileged youths construct their own successful form of capital accumulation through crime (Peters 1996). However, is it really the pathological pursuit of happiness that has facilitated societal decay in the United States? The Canadian identity aspires to distinguish itself from being American. However Canada's emphasis on social order, respect for authority, higher ethnic tolerance and paternalistic attitudes has made no apparent difference upon the growth of their social problems.

What does Canada do differently than United States? Perhaps partly attributed to Canada's dominant paternalistic government Canada has: highly developed safety nets to protect children from poverty; severe restrictions on firearms; much shorter prison sentences for nonviolent crimes, and Canadian prisons have a much greater emphasis on rehabilitation (Donziger 1996). Despite Canada's safety nets, poverty will continue to deepen into a national disgrace. According to O'Reilly-Fleming (1993), the level of government apathy concerning this problem in Canada parallels that of the experience of the United States. It suggests that Canada lags behind the United States by several years in the development of social ills, and this would certainly be the case with child poverty. Through Canadian's respect for government, they have been misinformed of the true situation of poverty and have given up their individualistic responsibility for their own country—"It's not my problem, it's the government's." Canadian politicians have been

very reluctant to make public announcements concerning social ills, hoping that no one would notice that something was very amiss (Stewart 1983). Perhaps Canada can learn from the United States philanthropic giving and self responsibility over government. Yet opposite on the continuum is America with its lack of trust in their government and individualism coming before equality. Both nations can learn from each other.

Low human capital, capital disinvestment -- which translate into concentrations of poor families in geographic areas, residential segregation, income inequality, high turnover rates. family disruption, high percentage of female householders, housing and population density-- are linked to increased levels of violence. These factors are often compounded by ineffective parenting, substance abuse, school failure and unemployment. For many in these circumstances. economic stress and isolation frame daily life and promote incidents of violence. Inequality, unemployment, isolation, and overall capital disinvestment in communities all nurture the persistence of concentrated urban poverty in both countries. Surprisingly, as a proportion of the national population, Canada has more disadvantaged residents living in concentrated poverty areas than the United States. However, in absolute numbers the United States has larger areas concentrated with poverty which in turn further exacerbates their degree of residential segregation, racial discrimination and overall social disorganization. Another element revealed was that concentrated poverty neighborhoods are not only poor but also further lacking in almost all senses—welfare, dependency, low human capital, labor force non-participation, domestic violence, high tolerance to violence, and other social dislocations which may create a permanent cycle of poverty. The housing market also further perpetuates the

cycle of poverty through the suburbanization of unemployment and increasing the growth of residential segregation. Not only do the disadvantaged have to deal with the negative social dislocations which surround them, they are virtually forced to live in these areas. Finally the issue of race and poverty plays an integral part in increasing the likelihood of one's chances in living in concentrated poverty areas in both countries. About one in five Canadian Aboriginals and about seven out of eight minority group Americans are living in concentrated poverty areas—these people are the 'truly' and often forgotten disadvantaged.

According to the Child Welfare Council (1975: 33), poverty is a crime against the human spirit—it denies disadvantaged individuals the opportunity to develop their knowledge, skills and talents, (i.e. human capital) and limits their capacities to contribute to their community (i.e. social capital). In the socially deteriorating atmosphere of these communities, an individual's coping skills decrease and emotional distress increases. All structural factors merge to create the stage for an oppositional culture of abuse and extreme expressions of violence (i.e. suicide and homicide) flourish. It also breeds a particular intolerance and fear of poor children among the better-off with the consequence that poor children may receive biased treatment from schools, health, and social service agencies, the police and the courts.

The criminal justice system is a major player in the lives of inner city people, but marginalization and alienation-- resulting from unstable and violent childhood experiences, coupled with lack of education, opportunities and options-- are the real sources in making people vulnerable to committing crime and experiencing criminal

justice processing. Further, the racial divide in the criminal justice system highlights an important similarity between both countries. Race links, but is not the cause of crime. Violence is a complex phenomenon of socially generated stress which derives from a combination of personal choice, family circumstance, low human capital, low social capital, capital disinvestment, and much more. In order to reduce this involvement it is necessary to identify more specifically the needs of inner city people, and to alter the physical and emotional conditions in which they live. A reduction in the involvement of disadvantaged youth in the criminal justice system is essential.

Instead of addressing the root problems of the inner-cities, this synthetically induced climate of expressive violence is only heightened through ignorance and externally attacking the disadvantaged through incarceration. The prison populations describe the story, the disadvantaged are highly over represented. Since Canadian natives and American blacks are the most disadvantaged groups within each nation, they are also over represented in the prison population. Through the excessive imprisonment of natives and blacks, their disadvantaged situation is only amplified by being stigmatized as *criminal*. The lack of generosity and understanding of the disadvantaged in the United States and Canada is pushing the poor further away from the mainstream and into alienated homeless lives surrounded by violence. Thus instead of attacking the victims of social disorder, perhaps one should help. The federal government must assume direct responsibility in both countries for the large number of children growing up in poverty and for the increasing numbers at risk of entering into poverty.

Two final points should be clearly identified. The social problems of concentrated urban poverty are not a phenomenon unique in the United States. Neither is it unique to specific racial minorities. While concentrated urban poverty and the growth of the social ills of tolerated violence have been amplified by racial discrimination in Canada and the United States. it is specific elements of social structure that have led these two nations to share an extensive and startling problem. It is only through changes to and reinvestment in this social structure that concentrated urban poverty and its accompanying social ills can be truly alleviated.

Ultimately, this thesis is only the onset of a larger investigation of the links between crime. capital disinvestment. human capital, and community level factors in United States and especially in Canada. Particularly. it has not been demonstrated how rapidly concentrated poverty in Canada is growing. Even though it would be time consuming. a time series analysis would be extremely helpful in addressing these comparative links. Further. more information concerning the long term effects of living in areas of concentrated urban poverty will be a great asset. While preliminary evidence from the United States indicates that the concentrated poor population is undoubtedly worse off, researchers need to discover how "truly disadvantaged" the Canadian population is. Either a time series analysis at the individual level or more detailed ethnographic work could assist in establishing a clearer understanding of the depth of social isolation, violence, and alienation which exists in concentrated poor neighborhoods (Hajnal 1995). Currently, in the department of income and housing survey section of Statistics Canada the first year data of a national longitudinal survey of households has

been released. Once information has been accumulated over time, demographic, social and economic statistics can further describe the situation of residents living in concentrated urban poverty. In order to provide a solution to alleviate the social ills of the disadvantaged, a fundamentally new approach must be implemented—social development.

Attacking the Roots of Crime-- Social Development

Planners interested in the reduction of crime have rarely dealt with broader aspects of the economy. Instead, the recommendations have centred on criminal justice agencies and the apprehension and punishment of offenders. This priority is shameful considering that social factors like economic inequality, unemployment, poverty, racism, and social disorganization predict fluctuations in crime rates more reliably than factors based on police, courts or prisons (Schwendiger and Schwendiger 1993: 443). As Doniziger (1996) claims, there is nothing more disturbing than the fear of being the victim of a violent crime. Much of that fear is legitimate for violent street crime especially in the inner city. However, fear of crime instead of crime itself is the primary catalyst in much criminal justice policy, particularly in the United States. "Fear of crime and crime are not the same thing. Policies based on fear are not the same as policies based on fact. (97)"

Fear does not flourish from the threat of crime, but is cultivated by the way crime data are presented. This usually convinces people to encourage the government to invest in the criminal justice system so that they feel like we are lowering the fear even though we are not lowering the crime. Imprisonment is the most politically appealing response to fear since a person who is locked up obviously cannot commit a crime against a person on the outside. Yet simplicity can be deceptive. In the United States, the small time drug

dealer has helped the jail and prison expansion, yet this person is the most easily

replaceable in the drug trade. By the time the criminal justice system has incarcerated

generations of drug dealers, billions of dollars have been wasted and the street corner is

still scattered with vials of crack cocaine. The United States has the highest incarceration

rate in the world. However nationally, crime has not reduced significantly and most of its

citizens do not feel safer. As the United States is the best example, the 'get tough'

strategies against crime have not shown any apparent results over time.

As Laprairie (1994:446) suggests, there are only two real options for responding

to violence in the lives of inner-city subordinate groups. The first is to change the

childhood conditions in which many live, and community conditions that create problems

in the first place. The second is to reduce the degree of social and economic marginality

amongst this group as adults. The two are related and there are no short cuts, quick fixes

or simple solutions. At the same time, however, it is possible, as Newburn and Stanko

(1993) suggest, to develop more practical and decent approaches than incarceration. It is

also possible, if the political will is present, to ensure better protection for those most at

risk of abuse and violence.

Fattah (1993:33) argues that it is much easier to change situations than to change

people: "the primary objective of prevention policy should be to alter the conditions that

create or aggravate the problem as well as the situations in which the behaviour is most

likely to occur." Leman (1994) states that the notion of community and economic

revitalization is simply wrong headed, and a waste of time and money, because it does not

work. Poor neighbourhoods tend to be home to people who plan to move out as soon as

they make a little money. The standard model of progress for poor people living in urban slums, repeated millions and millions of times over the decades is to get a good job outside the neighbourhood and then decamp for a nicer part of town. The author claims that through the implementation of realistic programs such as housing, day care, and safety, education and job training will significantly improve daily life.

The most common characteristic of youth exposed to poverty and violence is the near-absence of any on-going supportive intimate relationship among parents, teachers, peers, or any adults in their neighbourhoods. Intimacy does not thrive in environments where violence abounds and where economic survival is a constant problem (Greene 1993: 109 - 110) The message this and other research sends is that society can create crime control and social problems "industries" to deal with these issues after the fact, but it would be more humane, less costly and more efficient to prevent them from occurring in the first place. (Laprairie 1994: 94) If any nation is to become a safer society, a fundamentally new approach must be utilized—social development. The incorporation of social development strategies through capital reinvestment in the development of crime prevention policies will offer a remedy to the complex situation of the disadvantaged.

Increasingly, the social development approach to community based crime prevention is being seen as most effective. Alinsky (1946:82) describes the rationale for social development: " You don't, you dare not, come to people who are unemployed, who don't know where their next meal is coming from, where children themselves are the gutter of despair—and offer them not food, not jobs, not security, but supervised recreation, handicraft classes and character building." Skogan (1988) has described such

community based initiatives as insurgent since they do not address the true structural roots of crime. as opposed to more traditional 'preservationist' crime approaches which attempt to preserve or strengthen the supportive environments, or networks, that are assumed to exist in neighborhoods (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). From previous reading it is understood that: a child born to a low income householder has a greater risk to become violent; incarceration exacerbates the condition of being disadvantaged by making a person less employable and increases the chances of their children to grow up to commit crime: and the criminal justice system can not solve crime by itself. Through social development's interdisciplinary approach a realistic chance of progressing in the direction of a greater safer society can be accomplished.

The social development approach differs drastically from the direct anti-crime approach in that it attempts to deal with the underlying causes of delinquency. Utilizing a proactive approach, it moves the concentration away from personal and property protection by targeting risk groups who are socially and economically disadvantaged. This approach emphasizes the importance of preventing a large range of social conditions. which were discussed previously, that contribute to the likelihood of chronic delinquency (Canadian Council on Social Development 1990). Based on practical community based terms, this may mean creating community groups involving educators, potential employers, people with expertise in building self esteem, etc. who can provide increased local opportunities for target groups, or people who are more at risk to committing crimes. Through the very nature of social development involving a wider range of people providing productive opportunities to the disadvantaged, it is likely to

lead to more integrated neighborhoods. The Canadian Council on Social Development comments that the 'Safer Communities' approach is based on the concepts that: "the community is the focal point of effective crime prevention; the approach needs to be more comprehensive than what is provided by the criminal justice system; prevention should bring together individuals from a range of sectors to tackle the situations that breed crime—e.g. housing, social services, schools, policing, the criminal justice system, the strategy should be linked to other community development efforts, especially healthy community projects.(Jim Ward Associates 1992)"

The Canadian Justice Association (1989: 383 - 386) identifies four critical initiatives which crime prevention through social development addresses: parent and families. schools, social housing and neighborhoods, and employment. In order to promote children to become healthy. productive, contributing members of society, programs concentrating on parents and families must offer them the nurturing and assistance they require. By proactively supporting children early in their lives, one may be able to identify and deal with certain risk factors before they develop into more serious and expensive problems. Evidence shows that early investment programs (such as head start, parenting programs, encouraging parents to invest in employment programs) can be cost effective in decreasing the costs of special education, public assistance, and criminal justice services for these children. Another sub-category within parents and family are targeted social programs established to break the cycle of family violence. As discussed previously, family violence is one of the key factors contributing to crime in the community. The program's response deals with the reality of violence occurring now,

especially towards the most vulnerable members of society—women, children, elderly, disabled people-- by heightening their safety and promoting healing of the damage they have experienced. A full response against family violence includes decreasing tolerance by others through education (Webster and Hilton 1990: 18, Laprairie 1994), programs concerning the prevention of substance abuse, and altering structural factors (e.g. employment, education programs) that encourage people to use violence as a means to solve their problems (Edmonton Mayor's Task Force 1992).

Students from a wide diversity of backgrounds and lifestyles attend schools. By offering the proper perceptual tools through education, teachers and administrators would be able to recognize the underlying problems of most students and offer guidance before they lead to delinquency (Lynn and McGreary 1990). Since truancy and dropping out of school are the primary indicators of developing deviant behavior, schools can be considered as the front line of crime prevention through social development. Examples of such programs are: remedy identified behavior problems through parents, social services, school officials; remedial support programs; curricula developed which focus on life skills including parenting, sexual behavior, etc.; creation of programs concentrating on peer pressure and personal commitment; and promoting involvement of parents in both learning and school, and teachers as positive role models.

The social development and planning of neighborhoods, including social housing, is an essential component in the reduction and prevention of delinquency, and social priorities should be given equal weight with economic considerations. Examples of social housing and neighborhoods would be: the emphasis on increased integration of public

and non-public housing, thereby diminishing the high concentration effects of the disadvantaged (Sampson and Wilson 1995, Goldsmith and Blakley 1992, Hagan 1994); community programs including close participation of all residents which would improve the supportive environment; development of public services, job creation programs, and affordable housing which is an important ingredient in self reliance, self esteem and creating a sense of community.

The relationship of employment, or human capital, and crime is indirect. There are various factors, such as inequality, low social mobility, low self esteem, and poor education, that are influenced by employment, and whose combined presence can predispose to crime. Thus programs aimed at improving employability, especially targeted for the disadvantaged, are likely to increase the quality of social conditions and to reduce the likelihood of crime. Examples of programs dealing with the employability of the disadvantaged are: offering school drop-outs opportunities to acquire skills essential to obtain and retain employment; employment preparation programs, encouraging businesses to de-emphasize minor criminal offenses against property as a barrier to unemployment and volunteer opportunities; developing programs to divert young people out of correctional institutions, utilizing community alternatives to incarceration. Generally, social development focuses on families, schools, housing, and employment. In order to provide a more comprehensive example of the social development perspective, population health, the determinants of health and building supportive networks will be discussed.

Population Health Approach

The population health approach focuses on factors that enhance the health and well-being of the overall population. It perceives health as an asset that is a source of everyday living, not simply the absence of disease. Population health concerns itself with the living and working environment that affect people's health, the conditions that enable and support people in making healthy choices, and the services that promote and maintain health.

Health is viewed as a dynamic process involving the harmony with our environment which incorporates: the ability to achieve one's potential and to respond positively to the challenges of the environment; a positive concept emphasizing social and personal resources as well as physical capacities-- a resource for everyday life; a state of complete physical, mental and social well being; the extent to which an individual or group is able, on one hand, to satisfy needs and realize aspirations; and on the other hand, to change or cope with the environment. Perceived this way, health is not only considered in terms of absence of illness. Health is a force in our daily lives, determined by life circumstances, beliefs, actions, culture, and social, economic and physical environments (Healthy Communities 1989).

Based on the determinants of health, the key factors identified that influence children's health include the nurturing that they receive from their families, the financial resources of their parents, and their own biological makeup. A safe and stimulating environment in which to play and explore helps young children develop the learning and coping skills they will need as they grow into adulthood. Other important factors that

encourage healthy development include developing positive relationships and self-esteem and experiencing success.(Turning Points 1996)

The Determinants of Health

More governments, researchers, and community groups agree that to improve health and reduce health inequities all stakeholders, including government departments, must work collaboratively to influence the determinants of health. An individual is uniquely dependent on the health and well-being of his/her family and the strength of the community. Therefore the quality of the health of parents and community has both a direct and indirect effect on the child. The inter-related determinants of health which impact children, families and communities include(Committee on Population Health 1994):

Income and Social Status. This is the single most important determinant of health. Many

> studies show that health status improves as income and social status increase. Reasonably prosperous societies with equitable distribution of wealth have the healthiest populations, regardless of the amount they spend on health care.

Social Support Networks. Support from families, friends and communities is associated

> with better health. Some experts conclude that the health effect of social relationships may be as important as established risk factors such as smoking, physical activity, and substance abuse.

Education. Health status improves with increased levels of education. Education increases

> opportunities for stable employment, income, and helps to equip people with a sense of control over life circumstances.

Employment and Working Conditions. Workplace hazards and injuries are significant causes of health problems. Unemployment is associated with poorer health. Increased control over work circumstances and decreased job-related stress contribute to better health.

Physical Environments. The natural environment such as air, water and soil quality influence health. Factors in the built environment such as housing, workplaces, road design and community facilities are also important influences.

Biology and Genetic Endowment. The genetic endowment of the individual, functioning of the body systems, and the processes of physical maturation all influence health.

Personal Health Practices and Coping Skills. People's knowledge, intentions, behaviors and coping skills, are key influences on health. Social environments that enable and support healthy choices and lifestyles are important.

Healthy Child Development. The effect of prenatal and early childhood experiences on subsequent health, well-being, coping skills, and competence is very powerful.

Health Services. Health status improves when there is a reasonable balance within the health system between promotion/prevention and treatment services.

Each health determinant has an individual impact on health status. When there are deficiencies in more than one determinant, the cumulative impact can be profound. Public health strategies focus on children and youthful offenders partly because of the problem of escalating youth crime and older offenders begin their careers as juveniles (Sampson and Laub 1994). Generally, a child whose family has limited financial resources, little social support, poor problem solving and coping skills and living in socially isolated

neighborhoods that fail to meet the basic needs of their residents, including access to health care, educational opportunities, jobs, housing, and reasonably priced food stores (McCart 1994). Significant factors for youth violence include chronic parental unemployment, substance abuse, early onset of aggression, child abuse, victimization, and poor performance in school.

Reinforcing Supportive Environments-- Resiliency

Why do some people survive and even thrive in the face of adversity? The answer is resiliency-- the ability to adapt and rebound in the face of severe stress. Over time, the resilient individual develops the resources he or she needs to cope-- and even become stronger-- while rising to the challenges of disadvantage. Several protective factors, or buffers, foster resiliency: personal characteristics, including social competence, problem solving skills, autonomy, perseverance and an optimistic outlook; families and schools that provide care and support, high but achievable expectations, and opportunities for children to participate and contribute; families that have the strength to cope and endure despite chronic stress and repeated crises; and caring communities and nations that support the family and see children as a shared and precious resource (Steinhauer 1996: 4).These protective factors assist the child to combat accumulated risk factors (See Appendix 1, Chart 1) within their environment which may predispose children to later criminal activity and risky lifestyles. It is the combination of risk factors individuals experience, particularly if these are multiple, persistent, and not balanced by protective factors, that predispose them to negative outcomes. This understanding primes society to make the important and necessary shifts towards prevention of crime and victimization.

The goal of prevention is to reduce risk and increase protective factors related to the individual, supportive environments, and the broader community. The earlier protective factors are increased in a person's life, the greater the chance for diminishing risk (e.g. of studies: Perry Preschool, Tremblay, success by six). Thus providing coping strategies/support during the critical transitional stages of an individual's child's life will increase significant results in increasing health.

Individuals must be free from the risk factors associated with poverty. Effective pre-natal care and nurturing parents help promote healthy babies with secure attachments. The physical safety and emotional well-being of children are protected by families who understand and respond to the developmental need of their children. Security and social responsibility are fostered by parents who are actively participating in raising their children and providing effective/consistent discipline. Opportunities for exploring and learning through educational social activities encourage the acquisition of capital skills that children require to meet the challenges of school. Finally, supportive communities assist to buffer negative influences and strengthen protective factors in the lives of children (National Crime Prevention Council 1996: 41).

If one is to foster resiliency, we must adopt a common resolution to: alleviate inequity and make it the highest national priority; protect and nurture children and youth through all key stages of development, especially in times of diminishing resources; view children as a shared natural resource that represents society's future, not as the sole responsibility of the parents; focus community attention on the human and economic costs of failing to protect the development of vulnerable children and their families; rebuild the

social fabric; foster social support in the community that protects and nurtures healthy child and youth development. In order to achieve this goal, Steinhauer (1996) suggests that all levels of governments need to: adopt a comprehensive integrated, long-term, research based policy that supports child development from conception to adulthood (the transition to work); commit a prescribed percentage of revenues (e.g. 1%) to programs that support the healthy development of children; confront and change current social policies that threaten disadvantaged families; face head-on the lack of national standards for policy support and services: and make investments in social capital as important as investments in economic capital.

In order to be effective, promotion and prevention social development strategies for families must start early. It is important to take a long-term view and not expect instant results. Preventive strategies are proven to be cheaper over the long-term, than intervention after the fact. Prevention is also preferable in human costs.(Turning Points 1996) Wolfe (1996). identifies key factors in designing and implementing early intervention strategies: increase parents' knowledge of child development and the demands of parenting; enhance parent's skill in coping with stress related to caring for small children. Enhance parent-child attachment and communication; increase parents' knowledge of home management; reduce or share the burden of child care; increase access to social and health services. (Wolfe 1996)

In order to have the greatest effect, promotion and prevention strategies for families must start early. *Public funding directed at families is a long-term investment.* By investing in the early years of child development, we can save future costs in health, social service and judicial systems. More importantly, children will continue to receive the support they

need to develop into skilled, competent and capable adults. Crime prevention through social

development offers a major new dimension to be discovered and utilized to assist and

alleviate the situation of the disadvantaged. As noted beforehand, in most crime ridden

areas, crime is only one aspect of general deterioration. Through capital reinvestment and

family policy, social development provides the key to reducing crime. As Walker (1994:

290) concludes, "Crime is not a justice problem. Crime is not something distinct from other

social problems. The first step in the development of sensible crime policies is to look

outside the justice system and think seriously about families, neighborhoods, and jobs." As

Harold Cardinal concludes:

> No magic solution will wash away the social disorganization or the
> spectre of poverty. On the face of it, the vicious poverty that grips our
> people presents one of the most complex human problems that any society
> might face. But the very fact that the problem was man-made argues that
> the solution does not lie beyond man. (Nagler 1974; 110)

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Appendix 1:

Tables and Figures

Tables	**Page**

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Table 1

EXAMPLES OF THE RULE OF 10:1

	CANADA AS SHARE OF UNITED STATES	UNITED STATES AS A MULTIPLE OF CANADA
Situations When the "Rule of 10:1" Works Fairly Well		
Total output ('92):	.097	10.3
Total employment ('93):	.104	9.6
Total population ('91):	.108	9.2
Situations When the "Rule of 10:1" Does Not Work at All		
Self-employed women ('93):	.179	5.6
Unemployed ('93):	.179	5.6
Marriages ('91):	.073	13.8
Divorces ('91):	.065	15.4
Murders ('92):	.031	32.0

Sources: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 93-310, 71-220, 84-205, 85-002. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstracts of the* United States; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Economic Outlook.

Table 2

PRIDE AND SATISFACTION WITH COUNTRY

	Canadians		Americans	
Very/quite proud to be Canadian/American:	89%	('91)	96%	('91)
Voter turnout/national elections:	73%	('80s)	54%	('80s)
Content to stay in own country:	76%	('91)	90%	('91)
Dissatisfied with direction country is going:	76%	('92)	68%	('93)
Excellent or good health care:	71%	('92)	59%	('92)
See rising standard of living in future/next generation:	23%	('93)	28%	('92)
Taxes too high (agree):	77%	('93)	55%	('93)
Too much spending on defence (agree):	33%	('91)	42%	('93)

Sources: Gallup Canada, *The Gallup Report. The Gallup Poll Monthly* (U.S.). Statisti Canada, *Canadian Social Trends,* Winter 1992.

Table 3

HOW WE RATE EACH OTHER – 1989

	Canadians towards Americans		Americans towards Canadians	
Attractiveness of men/women in the other country?				
–On a scale of 1 to 10:	6.2		6.3	
Best word to describe people the in other country?				
–Most popular word:	Snobs	11%	Friendly	28%
–2nd most popular word:	Good	9%	Nice	9%
–3rd most popular word:	Friendly	8%	Neighbours	6%
What you like least about people in other country?				
–Most mentioned trait:	Superior attitude/	25%	Nothing	37%

Source: Maclean's, "Portrait of Two Nations." July 3, 1989.

Table 4

ATTITUDES ON RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY

	Canadians		Americans	
Attended church, synagogue or other place of worship during last seven days:	35%	('93)	41%	('91)
Believe in heaven:	71%	('90)	78%	('91)
Believe in reincarnation:	26%	('90)	23%	('91)
Believe in hell:	34%	('90)	60%	('91)
Believe in the devil:	30%	('90)	52%	('91)
Believe in witches:	18%	('92)	16%	('91)
Abortion should be legal under all circumstances:	31%	('93)	32%	('93)
Approve of abortion pill:	48%	('92)	54%	('93)
Legalize euthanasia:	77%	('92)	65%	('91)

Sources: Gallup Canada, The Gallup Report. The Gallup Poll Monthly (U.S.).

Table 5

SEXUAL AND GENDER ATTITUDES

	Canadians		Americans	
Believe women get as good a deal as men:	41%	('93)	42%	('90)
Allow gays into military:	67%	('92)	57%	('92)
Welcome more acceptance of sexual freedom:	40%	('93)	29%	('91)
Premarital sex is not wrong:	70%	('92)	54%	('91)
Extramarital sex is wrong:	81%	('92)	91%	('91)
Valentine's Day intentions:				
-to give valentine	66%	('91)	56%	('92)
-to give flowers	30%	('91)	45%	('92)
-to give chocolates/candies	20%	('91)	27%	('92)

Sources: Gallup Canada, *The Gallup Report. The Gallup Poll Monthly* (U.S.).

Table 6

FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES

	Canadians		Americans	
Ideal number of children is two or fewer:	59%	('91)	60%	('90)
Would welcome:				
-more emphasis on traditional family values	87%	('93)	94%	('91)
-less emphasis on money	68%	('93)	69%	('91)
-less emphasis on working hard	28%	('93)	29%	('91)
-more acceptance of marijuana use	14%	('93)	12%	('91)
Describe self as overweight:	35%	('92)	35%	('91)
Smoked during previous week:	29%	('93)	28%	('91)
Use alcohol:	76%	('92)	64%	('92)
Fear about walking in neighbourhood alone at night:	35%	('93)	44%	('92)
Favour more restrictive gun control laws:	77%	('94)	70%	('93)

Sources: Gallup Canada, *The Gallup Report. The Gallup Poll Monthly* (U.S.).

Table 7

Political Protest and Violence
In Canada and the United States, 1948–82

	Protest demonstrations	Riots	Deaths from political violence
Canada			
1948–67	27	29	8
1968–77	3:	5	4
1978–82	13	0	—
United States			
1948–67	1,175	683	320
1968–77	1,005	149	114
1978–82	1,165	93	—

Source: Incidence for 1948–77 calculated from data in Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 3d ed., vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 19–25, 33–36, 47–51. The data for 1978–82 are not in the book but were supplied to me by Professor Taylor.

Table 8

PROVINCES AND STATES RANKED BY POPULATION SIZE – 1991

	000's	Rank
California	30380	1
New York	18058	2
Texas	17349	3
Florida	13277	4
Pennsylvania	11961	5
Illinois	11543	6
Ohio	10939	7
ONTARIO	10085	8
Michigan	9368	9
New Jersey	7760	10
QUÉBEC	6896	11
North Carolina	6737	12
Georgia	6623	13
Virginia	6286	14
Massachusetts	5996	15
Indiana	5610	16
Missouri	5158	17
Washington	5018	18
Wisconsin	4955	19
Tennessee	4953	20
Maryland	4860	21
Minnesota	4432	22
Louisiana	4252	23
Alabama	4089	24
Arizona	3750	25
Kentucky	3713	26
South Carolina	3560	27
Colorado	3377	28
Connecticut	3291	29
BRITISH COLUMBIA	3282	30
Oklahoma	3175	31
Oregon	2922	32
Iowa	2795	33
Mississippi	2592	34
Kansas	2495	35
ALBERTA	2546	36
Arkansas	2372	37
West Virginia	1801	38
Utah	1770	39
Nebraska	1593	40
New Mexico	1548	41
Nevada	1284	42
Maine	1235	43
Hawaii	1135	44
New Hampshire	1105	45
MANITOBA	1092	46
Idaho	1039	47
Rhode Island	1004	48
SASKATCHEWAN	986	49
NOVA SCOTIA	900	50
Montana	808	51
NEW BRUNSWICK	724	52
South Dakota	703	53
Delaware	680	54
North Dakota	635	55
Alaska	570	56
NEWFOUNDLAND	569	57
Vermont	567	58
Wyoming	460	59
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND	130	60

Source: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 93-310, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States.

Table 9

METROPOLITAN AREAS
(000's of persons/census in early 1990s)

	CANADA	**UNITED STATES**	
		10 Largest Metropolitan Areas	
Toronto	4040	New York	19342
Montreal	3215	Los Angeles	14532
Vancouver	1949	Chicago	8242
Ottawa	953	Washington/Baltimore	6727
Edmonton	857	San Francisco	6253
Calgary	769	Philadelphia	5893
Winnipeg	665	Boston	5455
Quebec	663	Detroit	5187
Hamilton	621	Dallas	4037
London	398	Houston	3731

	CANADA	**UNITED STATES**	
		10 Smallest Metropolitan Areas	
Windsor	272	Erie	276
Oshawa	249	Fayetteville	275
Saskatoon	214	Binghampton	264
Regina	195	Provo	264
St. John's	175	Springfield	264
Chicoutimi	165	Columbus	261
Sudbury	163	Savannah	258
Sherbrooke	143	Reno	255
Trois-Rivières	140	Fort Pierce	251
Saint John	130	Charleston	250

Sources: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 93-310. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the United States.

Table 10   Relative Rates of Poverty for Ten Countries, Nonelderly
Families, Various Years

Country	Year	All Families %	Couples/ Children %	Female Lone-Parent/ Children %	Families under 25 years %
Australia	1985-86	15.7	12.2	66.4	26.2
Belgium	1985	5.4	13.6	17.1	12.6
Canada	1987	15.4	10.5	52.1	30.1
France	1984	8.9	7.5	21.9	11.9
Germany	1984-85	8.5	5.5	38.8	25.9
Italy	1986	10.1	11.7	21.1	23.6
Netherlands	1987	4.7	4.8	10.6	10.3
Sweden	1987	12.1	3.2	6.0	31.0
UK	1986	12.4	14.5	30.4	18.8
USA	1986	18.7	14.2	59.8	37.3

Source Michael Forster, cited in Ross, Shillington, Lochhead, 1994: 111.

Table 11

SHARE OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOMES BEFORE TAX

	Canadians 1980/1992	Gain/ loss	Americans 1980/1992	Gain/ loss
	% of total incomes		% of total incomes	
Richest 20% of households:	42.1/43.6	+1.5	44.0/46.9	+2.9
Middle 40% of households:	43.0/41.5	−1.5	41.6/40.0	-1.6
Poorest 40% of households:	14.9/14.9	—	14.4/13.2	-1.2

Sources: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 13-207. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Report P60-180.

Table 12

ALTERNATIVE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

	Canada 1980	1993	United States 1980	1993
Official rate:	7.5%	11.2%	7.1%	6.8%
RATES BY DURATION				
Long-term unemployed (13 weeks or more):	2.5%	5.6%	1.7%	2.4%
Persons who are discouraged and have dropped out of the workforce:	1.0%	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%
RATES BY SEX AND AGE				
Male workers:	6.9%	11.7%	6.9%	7.1%
Female workers:	8.4%	10.6%	7.4%	6.5%
Adult (25+) workers:	5.4%	9.9%	5.1%	5.6%
Youth (under 25) workers:	13.8%	17.7%	13.8%	13.3%

Sources: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 71-220 and unpublished data. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Economic Review, March 1990, and published updates.

Table 13

POVERTY IN CANADA, 1973-1986

[Lines (A) = CCSD definition; Lines (B) = StatsCan definition]

	1973		1979		1986	
	Number (000)	Rate (%)	Number (000)	Rate (%)	Number (000)	Rate (%)
Families	908	17.4	1,300	21.6	1,471	21.2 (A)
	701	13.4	789	13.1	851	12.3 (B)
Individuals	756	39.7	1,034	41.3	1,051	36.7 (A)
	766	40.2	1,003	40.3	982	34.3 (B)
Total	1,664	23.3	2,334	27.4	2,522	25.9 (A)
	1,467	20.6	1,792	21.1	1,833	18.7 (B)

Table 14

POVERTY IN CANADA, ACCORDING TO LOCATION OF RESIDENCE

[Lines (A) = CCSD definition; Lines (B) = StatsCan definition]

	1973		1979		1986	
	Families %	Individuals %	Families %	Individuals %	Families %	Individuals %
100,000 or more	32.4	53.1	41.4	53.1	43.8	58.5 (A)
	45.9	60.9	51.0	61.3	56.7	69.1 (B)
30,000-99,999	8.1	9.7	11.4	14.1	11.1	11.5 (A)
	6.5	6.7	10.1	11.1	10.3	9.7 (B)
under 30,000	21.7	21.6	19.2	21.4	16.9	16.7 (A)
	19.4	19.1	15.4	18.0	14.3	12.7 (B)
rural areas	37.8	15.6	27.8	11.5	28.2	13.2 (A)
	28.2	13.2	23.4	9.5	18.8	8.4 (B

Table 15

Percentage of Area Population That Is Poor, by Race, 1975–89

	Central Cities			Central Poverty Areas		
	All	White	African-American	All	White	African-American
1975	10.7	7.0	18.2	15.0	10.8	29.1
1980	17.2	12.1	32.3	36.1	30.9	43.8
1985	19.0	14.9	32.1	37.5	34.2	41.2
1989	18.1	14.9	32.1	37.3	31.7	42.8

Source. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Survey, Money Income and Poverty Status in the United States, 1989, Series P-60, various years

Table 16

Percentage of Poor People Concentrated in Poverty Areas,
by Race, 1975–89

Poor	1975		1980		1985		1989	
Population	White	African-American	White	African-American	White	African-American	White	African-American
Central city	32.1	70.1	25.4	58.8	42.8	74.9	40.0	71.0
Suburbs	10.2	39.3	13.3	44.1	14.0	45.4	13.0	40.1

Source. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Survey, Money Income and Poverty Status in the United States, Series P-60, various years

Table 17

Residential Segregation, Ten Largest Metropolises, 1980

Metropolis	Population Size (1988) (thousands)	Percent Black	Index of Racial Segregation	Racial Composition of Tract of Typical Black	
				Percent Black	Percent White
New York	17,053	15	78	64	28
Los Angeles	13,920	8	79	61	30
Chicago	7,396	21	88	84	14
San Francisco	4,950	8	71	51	42
Philadelphia	4,904	17	78	70	28
Detroit	4,434	20	88	80	20
Washington, D.C.	3,849	14	71	69	30
Dallas	3,513	26	78	67	30
Houston	3,306	16	74	66	31
Miami	3,212	20	79	68	30

Source. Reynolds Farley and Steven Schechterman. "The Social and Economic Status of Blacks Does It Vary by Size of Metropolis?" Table 6 from photostat, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, June 1990.

Table 18

Residential Segregation, 203 Metropolitan Areas, by Population Size, 1980

Population Size	Number of SMSAs[1]	Index of Racial Segregation	Racial Composition of Tract of Typical Black	
			Percent Black	Percent White
2,000,000+	15	78	66	31
1,000,000 to 1,999,999	17	74	57	41
500,000 to 999,999	33	71	57	41
325,000 to 499,999	29	66	47	51
250,000 to 324,999	22	64	43	56
150,000 to 249,999	38	64	47	51
100,000 to 149,999	40	59	44	55
Under 100,000	10	57	34	63

Source: Robert J. Wilger. "Black-White Residential Segregation in 1980" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1988), Table 3.3. Printed in Reynolds Farley and Steven Schechterman. "The Social and Economic Status of Blacks: Does It Vary by Size of Metropolis?" photostat, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, June 1990.

[1]Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas

Table 19

Percentage Not at Work, African-American Men Aged 16–62, Less Than High School Education, 1969–87

Part of Metropolis	1969	1977	1982	1987
Central city	18.8	36.3	49.5	49.5
Suburban ring	16.3	31.4	38.2	33.4

Source: John D Kasarda. "Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 501 (Jan 1989): Table 8, p. 42.

Table 20

The Concentrated Urban Poverty (CUP) Population
ada and the United States

	Total Population	As a Percent of National Population
CANADA*		
All Persons in CUP	689,175	2.7
Poor Persons in CUP	313,560	1.2
UNITED STATES**		
All Persons in CUP	3,673,585	1.6
Poor Persons in CUP	1,834,384	0.8

* Sources for this table are the 1980 US Census and the 1986 Canadian Census
* are for the 25 CMAs in Canada
** are for the 100 largest central cities in the US

Table 21

Racial Ethnic Character of Concentrated Urban Poverty in Canada and the United States

Race/Ethnicity	All neighborhoods	Over 40 Percent Poor
CANADA		
British	32.2	16.5
French	29.2	41.7
Aboriginal	0.8	2.8
Black	1.5	3.0
Chinese	3.7	6.3
Italian	5.9	2.8
German	4.4	2.8
South Asian	3.7	1.6
Ukrainian	2.4	1.8
Jewish	2.2	1.6
Dutch	1.6	0.5
Polish	1.5	1.4
Scandinavian	0.9	0.5
UNITED STATES		
White	57.3	12.1
Black	26.0	66.6
Hispanic	12.5	19.2
Asian	3.2	1.7

Sources for this table are the 1980 US Census and the 1986 Canadian Census
Canadian calculations are for respondents who listed only a single origin under their ethnicity.
Data are for the 23 CMAs in Canada
Data are for the 100 largest central cities in the US

Table 22

Percent of Each Race/Ethnic Group Living under Various Levels of Neighborhood Poverty

Race/Ethnicity	Neighborhoods with less than 20 Percent Poor	20 to 40 Percent Poor	Concentrated Poverty Neighborhoods	All Neighborhoods
CANADA				
British	75.0	22.2	2.8	100%
French	58.8	33.5	7.7	100%
Black	55.0	34.3	10.7	100%
Aboriginal	42.2	39.2	18.6	100%
Chinese	52.9	37.9	9.2	100%
Italian	66.7	30.7	2.6	100%
German	74.7	22.9	2.4	100%
South Asian	67.6	28.7	3.7	100%
Ukrainian	66.9	28.5	4.6	100%
Jewish	79.2	17.0	3.8	100%
Dutch	78.7	19.6	1.7	100%
Polish	64.9	29.9	5.2	100%
Scandinavian	71.7	25.1	3.2	100%
UNITED STATES				
White	82.7	14.9	2.4	100%
Black	34.2	45.8	20.0	100%
Hispanic	46.8	40.8	12.4	100%
Asian	74.8	22.3	2.9	100%

Note: Sources for this table are the 1980 US Census and the 1986 Canadian Census
Canadian calculations are for respondents who listed their ethnicity as a single origin
Data are for the 23 CMAs in Canada
Data are for the 100 largest central cities in the US

Table 23

Mean Economic Characteristics of Poor and Non-poor
Neighborhoods in Canada

Characteristic	All Neighborhoods	Over 40 Percent Poor
Male		
Employed	69.1	47.4
Unemployed	8.8	19.3
Not in Labor Force	22.1	33.2
Median Earnings	$21,867.00	$11,084.00
Female		
Employed	48.5	30.3
Unemployed	10.0	17.5
Not in Labor Force	41.5	52.2
Median Earnings	$10,931.00	$8,208.00
Earnings From:		
Government Transfers	10.3	24.1
Work Income	78.3	67.8
Education		
Less Than 9 Years	14.6	29.9
Without High School	40.3	54.2
Graduation	-	
University Graduate	12.2	8.1
Immigrants	21.4	23.2
Housing:		
Percent Built Before 1946	19.7	44.5

Source: 1986 Canadian Census

Table 24

BLACK AMERICANS
SELECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS*
(mostly early 1990s - bracketed numbers are for U.S. white population)

Population	31,895,000	
highest percentage of population in metropolitan areas:	43% — Jackson, Mississippi 41% — Memphis, Tennessee 36% — Montgomery, Alabama	
Median age	28.1	(34.4)
Percentage with 4 or more years of college (age 25+):	12%	(22%)
Percentage of age 16 and over in labour force:	63%	(67%)
Percentage unemployed:	12%	(6%)
Median income of families(US$):	$21,400	($36,900)
Percentage of families below the poverty level:	29%	(8%)
Median household net worth(US$):	$4,200	($43,300)
Percentage who own homes:	43%	(67%)
Percentage who voted in 1992 election:	54%	(64%)
Percentage of families comprised of a married couple:	49%	(83%)
Percentage of births to unmarried mothers:	65%	(19%)
Percentage of children living with both parents:	36%	(79%)
Persons per family:	3.5	(3.1)

*United States definitions and dollars.

Table 25

ABORIGINAL CANADIANS
SELECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS*
(1991 unless indicated - bracketed numbers are for all Canada)

Population	625,710 to 1,002,675	
highest percentage of metropolitan areas:	6% — Saskatoon, Sask. 6% — Regina, Sask. 5% — Winnipeg, Man.	
Percentage of population under age 25:	57%	(35%)
Percentage with post-secondary education (ages 15-49):	33%	(51%)
Percentage of ages 15 and over in labour force:		
- Total	57%	(68%)
- North American Indian	55%	
- on reserve	45%	
- off reserve	61%	
- Metis	63%	
Percentage unemployed:		
- Total	25%	(11%)
- North American Indian	26%	
- on reserve	31%	
- off reserve	23%	
- Métis	22%	
Average income (age 15+) (in 1985):	$12,899	($18,188)
Percentage of individuals with an income under $10,000:	54%	(34%)

*Canadian definitions and dollars.

Table 26

Poverty, effectiveness of government transfers, dependence, and prevalence
of single-mother families in seven wealthy nations.

Country	Percentage poor (below half of median income)	Percentage reduction in pretransfer poverty by government benefits	Percentage of single mothers dependent on government benefits for half or more of income	Percentage of families with children headed by single mothers
Canada	45	19	39	13
France	16	59	25	12
Germany	25	34	39	11
Netherlands	7	89	75	12
Sweden	6	81	33	12
United Kingdom	18	75	71	13
United States	53	5	38	22

Source: Columns 1-3, Smeeding and Rainwater (1991); column 4, figures for

Canada, Sweden, France, and Unites States from McLanahan and Garfinkel (1991), for Germany, the Netherlands,

and the United Kingdom from Ermisch (1990) as Quoted from Garfinkel and McLanahan 1994: 209.

Table 27 SELECTED BIRTH STATISTICS

Canadians   **Americans**

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE
(children per woman during lifetime)
1.8 (1991)   2.1 (1991)

BIRTHS TO UNWED MOTHERS
(births to unwed mothers as a percentage of all births)
25% (1991)   30% (1991)

BIRTHS TO TEENAGERS
(births to teenagers as a percentage of all births)
6% (1991)   13% (1991)

LOW BIRTH WEIGHTS
(percentage of births with weights of less than 2,500 grams)
5.5% (1991)   7.0% (1991)

INFANT MORTALITY
(deaths per 1,000 live births)
6.8 (1990)   9.2 (1990)

ABORTIONS ·
(abortions per 1,000 live births for women aged 15 to 44)
175 (1991)   · 401 (1988)

Sources: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 82-553, 82-003. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstracts of the United States.

Table 28   Suicide and Homicide Rates, Canada and Selected Countries by latest year available

		Suicide Rate (per 100,000)	Homicide Rate (per 100,000)
Australia	1988	13.3	2.4
Barbados	1988	- 4.7	7.1
Belgium	1987	22.7	1.6
Canada	1990	12.7	2.1
Colombia	1990	2.7	74.4
England and Wales	1991	7.6	0.5
Finland	1991	29.8	3.1
France	1990	20.1	1.1
Greece	1990	3.5	1.1
Hungary	1991	38.6	4.0
Ireland	1990	9.5	0.6
Israel	1989	7.8	2.4
Italy	1989	7.5	2.2
Japan	1991	16.0	0.6
Kuwait	1987	0.9	0.5
Latvia	1990	26.0	9.2
Mexico	1990	-2.2	16.8
Netherlands	1990	9.7	0.9
Scotland	1991	10.3	1.5
Sweden	1990	17.2	1.3
Trinidad and Tobago	1989	14.3	8.1
USA	1989	12.2	9.1

Source: UN 1994 Demographic Yearbook: 688-709.

Table 29

The Disproportion of African American Arrests

Crime Type	African American Disproportion[a]
All crimes	2.5
Violent crime[b]	3.7
Property crime[c]	2.9
Robbery	5.1
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	4.6
Suspicion	4.2
Vagrancy	4.0
Gambling	3.8
Forcible rape	3.6
Stolen property offenses	3.5
Weapons offenses	3.5
Motor vehicle theft	3.3
Drug abuse violation	3.3
Aggravated Assault	3.2
Prostitution, commercialized vice	3.0
All other offenses (except traffic)	3.0
Fraud	2.9
Other assault	2.8
Forgery and counterfeiting	2.8
Disorderly conduct	2.7
Larceny-theft	2.6
Burglary	2.5
Embezzlement	2.5
Offenses against family and children	2.4
Arson	1.8
Vandalism	1.8
Curfew and loitering law violations	1.8
Other sex offenses	1.6
Drunkenness	1.4
Runaways	1.4
Liquor laws	0.9
Driving under the influence	0.8

[a] The percentage of African Americans arrested for each offense divided by the percentage African American in the population in 1991 (12 percent).

[b] Violent crime=murder, rape, robbery, and assault.

[c] Property crime=burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

Table 30

Suicide/Homicide Ratio Scores by Race/Ethnicity, 1965-1983

	SUICIDE/HOMICIDE RATIO SCORE*		
Year	White	Black	American Indian
1965	.81	.17	.44
1966	.80	.17	.44
1967	.79	.15	.42
1968	.78	.15	.50
1969	.77	.13	.46
1970	.77	.13	.52
1971	.75	.13	.49
1972	.76	.13	.52
1973	.74	.14	.53
1974	.78	.15	.57
1975	.77	.15	.55
1976	.76	.17	.58
1977	.75	.16	.60
1978	.74	.15	.50
1979	.74	.15	.53
1980	.72	.15	.54
1981	.71	.14	.55
1982	.74	.15	.56
1983	.74	.15	.58

*Suicide/Homicide Ratio Score = [Suicide Rate/(Suicide Rate + Homicide Rate)]

Figure 1

INTERACTION OF SOCIAL, HUMAN, AND CULTURAL CAPITAL

Letters= human capital
Arrows= social capital

Figure 2

INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION

as % of population growth

Figure 3

POPULATION
15 Years Back – 15 Years Forward

Figure 4

Poverty Rate, Lone-Parent Households, Canada and Selected Countries, mid-1980s

% of lone-parent households

```
65  ←— USA

50

45  ←— Canada

40

35

30

25  ←— Germany

20  ←— UK

15  ←— France

10  ←— Netherlands

 5  ←— Sweden

 0
```

Source. *Centre for International Statistics on Economic and Social Welfare, Campaign 2000, 1993. Child Poverty Indicator Report.*

Figure 5

Child Poverty Rates, Canada, USA, and Sweden, 1967-1992

Source. *Smeeding, T., 1996. Luxembourg Income Study Data Quality: Some Issues Related to Health Outcomes.*

Figure 6

International Child Poverty Rates

**Sources:** U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table 21: Poverty Status of Persons, by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1968–1993; Rainwater, Lee, and Timothy M. Smeeding (August 1995), *Luxembourg Income Study,* Table 3.

Figure 7

Human Development Index, 1992

World rank (1=best)	
1	← Canada
2	← USA
3	← Japan
4	← Netherlands
5	← Finland
6	← Iceland
7	← Norway
8	← France
9	← Spain
10	← Sweden
~	
174	

Source UNDP, 1995. Human Development Report 1995.

Figure 8

Human Development Index (adjusted for gender inequality), 1992

World rank (1=best)	
1	← Sweden
2	← Finland
3	← Norway
4	← Denmark
5	← USA
6	← Australia
7	← France
8	← Japan
9	← Canada
10	← Austria
~	
130	

Source: UNDP, 1995. Human Development Report 1995.

Figure 9

Gross domestic Product (GDP) per Capita, Canada and Selected Countries, 1970-1993

GDP per capita ($US PPP)

Source: OECD, OECD Health-Data, version 3.6, 1995.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1995.
Note The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the value of all final goods and services produced within a country. GDP can be calculated in various ways. In Figure 81, GDPs have been converted to US dollars using purchasing power parities (PPP), which reflect the cost of purchasing an identical basket of goods and services in each country. Using PPP helps to make international comparisons more accurate.

Figure 10

Income Inequality, 1991-1992

Gini coefficient *

- .34 — ◄— United States
- .32
- .30 ◄— Australia
- .28 ◄— Canada
- .26 ◄— Netherlands
- .24 ◄— Denmark
- .22 ◄— Finland, Sweden
- 0

Source: Smeeding, T., 1996. *Luxembourg Income Study: Some Issues Related to Health Outcomes* In this study, comparable data for Japan were not available.
*Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality. The higher the number, the greater the inequality (the gap between the rich and the poor).

Figure 11

HOUSEHOLD INCOME INEQUALITY
ratio of income of richest 20% to poorest 20% of households

12.3
10.5
Americans
10.0
Canadians   9.5

Year: 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 '92

Sources: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 13-207. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Report P60-180.

Figure 12

Unemployment Rate, Canada and Selected Countries, 1970-1993

Percent

Source: OECD, OECD Health-Data, version 3.6, 1995.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human
Development Report 1995.

Figure 13

Percent of People With Selected Characteristics Who Were Chronically Poor: 1992 and 1993

(The chronically poor were poor in all 24 months of 1992 and 1993.)

Characteristic	Percent
All people	4.8
White	3.1
Black	15.1
Hispanic origin[1]	10.3
Under 18 years	8.3
18 to 64 years	3.2
65 years and over	4.9
Employed full time	0.5
Employed part time	1.6
Unemployed	9.6
Not in labor force	8.5
People in married-couple families	1.6
People in female-householder families	17.2
Unrelated individuals	8.1

[1]People of Hispanic origin may be of any race.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).

Figure 14

Percent of People With Selected Characteristics Who Exited Poverty In 1993

All people	21.6
White	25.7
Black	13.2
Hispanic origin[1]	18.4
Under 18 years	17.7
18 to 64 years	26.1
65 years and over	15.0
Married-couple families	28.6
Other families types	12.2

[1]People of Hispanic origin may be of any race.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).

Figure 15

Percent of People With Selected Characteristics Who Entered Poverty In 1993

All people	3.0
White	2.6
Black	6.7
Hispanic origin[1]	8.6
Under 18 years	4.0
18 to 64 years	2.8
65 years and over	2.2
Married-couple families	1.6
Other families types	6.2

[1]People of Hispanic origin may be of any race.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).

Figure 16

Underclass   230

Thousands

$50
$40 $36,812 $38,909
$30
$20 $21,161 $23,901
$10
$0

All Families   White   African American   Hispanic

Median Family Income, 1992

Income Distributions (1990 Dollars)

	1970	White Families	1990
Over $50,000	24.1%		32.5%
$35,000 to $50,000	24.1%		20.8%
$25,000 to $35,000	20.6%		16.5%
$15,000 to $25,000	16.9%		16.0%
Under $15,000	14.3%		14.2%
Median Income	$34,481		$36,915

	1970	African American Families	1990
Over $50,000	9.9%		14.5%
$35,000 to $50,000	13.9%		15.0%
$25,000 to $35,000	17.6%		14.0%
$15,000 to $25,000	24.0%		19.5%
Under $15,000	34.6%		37.0%
Median Income	$21,151		$21,423

Income Distributions for White
and African American Families

Andrew Hacker. Two Nations: Black and White: Separate, Hostile, Unequal
(New York: Scribner's, 1992). p. 98

Figure 17

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATES

Marriages per 100 aged 15 to 64 — Divorces per 1000 married women

Canada: 70=14, 80=12, 90=10
U.S.: 70=17, 80=16, 90=15
Canada: 70=6, 80=11, 90=12
U.S.: 70=15, 80=23, 90=21

Sources: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 82-003, supplement # 17; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Economic Review, March 1990, and unpublished updates.

Figure 18

Teen Pregnancy Rates, Canada and Selected Countries, Mid-1980s

Source. United Nations, Demographic Yearbooks. In Wadhera & Strachan, 1991.

Figure 19

International Rates of Incarceration, 1992-1993

Country	Rate
United States	555
South Africa	369
Singapore	229
Hong Kong	179
Northern Ireland	126
Canada	116
Mexico	97
United Kingdom	93
Australia	91
Spain	90
Switzerland	65
France	64
Italy	80
Denmark	66
Norway	59
Netherlands	49
Japan	36

Total Incarceration (Rate per 100,000)

Note: Russia's incarceration rate is estimated to be 558; it has been omitted because of questions of reliability. The incarceration rates include both prison and jail populations.

Sources: Mauer, Marc (September 1994), *Americans Behind Bars: The International Use of Incarceration, 1992-1993* (Washington D.C.: The Sentencing Project); Austin, James (January 1994), *An Overview of Incarceration Trends in the United States and Their Impact on Crime* (San Francisco: The National Council on Crime and Delinquency).

Figure 20

Murder Victims, Type of Weapons Used, 1993

Weapon	Number of Victims
Firearms	16,189
Knives or cutting instruments	2,957
Blunt objects (clubs, hammers, etc.)	2,024
Personal weapons (hands, fists, feet, etc.)	1,164
Strangulation/Asphyxiation	442
All other weapons	1,495

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (December 1994), *Crime in the United States—1993*. p. 18.

Figure 21

Except for Murder, Victimization Rates in the U.S. Are Not Higher ...

International Victimization Rates for Selected Offenses

Figure 22

... But Fear Is

Percentage of the Public Feeling Unsafe When Walking in Their Own Area After Dark

Country	Percentage
United States	41.0%
New Zealand	38.2%
Italy	35.1%
England	33.0%
Australia	31.1%
Netherlands	21.1%
Canada	20.0%
Belgium	19.6%
Finland	17.9%
Sweden	13.5%

Source: Van Dijk, Jan J. M. (November 1992), *Criminal Victimisation in the Industrialized World,* pp. 10, 24, 33, 57, The Netherlands: Ministry of Justice.

Figure 23

Percentage of houses protected by a burglary alarm

Figure 24

U.S. Incarceration Rate of Sentenced Prisoners
in State and Federal Institutions, 1860-1993

Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (1994), *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1993,* p. 600; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (June 1994), *Prisoners in 1993,* p. 2; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (December 1986), *Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984,* p. 34.

Rate per 1,000 persons age 12 and over

--●-- Personal Theft—White   --■-- Personal Theft—African American
--▲-- Violent—African American   --◆-- Violent—White

Figure 25   Victimization Rates for Violent and Personal Theft Crimes,
by Race: 1973–92

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States: 1973–92 Trends
(Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1994), Table 4, pp. 14–15.

Rate per 1,000 households

--●-- African American   --◆-- White

Figure 26   Victimization Rates for Household Crimes, by Race:
1973–92

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States: 1973–92 Trends
(Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1994), Table 4, pp. 14–15.

Rate per 1,000 households

■ African American · ■ White

Figure 27   Victimization Rates, by Race of Head of Household, 1992

Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1992* (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1994;. Table 22, p. 44.

Figure 28

Firearm Homicide Victim Rate for Youth Aged 10-19 by Race, 1980-1992

Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (August 23, 1994), *Death for Selected Causes, By 5 Year Age Groups, Color and Sex: United States, 1979-92*; U.S. Bureau of the Census (February 1993), *U.S. Population Estimates, By Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 1991*; U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1994), *U.S. Population Estimates, By Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 1993*.

Figure 29   Race Discrimination or Crime?

African-American/White Ratios in the Criminal Justice System

For every white arrest,
there are 3 African-American arrests

For every white prisoner,
there are 7 African-American prisoners

Arrest   Prison

☐ White   ■ African-American

Figure 30   U.S. Illicit Drug Use by Race, 1992

■ Ever Used
☐ Past Year
■ Past Month

White   African-American   Hispanic

Figure 31   Drug Arrest Rates by Race, 1981-1993

African-American
White

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Figure 32   Death Penalty Process in North Carolina, by Race of Offender and Victim

Data obtained from Harold Garfinkel, "Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides," *Social Forces* 27 (1949), Tables 2 and 3.

Figure 33

Suicide Rates by Ethnicity, 1965-1983

## Figure 34

Homicide Offender Rates by Ethnicity, 1965-1983

Figure 35

Victim/Offender Relationship Specific Homicide Rates, 1980-1984

Figure 36

Suicide Rate for Registered Indians* and the Total Population, Canada, 1979-1991

* The data for the Pacific region cover only the years 1979-1984 and for the N.W.T. only the years 1979-1986.
Source: Medical Services Branch, Health and Welfare Canada, Unpublished, 1993.

Figure 37

MURDER RATE FOR CANADIAN
### INDIAN OFFENDERS, CANADA, 1961–1989*

Chart 1. **Strategic Prevention**

		Protective Factors	Risk Factors	Some Prevention Strategies
I N D I V I D U A L		Social Competence	Alienation, rebeliousness and lack of bonding to society	Increase skills, competencies in the population of youth as a whole, with particualr emphasis on periods prior to key development transitions.
		Problem Solving Skills	Association with friends who drink, use drugs	
		Autonomy	Favourable attitudes toward alcohol/drugs	Target those individuals at high risk to increase their sense of control and involve them in projects with meaningful roles and opportunity for decision making.
			Early imitation of behavior	
			Personality factors (sensation seeking, lack of impulse control	
E N V I R O N M E N T	Family	Caring and Suppport	Family history of addiction	Provide information to encourage parental modelling of reponsible or non-drug use behavior
			Family management problems	
		High Expectations	Family conflict	Support the development of family management skills for parents and youths in treatment.
			Favourable parental attitudes and involvemnet in bahavior	
	School	Youth Participation and Involvement	Early and persistent antisocial behavior	Provide youth with opportunity to participate in meaningful ways in the school.
			Academic failure in elementary shool	
		Healthy Beliefs and Clear Standards	Lack of commitment to school	Work with schools to develop compassionate and effective responses to kids in trouble and those returning from treatment
	Community	Bonding	Availability of drugs	Partner with the community to develop healthy alcohol/drug use policy
			Community laws and norms favorable toward drug use	
			Transitions and mobility	
			Low nieghbourhood attachment	Provide support to community action groups concerned about reducing harm associated with alcohol/drugs.
			Community disorganization	
			Severe economic deprivation	