IMPERIALISM AND REGIONALISM
Nova Scotia and the Road to the American Revolution

by
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Abstract

Before the American Revolution of 1776, the British colonies of North America were part of an imperial community premised on British citizenship and Protestantism. The pressure from France and Spain strengthened the colonists' affiliation both to the Crown and to each other as fellow Britons. Supplementing the imperial community, and often superceding it as the colonies embarked on the road to revolution, were regional and local cultures. Such regional identities operated across the borders that divide contemporary North America into Canada and the United States. Nova Scotia and New England were part of the same regional community, a relationship complicated by the two colonies' political differences when one declared loyalty to and the other rebelled from British rule. Discussion of the conflict between and intersections of imperial and regional cultures in Nova Scotia and New England provides a valuable contribution to imperial interpretations of why Nova Scotia did not join the other thirteen colonies in revolt against Britain. Nova Scotia's relationship to the imperial centre set the terms of the province's response to the Revolution. While New England fought to sever its ties to Britain, Nova Scotia reasserted its affiliation to the Crown. Despite the colonies' political differences, local bonds between Nova Scotia and New England remained strong through social and cultural connections. Nova Scotia Yankees retained many ties to their homeland despite resistance from the authorities in Halifax, and looked to New England as a model for settlement. As the colonies headed into the Revolution, both Nova Scotia and New England had patriots, loyalists, and neutrals who responded to the conflict between imperial and regional communities.

Acknowledgements

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

New England and Nova Scotia 1776

[1] George A. Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), p. 219.

Introduction

On 4 July 1776, thirteen of the sixteen British colonies in North America declared their independence from the British crown. While many historians have offered interpretations explaining why these thirteen colonies revolted, relatively few have attempted to answer why the remaining three did not. Too often, the history of colonial North America is written with contemporary national borders imposed on the past. Scholars searching for the colonial roots of the present often overlook the existence of historical relationships that bound together what became Canada with what became the United States. As such, discussion of Nova Scotia, one of the British colonies that did not revolt, is rarely an integral component of histories examining the events that led to the American Revolution. Yet Nova Scotia was part of the same British imperial community to which the other colonies belonged, and it experienced similar political divisions as its residents rebelled against the Crown, expressed loyalty, or tried to remain neutral.

Historians who seek the foundations of the American national identity often assume that certain geographical areas contain the essence of Americanism, and consequently overlook the many links which bound all of the British colonies together.[1] The integration of regional studies into a comprehensive imperial interpretation is still wanting, both within histories of the thirteen colonies, and of

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[1] The many regional studies which draw conclusions concerning the root of the American identity are too numerous to list. Those considered in this study include John Demos, *A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Kenneth Lockridge, *A New England Town: The First Hundred Years* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1970);

the larger British empire.[2] The common ground of participation in the Revolution is taken for granted, and therefore a consensus is assumed between colonies which had very little in common. A British imperial community existed long before any colonist identified with a distinctly American cause, and regional identities and affiliations operated across the borders that divide contemporary North America. Regardless of their stance during the Revolution, each colony in North America was part of an imperial plan to oust the French and the Spanish and to establish British, Protestant rule over the entire continent.

Not only were the North American colonies part of an imperial community, many of them were also bound through geography to a more regional or local culture. Any discussion of the relationships Nova Scotia shared with the other colonies, particularly New England, must account for the existence of political, economic, and social bonds on both an imperial and a local scale. The eventual acceptance or rejection of the Revolution by each province was a product of the intersection of imperial and regional culture. Because of the interplay between imperial and regional affiliations, no colony was completely loyal or rebel. Political sympathies within each of the sixteen colonies were not dictated by the political stance of their respective governmental assemblies. Likewise, New England's defiance of Britain and Nova Scotia's profession of loyalty to the Crown did not

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Perry Miller, *Errand Into the Wilderness* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964).

[2] Imperial interpretations to date have largely focused on economic links the colonies shared. For examples of such economic interpretations, see Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934); and Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924).

effect a severance of all New England ties with Nova Scotia. Although political relationships soured between the two colonies as the Revolution approached, social bonds between family and friends in Nova Scotia and New England still flourished.

The imperial school of interpretation needs to be rethought to include not only a discussion of economics and politics, but also a consideration of social and cultural forces. British colonists had a multi-layered identity created by being subjects of the King who lived on the fringe of the empire. The colonists were proud of their British heritage and fought for the establishment of British rule throughout the North American continent, but they also identified with the geographic region in which they were settled. When Benjamin Franklin proposed a plan for the union of the colonies in 1754, regional leaders rejected it because they could not reconcile their differences. Since their arrival in the New World, the colonists had developed social and cultural structures which differed from Britain's as well as from the other British colonies. New England Puritanism had no place in a planter-ruled Virginia, for the two colonies were founded on separate principles. Colonists were often perplexed by their identities as they tried to be Britons and maintain fealty to their specific regional culture.

Although Nova Scotia became official British territory in 1713 under the Treaty of Utrecht, plans to settle the colony with English-speaking, Protestant residents were not formed until the late 1740s. Such plans were developed even further in the wake of the expulsion of the Acadians in 1755, creating a need for loyal Protestant settlers to farm the Nova Scotia countryside. Land shortages in New

England produced ample candidates to take the Acadians' place, but the lack of political structures in Nova Scotia provided sufficient reason for New England families not to move north. To counteract New Englanders' hesitance, Britain set in motion a plan, in cooperation with Massachusetts' governor William Shirley, to reproduce New England culture in Nova Scotia. With the establishment of a House of Assembly in 1758, New Englanders began to come to Nova Scotia. By the 1760s, they comprised two-thirds of the province's population.

The efforts to make Nova Scotia an extension of New England, however, were complicated in 1763 with Britain's attempt to raise revenue by taxing the colonies to pay for the recent Seven Years' War with France. By the mid eighteenth century, Nova Scotia was still a developing colony experiencing problems New England had overcome almost one hundred years ago. With the Royal Proclamation of 1763, Nova Scotia had become the edge of the American frontier, a frontier which lacked the economic stability to resist taxation in the way New England could. Unlike Massachusetts or Connecticut, Nova Scotia was a parliamentary colony, and it lacked internal taxes to raise revenue, which appealed to New Englanders. The passage of the Stamp Act in 1765 forced the North American colonies to redefine their relationship with Britain, and Nova Scotia's lack of development forced the province to forge a path different from New England's.

As New England began to embark down the road to revolution and Nova Scotia did not, the intersections of imperial and regional communities created a crisis within Nova Scotia. Although the Nova Scotia Yankees carried with them the

cultural baggage of their homeland, and had such things as Congregational churches and New England style political representation in their new home, Nova Scotia's dependence on parliamentary monies defined the province's position in the broader imperial community. New Englanders did not come to Nova Scotia until 1760, and with few settlers the province's economy remained underdeveloped which forced Nova Scotia into a relationship of dependence on Britain. While many Nova Scotians had sympathy for the cause of their friends and family in New England, their condition within the imperial community forced them into a tenuous loyalty to the Crown. While New England wanted to sever its imperial ties to Britain, Nova Scotia needed to maintain a strong relationship with the mother country to survive.

In 1937, J.B. Brebner set the terms of debate that scholars use today to understand Nova Scotia's relationships to the American Revolution. Brebner argues that Nova Scotia was a "relatively negligible colonial outpost" which New England exploited solely for its own economic gain.[3] Despite his claim that New England planters "laid the abiding foundations of Nova Scotian life," Brebner fails to account for the systemic and organizational links which connected Nova Scotia to New England.[4] Also, as historian George Rawlyk notes, Brebner tended "to interpret events in light of what he knew would eventually happen rather than to view them through the eyes of the men of the time."[5]

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[3] J.B. Brebner, *The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony During the Revolutionary Years* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1937), 6.
[4] Ibid., 24.
[5] George A. Rawlyk, *Revolution Rejected, 1775-1776* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1968), 17.

Research of Nova Scotia's relationship to the thirteen colonies before the American Revolution is relatively scant, and few historians care to step beyond the parameters Brebner set. Despite his criticisms of Brebner, Rawlyk himself ignores many of the ties connecting Nova Scotia and New England. He argues that Massachusetts exhibited indifference towards Nova Scotia, and that military expeditions into the province did not signify an increasing Massachusetts or New England imperialism.[6] Rawlyk's focus needs to be shifted away from the borders of today and onto the relationships of the past. Nova Scotia was not the product of New England imperialism, but rather of British imperialism, in which New England played a significant role.

In their book A People Highly Favoured of God, George Rawlyk and Gordon T. Stewart argue that Nova Scotians were not aware of the political ideas which fueled the Revolution.[7] Not only were Nova Scotians neutral, the authors argue that they were also confused. The rhetoric and political ideology of the Revolution, however, began as early as 1765 when the New Englanders in Nova Scotia were no more than six years out of their homeland. The fact that Nova Scotians did not adopt the same political ideology that New Englanders did does not mean that they

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[6] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630-1784* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), xvi. Elements of Rawlyk's argument that Nova Scotia was of little interest to New England can be found in his earlier book, co-authored with Gordon T. Stewart, *A People Highly Favoured of God: The Nova Scotia Yankees and the American Revolution* (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1972). For Rawlyk and Stewart, Nova Scotia was, as Brebner argues, a marginal colony during the Revolution. It is Nova Scotia's lack of participation in the American Revolution which causes these authors to erroneously disregard or diminish the relationships Nova Scotia shared with the other British colonies.

[7] Rawlyk and Stewart, *A People Highly Favoured of God*, 62.

did not understand such ideology. Nova Scotians were at least as politically conscious as their New England counterparts.

The answers to why Nova Scotia did not join the Revolution lie somewhere between the interpretations of Brebner and Rawlyk. As Rawlyk argues, the neutrality thesis is too limited to account for all the forces operating in Yankee society. Nova Scotians were not, however, the ignorant and confused pawns of geographical forces, for they actively chose either to support or reject the Revolution. In many ways, Nova Scotia was very similar to the thirteen colonies in that various elements of its population were rebel, loyal, and neutral. Interpretations of Nova Scotia during the Revolution must account for the fact that not every person in the thirteen colonies was a patriot, nor was every person in Nova Scotia a loyalist. Political division must be seen in light of the imperial relationships which were forged before 1776.

Chapter One

Imperialism and Regionalism: New England Contributions to the Establishment of Nova Scotia as a British Colony, 1713-1758

The 1691 Royal Charter of the Province of Massachusetts Bay ordained that the territories and colonies "commonly called or known by the names of the Collony of the Massachusetts Bay and the Collony of New Plymouth, the Province of Main, the Territore called Acadian or Nova Scotia, and all that tract of land lying between the said Territories of Nova Scotia and the said Province of Main be Erected, United, and Incorporated."[1] The new united province was to bear the name of Massachusetts Bay. The Explanatory Charter of 1725 reiterated the establishment of a united Massachusetts Bay colony, and guaranteed all freeholders and inhabitants within the province representation in both the Great and General Courts.[2] Although the Massachusetts Assembly granted Nova Scotia a seat, there is no record that anyone from the Acadian territory ever filled such a position. Throughout their continual conflict with France in the Acadian territory, Massachusetts Bay continued until 1774 to claim Nova Scotia as its own under the charter of 1691.[3]

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[1] "Royal Charter of 1691," printed in Albert Matthews ed., *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts* (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1913), 4 vols., 2:15.

[2] Ibid., 2:30-31. The charter stipulated that the "Great and General Court or Assembly should Consist of the Governor and Council or Assistants for the time being and of such Freeholders of their said Province or Territory as should be from time to time elected or deputed by the major part of the Freeholders and other Inhabitants of the respective Towns or places being thereby impowered to Elect and Depute two Persons and no more to Serve for and represent them respectively in the said Great and Generall Court or Assembly."

[3] Each commission to the Governor of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, up until the last in 1774, reiterated the land claims of the 1691 charter and granted those in united territory all the

New England's consistent involvement in the establishment of Acadia as a part of the British empire left an indelible mark on Nova Scotia. The struggle for control of the northern portion of North America pitted British against French, and Protestant against Catholic. As the French tried to surround the British to the north in Canada, and to the south in the Louisiana Territory, Anglo-Protestants in the American colonies participated in schemes to reduce the French presence and establish British rule in North America. Geographic proximity and imperial exigency necessitated New England's involvement in wresting Nova Scotia from French control. The investments into Acadia made by Massachusetts and the surrounding colonies established Nova Scotia as more than New England's "outpost."[4] It was an extension of the New England community. Nova Scotia never officially became a part of the province of Massachusetts Bay, but with the influx of New England planters into the province from 1758 to 1768, the two colonies had similar political, religious, and social structures. The common bonds shared by Nova Scotia and New England rested on British loyalties supplemented by colonial regionalism. A British imperial community premised on ridding the Acadian territory of its French inhabitants and making a concerted effort to settle the province with British Protestants tied Nova Scotia and New England together.

Situated at the mouth of the St. Lawrence river which granted access to the Great Lakes and the Mississippi river, Nova Scotia, or Acadia, was an imperial prize

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"Priviledges, Franchizes, and Immunities" of Massachusetts Bay. For each commission, see ibid., 2:69-174.

sought after by both France and Britain. Tensions between the two countries on the European continent translated into animosity between both French and English, as well as Catholic and Protestant, in North America. In 1690, Massachusetts raised eight hundred men under Sir William Phips to march to Nova Scotia and subject its French inhabitants to British rule.[5] In the same year, two thousand men and approximately forty ships were raised for the reduction of Canada. While the excursion into Canada was unsuccessful, Nova Scotia remained subject to England for a short time until King William gave the colony back to the French in the Treaty of Ryswick in 1696. Peace was short lived, however, as the French, having "no better card to play than to induce the Indians by religious motives and temporal rewards to plunder and massacre," kept the people of Massachusetts "in perpetual Alarm."[6] The years 1701 to 1713 saw Massachusetts engaged in conflict with French colonists and their native allies. Failed attempts to conquer Canada in 1709 and Port Royal in 1710 left Massachusetts "exhausted and impoverished" as it "bore its full share of the Burthen and in the Loss" of these expeditions.[7]

Nova Scotia officially became part of the British empire in 1713 under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht. Although the colony's population was approximately seventeen hundred, and most of the inhabitants were of French heritage, there were

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[4] See J.B. Brebner, *New England's Outpost: Acadia Before the Conquest of Canada* (London: P.S. King and Son, 1927). George Rawlyk reiterates Brebner's thesis in *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973).

[5] "Brief State of the Merits and Services of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, their Exertions and Expences in the Common Cause," *Halifax Gazette*, 27 September 1774. This proclamation had originally been written by the Massachusetts House of Assembly in response to the Grenville reforms, and reprinted both in Boston and Halifax in 1774.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

no concerted efforts to populate the colony with British citizens until the late 1740s.[8] Even after Nova Scotia came under British rule, tensions with the French remained. Disputes over the boundaries of the colony helped to fuel the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756. French encroachments on lands thought to be British increased both New England's military presence in Nova Scotia, and Anglo-Franco tensions.

The military contributions of Massachusetts, as well as other American colonies, to the establishment of Nova Scotia were invaluable to the British imperial cause. Under the direction of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America from 1741 to 1757, military expeditions against the French paved the way for thousands of New Englanders to emigrate to Nova Scotia. In 1744, Britain declared war with France, and again, tensions escalated in North America. Massachusetts sent forces to Annapolis Royal to aid the people there who were under French attack, and the year 1745 saw the first assault on the French stronghold of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island.[9] Although Nova Scotia was one of the poorest colonies in North America, its fisheries and access to trade routes made its economic potential quite substantial. In recognition of Nova Scotia's value, Britain implemented steps to institute firmly imperial rule in the colony.

True control of Nova Scotia meant not only an establishment of military power, but also populating the colony with British inhabitants. "The settling of Nova Scotia," argued Otis Little in 1748, "will in a few years render the present inhabitants

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[8] See Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, xiii-xiv.

[9] Although Louisbourg was conquered, Britain gave the fortress back to the French in 1749 in spite of resistance from New England. See Naomi Griffiths, *The Contexts of Acadian History, 1686-1784* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 77.

industrious and useful, whereby it may be justly accounted a most valuable acquisition."[10] Secure possession of Nova Scotia guaranteed control of the St. Lawrence River, and diminished the French presence in North America.[11] William Shirley echoed Otis's sentiments, writing that the acquisition of Nova Scotia by the French would give France the cod fisheries of New England, Nova Scotia, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, which "would maintain an immense nursery of men to man their Navy."[12] Control of such a large portion of the Atlantic sea coast would give the French not only an economic advantage over the British colonies, but a military one as well. Even if Britain did not have immediate plans to settle Nova Scotia, Shirley argued, the military and financial security of the American colonies rested on keeping Acadia out of French control. After forty years of relative inactivity, Britain decided to reap the benefits that settlement of Nova Scotia promised.

On 28 February 1745, the British government issued a circular to Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island stating that Nova Scotia was under French attack, and that none of the neighbouring provinces, save Massachusetts Bay, had come to its assistance. The four colonies were instructed to assist Nova Scotia with whatever resources they could spare, "to the end that our said province of Nova Scotia may not be lost for want of such succor."[13] The

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[10] Otis Little, "The State of Trade in the Northern colonies Considered; With an Account of Their Produce, and a Particular Description of Nova Scotia," (King's Arms: G. Woodfall, 1748), vii.
[11] Ibid. As Otis argued in support of securing Nova Scotia, "the advantages the French might otherwise make of this province . . . sufficiently demonstrates the necessity of keeping it out of their hands, without being diverted by the consideration of the expense."
[12] Shirley to Robinson, in Charles Henry Lincoln ed., *Correspondence of William Shirley* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1912, 2 vols., 2:149-50.
[13] "Assistance to Nova Scotia," in Leonard Woods Labaree ed., *Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors* (New York: Octagon Books Inc., 1967), 2 vols., 1:431.

subjection of the French, and the population of Nova Scotia with British settlers became one of Britain's main objectives in northern North America.

In the late 1740s, the British government proceeded with a definite plan to settle Nova Scotia permanently. Advertisements posted in Britain and the colonies promised that fifty acres of land free of quit rent for ten years would be granted in Nova Scotia to every private soldier or seaman, and an extra ten acres to those with families.[14] The advertisements also promised the establishment of a civil government whereby the settlers would be guaranteed all the liberties, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by every British subject in the other colonies and plantations in North America.[15] In conjunction with the thirteen ships that sailed from England under Edward Cornwallis to Nova Scotia in June of 1749, the British government issued instructions to the colonial governor to ensure the successful settling of the province.[16] The royal instructions clearly stipulated how Nova Scotia should be settled in terms of land grants, political and social institutions, and how to accommodate the French presence in the province.

As plans for settling Nova Scotia began to be put into place, it became apparent that the council in Annapolis Royal was not sufficient to govern the province.[17] In hopes of settling the province with New England planters, Britain

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[14] "Advertisement," in Thomas B Akins ed., *Selections from the Public Archives of the Province of Nova Scotia* (Halifax: Charles Annand, 1869), 495.
[15] Ibid., 496.
[16] Cornwallis was Governor of Nova Scotia from 1749 to 1752.
[17] The council had been established in 1719 under a Royal instruction which decreed that Nova Scotia "shall not take upon you to fill up any vacancies that may happen on the said council . . . without his Majesty's leave first obtained unless the number of councilors in your government be under seven, and in that case you are only to complete them to the number of seven and no more." See Labaree ed., *Royal Instructions*, "Not to Appoint Councilors Above Seven," 95.

began planning for the establishment of a representative government to replace the council. It had been Britain's plan to establish a representative government as soon as Nova Scotia had sufficient settlers, but with the need to attract loyal subjects into Nova Scotia, Britain wanted to assure prospective settlers that they would have the same rights and liberties they enjoyed in New England.[18] On 3 October 1747, the Duke of Newcastle, under royal direction, requested William Shirley to design a plan of civil government for the province of Nova Scotia.[19] Shirley based his plan on "the Charter their late Majesties King William and Mary granted to the Province of Massachusetts Bay," and stated clearly that he hoped such a government would facilitate the immigration of New England colonists to Nova Scotia.[20] Shirley's plan granted the same powers, privileges, and franchises which the inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay enjoyed, but he also made twelve changes to suit the specific needs of the province.

Shirley had the benefit of looking back over the many decades in which Massachusetts Bay had been a colony, and so his plan for Nova Scotia sought to remedy the clauses of the 1691 charter he felt had not worked in practice. In some

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[18] When the Nova Scotia council was formed in 1719, they were given orders to follow the instructions given to the governor of Virginia until a representative government could be formed. The instructions told the council to "conduct [themselves] till His Majesty's further pleasure shall be known, as near as the circumstances of the place will admit in such things as they can be applicable to, and where [they were] not otherwise directed by these instruction." See ibid., "Nova Scotia to Follow Virginian Instructions," 85. There is no indication why Nova Scotia should follow Virginian and not New England instructions. Nova Scotia was, however, an imperial, and not a New England possession.

[19] Shirley replied to this letter on 27 February 1748. For the full details of this plan, see Lincoln ed., *Correspondence of William Shirley*, "William Shirley to the Duke of Bedford," 1:472-477.

[20] Ibid., 470. Shirley stated that "a near conformity of the civil government of Nova Scotia to that of this province [Massachusetts Bay], may be a great advantage to the former for attracting New England settlers to live there."

cases, however, Shirley proposed changes for which he stated that no reason need be assigned.[21] One such change was the suggestion that all prior grants of land be forfeited to the crown since the present inhabitants had done little either to "exercise any jurisdiction for the government of it," or to defend it from French encroachments. Shirley also wanted the provincial assembly to meet triennially instead of annually, and to give the governor power to suspend the Lieutenant Governor and any of the councilors. Shirley felt that the balance between the two branches of the Massachusetts legislature had "been in some measure destroyed," and proposed to limit the number of representatives in the new assembly to ensure a balanced government in Nova Scotia.[22] The General Court of Massachusetts Bay decided how many representatives each town could send to the Assembly, so Shirley wanted to guarantee an equilibrium between the Council and the House of Representatives in Nova Scotia by dictating the proportions of each in the charter.[23]

With regard to the French inhabitants of Acadia, Shirley suggested giving the Catholics in the province freedom of religion for a fixed period, after which they would have the same disqualifications and incapacities as Catholics living in England.[24] In light of the "experience of bad influence, which the mobbish factious spirit of the town of Boston" had on other towns, Shirley wanted to give the monarchy the right to incorporate any town and withdraw its privileges.[25] To further monarchical authority over Nova Scotia, he proposed to make the appointment of

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[21] Ibid., 472.
[22] Ibid., 473.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid., 474.

the Chief Justice and the Attorney General the responsibility of the Crown. Shirley also suggested giving the judges of the Supreme Court the same power and authority to hear cases and pass judgement as the Royal Court. Other unexplained changes to the charter included making sure the governor and council had knowledge of all conflicts concerning marriage and divorce, and allowing appeals in court cases from the Courts of Judicature.[26] In the interest of the military security of Nova Scotia, Shirley stipulated that all trees over twenty four inches in diameter be reserved for the use of the Royal Navy.[27] Finally, a provisional judicial system had to be established until the French inhabitants of Nova Scotia could understand English language, customs, and government, in order to sit on juries.

In 1749, Britain authorized the Nova Scotia Council to create a general representative assembly from the freeholders and planters within the province. The Council was to instruct the sheriff to issue writs to summon the freeholders of the province, and then proceed with the election of two persons from each township to represent their fellow settlers in the House of Assembly.[28] Elections in Nova Scotia, however, did not occur until 1758. Nevertheless, the proposed steps towards political organization made Nova Scotia a more desirable place to live for New Englanders experiencing land shortages in their own colonies.[29] Under the guidance

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[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., 475
[27] Ibid., 476.
[28] Labaree ed., *Royal Instructions*, 91-92.
[29] On 3 January 1757, the Nova Scotia council decided to establish a House of Representatives with members from the counties as follows: four from Halifax County, two from Lunenburg, one each from Dartmouth, Lawrence Town, Annapolis Royal, and Cumberland counties. There were also to be twelve other representatives from the "province at large not yet divided into counties." See Akins ed., *Selections from the PANS*, 1:718.

of Shirley, plans were made to populate Nova Scotia with New England planters. Confident that his plan of civil government would come to fruition, and reassured by the display of British military power in the founding of Halifax, Shirley promoted Nova Scotia as a viable place to settle.

The establishment of Halifax in 1749 was a response to the return of Louisbourg to the French a year earlier under the treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle. As the centre of military strength in Nova Scotia, Halifax replaced Annapolis Royal as the seat of political power. Despite the establishment of military strength, Nova Scotia would not be secure without a sympathetic Anglo-Protestant population. Possibly in an effort to realize the 1691 charter in its entirety, Shirley devised the "Great Plan" to bring six thousand settlers to Nova Scotia by 1759.[30] New England had experienced rapid population growth in the mid-eighteenth century which, as generations passed, resulted in a shortage of farm land.[31] In 1750, Massachusetts' approximate population was one hundred ninety thousand.[32] By 1737, Connecticut's population had quintupled since its establishment in 1637, and it had almost quadrupled again by 1760.[33] Compounding Connecticut's problem of population increase was the practice of selling land by public auction, which favoured the

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[30] R.S. Longley, "The Coming of the New England Planters to the Annapolis Valley," in Margaret Conrad ed., *They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime Canada* (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1988), 17.

[31] For more information on land shortage and its effect in New England, see Kenneth A. Lockridge, *A New England Town: The First Hundred Years* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1970); and John Demos, *A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[32] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, xiii.

[33] Longley, "The Coming of New England Planters," 15. By 1760, Connecticut's population was approximately 141 000.

wealthy.[34] Before any migration would begin, however, Shirley wanted assurance that the French would not re-conquer Nova Scotia and that a representative assembly would eventually be constructed under the guidelines of his plan for civil government.[35]

In 1749, the British government decided that "for the better security, regulation, and government" of Nova Scotia, any persons immigrating to the province should be settled in townships.[36] Surveys were ordered for townships of one hundred thousand acres each to be established in such places that incorporated the most profitable land and were close to trade routes.[37] Wary of "the insults and incursions of neighbouring Indians [and] other enemies," Britain gave the Nova Scotia governor discretion to place the townships in areas that he deemed most proper.[38] Britain was mindful of relations with the Natives, knowing from past experience that Indians could make helpful allies in times of war. Royal policy favoured the intermarriage of Natives and non-Natives to facilitate the peaceful settlement of the province. The Governor had received instructions in 1719 which had stated that any male who married an Indian would receive fifty acres of land free from the payment of quit rent for ten years, after which they would have to pay one shilling a year for every acre.[39] After 1749, any male who married a Native, in addition to the land grant stipulated in 1719, would receive ten pounds and be

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[34] Ibid., 16.
[35] Ibid., 17.
[36] Labaree ed., *Royal Instructions*, "Laying Out Townships in Nova Scotia," 2:540.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., "Encourage Intermarriage with Nova Scotia Indians," 2:470.

relieved of rent for twenty years.[40] Similar land grants were also given to encourage Protestant and Catholic intermarriage and Catholics' conversion to Protestantism.[41] Any Acadian settlements included in the surveys of the townships were to be incorporated so that all French inhabitants in Nova Scotia would be subject to the rules and orders which Britain intended to design for the better ordering and governing of the townships throughout the province.[42] While a Native policy of integration was officially in effect until the Revolution, land grants to the Acadians ended in 1755.

In order to guarantee that the French would not re-conquer Nova Scotia, Britain tried to convince the Acadians to swear allegiance to the Crown. As early as 1719, Nova Scotia had received instructions to secure Acadian loyalty to the Crown. Britain had proposed an oath which guaranteed that if the Acadians pledged their allegiance to the King they would have free exercise of religion as long as they behaved themselves "as becomes good subjects."[43] The suggested oath of allegiance had also stipulated that Acadians' estates in Nova Scotia would descend to their heirs. The Acadians, however, had preferred neutrality and few chose to swear allegiance to the British crown. In 1749, Britain gave Nova Scotia another set of instructions which explicitly asked for the allegiance of the Acadians in order to

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[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., "Catholicism and Protestantism in Nova Scotia," 2:499. Any person who converted to Protestantism would be given land and a relieved of quit rent for ten years. This instructions also encouraged French inhabitants to send their children to Protestant schools.

[42] Ibid., "French Settlements to be Included in Townships," 2:541.

[43] Ibid., "Get Acadians to Swear Allegiance," 2:435. Despite the instructions of 1719, diligent enforcement of the oath of allegiance did not occur until 1749.

facilitate the population of Nova Scotia with settlers.[44] Unlike the instructions of 1719, however, Britain omitted the clause guaranteeing the Acadians that their land would automatically pass to their heirs.

After the first attack on Louisbourg in 1745, Shirley was constantly concerned with French encroachments on British land in Nova Scotia, and had suggested the idea of making the Acadians and the Indians swear an oath of allegiance as early as 1746.[45] He also favoured the expulsion of treasonous elements, and suggested that Nova Scotia should "apprehend and examine a convenient number of such of the inhabitants, as shall be judg'd to be the most obnoxious and dangerous to his Majesty's government."[46] If any Acadians or their Native allies were found guilty of engaging in any treasonable correspondence with the enemy, Shirley suggested disposing "of them and their estates in such manner, as his Majesty's gracious pardon and a general indemnity to the rest for what is past upon their taking the Oaths of Allegiance to his Majesty."[47] Shirley called for the establishment of small forts at Menis [Minas] and in other parts of the province "well stock'd with all proper supplies for the Indians to be sold or barter'd to 'em for Furs &c at the most reasonable rates."[48] He hoped that supplying the Natives with goods would cause them to sever their ties with the French. With the Natives as British allies, and by removing the Catholic Priests out of the province and introducing Protestant

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[44] Ibid., "Acadians to Take Oath of Allegiance," 2:437-438.
[45] Lincoln ed., *Correspondence of William Shirley,* "Shirley to Duke of Newcastle," 1:336.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid., 1:337.

schools, the inhabitants of Nova Scotia would be kept in subjection to the British crown.[49]

William Shirley supported a plan to remove the Acadians from Nova Scotia as early as May of 1754. In a letter to Sir Thomas Robinson, he wrote, "I have not dwelt, my Lord, so long on the state of the French encroachments and English settlements in Nova Scotia, in order to convince your Lordship of the necessity of removing the former before a rupture shall happen with France."[50] As commander of the forces in Nova Scotia, debates with the French over the boundaries of Nova Scotia were of constant concern to Shirley. He contested the French claims to land "as far as the River Kennebeck in the Westward, and to the city of Annapolis Royal, as also part of the lands lying between that and the sea coast of Nova Scotia from Cape Sable to Cape Canseau, to the eastward," arguing that the boundaries of Nova Scotia were to be determined by the 1691 charter of Massachusetts Bay.[51] Shirley did not want the French to gain control of the Kennebec River, for it would sever Nova Scotia from Massachusetts.[52] French presence on the eastern coast was not desirable should a war with France break out, and Shirley resolved never to give them a foothold.

As tensions with France over Nova Scotia's borders escalated, Nova Scotia Governor Charles Lawrence decided in 1755 to expel the Acadians from the province and disperse them throughout the other North American colonies. The

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[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid., "Shirley to Robinson," 2:62.
[51] Ibid., "Shirley to the Lords Commissioners," 2:32, 53-55.
[52] Ibid., "Shirley to the Earl of Holderness," 2:53

Lords of Trade wrote to Governor Lawrence on 25 March 1756, guaranteeing "the War between us and France to be inevitable, and from the best judgment we are able to form of the views and designs of the enemy, we are inclined to believe that a great part of their force will be exerted to distress and annoy us in North America."[53] The successful removal of the Acadians required the participation and expense of many of the American colonies. While the expulsion facilitated the implementation of Governor Shirley's Great Plan, he was hesitant to assume any of the costs of the Acadians' removal. On 13 February 1756, he addressed the Massachusetts legislature with apologies for the costs that integrating Acadians into various towns in New England would incur. He explained that these costs were an unfortunate expense, and that he would do everything to induce the Acadians to provide for their own support as well as that of their families.[54]

The boundaries of Nova Scotia were of concern to Benjamin Franklin during the Albany Congress which met July 1754. Attended by representatives of seven colonies, the Congress proposed a plan of union among the British colonies in North America for the purpose of solidifying British power on the continent in order to combat the French and Spanish.[55] The Congress stated that "the right of the English to the whole sea coast from Georgia in the south to the River St. Laurence, excepting the Island of Cape Breton and the islands in the Bay of St. Laurence,

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[53] Akins ed., *Selections from the PANS*, "Letter Lords of Trade to Governor Lawrence," 298.
[54] Ibid., "Governor Shirley to the Legislature in Massachusetts," 296
[55] Allan Nevins and Henry Steele Commager, *A Pocket History of the United States* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967), 57.

remains plain and indisputable."[56] Franklin appealed to the Treaty of Utrecht to support British land claims, arguing that although the French had once owned Nova Scotia, these claims had been negated by King James. There was concern that the French, who the Congress believed had unjustly taken possession of land in Nova Scotia near the St. John River, were "drawing off the Indians from the British interest."[57] The Congress saw that since the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, the French had increased the number of their forts around the Great Lakes and on the rivers which ran into the Mississippi, and they feared the French were hemming in the American colonies. The Congress worried that the French were securing a communication between Louisiana and Canada, while at the same time "putting themselves into a capacity of annoying the southern British colonies, and preventing any further settlement of his Majesty's dominions."[58] Although Nova Scotia was not included in the Albany plan for union, the Congress felt that its loss to the French would strike a blow to the other British colonies.[59]

The New England colonies were the most likely to benefit from the expulsion, but they were not the only ones to participate in the dispersal of the Acadians. The accounts submitted by Apthorp and Hancock of Boston to Governor Lawrence indicate that Virginia, Maryland, and North and South Carolina received exported

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[56] Leonard W. Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 34 vols., 5:368.
[57] Ibid., 5:369-71.
[58] Ibid., 5:370.
[59] Delaware and Georgia were also omitted from the Albany plan. A letter which survives in Franklin's collections, possibly written by a colonist in 1754, argues that Nova Scotia should be included in the Albany Plan by virtue of the economic benefit of its fisheries. See ibid., 5:466.

Acadians.[60] Apthorp and Hancock hired at least ten ships and sloops from August 1755 to April 1756 for the transport of the Acadians, and supplied these voyages with staples such as barreled pork and beef, bread, and wood. The expenses of the removal, plus a fee for services rendered, were sent to Governor Lawrence and refunded to the entrepreneurs.[61]

Upon hearing of the plan to expel the Acadians from Nova Scotia, the Connecticut Assembly resolved in October 1755 that if any of the Acadians happened to be brought into their colony, they would be "received, taken care of and disposed of, in such places . . . as may be judged most expedient."[62] While Massachusetts sought reimbursement for their part in the expulsion, Connecticut resolved to lay such expenses before the Committee of the Pay-Table who would provide funds directly out of the colony's treasury.[63] The Acadians were not only sent directly from Nova Scotia to the southern colonies, but were also moved around within the colonies once they arrived. In February 1757, Elisha Stoddard and the other selectmen of the town of Woodbury, Connecticut, complained of two new French neutral families that had been sent from Maryland. The Assembly resolved to send one family to Litchfield and the other to New Milford, the expense of moving these families to be assumed by the colony.[64]

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[60] Akins ed., *Selections from the PANS*, 1:285-291.
[61] For a detailed account of these expenses, see ibid.
[62] Charles J. Hoaldy ed., *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut* (Hartford: Lockwood and Brainard Company, 1877), 15 vols., 10:425.
[63] Ibid., 10:461.
[64] Ibid., 10:615.

The Connecticut Assembly passed an act for "distributing and well ordering the French People sent into this Colony from Nova Scotia" in January of 1756. The Assembly appointed Hezekiah Huntington, Gurdon Saltonstall, Christopher Avery, and Pygan Adams to oversee the distribution of the Acadians in the manner laid out by the colony's government. Expecting approximately four hundred Acadians to arrive at any time, the Assembly proposed to split the arrivals up between fifty counties throughout the colony.[65] Although the selectmen of each town received orders to support the Acadians as though they were fellow members of their town, restrictions were placed on the French which forbade them to leave their town of residence without written permission from a local civil authority.[66] The monitoring of Acadian movement, both within Connecticut and between the other colonies, and ensuring the proportionate dispersal of French throughout the various counties of the colony, was the product of years of Anglo-Franco tensions. The outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756 guaranteed that the American colonists would keep a close eye on their new French neighbours.

Pennsylvania also expended both money and men for the security of Nova Scotia and the expulsion of the Acadians from its borders. In Pennsylvania's February 1756 address to the Governor, the Assembly claimed that "no one colony on the continent had afforded more free recruits to the King's Forces than Pennsylvania."[67] The Assembly complained that they had few slaves and were short of labourers because of their contribution of men to both Shirley and Pepperell's

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[65] For the exact numbers and counties proposed, see ibid., 10:452-453.
[66] Ibid., 10:453.

forces in Nova Scotia, as well as to the New York and Carolina Independent Companies, and the West India Islands. In 1756, Pennsylvania drafted an account of the "sundry sums of money paid by the Province of Pennsylvania for his Majesty's service since the commencement of the hostilities by the French in North America."[68] The account detailed Pennsylvania raising, paying, and maintaining forces; building forts; "maintaining and treating with the King's Indian allies;" taking in the Acadians sent from Nova Scotia; billeting the King's regular forces; and other "purposes for his Majesty's Service."[69] All such expenses considered, the account totaled ninety thousand pounds.

By 1757, Nova Scotia began to consolidate as a product of imperial and local forces. Both Britain and New England had good reason to ensure that Nova Scotia be established as a loyal province free from French influence. New England embraced Nova Scotia as a part of the Massachusetts Bay colony, and since 1690 had been involved in claiming the Acadian territory for the Crown. Britain, wanting to secure Nova Scotia for its geo-political value, took advantage of New England's interest in Acadia to accomplish its imperial design for the province. By 1757, Nova Scotia lay ready to be populated by loyal, Protestant settlers. With promises that a political assembly modeled after Massachusetts' would soon be established, petitions began to be made to Nova Scotia's governor stating a desire to settle on the lands vacated by the Acadians. Both New England and Britain hoped, for their own interests, that Nova Scotia would become an extension of the New England

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[67] Labaree ed., *Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 6:397.
[68] Ibid., 7:335.

community. While the settlement of Nova Scotia was an imperial project, New England had a local interest vested in the success of that endeavour.

[69] Ibid., 7:337.

Chapter Two

Building an "Infant Collony:" Farmers, Fishermen, and Protestants in Nova Scotia, 1758-1765

"It has given us great pleasure," wrote the Board of Trade and Plantations to Nova Scotia Governor Charles Lawrence in 1758, "to find that the people of New England . . . be desirous of forming a settlement in Nova Scotia."[1] While many New Englanders were eager to immigrate to Nova Scotia, the fact that the province still did not have a political assembly made many potential settlers hesitant to leave their homeland until such steps were taken. To facilitate the speedy settlement of Nova Scotia, Britain instructed Governor Lawrence to proceed with the establishment of a political assembly despite his apprehensions that such an institution would in fact complicate the quick settlement and efficient government of the province. If Nova Scotia was to be settled, Britain knew that the colony had to mimic the political and cultural structures of New England.

Transplanting New England in Nova Scotia was no easy task, for the province's severe underdevelopment impeded such endeavours. In 1763, after five years of trying to settle Nova Scotia, Virginia land prospector Alexander McNutt still described Nova Scotia as an "infant collony," which was "almost an entire Wilderness."[2] The French still had a military presence along the St. John River and, aided by Native allies, continually infringed upon British land claims in Nova Scotia.

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[1] Whitehall Dispatch, Settlers from New England. Public Archives of Nova Scotia (hereafter referred to as PANS), RG1 Vol. 30 #21, 7 February 1758.

Crop failure, drought, and other natural disasters made settlement in Nova Scotia precarious, and forced the new colony into financial reliance on Britain. Neither the establishment of a political assembly nor the replacement of Acadians with New Englanders could transform Nova Scotia into an extension of New England. Halifax authorities, Governor Lawrence included, were comfortable with the years of military rule which had governed the province before 1758, and resisted the New England system of representation. Moreover, authorities in Halifax desired to assert control over the Yankee outsettlements in the province and break the regional bonds with New England which existed in those areas.[3] By 1765, many New Englanders who had helped wrest Nova Scotia from French control looked upon the province with disdain, and Nova Scotia became a province of conflict between regional and imperial communities. While the colony's governors wanted to break regional ties with New England and strengthen ties with Britain, most of its residents looked to New England as a model of settlement.

The late 1750s were a time of conflict between imperial and regional communities in Nova Scotia. While some New Englanders held contempt towards Nova Scotia and their fellow countrymen who had immigrated there, the capture of Louisbourg on 27 July 1758 by British regular troops caused many to view Nova Scotia more favourably.[4] The threat of French infringement on New England land

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[2] McNutt to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations. National Archives of Canada (hereafter referred to as NAC), Colonial Office. Nova Scotia "A". Belcher and Wilmot, 1763. MG 11 N.S. "A" Vol. 70, 47.
[3] George A. Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630 to 1784* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), 226.
[4] Ibid., 217.

was now eradicated, causing, as the *Boston New-Letter* reported, "Sentiments of Loyalty and Joy" and "A chearful Countenance . . . in all Ranks of People."[5] In comparison to the first siege of Louisbourg in 1745, however, the level of New England involvement and excitement in the second capture of the French fortress was considerably less.[6] Massachusetts contributed a few companies of Indian fighters and a contingent of carpenters to aid British troops in 1758, whereas in 1745 many companies of troops had been organized under William Shirley. Likewise, while British victory in 1745 had created an explosion of "frenzied jubilation" throughout Massachusetts, response to the 1758 victory was more one of relief than a celebration of the accomplishment of a common goal.

On 20 May 1758, the Nova Scotia council resolved to issue writs returnable by 2 October, for twenty-two members from the province to sit on the first political assembly. Many people in Massachusetts considered the establishment of a house of assembly a victory for the few New Englanders living in Nova Scotia at the time. The development threw the doors of Nova Scotia wide open to New England settlers, and helped offset the view many in Massachusetts held of Nova Scotia as a province controlled by an Anglophile military-commercial elite.[7] Halifax authorities, however, were not willing to relinquish their control of the province to members of a representative assembly. On 26 September, Governor Lawrence expressed his apprehensions concerning the Assembly to the Board of Trade and Plantations, stating that "too many of the members chosen as such have not been the most

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[5] *Boston News-Letter*, 24 August 1758, quoted in Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 218.
[6] Ibid., 217.

remarkable for promoting unity or obedience to his Majesty's Government here, or, indeed that have the most natural attachments to the province."[8]

In spite of Lawrence's objections, Britain consented to the establishment of an assembly, which first sat on 2 October 1758. By December, Governor Lawrence seemed to have abandoned some of his former fears and wrote to Britain that although he had been apprehensive of the "seeming disposition" of persons elected to sit on the Assembly, he had reason to hope that they would get through their business in good time, and with less altercation than he had feared.[9] Lawrence's anxiety apparently did not stem from an apprehension of Puritan rebelliousness or New England democracy, for less than half of the members of the first assembly were originally from New England. The other members were immigrants from Britain, most of whom had come to Nova Scotia with George Cornwallis in 1749.

The task of the first Assembly was to pass laws which would ensure the quick and stable establishment of Nova Scotia as a loyal colony of the British empire. Before such a goal could be accomplished, the members of the Assembly first had to weed out what they claimed to be the corrupt elements of Nova Scotia's civil service. The Assembly was convinced that Mr. Archibald Hinshelwood, a collector of impost and excise taxes, was using his position for his own financial gain. The Assembly hoped that an act to discourage smuggling would put an end to such practices throughout the province. Britain, however, was displeased with the Assembly's actions, and posited that their complaints seemed "unsupported by anything but base

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[7] Ibid., 218.
[8] Governor Lawrence's Plan to Make Proclamation. PANS, RG1 Vol. 36 #38, 26 September 1758.

surmises raised to answer the purposes of those who were anxious of profitable employments for themselves and friends."[10]

In response to the accusations, Hinshelwood wrote to Governor Lawrence with incredulity that he had been accused and condemned of illegal activities without being able to speak one word in his own defence.[11] Hinshelwood did not deny that there were smugglers in Halifax, but he argued that if the King was to remove "all the gentlemen concerned in the customs upon every such discovery, I believe the Crown would soon be without one faithful servant in that branch."[12] Despite resistance from the Council, the Nova Scotia assembly decided with the support of Governor Lawrence that no member of the Assembly could hold an employment or place of profit under the government, namely as the collector of import and excise duties. The Assembly then agreed to recommend to the council John Newton and Malachy Salter to replace Hinshelwood.

The Assembly's desire to weed out the corrupt elements of the Nova Scotia had its roots in the political culture which grew out of the resistance to the administration of Prime Minister Sir Robert Walpole (1721-1742). Republican critics of Walpole, from both the right and the left of the political spectrum, had proclaimed that corruption had infiltrated all aspects of Walpole's government through the manipulation of Parliament by a power-hungry ministry.[13] The same

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[9] Dispatch to Whitehall, Interest in Settlements. PANS, RG1 Vol. 36 #39, 26 December 1758.
[10] NAC, Colonial Office. Nova Scotia "A." Belcher and Wilmot, 1763. MG 11 N.S. "A" Vol. 70, 38.
[11] Ibid., 40.
[12] Ibid., 41.
[13] Bernard Bailyn, *Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 51.

critics had also seen English society in general, experiencing a level of wealth never before enjoyed in England, succumbing to corruption through its hedonistic pursuit of gain.[14] If nothing was done to check the corrupt elements of the government and society, then England would decline in a downward spiral of tyranny to its own destruction. Parliament had tried to counteract the effects of corruption with legislation, passing the Act of 1729 against bribery, and the Act of 1742 which prevented certain civil officers from sitting in the House of Commons.[15] In England as in Nova Scotia, the legislative attempts to weed out corruption had little effect. Nova Scotia authorities merely wanted to replace old civil servants with their own friends, and their English predecessors were often just as self-serving. Ulterior motives aside, the Nova Scotia assembly adopted the rhetoric and policy of the imperial centre.

With a political assembly in place, Lawrence embarked on a plan to replace the expelled Acadians with New England planters. On 12 October 1758, he issued a proclamation throughout New England declaring "that I shall be ready to receive proposals that may be hereafter made to me, for settling the said vacated or any other lands within the province."[16] By December 1758, Lawrence reported to Britain that hundreds of families were interested in farming the lands vacated by the French. The growing population in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts made the relatively vacant Nova Scotia look attractive, especially in light of the

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[14] Ibid.
[15] Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthmen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 278.
[16] quoted in Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 218.

province's lack of internal taxes. As Lawrence wrote to the Board of Trade and Plantations, "taxes on the Continent are become intolerably burdensome by the War."[17] Despite such enticements, New Englanders did not immigrate into Nova Scotia without first obtaining assurances of political and physical security from the authorities.

Settlement in Nova Scotia was tenuous in 1759, and Lawrence worried that if news of the recent attacks by Algonquian tribes on the township of Lunenburg reached the ears of potential New England immigrants, no settlers would come to Nova Scotia. He asked Britain for some money to aid the inhabitants of the township and thus promote settlement throughout the entire province.[18] More worried about the state of finances, however, Britain instructed Lawrence to discontinue all extra aid to Lunenburg except in cases of extreme distress. The Board of Trade and Plantations believed that all incursions from the French and their Indian allies had ended with the recent reduction of Louisbourg, and thus the petitions from Lunenburg, they surmised, must have been exaggerated. Certain that news of the distress of the people of Lunenburg would reach New England ears, Lawrence disobeyed the Board and continued to send money to the distressed settlement. Lawrence's fears were not quelled, however, for in the spring of 1759, Algonquian warriors killed and scalped five British soldiers near Fort Cumberland,

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[17] Dispatch to Whitehall, Interest in Settlements. PANS, RG1 Vol. 36 #39, 26 December 1758.

[18] In a letter to the Board of Trade and Plantations, Lawrence wrote that the Indians still "infest and harass the promising settlement of Lunenburg, they have just now destroyed a whole family remarkable for their industry and merit, and that in so bloody and barbarous a manner as to terrify and drive three parts of the people from the country lots, into the town for protection." See PANS, RG1 Vol. 36 #39, 26 December 1758.

and some Native allies and French soldiers captured a provision vessel in the Bay of Fundy.[19]

Lawrence's first proclamation generated many questions from potential migrants concerning quit rent and taxes, government, the size of land grants, and religious freedom.[20] To answer these questions, Lawrence issued a second proclamation on 11 January 1759 stating that land would be granted in proportion to the ability of each individual to "settle, cultivate, and enclose the same," and that quit rent would not be collected until ten years after the grant was issued.[21] Lawrence assured New Englanders that the government of Nova Scotia and the Courts of Justice were constituted in a like manner with those of Massachusetts, Connecticut and the other northern colonies.[22] In regard to religious freedom, Lawrence promised "full liberty of conscience . . . Papists excluded," and guaranteed that "dissenters" would be excused from any taxes levied for the support of the Anglican church.[23] Finally, Lawrence guaranteed settlers protection from Native raids by stationing British troops throughout the granted lands.

The Board of Trade and Plantations expressed displeasure with the second proclamation because Lawrence promised too much financial assistance to incoming settlers. The Board preferred Lawrence's original proclamation, describing it as "regular and proper" with respect to the "nature and frame of the constitution of the colony in regard to civil or religious liberty, and the nature and situation of the

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[19] Dispatch to Whitehall, Agents from New England. PANS, RG1 Vol. 36 #41, 20 April 1759.
[20] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 218.
[21] quoted in ibid., 219.
[22] quoted in ibid., 219.

land."[24] Where the Board found the second proclamation "irregular and improper" was in Lawrence's promise to financially aid settlers who were granted the lands which had been owned by the Acadians.[25] It seemed to the Board gratuitous to assist settlers who were moving onto lands already cleared and, for the most part, ready to be farmed. In his own defence, Lawrence used the Board's own instructions to speedily settle the province to justify his second proclamation.

By February 1759, various applications for settlement of townships had been made to Thomas Hancock of Boston, an agent responsible for settling matters of land between New England applicants and the Nova Scotia council. At the same time, the Council and the Assembly were in conflict over jealousies the Assembly entertained concerning the special rights and privileges they thought the Council enjoyed.[26] The hostility between the two political bodies caused the Assembly to proceed very slowly in passing land laws, and impeded settlement in Nova Scotia as no petitions for land could be agreed upon between the Council and the Assembly. In April, agents from Connecticut and Rhode Island arrived both to visit the land plots on the Bay of Fundy, and to choose land "for the immediate establishment of two or more townships."[27]

In June 1760, Governor Lawrence expressed his confidence to the Board of Trade and Plantations in the "success of [settlement], from the Spirit and content

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[23] Ibid., 219.
[24] Whitehall Dispatch, Second Proclamation. PANS, RG1 Vol. 30 #29, 1 August 1759.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Dispatch to Whitehall, Agents from New England. PANS, RG1 Vol. 36 #41, 20 April 1759.
[27] Ibid.

with which the Settlers, already arrived, appear to be setting out."[28] In the same month, the first immigrants to respond to Lawrence's second proclamation arrived in Nova Scotia and settled in Liverpool, bringing with them thirteen fishing schooners and a considerable number of livestock.[29] They began to build houses so that the rest of their families could join them, erected three saw mills, and Lawrence wrote to the Board that these settlers would immediately engage in agriculture, and the lumber and fishing trade.

Not all reports from the Nova Scotian countryside were optimistic however, for a violent storm in November 1759 had destroyed many of the dykes which protected the land on which the new settlers were to farm, and by early 1760, these dykes still remained in a state of disrepair.[30] In the same storm, seven hundred cords of firewood had been swept into the sea, and Lawrence worried that news of this accident would discourage settlers, especially poorer farmers, from remaining in Nova Scotia. Lawrence considered the successful remedy of such problems a "critical juncture for well peopling the province," and assured Parliament that he would do so with no expense to Britain.[31] The severe weather and damage had by no means rendered the province as unprofitable as if its lands had never been improved, argued Lawrence, "[and] the repair of the dykes will doubtless be attended with great labour, and if the Crown was to pay for performing it, with great cost likewise:

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[28] Dispatch to Whitehall, Arrival of Settlers. PANS, RG1 Vol. 36 #48, 16 June 1760.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Address to London from General Assembly. PANS, RG1 Vol. 36#44, 27 December 1759. Lawrence wrote to the Board that the storm "brought such an inundation on the dykes, in several parts, as exposed the marsh lands to the overflowing of the sea and your lordships may perceive, by the enclosed memorials, how far it is likely to affect some of the grantees."

but I would fain flatter myself, that this may be accomplished by means of the inhabitants themselves who are come, and everyday coming to these lands."[32]

Governor Lawrence had to constantly reassure Britain that he would control spending. He was rarely successful in being frugal, however, and often had to justify his actions to a disgruntled Board of Trade and Plantations. In late 1759, the Assembly sent an address to the Board of Trade and Plantations asking that the dykes be repaired at the public expense, and that the settlers be given assistance for three to four years until they could support themselves off the land. The Board, of course, rejected the Assembly's petition and looked to Lawrence for some explanation as to why the Assembly would ask for such large sums of money. Lawrence explained that their "meaning and intention . . . was that by setting forth the state and condition of the province, . . . they might procure something, by way of support and assistance to the most indigent amongst the settlers and not by any means to burthen the public with the charge of repairing the dykes."[33] Lawrence assured Britain that if he had thought the Assembly literally meant what they were asking for, he would never have laid the address before the Board.

Money was the principle concern in the early settlement of Nova Scotia, but while policy dictated the speedy settlement of Nova Scotia, the Board of Trade and Plantations constantly warned provincial authorities to curb their spending and to be as frugal as possible. The settlers who came to the townships of Horton, Cornwallis and Falmouth in 1760 had received generous government assistance, and many

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[31] Dispatch to Whitehall, Arrival of Settlers. PANS, RG1 Vol. 36 #48, 16 June 1760.
[32] Ibid.

potential settlers sought to get the same treatment from the Nova Scotia government. Financial support for new settlers, as well as assistance for struggling counties was often the only way to entice New Englanders to come and stay in Nova Scotia. The province had little infrastructure even by the 1760s, and the level of development which Britain desired for the province required spending much more money than had been budgeted. Hence, the Governor of Nova Scotia was constantly placed in a precarious position, being told in one letter to settle the colony by whatever means possible, and being reprimanded in the next for spending too much money.

Lawrence's letter of 16 June 1760 to the Board of Trade and Plantations attempted to remove any apprehensions Britain might have had "at a seeming necessity there was, either that the public must incur an enormous expense in repairing the dykes and supporting the settlers, or else, that the well establishing and peopling the country, which is so happily begun and is an object of such high importance, must entirely fall through."[34] The only immediate solution Lawrence could offer to the problem of the broken dykes, although he admitted it was an unpractical one, was to give the people whose lands had been ruined new plots of cleared land. The problem was, however, that all the cleared ungranted land lay on the north side of the Bay of Fundy, far away from the townships of Minas, Pisquid, and Annapolis. Possibly the only way to get the settlers to move to new lands would be to offer them money, but Lawrence acknowledged that Britain would not take

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[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.

favourably to this idea. "Besides," he wrote, "as the people of every settlement are equally entitled to a compensation, there would not I fear, be cleared lands sufficient to accommodate them all."[35]

Lawrence assured Britain that he would satisfy the disgruntled settlers without presenting the Lords of Trade with any new article of high expense, or parting with any ungranted lands.[36] Sensible to the need to be frugal, Lawrence remained convinced, either by necessity or by naiveté, that the dykes could be repaired and the land settled with little cost to the public. He acknowledged that introducing settlers to the province in the same manner the settlers had been introduced in Horton, Cornwallis and Falmouth was "highly unreasonable."[37] Some aid was needed to promote settlement, however, and Lawrence asked for permission to transport the poorest of the settlers into Nova Scotia, particularly those whose present homes were located far away from the coastline, had no boats, and consequently would have to sell their livestock to pay for their passage north.[38] Lawrence guaranteed Britain that the settlers had but to see the lands available throughout the province to leave their homelands and settle immediately in Nova Scotia.

Lawrence died unexpectedly on 19 October 1760 at age fifty-one after catching a chill only a short time before.[39] After the shock of his untimely death had

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[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Dominick Graham, "Charles Lawrence," in Mary P. Bentley et al, eds. *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), Vol. IV, 365.

passed, the Board of Trade and Plantations ordered an investigation of "partiality, profusions and private understanding" in relation to many land grants and settlement contracts, and the misuse of public funds to maintain Lawrence's own vessels.[40] The Board alleged that Lawrence had granted larger amount of lands to individuals than was allowed, and that he had hidden the true costs of settlement in Nova Scotia from Britain. Jonathan Belcher, Lawrence's successor, investigated the charges laid against the late Lawrence, but found that "upon the best examination in the severest charges" all the allegations were unfounded.[41]

The Board of Trade warned Belcher that Lawrence's lack of frugality would "be the foundation of difficulty in Parliament which although it [had] hitherto liberally and cheerfully supported the colony, will with reluctance acquiesce in providing for any further exceeding after such large sums have already been granted on that account."[42] Britain let Belcher know that the successful settlement of Nova Scotia was still very much a priority, but that the liberties which Lawrence had taken would no longer be acceptable. "The importance of the province of Nova Scotia which is at present under your government," wrote the Board of Trade and Plantations, "makes it necessary for us (as the future prosperity of the colony depends so much upon your conduct in this particular juncture) to furnish you with such instructions as may enable you to execute, agreeable to your own wishes and the expectations of the public, the trust which is devolved upon you."[43]

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[40] quoted in ibid, 365.
[41] quoted in ibid, 365.
[42] Whitehall Dispatch, Settlement of Forfeited Lots. PANS, RG1 Vol. 31 #7, 10 June 1762.
[43] Whitehall Dispatch, Frugality Urged. PANS, RG1 Vol. 30 #39, 3 March 1761.

The watchful eye of Britain and a tight budget made Belcher overly cautious of spending any money on promoting settlement. On 10 April 1761, he wrote to the board that "it would be difficult to proceed to any further assistance in the settlement without permission from your Lordships, to answer the many importunities for a supply of provisions to the poorer settlers as well as the aids of government in their transportation."[44] The government hoped to still be able to provide transport for New England planters to come to Nova Scotia as Lawrence had done. Worried that any impediment to potential immigrants would dampen "the spirit for settling," Belcher and the Council agreed to use the province's vessels to bring settlers into Nova Scotia, and then to hire private boats to transport only those people who could not be accommodated by government ships.[45] Lawrence had hired Mr. Hancock of Boston to provide transport for New England planters, and after the governor's death the province still owed him "a considerable amount" which could only "be discharged by a further grant from parliament."[46] To make the transporting of settlers more cost effective, Belcher discharged the previous government vessel, the Monckton schooner, and purchased a vessel twice its size. To keep costs down, Belcher reduced the number of hands on deck. Belcher predicted that through the course of the summer the government vessels alone would bring six hundred persons and their stock to Nova Scotia.[47]

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[44] Dispatch to Whitehall, Transportation Expenses. PANS, RG1 Vol. 37 #5, 10 April 1761.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.

In order not to stem any migration of settlers that had started during Lawrence's administration, Belcher issued a proclamation stating that all agreements made by the late governor Lawrence would be honoured, and that further proposals for settlement were invited.[48] Many proprietors who had received their land grants in 1758 had still not settled in Nova Scotia by early 1761. Belcher issued a second proclamation explaining that those settlers who had failed to fulfill the terms of their land grant would be given until 1 June 1761 to settle, after which time their grants would be forfeited.[49] Not wanting to dissuade any settlers or to make new grants with new conditions, Belcher offered assistance and protection to all absentee proprietors.[50] The Assembly, conscious that Nova Scotia needed able-bodied planters to establish the province as an asset of the British empire, tried to pass an act "to prevent the importing of disabled, inferior, and other useless persons into this province."[51] The act, however, was struck down by Britain.

In order to gain a sense of the state of Nova Scotia, Belcher ordered Charles Morris to survey and lay out townships throughout the entire province. Morris' survey revealed that many settlements throughout Nova Scotia had either failed or were not producing to their full economic potential because of poor soil and inclement weather conditions. While Britain and the Nova Scotia government had great plans for both farming and the production of raw materials throughout the province, few of them had come into fruition. Such was the case with Halifax, a town

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[48] *Boston Evening Post*, 22 December 1760.
[49] Jonathan Belcher's Second Proclamation. *Boston Evening Post*, 19 January 1761.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Royal Disallowance of Two Nova Scotia Acts. PANS, RG1 Vol. 165, 10 September 1761, 180.

completely devoid of husbandry whose population relied almost completely on the navy and the army for their subsistence. Little had been done to settle the land around Halifax, and Morris reported that not one family in the town nor in the surrounding lands subsisted by husbandry despite previous attempts to promote farming by Nova Scotia Governor Edward Cornwallis.[52]

In 1750, Cornwallis had divided three thousand acres of land around Halifax into five acre lots for the inhabitants to improve. He had also ordered a bounty of twenty shillings be paid for every acre cleared of trees and fenced. Inspired by the prospect of financial gain, Haligonians had cleared one thousand acres, fenced the lots, and sowed grass seed. The residents had then set fire to the cleared land to burn away the underbrush, unfortunately also burning down all the fences they had erected. It was then discovered that the soil around Halifax was mainly stone and quite unsuitable for farming. By 1762, no more attempts had been made to improve the land.

West of Halifax was the township of Lunenburg, a settlement established in 1753 by Dutch and German settlers transported to the colony by Governor Cornwallis. Lunenburg was a settlement fraught with problems. At public expense, the township had been given building materials, considerable amounts of flour, and grain every year for nine years. The government had also given Lunenburg a thousand pounds sterling for the purchase of cattle, and had provided food for their livestock since 1753. When the Acadians were expelled from the area, the people of

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[52] Description of Several Towns in Nova Scotia. PANS, RG1 Vol. 37 #13 ¾, 11 January 1762.

Lunenburg were given permission to take "as many [of the French's] cattle as they could possibly keep."[53] Despite the great amount of money poured into Lunenburg, by 1762 the township had decreased rather than increased in population. Some of the Catholic inhabitants had left to live with French families in various parts of Nova Scotia, while others had deserted their farms and sought work in Halifax. The inhabitants of 1762 had cleared only ten acres of land and supplied Halifax with negligible amounts of wood and timber.

Lunenburg suffered extremely violent weather conditions which destroyed the residents' crops and prompted many to abandon the settlement. Lunenburg was not alone, however, for many other townships also experienced the scourges of drought, hail, flooding, and fire. Drought destroyed the corn crops in Cornwallis, Horton, Falmouth, and Newport, all townships whose forests were recovering from a fire in 1712 which had leveled all the trees in the area.[54] The residents of Truro had planted their corn crop too late, and it was burned by the drought and then completely destroyed by an early frost. Although the inhabitants of Truro managed to raise potatoes and other roots, and enough hay for their livestock, the government had to lend them six hundred bushels of corn "to be repaid when demanded."[55]

A major problem impeding the settlement of Nova Scotia which Morris' survey revealed was the negligence of proprietors to immigrate and settle their lands as quickly as promised. The township of Barrington, on the southernmost tip of Nova Scotia, had only twenty of the expected one hundred families settled in early

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[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.

1762. Likewise, on the twenty league plot of land stretching from Cape Sable to Long Island which had been granted to the town of Marblehead, Massachusetts, only a few of the promised eighty families were settled when Morris passed through.[56] Many empty plots of land also lay in the townships of Yarmouth, Granville, and Annapolis, with promises from their proprietors that they would soon be settled.

By late 1762, many settlers were in danger of forfeiting their lands. People from various townships petitioned the Nova Scotia assembly for more time to complete clearing their land. Many grants were forfeited, however, mainly because of absentee landlords who had not yet made the trek to Nova Scotia with their families. Belcher issued a proclamation of 23 March 1762 stating that there were vacant land shares in Sackville, Amherst, Granville, Yarmouth, Barrington, Onslow, New Dublin, and Chester. Petitions were made quickly to Belcher, and families promised to come soon to Nova Scotia with their livestock to take the place of those who had failed to clear their lands.[57]

The tight budget on which Nova Scotia had to run provided little money for bursaries to entice immigrants into Nova Scotia. The lack of money led to a clash with Alexander McNutt, a land speculator who had brought many settlers to Nova Scotia under Governor Lawrence. In November 1762, McNutt arrived in Nova Scotia with two hundred people from Ireland, demanding that the government pay for their provisions or he would take them to Philadelphia. Belcher wanted to take in as many settlers as possible, but since the Board had resolved not to pay for any

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[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.

more of McNutt's speculation schemes, he argued that taking in McNutt's settlers would discourage the general plan resolved on by the government.[58] In January 1763, McNutt proposed to settle his immigrants on the lands along the St. John River which had been promised to soldiers presently fighting the French. His plan was, however, rejected by the Nova Scotia assembly.

McNutt's two previous transports of settlers to Nova Scotia had cost Britain nearly five hundred pounds, so Belcher gave him notice that unless his plan could be better supported with private money, it could not possibly be carried into execution in Nova Scotia without "peremptory orders from the King's ministers and a public fund allotted for that purpose."[59] In response to Belcher's notice, McNutt petitioned the Board of Trade and Plantations asking for recourse in the matter of his rejected settlers. McNutt argued that he had been invited by Governor Lawrence to "continue his endeavours to procure inhabitants for the peopling of the infant colony of Nova Scotia, then almost an entire wilderness notwithstanding the immense expense bestowed upon it by Great Britain, all schemes for the peopling that important colony having hitherto proved abortive."[60]

Many British authorities shared McNutt's critique of the failure of Nova Scotia authorities to settle the province as quickly and frugally as had been planned. By 1763 it was apparent that the venture to make Nova Scotia an extension of New England in order to promote immigration had failed. Fewer planters than had been

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[57] Dispatch to Whitehall, St. John River Settlers. PANS, RG1 Vol. 37 #24, 24 January 1763.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] NAC, Colonial Office. Nova Scotia "A". Belcher and Wilmot, 1763. MG 11 N.S. "A" Vol. 70, 48.

anticipated had come to Nova Scotia, which left many tracts of land uncultivated and unproductive. Consequently, Nova Scotia's great economic potential remained unrealized, and the province relied on government grants to pay debts and keep the economy functioning. By 1763, the Belcher administration had not recovered from the two thousand pound debt left by Lawrence. Despite his professions of frugality, Belcher himself forced the province deeper into debt and near bankruptcy, causing Edmund Burke to proclaim in the Commons, "Good God! What sum the nursing of that ill-thriven, hard-visaged, and ill-favoured brat, has cost to this wittol nation . . . the whole of the job still lies upon the patient, callous shoulders of the people of England."[61]

What had seemed to Governor Lawrence in 1758 as a simple plan to invite land hungry New Englanders to Nova Scotia to settle the lands vacated by the Acadians, had become by the 1760s a complicated situation with many economic, social, and political ramifications. The intersections of imperial and regional communities in Nova Scotia led to both conflict and consensus within the province. As Nova Scotia Yankees tried to strengthen ties to their homeland, authorities in Halifax wanted to sever them and establish stronger links to the imperial centre. The result was disdain in New England for the tyrannical assertion of power by Halifax, and a distrust in Nova Scotia of the political structures of New England. By 1765, the political differences between Nova Scotia and New England were clear. Halifax did not permit settlers all the freedoms they had enjoyed in New England in

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[61] Quoted in J.B. Brebner, *The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony during the Revolutionary Years* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1937), 67.

choosing local officials. The 1765 Act for the Choice of Town Officers and Regulating Townships stipulated that the local Grand Jury could nominate two or more persons for each office. The Court of Quarter Sessions, comprised of individuals prudently selected by Halifax officials, then appointed their choice of the nominees to a position.[62] As historian D.C. Harvey has argued, the Act undermined the New England form of township government and allowed the central administration to monitor the townships' activities.[63]

The central checks on the attempts of New England settlers to establish local forms of government meant that Nova Scotia never experienced rule by town meeting. 1765 also saw an alteration in the constituency system. The population increase in the out-settlements of the province prompted Halifax authorities to give Halifax County a larger representation in the House of Assembly and to limit the number of representatives from the new townships.[64] With weak local government and declining representation in the Assembly, Nova Scotia Yankees depended on Halifax for the regulation of local affairs and the provision of local social services.[65] Halifax authorities' attempts to sever the ties Nova Scotia Yankees had to their homeland generated a political culture different than the New England one the Planters had tried to recreate. As New Englanders protested against the loss of their

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[62] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 226.
[63] D.C. Harvey, "The Struggle for the New England Form of Township Government in Nova Scotia," in *Canadian Historical Association Report* (1933), 22. Taken from Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 226.
[64] S.D. Clark, *Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640-1840* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 41.
[65] Ibid., 43-44.

colonial liberties, the Nova Scotia Yankees sought to obtain any or all of their old New England "Rights and Privileges."[66]

While Nova Scotia Yankees found themselves forced into a political climate different than that of their homeland, they tried to establish strong ties to New England through religion. Requests for Congregational ministers and churches throughout Nova Scotia caused the established church much concern. Reverend Bennet, an Anglican missionary to Nova Scotia, wrote to Governor Belcher in January that he had been settled for six weeks in King's County and by residing their had "prevented the inhabitants of the several townships sending to New England for dissenting ministers."[67] Bennet hoped to reconcile the residents to the Church of England, and asked the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel for bibles, tracts on baptism and the Lord's supper, and "some shewing the reasonableness of conformity and the danger of separation."[68] The society resolved that the "secretary be directed to apply to Mr. Pownall concerning an allowance to Mr. Bennet in lieu of a house."[69] The funds given to the Anglican church by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Board of Trade and Plantations strengthened the church to the detriment of Congregational ministers. An Anglican minister could expect a salary of seventy pounds a year, whereas a Congregational minister, supported solely by his church, was fortunate to receive as much as twenty pounds.[70]

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[66] quoted in Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 227.
[67] NAC, Colonial Office. Nova Scotia "A". Belcher and Wilmot, 1763. MG 11 N.S. "A" Vol. 70, 2.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, 189-191.

By early 1765, many Nova Scotia Yankees realized that Governor Lawrence's promises in his proclamation had failed to materialize. In almost every aspect of their lives, the New England planters were pressed to cut their ties with their homeland and turn to Halifax. Halifax authorities denied Nova Scotia Yankees rule by town meetings, Congregational ministers were scarce, and many of their own countrymen looked upon them as vagabonds living in a land of tyranny. Halifax authorities did their best to establish central control in Nova Scotia, but had to acquiesce to certain measures to ensure that New Englanders would still immigrate. Complicating the Nova Scotia Yankees' attempts to establish and maintain links with New England was their poverty and the province's lack of infrastructure. In many ways, the settlers' economic situation mirrored their political one, for because of the lack of self-sufficiency of many of the townships, they had to rely on Halifax for subsistence. The intersections of regional and political communities established Nova Scotia as a province of conflict.

Chapter Three

"And to Complete our Misfortunes, we must be Stamp'd:" Nova Scotia and the Stamp Act

At the height of the Stamp Act crisis, lawyer and budding revolutionary John Adams wrote that the spirit of liberty was everywhere in the colonies. "Such a Union," he proclaimed in his diary, "was never known before in America."[1] Of Nova Scotia, however, he wrote that Halifax consisted of "a set of fugitives and Vagabonds, who [were] kept in fear by a Fleet and an Army," and he pitied the "Great Misfortune" that had befallen the inhabitants of the province.[2] The majority of the people for whom Adams held such a low opinion were, however, New Englanders who had emigrated to Nova Scotia because of land shortages in their homeland. In the wake of the expulsion of the Acadians in 1755 and the offer of free land in the final years of the Seven Years' War, approximately two-thirds of Nova Scotia's population of fifteen thousand had migrated from New England.[3] Yet despite their New England heritage, the residents of Nova Scotia did not oppose the Stamp Act to the extent to which their friends and families did in the New England colonies.

With the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 and the subsequent reorganization of the British empire, Prime Minister Grenville sought to raise

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[1] L.H. Butterfield, ed., *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams: Diary 1755-1770* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961), 4 vols., 1:285.
[2] Ibid.
[3] George Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630 to 1784* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), xiii; Margaret Conrad, *They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime Canada* (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1988), 9.

additional revenue for imperial purposes. Britain gave notice to its colonial agents as early as 1764 of Parliament's intention to pass the Stamp Act, and though all of them opposed it, they did not provide any alternative suggestions.[4] The preamble stated that the act's purpose was to defray the expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the North American colonies by applying certain stamp duties in those colonies. Parliament designed the Stamp Act to raise sixty thousand pounds, and its prescribed duties affected virtually all aspects of colonial life.[5] All written or printed declarations were levied a stamp duty of three pence, and any degree from a university, academy, college, or seminary would receive a stamp duty of two pounds. Liquor licenses were taxed twenty shillings, appointments to any public beneficial office ten shillings, and wills five shillings. Land warrants and grants, bonds, indentures, leases, contracts, bills of sale, charters, articles of apprenticeship, deeds, letters of attorney, mortgages, packs of playing cards, dice, newspapers, pamphlets, advertisements, almanacs, calendars, and written proceedings in languages other than English were subject to stamp duties varying from one half-penny to four pounds.[6] Parliament passed the Stamp Act with little opposition on 22 March 1765.

In many ways, Nova Scotia's response to the Stamp Act differed very little from that of the American colonies. Some colonists supported what the British parliament dictated, others opposed it, and still others tried to avoid conflict by remaining neutral. Ties to family and friends, political similarities, and cultural

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[4] Henry Steele Commager, *Documents of American History* (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1973), 2 vols., 1:53.
[5] Ibid.
[6] "The Stamp Act," in ibid., 1: 53-55.

bonds with New England theoretically made Nova Scotia a prime candidate to join the oppositional fervour of the other American colonies. Instead, the Nova Scotia House of Assembly never considered supporting the other colonies, and overt resistance in Nova Scotia was scant and ineffective. Although political rhetoric seemingly began to divide the colonies, even the supporters of rebellious factions were not unified under one homogenous ideology.[7] One thing each colony had in common, however, was that the Stamp Act forced every one of them to redefine their relationship to the imperial centre.

Nova Scotia presents many problems of interpretation because of its population's relative political inaction. Personal documents from the New Englanders who immigrated to Nova Scotia are scarce, and as such, the representatives of the province's townships who sat in the House of Assembly are often the only voice heard from the countryside. The House of Assembly cannot, of course, speak for the entire province, and their response did not echo that of all Nova Scotians. A small group living in the west of the province eventually supported the American rebels in 1775, and the New Englanders living in the Chignecto Isthmus, by far the largest ethnic group in the province, pursued an ambivalent political course.[8] Nova Scotia was a legislative province, meaning that it relied on parliamentary monies and not internal taxes to perform civil functions. Lack of infrastructure within the province isolated settlements from one another, but the

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[7] As seen in Dirk Hoerder, "Boston Leaders and Boston Crowds, 1765-1776," in Alfred F. Young, ed., *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of Radicalism* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976), 231-271.

planters' ties to friends and family in New England remained strong.[9] Resistance to the Stamp Act never reached the level it did in the American colonies, but it did exist.

For historians like J.B. Brebner, George Rawlyk and Gordon T. Stewart, the Stamp Act was of little significance, merely another step the Nova Scotia Yankees took towards neutrality and confusion. For historian Wilfred B. Kerr, the rejection of the Stamp Act "marked the first step toward the formation of a second nation [i.e. Canada] on the North American continent."[10] While Kerr's interpretation errs in anticipating contemporary borders, Nova Scotians' reaction to the Stamp Act was indeed of importance to the future of the province. The refusal to participate in the opposition to the Stamp Act began Nova Scotia's political divergence from its position in North America as an extension of New England.

Anthony Henry's *Nova Scotia Gazette* provides some of the only evidence that opposition to the Stamp Act existed in Nova Scotia. Born in 1734 in France to German parents, Henry joined the British forces in 1758 as a fifer and was sent to Louisbourg in the same year.[11] After being relieved of military service, he obtained employment with printer James Parker in Woodbridge, New Jersey. He went to Halifax in 1759 and worked for printer John Bushell, aiding in the production of Nova Scotia's first paper, the *Halifax Gazette*. Bushell had come from Boston in

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[8] George Rawlyk, *Revolution Rejected, 1775-1776* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1968), 18-19.
[9] Ibid., 18.
[10] Wilfred B. Kerr, "The Stamp Act in Nova Scotia" in *The New England Quarterly* (Volume VI, 1933), 566.

1752 to take over for printer Bartholomew Green, but because of his lack of both business sense and frugality, Bushell quickly fell into debt.[12] His devotion to what his grocer referred to as "liquid groceries" only added to his problems.[13] In the early 1750s in Halifax there was "but little encouragement for the press," and Bushell supported himself mainly on government printing jobs.[14] Upon Bushell's death in 1761, Henry took control of the *Gazette* as well as the responsibilities for being the province's government printer. He worked closely with provincial secretary Richard Bulkely, who had edited the paper since 1758.[15]

On 17 October 1765, Anthony Henry asked his readers who were indebted to the *Gazette* to settle their accounts before the first of November before the Stamp Duties were put into effect.[16] He also informed his subscribers that because of the Stamp Act, the price of his paper would increase from twelve to eighteen shillings a year. As there was only one stamp per sheet of paper, using stamped paper doubled the *Gazette's* size from one half sheet, or two pages, to a whole sheet, or four pages of print. Despite the significant increase in size, Henry promised to fill all four pages

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[11] Mary P. Bentley et al eds., *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 4:342.

[12] Isaiah Thomas, *History of Printing in America* (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1874), 2 vols., 1:357-358. Green arrived in Halifax from Boston in August of 1751 to begin a Halifax printing business and a newspaper. He died after two weeks of being in the city at age fifty two. Bushell, who had worked under Green in Boston immediately came to Halifax to take Green's place, and published the first *Halifax Gazette* on 23 March 1752. Thomas describes Bushell as a man who was "a good workman, but had not all the art of acquiring property; nor did he make the most economical use of the little which fell into his hands."

[13] J.J. Stewart, "Early Journalism in Nova Scotia" in *Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society* (Halifax: Nova Scotia Printing Co., 1888), Vol. VI, 100.

[14] Thomas, *History of Printing in America*, 357.

[15] Bentley et al., *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, 342.

[16] *Halifax Gazette*, 17 October 1765.

with the "freshest news foreign and domestic."[17] He usually dedicated the extra space to a postscript which reported the reception of the Stamp Act in the American colonies. News of revolts, burning of stamp masters in effigy, and treatises concerning the insults to British liberties that Parliament inflicted on the colonists filled the pages of the *Gazette*.

Opposition to the Stamp Act in the American colonies occurred before the act was put into practice, and the *Gazette* reported news of New England disgruntlement with the tax as early as 3 October 1765. An extract from a Boston paper, told of the merchants of Boston writing "to England for some Goods, to be sent upon Condition *only*, that the Stamp Act is repeal'd."[18] A small statement that the Stamp Master in New York, "with the advice of his Friends, [had] resigned from that *ODIOUS* Office," finished off the front page.[19] The 24 October 1765 edition reported that J. Ingersoll, Stamp Master in Hartford, had resigned. The article stated that "after many proposals, [Mr. Ingersoll] delivered the resignation . . . which he read himself in the hearing of the whole company; he was then desired to pronounce the words LIBERTY and PROPERTY, three times, which having done, the whole body gave three huzza's."[20] Henry reprinted a copy of Ingersoll's letter of resignation below the article. On a somewhat lighter note, the 24 October issue contained news from Boston that "numbers of young persons in the country [were]

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[17] Ibid.
[18] *Halifax Gazette*, 3 October 1765.
[19] Ibid.
[20] *Halifax Gazette*, 24 October 1765.

joining in wedlock, earlier than they intended" in order not to pay "dearly for stamping."[21]

Henry did not offer any original journalism in his paper, but rather pieced together extracts from both British and American papers.[22] As such, the subscribers to the Gazette were reading of events which had happened four months ago in Britain, and three weeks or more ago in the American colonies. Henry also borrowed stylistic elements from his sources, namely the *Boston Gazette and Country Journal*. In the 24 October 1765 issue, Henry added a subtitle to the paper's heading, which had remained the same since Bushell's first issue, so that it read "The Halifax Gazette: Containing the freshest Intelligence, Foreign and Domestic." The *Boston Gazette* displayed the same phrasing in its own heading.[23] Henry continued to borrow stylistic techniques from the Boston papers throughout the Stamp Act crisis.

The 31 October 1765 issue was the first *Gazette* to bear the official half-penny stamp. The heading of the paper changed again; the two woodcuts which had originally flanked the paper's title were changed to a single, central woodcut of a three-masted ship. Henry enclosed the subtitle and the date in lines, giving the paper the linear look of the Boston papers. Evidently, news of the Stamp Act was scarce as the issue contained several poems including "To a Young Lady, on her Fine Ear for Music," "To a Lady, who sent the Author a Pair of Garters," "Advice to

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[21] Ibid.

[22] As with most gazetteers of that time, Henry was first and foremost a printer, not a journalist.

[23] The *Boston Post Boy* and the *Boston Evening Post* also printed the same subtitle, indicating that all the Boston papers borrowed news and stylistic elements from each other. The layout and content of the *Halifax Gazette* approximates that of the *Boston Gazette* more closely than any of the other Boston papers.

Ladies," and "The Choice of a Wife writ over a Chimney." Henry assured his readers that "the publisher of this Gazette will take all methods possible to collect the most authentic articles of intelligence from time to time, and when there happens to be a scarcity of news will insert pieces of speculation that may be entertaining to the reader."[24] He also encouraged all gentlemen who desired to communicate their thoughts to submit their writings to the *Gazette*. Unfortunately, very few Nova Scotians took advantage of Henry's offer.

In the autumn of 1765, a young man named Isaiah Thomas came to Halifax from Boston and found employment with Henry. Aged sixteen, Thomas had left Boston after having a "serious fracas" with his master, Zechariah Fowle, a prominent Boston printer.[25] Thomas' parents had indentured him to Fowle at the age of six, and after ten years of service he had set out to England via Nova Scotia to learn more about the printing trade.[26] Thomas worked on the editing and printing of the *Gazette* in return for a small wage and room and board with Henry.[27] Exactly how much control Thomas had over the *Gazette* is debatable. There is no other source by which Thomas' relation of the facts can be tested, and it is obvious that he

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[24] *Halifax Gazette*, 31 October to 7 November 1765.

[25] Thomas, *History of Printing in America*, xxxi. Thomas does not provide any details as to the cause of the dissention with his master.

[26] Stewart, "Early Journalism," 102.

[27] Thomas, *History of Printing in America*, xxxi-xxxii. Benjamin Franklin Thomas' memoirs of his grandfather are as unreliable as Isaiah Thomas' accounts of his days in Halifax. Benjamin Thomas claims that Henry was "indolent, and [Isaiah Thomas] ambitious and willing to work," and so "the editing and printing [of] the *Gazette* soon fell into his hands. He was found quite competent to the task. He remodeled the paper as well as he could with the means he had, and went to work." Benjamin Thomas' account is full of discrepancies which cast a shadow of doubt over the entire memoir.

had a propensity to inflate the truth.[28] Whether or not the responsibility for the anti-Stamp Act content of the paper belonged to Thomas, however, is not as important as the reactions, both from the public and the government, the paper's statements provoked.[29]

There is little evidence in the *Gazette* of direct public opposition to the Stamp Act in Nova Scotia, either by Henry or his contemporaries. In the 7 November 1765 issue, the following proclamation appeared: "It being Cucumber times with many of the Taylors in Town, they beg the Prayers of all good People that the Stamp Act may be repealed, as most of their customers have declared they will have no new Clothes made until such Time as the said Act is repealed—*A noble Resolution!*"[30] The Halifax column ended with the statement that "trade is dull, money scarce, and to complete our misfortunes we must be STAMP'D—Quere, *Is this right?*"[31] The most direct critique of the Stamp Act appeared in the 24 November 1765 edition. The postscript read that the *Gazette* had no more news concerning public affairs, except that the Stamp Act was going forward "though much against the Inclination of the People in general, who wait with great Impatience to hear the *happy News* of the STAMP ACT being repealed, which would fill the Breast of every loyal Subject and

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[28] Ibid. Of Thomas' claim that he was on his way to England, Stewart argues, "from an independent point of view, it looks very much as if this excuse might not be the correct one; and as Thomas was undoubtedly given to handling the truth rather carelessly, we are under no obligation to believe any more of his story than we see fit." See p. 102.

[29] The influence of the Boston papers on the *Halifax Gazette* is obvious, and it is possible that Thomas was responsible for the remodeling the *Gazette* due to his time as an apprentice in Boston. However, it is equally plausible that Henry had a hand in the new look of the *Gazette* since he borrowed news from the Boston papers before Thomas arrived.

[30] *Halifax Gazette*, 7 November to 14 November 1765.

[31] Ibid.

Friends of LIBERTY with Joy and Gladness!—May the *happy* Moment be near at Hand."[32]

Henry was reprimanded by provincial secretary Richard Bulkely for the content of the 24 November issue. Bulkely summoned Henry to answer for his actions and threatened to discontinue the government's patronage of his print shop.[33] Henry offered the excuse that he had been confined to his house with sickness, and explained that Thomas had taken advantage of Henry's absence to express his own patriotism. Bulkely then called Thomas and asked him why he had published a statement in the *Gazette* that the people of Nova Scotia were displeased with the Stamp Act. Thomas answered that he thought the statement was true, whereupon Bulkely cautioned him to remember that he was no longer in New England.[34] Henry's position as a government printer and gazetteer placed him in a precarious position between economic pragmatism and political conviction. The majority of Henry's income came from government printing jobs, but his employment with the province depended on the nature of the material he printed in his paper. As historian Robert M. Weir has argued, "being the medium of the leadership, colonial newspapers normally printed what its members wanted said."[35]

Henry not only had to balance his own political convictions with those of the

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[32] *Halifax Gazette*, 14 November to 21 November, 1765.
[33] Stewart, "Early Journalism," 103. Stewart argues that since Bulkely was the editor of the *Gazette*, "he summoned Thomas before him in his capacity as editor . . . if he ever did; but it adds to the impressiveness of the incident for Thomas to represent himself as being summoned before the Secretary of the Province."
[34] Benjamin Franklin Thomas, "Memoirs of Isaiah Thomas," in *The History of Printing in America*, xxxii-xxxiii.

government officials, he also had to account for the politics of his readership. Andrew Steuart, printer of the *North-Carolina Gazette*, lamented, "what part is [the printer] now to act? . . . Continue to keep his press open and free and be in danger of corporal punishment, or block it up, and run the risk of having his brains knocked out?"[36] Although Henry did not run the risk of such violent public reprisal, he was not free to print whatever he wished.[37] While Henry borrowed much from the Boston papers, when the printers of the *Boston Evening Post*, *Boston Post Boy and Advertiser,* and *Boston Gazette* added the phrase "The United Voice of All his Majesty's free and loyal Subjects in America, Liberty and Property and No Stamps" to their title heads, the *Halifax Gazette* did not follow suit.

Despite Bulkely's reprimand, the 28 November issue of the *Gazette* came out in mourning, a convention employed by Boston papers to oppose the Stamp Act.[38] Thick black lines enclosed the title head and completed the last page, giving the paper a heavy and despondent look. The next week's paper offset the moderateness of this stylistic tactic by replacing the stamp with a death's head. There is no record that Henry or Thomas received any direct reprimand for the death's head, so it is questionable if this paper entered public circulation. The *Gazette* continued in mourning until its 2 January 1766 issue, and the new year saw more politically neutral content fill the pages of the paper. The final act of retaliation to the Stamp

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[35] Robert M. Weir, "Newspaper Press in the Southern Colonies" in Bernard Bailyn and John B. Hench, eds., *The Press and the American Revolution* (Worcester: American Antiquarian Society, 1980), 117.

[36] Quoted in Weir, "Newspaper Press," 103.

Act appeared in the 6 February 1766 issue in which the paper was printed on the opposite side of the page, thus inverting the stamp on the other side. The following inscription was printed beside the stamp along with a picture of the devil with his pitchfork: "Behold me the Scorn and Contempt of AMERICA, pitching down to Destruction. D—ils clear the Way for B—s and STAMPS."[39]

The header of the 13 February 1766 edition of the *Gazette* informed its readers that "As all the Stampt Paper for this Gazette is used up, and no more to be had, the Publisher will supply his customers as usually, at twelve shillings a year."[40] A poem titled "Inscription for the Tree of Liberty" celebrated the "groaning" land's freedom from Stamps and Stampmen.[41] Britain officially repealed the Stamp Act on 18 March 1766, but the lack of stamped papers in the colonies promoted the celebration of its annulment in February. For Henry's campaign against the Stamp Act, Bulkeley withdrew government patronage from the *Gazette* and replaced him as government printer with Robert Fletcher, a printer from London who arrived in Halifax with superior font and type.[42] Thomas received orders to leave the province, and he departed for Boston on the nineteenth of March. Henry founded the rival *Nova Scotia Chronicle and Weekly Advertiser*, the first newspaper to run

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[37] The Boston printers read the *Halifax Gazette*, and Henry certainly was familiar with the newspapers from Boston. Henry's paper is somewhat tamer than its Boston counterparts, evidence of careful editing.

[38] J.B. Brebner, *The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1937), 160.

[39] *Halifax Gazette*, 6 February to 13 February 1766. Brebner has argued that this issue was not circulated generally in Halifax, for if it were, some record surely would have been made of Henry or Thomas' impudence. However, the fact still remains that Henry lost the right to print the *Gazette* in April of 1766. It is unlikely that his dismissal was solely due to the November 21 incident.

[40] *Halifax Gazette*, 13 February to 20 February 1766.

[41] Ibid. This poem had appeared one month earlier in the *Boston Post Boy and Advertiser*.

independently of government patronage, and by 1770 had put Fletcher out of business. He resumed his position as government printer, renamed his paper the *Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser*, and continued in his profession for the next thirty years.

The success of Henry and the subsequent failure of Fletcher suggests that Haligonians were sympathetic to the American colonists, even if they did not engage in popular revolt against the Stamp Act. The exact number of subscribers to the *Gazette* during the crisis is unknown. Thomas places the number below seventy, and Henry advertised continually during the Stamp Act that he would decrease the price of the paper to twelve shillings if he had more than one hundred fifty subscribers.[43] The readership of the *Halifax Gazette* would have been larger than subscription numbers can indicate, as papers were shared among friends, and read in taverns and coffee houses.[44] Subscription figures aside, Henry had enough readership to keep his paper in business, and to later succeed in competition with a rival newspaper of superior quality. Some public patronage may have been withdrawn during the Stamp Act, as the number of advertisements decreased during the crisis. While the lack of advertisements may be because of the stamp duty of two shillings, it may also have been a gesture to protest the content of the paper.

One of the few documented public displays of opposition to the Stamp Act in Nova Scotia occurred on 13 October 1765 when effigies of the stamp master, a

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[42] Brebner, *Neutral Yankees*, 294; Thomas, *History of Printing in America*, 358; Bentley et al., *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, 343.

[43] Thomas, *History of Printing in America*, 80. Thomas states that not more than seventy copies were issued from the press per week, although the "subscribers did not amount to that number."

boot—a reference to Prime Minister Lord Bute, and a devil were hanged on the gallows behind Citadel Hill. Those responsible for the act and for the inscription pinned to the stamp master, part of which read "what greater glory can this country see, than a stamp-master hanging on a tree," remained anonymous.[45] Reporting Nova Scotia's ineffective attempt at opposition, the *Newport Mercury* hoped that "the neighbouring colonies [would] be charitable enough to believe that nothing but [Nova Scotia's] dependent situation prevents them from heartily and sincerely opposing a tax unconstitutional in its nature."[46] On 11 November 1765, the *Boston Evening Post* reprinted Henry's announcement of 17 October that the *Halifax Gazette* would be printed on stamped paper, but offered no comment on the situation. One week later, the *Boston Post Boy* reported that Captain Atwood had arrived from Halifax, but that no stamped newspapers had been received from the printer there. "It is thought," the printer noted, "[stamped papers] are a commodity of too high a value for such persons to deal in." While the Boston papers denounced Britain for its tyranny, they talked of Nova Scotia in forgiving and understanding terms.

Nova Scotia's acceptance of the Stamp Act did not warrant much print in the Boston papers. Local news columns indicate that trade between Halifax and Boston continued, and that no condemnation was ever leveled at the residents of the province. News of Nova Scotia continued to be placed in the Boston column throughout the Stamp Act crisis. Even though the Boston papers eagerly reported

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[44] Weir, "Newspaper Press," 131-135.
[45] Kerr, "Stamp Act in Nova Scotia," 557.
[46] *Newport Mercury*, 4 November 1765, Quoted in ibid., 557. The same article appeared on the same date in the *Boston Post Boy and Advertiser*.

the incident at the Citadel Hill gallows, as well as news of the inhabitants of Liverpool burning a copy of the Stamp Act, no comments about Nova Scotian complacency were ever printed.[47] The only action taken against Nova Scotia was the burning of an issue of the *Halifax Gazette* in a Boston coffee house. The 30 December 1765 issue of the *Boston Evening Post* reported that Captain Mullowney had arrived from Halifax on December sixteenth and was carrying stamped papers on his ship. It was also rumoured that a Boston man had recently received a ream of stamped papers from Halifax, but when a group of twelve men from the coffee house had gone to his house, the accused only had one half sheet, or "eighteen pence of oppression."[48] The men from the coffee house seized a copy of the stamped *Halifax Gazette* from Mullowney's ship, and hung it up in the coffee house with the phrase "*Liberty, Property, and No Stamps. May this be the Fate of Every Enemy of Liberty*" on one side, and "*Liberty Triumphant, and Oppressors in Chains*" on the other. In the evening, after making Mullowney sign and read a statement swearing he possessed no other stamped papers, save those to clear his vessel upon his return to Halifax, the men set fire to the *Gazette*, "accompanied with loud huzzahs."[49]

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[47] The 11 November 1765 edition of the *Newport Mercury* reported that when a schooner arrived in Liverpool, where New Englanders were strong, the inhabitants made a large bonfire and "consigned the highly detested pamphlet to the flames." When the news reached Boston, one overzealous inhabitant wrote that "a quantity of stamped papers and parchments being sent by the distributor of stamps to a deputy at Liverpool, the people hearing thereof obliged the deputy to surrender them up, which they put in a bundle and burnt." Quoted in ibid., 558. The printers of the *Boston Evening Post* also ran the erroneous story in their 11 November edition, but amended it the following week, stating that it was only a copy of the stamp act which was burnt, and that "the report of the resignation of the Stamp Man at Halifax is premature."

[48] *Boston Evening Post*, 30 December 1765.

[49] Ibid. Emphasis in original.

Although Bostonians did not condemn Nova Scotia, they did recognize Halifax as a source of stamped papers. Robert Hooper, a subscriber to the *Boston Post Boy and Advertiser*, ran an advertisement for several weeks in October stating "whereas it has been currently and injuriously reported that I, the subscriber, have determined to . . . use [stamped papers] in the course of my business, and that if they were not to be obtained otherwise, that I would send to Halifax for them, which report is a great mistake."[50] Even though Halifax remained a centre for the distribution of stamped papers, the Boston newspapers indicate that trade continued with Nova Scotia, and that New Englanders thought that Nova Scotians' acceptance of the Stamp Act was not a measure of their contentment with the tax.[51] The belief that Nova Scotia sympathized with the rebel cause generated many erroneous stories of Nova Scotians' resistance to the Stamp Act that were circulated in several New England papers. For example, the *Boston Evening Post* reported that the stamp distributor in Halifax was a prisoner in his own house, guarded continually by soldiers "lest he should fall victim to the justly enraged people, who threaten his life, and have conveyed letters to him, desiring him to prepare for another world, for he should soon quit this."[52]

The regional relationship New England and Nova Scotia shared made the former forgiving of the latter's acceptance of the Stamp Act. Not all opposition to the tax came from the colonies, however, for many in Britain saw the Stamp Act as a

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[50] *Boston Post Boy and Advertiser*, 21 October 1765.
[51] The Boston Custom House column in the *Boston Evening Post* indicates that ships arrived to and from Halifax, Louisbourg, and Canada throughout the Stamp Act crisis.
[52] *Boston Evening Post*, 30 December 1765.

dangerous strain on imperial relationships. While the Stamp Act crisis caused the North American colonies to reevaluate their connection to the imperial centre, the colonists' resistance to the tax made Britain weigh increased revenue against a potential revolt. In 1766, a London resident named J. Almon published an anonymous pamphlet titled "The Necessity of Repealing the American Stamp-Act Demonstrated: Or, A Proof that Great Britain must be injured by that Act."[53] The pamphlet, a reprint of a letter to a member of the House of Commons by a man "lately arrived from North America," argued that Parliament should "not barely consider how the Stamp Act may affect our American colonies, but how it must affect the future strength and prosperity of His Majesty's dominions."[54] The author considered Britain's arguments that the colonies were indebted to the Crown for financial and military support during the Seven Years' War; that a standing army was necessary in America for which a tax was needed to support the troops; and that, as British citizens, the American colonists needed to share the burden of taxation. The colonists, the pamphlet argued, "have paid the most affectionate loyalty, and have ever appeared ready to spend the last drop of their blood, whenever his Majesty's honour, or the safety of his dominions, required their assistance."[55] If there was a balance to be paid, the author proposed that it was in the favour of the colonists.

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[53] Almon was also involved in the publication of "The Adventure of a Bale of Goods From America, In Consequence of the Stamp Act," and "The American Traveller: or, Observations on the Present State, Culture, and Commerce of the British Colonies in America," both of which argued against British taxation of the American colonies.

[54] "The Necessity of Repealing the American Stamp-Act Demonstrated: Or, A Proof that Great Britain Must be Injured by That Act" (London: J. Almon, 1766), p. 2, 5.

[55] Ibid., p. 7.

Almon's pamphlet has a strong correlation to the proclamation issued by the Massachusetts Bay House of Assembly in 1764 which detailed year by year the "exertions and expenses in the common cause" undertaken by Massachusetts Bay.[56] Both argued that although the American colonies had not paid taxes, the expenses they incurred in the expansion of the British empire in North America outweighed any support given by Britain during the Seven Years War. Unlike the Massachusetts Bay proclamation, however, Almon's pamphlet considered the negative economic ramifications of poor relations with the colonies. If the colonists proved unwilling or unable to support trade with Great Britain, the author argued, the loss incurred would be far greater than the revenue lost with the repeal of the Stamp Act.

The Nova Scotia House of Assembly also worried about money, or rather the lack thereof in the colony. In an address to the royal council in London, the assembly asked the council for "advice and assistance" to relieve the province from the "debts and difficulties" under which they struggled.[57] In specific, they asked the crown for sixteen thousand pounds to pay off the interest on the money they had borrowed to date. The Assembly was also looking for ways to raise money within the province so that they could stop looking to the Crown's purse to keep the colony afloat. The Assembly passed two bills in June of 1765, one to raise money to defray county charges, and another which forced absent proprietors to pay a dividend of

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[56] *Halifax Gazette*, 27 September 1774. The proclamation was reprinted in Boston and Halifax in 1774.

[57] National Archives of Canada (hereafter referred to as NAC), Manuscript Group 11, Colonial Office 220, Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, Sessional Papers, Journals of Assembly Vol. 6 (1765-1766), 32.

any town or county charges.[58] The Assembly also devised a plan to discharge provincial debt by taking away the salaries of provincial justices, but it was rejected by the royal council on the grounds that it was "subversive of the very being and existence of the constitution" and denied "his Majesty's subjects of the benefit of protection of the laws."[59]

The Stamp Act was never mentioned once by the Assembly despite the fact that the representatives from eleven of the twenty four townships were from New England. Dire financial circumstances, as well as the underdevelopment of the colony meant that the Stamp Act had little effect in Nova Scotia. Nova Scotians' poverty meant that they could not afford to pay any taxes, for there was no money in the province which could be collected. In November of 1766, the Assembly sent a message to the Legislative Council stating that the people of Nova Scotia "were at present unable to bear any tax whatever," and asked the council to "join them in a representation of the distressed state of the province, to be made to his Majesty's minister's."[60] For the representatives who sat in the Assembly, opposition to the Stamp Act was unthinkable. Money was of prime importance, and to cut ties with Britain would be the certain death of the colony. For those in the countryside, many of them were just finding their political voice in their new home, and even more importantly, many of them were just learning to survive.

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[58] Ibid., 39-42.
[59] Ibid., 54.
[60] NAC, Manuscript Group 11, Colonial Office 220, Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, Sessional Papers, Journals of Legislative Council Vol. 6 (1765-1766), 201.

For many in the Nova Scotia countryside, the instability of the Nova Scotian political system hindered any attempts at resistance to the Stamp Act. In 1765, the Nova Scotia House of Assembly was still concerned with settling the province and establishing a stable constitution, not attacking what Massachusetts saw as tyrannical taxation. June 1765 saw the Nova Scotia countryside in protest of Governor Montagu Wilmot's decree to reduce the number of representatives in the Assembly. Wilmot's proclamation changed the political system of representation formed under Governor Lawrence's administration by which any township whose population had reached fifty families could elect two representatives to sit on the Assembly. Many Nova Scotians were surprised and angered when in the elections of 1765, they were only allowed to send one representative to the Assembly, despite their townships being populated by over one hundred families. In response to the petitions which came from their constituents, the members of the Assembly wrote an address to the Governor, arguing that depriving the townships of one of their representatives would "be attended with very fatal consequences as it will greatly retard the speedy settlement of the province."[61] If members of neighbouring colonies ever heard of such an infringement of political rights, the members of the Assembly argued, "they will be discouraged from becoming settlers in a colony where the constitution may be liable to alteration."[62]

The rhetoric of the Stamp Act crisis resonated with many in Nova Scotia, and the scattered pockets of resistance is evidence that Nova Scotia was not devoid of a

[61] NAC, Manuscript Group 11, Colonial Office 220, Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, Sessional Papers, Journals of Assembly Vol. 6 (1765-1766), 15.

sympathetic political culture. The needs of the new colony were, however, much different from those of New England, causing the two colonies to diverge from one another. Nova Scotians were politically conscious, but they were more concerned with fair representation and legal election proceedings in their own counties. In June 1765, the residents of the county of Cumberland petitioned the Assembly, stating that an "undue and illegal" election had taken place in their county, and asked for rectification of the situation.[63] The Assembly appointed a committee to examine the complaint which found that there was not sufficient cause shown to invalidate the election.[64]

While politics were of importance to Nova Scotians, they were experiencing problems different from those of their New England relatives. The transference of New England culture into Nova Scotia was not complete, and the complications of the Stamp Act crisis were making the execution of this plan virtually impossible. It is clear that the level of opposition to the tax did not equal that in the other colonies, but the reactions of the houses of assembly in Nova Scotia and the American colonies cannot speak for all people within the colonies. The Nova Scotian countryside consisted of rebel supporters, "loyalists," and neutrals; the same as could be found in any American colony. Even the House of Assembly's support of the Stamp Act was ambiguous. Trade with the colonies did not stop, and non-stamped papers were overlooked. The sum of these factors did not equal the beginnings of a

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[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., 53
[64] Ibid., 56.

new country on the continent, but rather the beginnings of a new definition of what it meant to be a British colonist.

Chapter Four

The Road to Revolution: The Conflict of Imperialism and Regionalism

In the wake of the Stamp Act, it was clear that Nova Scotia and New England were embarking down two separate political roads. Lack of internal taxes in Nova Scotia meant that its inhabitants did not share the same outrage New Englanders did over taxation without representation. The Nova Scotia House of Assembly was in no position to defy Britain, for the province relied on parliamentary grants for its financial security. While the Assembly declared its loyalty to the crown, most Nova Scotians desired an abstinence from conflict and did not rise up against established authority. Nova Scotian "loyalty" to Britain was, however, quite tenuous and more complicated than a mere acceptance of either Toryism or the monarchy.

The longstanding policy to make Nova Scotia into an extension of the New England colonies meant that by 1770 approximately two thirds of the province's population was of New England heritage. Social bonds between Nova Scotia and New England grew strong through the establishment of Congregational churches as New England Planters tried to reassert their affiliation to their homeland. As Nova Scotia Yankees looked to New England as a model, the patriot cause fell on many sympathetic ears in Nova Scotia. Despite any rebel sympathies, however, Nova Scotia Yankees lived under a loyal government who warned them of the consequences of collaboration with rebels. As friends and family resisted Britain, Nova Scotia Yankees were caught between conflicting loyalties. While Nova Scotians refused to take up arms against American colonists, they also did not join in

armed rebellion against British forces. Nova Scotia Yankees were not neutral, but rather were rebel sympathizers without the resources to act on their political convictions.

The flow of New England planters to Nova Scotia had virtually stopped by 1768, but the problems of ensuring that settlement was secure within the province were not solved. To Nova Scotia Governor Montagu Wilmot's relief, many of the Acadian families who had not been expelled in 1755 declared their loyalty to the Crown. Britain was "well pleased to find . . . that the Acadians have at length seen that their true interest lies in a due submission to [the British] government, and have given such ample testimony of their wish to participate in the lenity of it."[1] While loyalty was becoming a pressing concern as the rumblings of political discontent were heard from the south, financial matters were also still of great importance. By 1770, many of the counties throughout the Nova Scotia countryside were still poor. In a letter to the House of Assembly, Benoi Danks, collector of impost and excise duties at Cumberland, stated that he had been unable to collect much money on account of there being none in the area. Instead of cash, Danks promised to bring oxen and horses to pay the difference.[2]

Despite the economic status of the Nova Scotia Yankees, elements of New England culture began to be established throughout the province. With their political representation securely in place, they sought to reap the other benefits of

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[1] Halifax to Bay of Fundy, Communications Opened. Public Archives of Nova Scotia (hereafter referred to as PANS), RG1 Vol. 31 #69, 26 February 1768.
[2] Letter Concerning Taxes Collected at Cumberland. PANS, RG1 Vol. 286 #63, 25 April 1770.

Lawrence's 1758 proclamation, namely freedom of religion.[3] By 1770, eight dissenting clergymen had settled in Nova Scotia, of whom six were Congregationalists and two were Presbyterian.[4] The Presbyterian ministers, Moor and Murdoch, were from Ireland, while the Congregationalists were all from New England. The eight men established churches in Liverpool, Chester, Halifax, Cornwallis, and Cumberland. While New Englander planters desired to attend churches other than Anglican, their poverty meant that their ministers received very meager salaries. In January 1770, Malachy Salter and Benjamin Gerrish wrote to Reverends Andrew Elliot and Samuel Cooper of Boston detailing the ministers' situation and asking for financial relief. Salter and Gerrish reported that each of the ministers was only receiving approximately twenty pounds a year to live on. "Should you be pleased, gentlemen," they wrote, "kindly to interest yourself of your necessitous brethren in the ministry here, any charitable donations from the well affected among you, will be very seasonable, and accepted with great thankfulness."[5]

On 11 October 1771, the Governor and Council of Connecticut read a memorial sent to them by Revererend Solomon Williams of Lebanon, Connecticut, on behalf of the Congregational church in the town of Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. Williams' letter stated that although settlers had established themselves in Cornwallis in 1760, the town had been "destitute of gospel administration" until

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[3] Lawrence's proclamation guaranteed a government and legal system similar to Massachusetts', and freedom of religion "papists excluded." Those who belonged to "dissenting" churches were also free from any taxes levied for the support of the Anglican church.

[4] Samuel A. Green, *Congregational Churches in Nova Scotia* (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1888), 5.

[5] Ibid., 7.

1765 when Reverend Benjamin Phelps had settled there by "general desire of the people."[6] 1767 and 1768 had been years of poor crops, a dilemma compounded by the time and expense the people had undertaken in repairing nearly two thousand dykes. The troubles of the last few years, Williams explained, "has involved [the people of Cumberland] so deeply in debt that except they can obtain relief by the charity of their Christian brethren and friends in Connecticut the cause of religion will greatly suffer."[7] After reading Williams' petition, the council resolved to allow Williams to ask for charitable contributions of the several religious societies in the towns of New London, Norwich, Lebanon, Colchester, Canterbury, and Lyme.

Nova Scotia residents who wished to work as Congregational ministers within the province had to be properly ordained in New England before they could pastor their own churches. On 20 January 1772, Jonathan Scott of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, received an invitation "to the work of the Ministry and Pastoral Office" from the Chebogue church.[8] Before he could accept, however, the invitation stipulated that Scott be examined and ordained by a Council of Ministers from the First church in Middleborough, [Massachusetts], and their associate churches.[9] Scott made the journey to Massachusetts and on 27 April stood before a council of thirteen ministers who read his confession of faith and "questioned [him] on the same as far

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[6] Charles J. Hoaldy, ed., *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut* (Hartford: Lockwood and Brainard Company, 1885), May 1768 to May 1772, 567-568.
[7] Ibid., 568.
[8] quoted in George A. Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630 to 1784* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), 223.
[9] quoted in ibid., 223.

as they saw fit."[10] The next day, Scott was ordained and declared a member of the association of Congregational ministers. He returned to Yarmouth in May, and the Chebogue church accepted Scott as their minister "by lifting up the hand unanimously."[11]

While some institutions were slowly taking root in Nova Scotia, the province was still quite underdeveloped in comparison to New England. As such, some of Nova Scotia's more affluent families sent their children to live with family or friends in New England to be educated there. Such was the case of Anna Greene Winslow of Cumberland. Anna's parents, Anna Greene and Joshua Winslow, were members of prominent Boston families and members of the Old South Congregational church.[12] Joshua Winslow, who had served as commissary general of British forces in Halifax during the first siege of Louisbourg, had moved with his wife to Cumberland county in 1758, in response to Governor Lawrence's offer of free land. One year later, their daughter Anna was born. In 1769, Anna's parents sent her to live with her aunt in Boston to learn the customs befitting a young New England woman. As a Boston resident in the early 1770s, Anna participated in the boycott of British textiles by wearing homespun cloth, and as a "daughter of liberty" refused to purchase British imports such as textiles and tea.[13] Anna's journal shows that she was conscious of both her New England Congregational background, as well as her frontier heritage. Although Anna wrote from Boston, her political views were often

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[10] from Scott's personal journal, quoted in ibid., p. 223.
[11] quoted in ibid., p. 223.
[12] Margaret Conrad et al eds., *No Place Like Home: Diaries and Letters of Nova Scotia Women, 1771-1938* (Halifax: Formac Publishing Company Limited, 1988), 27.

similar to those of the elite planters of Nova Scotia.[14] Anna's family moved back to Marshfield, Massachusetts on 18 April 1772, but her father's Toryism led him to once again move back to Nova Scotia.

The Winslow's experience shows that the borders of Nova Scotia and New England were permeable and allowed the exchange of culture. Those who came to Nova Scotia brought with them the cultural baggage of their homeland, and social bonds with New England kept the channels of exchange open between the two colonies. Nova Scotia Yankees even took their cultural heritage to the grave. The iconography of their tombstones attested to their New England background and identity. The inscription on the headstone of Colonel Jonathan Snelling, which proclaims he was formerly of Boston, is topped by an angel of death—a familiar icon in Boston cemeteries. The gravestones of Benjamin Greene and Malachy Salter, both members of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, also contain virtually identical death heads to those found in Boston (see Fig. 1-5). The death of a person revealed the whereabouts and social standing of their relatives, and their obituary showed that often only one part of a family would immigrate to Nova Scotia, leaving the rest behind in New England. For example, on 5 April 1775, the *Gazette* reported that Jane Chipman had died on 20 December 1774 "of the effects of a fall from her horse."[15] Jane was the wife of Handley Chipman of Cornwallis, daughter of Colonel John Allen of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, and granddaughter of Reverend

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[13] Ibid., p. 28.
[14] Ibid., 29.
[15] Terrence M. Punch, *Nova Scotia Vital Statistics from Newspapers, 1769-1812* (Halifax: Geneological Committee of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society, 1981), 10.

Fig. 1 Mother Goose's grave, Boston



Fig. 2 Colonel Jonathan Snelling's grave, Halifax



Fig. 3 Benjamin Greene's grave, Halifax

Fig. 4 Malachy Salter's grave, Halifax



Fig 5. Various graves, Boston

William Holmes also of Martha's Vineyard.[16] While many families were separated by immigration to Nova Scotia, they were often reunited by death.

By the 1770s, few families had members leaving New England to establish homes and farms in Nova Scotia. With little influx of new settlers to the province, Nova Scotia governor Francis Legge was concerned that the people who had immigrated were not industrious enough to stimulate the Nova Scotia economy. As he wrote to Britain on 23 October 1773, "from the information I have, the progress of this province is very much retarded by want of industry among the people who came into the back part of it from New England; and by the want of such roads as might promote an easy communication between the different parts of it."[17] The only comfort Legge could receive was in the fact that the less industrious were "decreasing by death," and that their lands were being sold to those who could fulfill the terms of their grants.

While communication within the province was limited, channels of exchange between Nova Scotia and New England were uninhibited and news of the opposition to British taxation in the American colonies reached the entire province. Sympathy for the patriot cause could be found in Nova Scotia, not just in the countryside, but in Halifax as well. On 27 September 1774, the *Halifax Gazette* published an article on its front page titled "Brief State of the Merits and Services of the Province of

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[16] *Nova Scotia Gazette*, 5 April 1775. Other examples include the 12 September 1775 issue which reported that Mr. Elizabeth Caswall, youngest daughter of William Partridge, Esquire, late Lieutenant Governor of New Hampshire, and only sister of the wife of the late Governor Belcher, had died in Boston at the age of eighty four. The November 1 obituaries stated that on October 7, Lady Pepperrel had died in Boston at the age of twenty seven, wife of the Honourable Sir William

Massachusetts Bay, Their Exertions and Expenses in the Common Cause." Originally written in 1764 in response to the taxes Britain imposed on the colonies after the Seven Years' War, the article detailed the many military efforts and expenses Massachusetts Bay had undertaken since 1620 to establish Nova Scotia as a British colony.[18] The people of Massachusetts Bay, the article declared, did not seek special immunity or favour from Britain for these expenses, they only asked that the "Privileges their ancestors purchased so dearly, and they have never forfeited, may be continued to them." The political sympathies of Anthony Henry, the *Gazette's* printer, were clear. After a campaign against the Stamp Act, Henry continued to oppose British tyranny from his office on Sackville Street. The poignancy of such an article during a time of political unrest was certainly not lost on governor Francis Legge.

While many Nova Scotia Yankees technically proclaimed neutrality, Legge still worried about the loyalty of the people in the countryside and took steps to ensure that rebellion would not rise up against his administration. On 3 June 1775, he issued a proclamation stating that all persons immigrating into Nova Scotia "from any parts of America's shores" would be required to swear and oath of allegiance and fidelity to the King's sacred person and government.[19] New immigrants were obligated to swear an oath in the presence of their local magistrate, and Legge

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Pepperrel who had commanded New England forces in Nova Scotia during the 1745 expedition against Louisbourg.

[17] Dispatch to Whitehall, Lack of Industry. PANS, RG1 Vol. 44 #24, 23 October 1770.

[18] Massachusetts Bay calculated these expenses to total almost 1.4 million pounds. See the *Halifax Gazette*, 27 September 1774.

[19] Proclamation on Oaths of Allegiance. PANS, RG1 Vol. 170, 166-167.

warned every Nova Scotian to "take heed of this proclamation and govern themselves accordingly."[20] By July, Legge's fear had not abated, so he issued another proclamation warning all Nova Scotians to neither aid nor correspond with any person or persons involved in rebellious activities against Britain. The proclamation forbade Nova Scotians to give rebel forces any supplies, either directly or indirectly, and warned that no person could correspond with, harbour, or conceal any rebel lest they be branded as traitors themselves.[21] Legge threatened legal action against all those caught dealing with the rebels.

On 14 June 1775, the Nova Scotia Assembly sent an address to Britain declaring the members' loyalty to the Crown. Upon hearing of Nova Scotia's proclamation, a sympathetic printer in Boston obtained a copy of the votes of the Assembly, and printed an extract of those proceedings in a one page political pamphlet. The pamphlet stated that Nova Scotia had made a "dutiful, loyal, and humble address to our gracious Sovereign and both Houses of Parliament . . . acknowledging the supreme authority of the British Parliament, and praying that the legislature of this province be permitted to grant to his Majesty a certain duty of impost on a commodities imported into [Nova Scotia]."[22] The printer of the pamphlet then asked rhetorically, "Would not a proceeding similar to the foregoing,

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[20] Ibid.
[21] Proclamation Forbidding Aiding Rebellion. PANS, RG1 Vol. 170, 169-170.
[22] "Extract From the Votes of the House of Assembly of the Province of Nova Scotia," (Boston, 1775).

had it been adopted by the different assemblies on the continent, have prevented the misfortunes under which we at present labour?"[23]

Despite Legge's efforts to enforce loyalism and the Assembly's profession of fealty to the crown, some Nova Scotians sympathized with the patriot cause. The summer of 1775 was a turbulent time for Nova Scotia because of a rebellion in the Chignecto region led by former House of Assembly members Jonathan Eddy and John Allan. Eddy was a native of Norton, Massachusetts, and Allan was a native of Scotland who had been educated in Massachusetts and married into a Yankee family in Nova Scotia.[24] In the summer of 1775, the inhabitants of Machias, inspired by the events in the southern colonies, advocated the use of arms against the authorities in Halifax. In June of 1775, they put their words into action and attacked an armed British schooner.[25] In July, Governor Legge wrote to Britain that he had been informed that the provincial congress of Massachusetts had given permission to the people of Machias and the surrounding area, about eight hundred people in total, to attack his Majesty's troops in Nova Scotia."[26] Legge worried that the Machias cause would soon galvanize all of the Chignecto Isthmus since the majority of its residents were of New England heritage. "Our inhabitants of Passamaquoddy and St. John's River are wholly from New England," he wrote, "as are the greatest part of the inhabitants of Annapolis River, and those of the township of Cornwallis, Horton,

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[23] Ibid.
[24] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 232.
[25] Loyalty of New England Settlers Questioned. PANS, RG1 Vol. 44 #71, 31 July 1775.
[26] Ibid.

Falmouth, and New Port."[27] Because of their New England affiliations, Legge knew he could not count on the loyalty of the militia units in the Chignecto region should any armed rebellion break out there.

Legge also worried that the people of Halifax were sympathetic to the American rebels, writing to Britain that "many in this town are disaffected . . . [and] that should an [armed] attempt be made I should dread the consequence."[28] Legge's mistrust of his fellow Haligonians stemmed from two incidents of arson, and a lack of British troops in Halifax. In the early months of the summer of 1775, fire had been set to approximately ten tons of hay shipped from Boston for governmental use. Later, fire was set to the buildings in the Navy Yard, but was extinguished before it reached the stores of gun powder. "It is certain without all doubt a malicious design to destroy that yard," wrote Legge, but admitted that the perpetrators had not yet been discovered.[29] The stirrings of rebellion to the south meant that most of the British troops had left Halifax to be stationed throughout the dissenting colonies. In July 1775, only thirty six British soldiers remained in Halifax. Legge had these men guard the gun and powder stores, and the ordnance store, thus sacrificing having his own sentry. To ensure peace, Legge also ordered thirty militia men to patrol the streets of Halifax at night.

His fears of revolt still not quelled, Legge again issued proclamations to local magistrates throughout the province which dictated that every person coming into the province be required to take an oath of allegiance to the King. In the interests of

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[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.

preserving "peace and good order," Legge ordered that any person who would not take the oath, or was otherwise disposed to incite rebellion, be detained for questioning.[30] The armed conflict already beginning in the other colonies had taken the lives of some British soldiers, and Legge knew that Britain would not spare any men for the protection of Nova Scotia since the province was not in open revolt.[31] To guard the naval yard and stores, the magazines, cannon and ordnance stores in Halifax and St. Johns against rebel attack, Legge proposed raising a regiment of one thousand Germans, neutrals (Acadians), and Irish, "without regard to their religion."[32] Legge was also particularly distressed over the fact that the rebelling colonies would not let any provision vessels through from Britain to Nova Scotia. He hoped to be able to get grain supplies from Quebec, but was unsure how long this arrangement could last. In a word, Legge described the situation in Nova Scotia at the end of the summer of 1775 as "alarming."[33]

The House of Assembly resolved on 26 August that all inhabitants of Nova Scotia be required to appear before their local magistrate and take an oath of allegiance to the Crown. The names of those who did not comply were to be written on a list and submitted to the governor. The Assembly then ordered companies of light infantry be raised from the militia to be ready to march on short notice.[34] Despite the oaths and the attempts to increase the defence of the province, in

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[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Thomas C. Haliburton, *History of Nova Scotia* (Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1973), 2 vols., 1:253-54

August the rebels from Machias attacked and overtook a small British outpost named Fort Frederick, located at the mouth of the St. John River.[35] Eddy and Allan hoped that the small military success at Fort Frederick would create a crisis throughout the province that would eventually lead to armed insurrection in Nova Scotia.[36] By November, American forces had moved into Canada, conquering Montreal under the command of General Montgomery on the twelfth. Uneasy at the nearness of the rebel troops, and wary of the Machias rebels, Legge declared martial law in the province on 30 November.[37]

One month later, New England rebels landed at Cape Sable in two armed schooners, seizing and carrying off several militia officers who were in charge of light infantry stationed by Legge for the defence of the province. The invading rebels assured the inhabitants of Cape Sable that if they remained quiet and did not resist that they and their property would not be harmed. Legge reported that "these proceedings [have] excited much terror among these people, that they have transmitted a memorial requesting in effect, that they may be absolved from their duties as subjects by having liberty to remain neuter or remove."[38] Britain rejected Cape Sable's plea for neutrality, stating that it was "utterly absurd" and "inconsistent with the duty of subjects."[39] In response to the American invasion, Britain commissioned five armed vessels to patrol the Nova Scotia coastline.

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[35] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 232.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Haliburton, *History of Nova Scotia*, 255.
[38] Dispatch to Whitehall, Rebel Privateers. PANS, RG1 Vol. 44 #85, 20 December 1775.
[39] Ibid.

Legge was not convinced that Nova Scotia had enough military protection to guard against the American invasion he believed would strike at any time. There were only nine hundred eighty troops in all of Nova Scotia, but due to illness and absence, only four hundred forty six were fit for duty. On 20 December 1775, Legge reported to the Earl of Dartmouth that he had been informed by persons from New England that the Continental Congress had raised five thousand men to attack Nova Scotia, but that the small pox at Halifax had prevented them from carrying out their plan.[40] The Continental Congress was indeed interested in Nova Scotia, and had resolved in November 1775 to send to people to Nova Scotia "to inquire into the state of that colony; the disposition of the inhabitants towards the American cause; and the conditions of the fortifications, docks, yards, the quantity of artillery and warlike stores, and the number of soldiers, sailors, and ships of war there."[41] Congress also directed General George Washington, if he found it practical and expedient, to invade Nova Scotia and destroy all British weapons and ships.

At the same time, resistance to Halifax governmental authority broke out in the Nova Scotia countryside when it was discovered that the Assembly, under the influence of the merchant class, had passed two unpopular acts. The first act ordered one-fifth of the militia be called out to defend the province, and the second imposed a tax for their support.[42] The acts had been passed in early November, mainly in response to two American schooners which had landed on the Island of St. John, plundered the place, and carried off the President administering the

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[40] Ibid.
[41] *Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress* (Boston: Thomas B. Wait, 1821), Vol. 1, 34.

government, and the Surveyor General.[43] In protest to the acts, the inhabitants of Truro, Onslow, and Cumberland sent petitions to Legge stating their disgruntlement. Legge took these petitions seriously, as he was already concerned about the armed uprising among the Yankee settlers of Machias. On 11 December, Parliament passed a bill which prohibited all intercourse with the American colonies. Confident that Nova Scotia was now under control, Governor Legge assured Britain that he had "persons of fidelity in every settlement from who I am informed of every transaction of any moment, and all matters are at present quiet and peaceable, and the proclaiming martial law, and the speedy punishment of rebellious proceedings will have a tendency to keep them so."[44]

On 11 January 1776, Legge transmitted the petitions of the residents of Truro, Onslow and Cumberland to Britain, stating that "they will fully explain to your Lordships the general disposition of the people in this province, for the same spirit subsists in all the other out settlements and that it will require the most diligent attention to prevail upon them and prevent their joining with the enemy in case an invasion should be made."[45] The petitions raised two principle arguments against the recently passed bills. The first was that the people in the Nova Scotia countryside were too poor to afford either to pay a tax or to sacrifice young men to military service. As the petition from Onslow stated, the residents of that township

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[42] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 232.
[43] Haliburton, *History of Nova Scotia*, 255. These two men were subsequently released by George Washington since the rebel officers had acted without orders. Washington offered his apologies, returned the plundered property, and dismissed the oficers.
[44] Dispatch to Whitehall, Need for Troops in Nova Scotia. PANS, RG1 Vol. 44 #86, 22 December 1775.

"are but barely able to support themselves" and should "a number of our industrious husbandmen who have large families depending wholly upon their labour for subsistence be ordered away . . . their lands must be untilled and neglected and perhaps their property may be destroyed in their absence to the ruin of private families, the distress of each society, and hurtful to the province in general."[46]

The second complaint raised in the petitions involved the bonds of kinship that linked Nova Scotia and New England. The petitioners rejected the militia bill because it would force Nova Scotia Yankees to take up arms against friends and family. "Those of us who belong to New England," wrote the residents of Cumberland, "being invited into the province by governor Lawrence's proclamation, it must be the greatest piece of cruelty for them to be subject to march into different parts in arms against their friends and relations."[47] Several Acadians living in Nova Scotia had signed the petition for they too opposed the idea of possibly fighting against their friends and family who had been distributed throughout the American colonies. The petition guaranteed Legge that the settlers would be ready to defend themselves and their property should any person or persons attempt to molest them, but to wage offensive warfare was unacceptable. Finally, the people of the three townships asked Legge to suspend putting the Militia and Tax Bill into execution, immediately dissolve the House of Assembly, and issue writs for a new election since

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[45] Petitions to Governor and Council from Townships. PANS, RG1 Vol. 45 #4, 23 December 1775 to 11 January 1776.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.

the present members of the Assembly seemingly had no intention of representing the opinions of their respective townships.[48]

Sensitive to the discontent spreading throughout the province, Legge suspended the two acts. With no tax or threat of military service, Eddy and Allan's plan for insurrection lost momentum. While many Nova Scotia Yankees would have supported an invading army from the American colonies, few were willing to take up arms and march to Halifax.[49] Eddy knew that he would now need to persuade George Washington to bring the Revolution north to Nova Scotia. He set out with fourteen men in February 1776 to meet with rebel leaders, eventually talking with Washington on 27 March. Washington rejected Eddy's pleas for an invasion of Nova Scotia because he was certain that the British forces that had evacuated Boston ten days earlier were now established in Halifax.[50] Eddy then went to the Continental Congress, but it too refused to consider sending troops into Nova Scotia. Daunted but not beaten, Eddy set sail for Boston to persuade the Massachusetts authorities to attack Nova Scotia, while Allan returned home to prepare his followers for what he and Eddy believed would be a province-wide insurrection.

The lack of support from the south did not discourage Eddy's supporters, and upon hearing of the American victory at Bunker Hill they obtained "a chaise and six horses, postillion and a flag of liberty, and drove about the isthmus, proclaiming the news and blessings of liberty."[51] In July, Legge reported that four people had left

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[48] Ibid.
[49] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, p. 233.
[50] Ibid.
[51] quoted in ibid., p. 233.

from Cumberland with a list of six hundred names to give to the Continental Congress with assurances that they would join any rebels forces sent to invade Nova Scotia. Legge also believed that the same four people intended to persuade the St. John's Indians to join the American cause, so he offered a reward of twenty Guineas a head for apprehending these men.[52]

Eddy understood the conflict between the regional and imperial communities as he tried to persuade American rebels to join his cause in Nova Scotia. In essence, he asked George Washington and the Continental Congress to support the regional community at the expense of the imperial one. Eddy's petition to the Massachusetts Council and House of Representatives tried to appeal to New Englanders' sense of a common bond with their brothers in Nova Scotia who were also trying to resist the onslaught of tyranny. Eddy's petition stated that "the enemy are now repairing the forts in [Nova Scotia] to the great detriment of the inhabitants of [Cumberland county] which we apprehend can be for no other end, but for to keep the inhabitants in subjection in their tyrannical measures especially since their forces arrived from Boston at Halifax."[53] Eddy gave assurances that the "far greatest part of the people at Nova Scotia" were concerned about the increasing British presence in the province which had already caused many to leave their property and move back to Massachusetts.[54]

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[52] Dispatch to Whitehall, Troops in Place. PANS, RG1 Vol. 45 #22, 8 July 1776.
[53] Petition to Massachusetts for Military Aid. Massachusetts State Archives (hereafter referred to as MsSA), Massachusetts Records Vol. 181 p. 167, 29 August 1776.
[54] Ibid.

In August, Eddy returned from Boston and reported to his supporters that Massachusetts would give them "two hundred pound weight of gunpowder, five hundred weight of musket ball, three hundred gun flints, and twenty barrels of pork."[55] Still convinced that a successful insurrection could be raised in Nova Scotia, Eddy headed to Machias where he recruited twenty-eight men to take up arms.[56] Allan, now certain that Eddy's rebellion was a hopeless mission, tried to persuade his partner to abandon his plans. Eddy, however, believed that as he and his men marched to Halifax many would join their cause until his forces numbered in the hundreds. Upon sailing to Maugerville, Eddy found the inhabitants "almost universally to be hearty in the cause," but could only enlist twenty-seven settlers and sixteen Indians.[57] Eddy's army then moved to the mouth of the St. John River to await the promised supplies from Massachusetts. When the provisions finally arrived in the final week of October, his forces moved north to the Acadian settlement of Memramcook where a number of Acadians joined the cause.[58]

By November, Eddy had reached Cumberland county, and sent word from Shepody back to Machias of the success of his insurrection thus far. "We are all in high spirits," he wrote, "and our party increases daily."[59] Eddy asked the rebels in Machias to inform the council in Massachusetts of the details of the rebellion, that they might be persuaded to send troops to aid his small army. He then sent a letter

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[55] quoted in Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 235.
[56] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 236.
[57] quoted in ibid., p. 236.
[58] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 237.
[59] Eddy Correspondence on Prisoners. MsSA, Massachusetts Records Vol. 195:336, 3 November 1776.

of his own on 12 November to the officials in Massachusetts in hopes of influencing them to join his cause. His letter told that he and his rebels had "seized a vessel in the harbour [at Cumberland] with a great quantity of stores &c for the garrison, and besides one officer and twelve men that we sent back from Shepperday, we have taken above thirty prisoners and have attempted the garrison but cannot take it without some cannon."[60] Eddy asked Massachusetts to send some privateers into the Bay to attack the British man of war anchored there, as well as some troops and military stores. He hoped that with the help of Massachusetts, he might be able to "promote the general cause and add another province to the United Colonies."[61]

Eddy expected that the people of Cumberland would rally to his cause and assist his small army of men to secure the countryside. The Nova Scotia Yankees in Cumberland, however, were caught between the invading rebels and the British forces at Fort Cumberland, and did not share Eddy's enthusiasm for an insurrection. In a petition sent mid-November by Josiah Throop to Colonel Joseph Goreham, who was in command of the garrison at Fort Cumberland, the residents of Cumberland stated that they had "given incontestible evidence of their peaceable dispositions, but if the garrison came here to defend and protect them, 'tis very late to be informed of it, four or five days after a number of people from the westward in arms appeared amongst them with an intention to take the fort."[62] Throop also claimed that "hundreds of savages" had come with Eddy, and had threatened to burn down their houses and destroy their families if they did not join in the common

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[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.

cause. If the people of Cumberland joined Eddy, Throop warned, it would be a decision "warranted by the Law of self preservation."[63] Throop stated that the people of Cumberland were averse to the shedding of blood and hoped for a speedy and happy settlement of the conflict.

Eddy's objective was to capture Fort Cumberland, but his followers expressed a deep concern that such an expedition had absolutely no chance of success. Eddy convinced his men that the Chignecto Yankees would rally to his cause as they pressed through the region towards Fort Cumberland. Only fifty Yankees joined Eddy, however, and when another twenty-seven men from Cobequid also joined, Eddy's army numbered an unimposing one hundred eighty men.[64] Two serious attempts were made on Fort Cumberland on the thirteenth and twenty-second of November, but both were utter failures. As Eddy tried to organize a third attack, British reinforcements arrived on the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth of November. The British intended to attack Eddy's army in the early morning hours of the twenty-eighth, and would have wiped out all of his men had not an African drummer sighted the British and beat out an alarm.[65] Finally realizing that his insurrection would never come to fruition, Eddy ordered a retreat back to the St. John River. Instead of pursuing and fighting Eddy, the British troops set fire to the home and barn of every person who had openly supported the rebellion.

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[62] Cumberland Inhabitants' Response to Goreham. PANS, RG1 Vol. 365 #8, 11 November 1776.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, 237.
[65] Ibid., 239.

On 17 December 1776, the residents of Cumberland and Sunbury counties sent a joint petition to the Council and House of Representatives of the state of Massachusetts Bay asking for relief from the precarious position Eddy's rebellion had put them in. The petition stated that Eddy had arrived in Cumberland on 7 November looking to attack the British garrison stationed there. "The friends to Liberty in the county of Cumberland," explained the petition, "on seeing the weakness of Captain Eddy's party, and that he was unprovided with artillery, feared the consequences of attacking this fort."[66] The inhabitants of Cumberland claimed that they thought Eddy would soon be reinforced by American troops, and so they joined Eddy and "disarmed such as were called Tories, and all such persons as were disaffected to their cause."[67] The people of Cumberland and Sunbury asked that Massachusetts take into consideration their distressed circumstances since their houses and barns were burned for the American cause. The petition also warned that since Eddy had been beaten, there was nothing to prevent the progress of the British troops to the St. John River, and then to the eastern settlements of the Massachusetts Bay."[68] The signers of the petition asked for a force to be dispatched to expel the British from Nova Scotia, and promised that they would use their utmost efforts to effect the same.

On 23 December 1776, Josiah Throop sent another petition to Massachusetts on behalf of the county of Cumberland stating that "the inhabitants of the district of

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[66] Petition to Massachusetts from Cumberland and Sunbury. PANS, RG1 Vol. 364 #28, 17 December 1776.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.

Cumberland are chiefly from New England and having tasted the sweets of liberty cannot resist the bitter potion prepared by the hand of tyranny for them implicitly to swallow."[69] In contrast to his earlier petition to Goreham, Throop claimed that the people of Cumberland had sacrificed much to support Eddy's attempt to end British tyranny in Nova Scotia. Throop recounted the details of the rebellion, and the hardships the people of Cumberland had endured in fighting for liberty. His petition verged on melodrama as he recounted the confrontation at Fort Cumberland where Eddy and his men sent an order to surrender to Colonel Goreham. According to Throop, Goreham refused to surrender and sent the residents of Cumberland a manifesto stating that "his most gracious Majesty had sent him there to defend and protect them if them would be peaceable and loyal—but that if they should aid or assist the party of traitors that had come from the rebellious colonies he would put the law in force and they might depend on an immediate military execution."[70] The rebels gave Goreham a flag in return, stating that "they had rather die like men than be hanged like dogs."[71] In addition to asking for supplies and provisions to aid the residents of Cumberland, Throop also requested that Eddy be made commander of a force for the eastern front.

While Eddy never received the level of support he desired from the government of Massachusetts, there was interest in his endeavour to create an

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[69] Petition to Massachusetts for Aid to Cumberland. MsSA, Massachusetts Records, Vol. 211, 435, 23 December 1776.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid. In Throop's earlier petition to Goreham, he stated "since your manifesto threatens us for what is already done with a military execution we have no encouragement to retract—We had rather

insurrection in Nova Scotia. Massachusetts sent Eddy some supplies, and the council of Suffolk county, Massachusetts, directed their sheriff to keep twenty five prisoners, taken by Eddy and his men, in the Boston jail. The sheriff was also told to take three other prisoners, Captain Barron, William Callan, and Mr. Eggleston, under guard at his house. Massachusetts may never have openly supported Eddy in order to avoid spreading their military resources too thinly, but the actions of the Council and Assembly indicate that they felt some obligation to help the residents of Nova Scotia further the rebel cause. Likewise, the loyalty of the residents of the Nova Scotia countryside was never a guarantee, despite their lack of armed resistance.

While the Nova Scotia Assembly responded to the growing rebellion in the American colonies by reasserting its ties to the imperial community, Nova Scotia Yankees looked to New England for support. In their impoverished condition, most of them wanted to abstain from conflict in order to establish their farms and support themselves without any government assistance.[72] The lack of desire to actively take up arms against Halifax did not mean that the Nova Scotia Yankees were neutrals, for when provoked they sided with their New England relatives and friends. The Nova Scotia Yankees were pragmatic, and consciously tried to navigate carefully through the increasing animosity between the province in which they lived and the province from which they came. As Josiah Throop wrote in his petition to Colonel

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die like men than be hanged like dogs—At the desire of the inhabitants of Cumberland." See PANS RG1 Vol. 365 #8. 11 November 1776.

[72] Historian Daniel Vickers defines competency as the desire to independently employ oneself relatively free of outside control. The most literal interpretation of competency is used in this work. For a more detailed discussion of competency and its ramifications to first generation New

Goreham, "we are not so insensible and stupid as to run mad in a wild affair inconsiderately."[73] They were neither confused nor the pawns of geography, nor were they ignorant of the political ideology fueling the revolt in the American colonies. When justifying their opposition to taxation, or when looking to New England for assistance, Nova Scotia Yankees appealed to the republican themes of tyranny versus liberty to support themselves.

The ideology of the Revolution reached more ears than just those of the Nova Scotia Yankees. Jonathan Eddy was able to enlist both Acadians and Natives in his army to fight against the British. In Halifax, German settler Anthony Henry supported the rebels through his paper, the *Halifax Gazette*. The fact that Governor Francis Legge trusted no one, either in Halifax or in the countryside, indicates that not just the Nova Scotia Yankees were sympathetic to the American cause. In New England there were similar conflicting loyalties. Not every New Englander wanted to sever their relationship to Britain, and many wanted to avoid armed conflict as much as the planters in Nova Scotia. As part of the same regional community, both Nova Scotia and New England experienced similar responses to their assemblies' declarations of loyalty or rebellion. New England rebelliousness was just as tenuous as Nova Scotia loyalty.

Englanders, see Daniel Vickers, *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 14-23.

[73] Cumberland Inhabitants' Response to Goreham. PANS, RG1 Vol. 365 #8, 11 November 1776.

Conclusion

The intersections of regional and imperial communities in Nova Scotia shaped the province's response to the rebellion of the thirteen American colonies. Although Nova Scotia never became a true extension of New England in that it perfectly mimicked its political and social institutions, Nova Scotia was nevertheless part of the same regional community as New England. While different in some ways, Nova Scotia did adopt aspects of New England culture such as political representation and Congregationalism. From a social perspective, Nova Scotia and New England were closely linked through the bonds of family and friendship. The borders of the two provinces were permeable, and the exchange of such things as ideology, raw materials and manufactured goods, and family members moved without inhibition. Because of the openness of the border, both New England and Nova Scotia had residents who supported the rebellion, those who opposed it, and others who refused to side with either party.

While members of a regional community, New England and Nova Scotia were also part of an imperial community. The residents of the colonies considered themselves British citizens, and took pride in their affiliation to the Crown. Massachusetts undertook considerable expense in wresting Nova Scotia from French control and ensuring that the province was a loyal part of the British empire. Under the provisions of the 1691 Charter of Massachusetts Bay, and then through the vision of Massachusetts Governor William Shirley, New Englanders understood Nova Scotia to be a part of the empire as well as a part of their own province. While New

Englanders wanted to ensure that the French would never encroach on their land, securing Nova Scotia for the Crown was part of a larger imperial plan to gain control of the entire North American continent. The resulting intersections of imperial and regional motives shaped Nova Scotia's political and social composition.

Britain recognized the regional bonds between Nova Scotia and New England and tried to exploit them for imperial purposes. While proclamations inviting settlers were sent to most of the other American colonies, only New England responded with any enthusiasm. Britain recognized that if Nova Scotia was to offer the same freedoms New Englanders enjoyed, the province could be quickly established as a loyal part of the empire. A seemingly simple plan was complicated by the growing disaffection in New England towards the Crown following the completion of the Seven Years' War. As political authorities in New England desired to separate from the imperial centre, their counterparts in Nova Scotia sought to strengthen the province's bonds with Britain. Caught in the middle of political tensions were the New Englanders who had immigrated to Nova Scotia and desired to model their settlements after New England.

The Stamp Act crisis did not generate the beginnings of either an American, or what would later be a Canadian, identity. As Pauline Maier argues, "no leader, not even the most outspoken American partisan, was anti-British when the long evolution of events that culminated in revolution began."[1] The Stamp Act caused a crisis in British identity, but in 1765, the rebels did not wish to gain independence

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[1] Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. xi.

from the Crown. Nova Scotia and the American colonies desired to continue their interactions, both civil and economic, with the Crown, but both wanted to redefine their relationship to Britain. The annual value of exports from the colonies totaled almost four million pounds, and imports from Great Britain totaled just over three million pounds.[2] Export and import to and from Nova Scotia and New England did not cease over political differences; Halifax harbour still received ships from Boston even though the ships' papers were not stamped.[3]

Examining the interactions of imperial and regional communities provides a way to understanding Nova Scotia's response to the road to the American Revolution. Such an interpretation can account for the many facets of Nova Scotia Yankee society, and can also provide a way to interpret New England's view of loyalist Nova Scotia. As part of the same regional and imperial community, similar forces were at work in both Nova Scotia and New England. As such, Nova Scotia Yankees cannot be seen as the pawns of geography who were thrown into an identity crisis once they immigrated to Nova Scotia. Nova Scotia Yankees were not confused, and their failure to take up arms against Britain is not an indication that they did not understand the revolution breaking out in the other thirteen colonies. If anything, the Nova Scotia Yankees knew all too well what the cost of supporting the rebels would be, and tried to navigate between the political differences of Boston and Halifax.

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[2] "The American Traveler" (London: E. and C. Dilly, J. Almon, 1769), p. 121.
[3] The *Halifax Gazette* reported continual movement of ships to and from the American colonies throughout the crisis.

The Nova Scotia Yankees were cautious, but their attempts to avoid conflict does not mean that they were neutral. When pressed by Britain, the Nova Scotia Yankees looked to New England for support, and even offered to join rebel forces should they ever invade Nova Scotia. The Nova Scotia countryside was not neutral, and Governor Legge worried that if American forces invaded, even the residents of Halifax would join them to oust British rule from the province. The Nova Scotia Yankees, while not under the same burden of taxation as New Englanders, had experienced enough tyranny to prompt them to support the rebel cause.

The New England critiques of the central power Halifax held did not escape the Nova Scotia Yankees, and being denied some of the rights and privileges they enjoyed in New England did not help dispose them kindly to British rule. Many Nova Scotia Yankees sympathized with the American rebels, but did not have the resources to act on their convictions. Nova Scotia did not join the Revolution unlike New England, but both Nova Scotia and New England had patriots, loyalists, and neutrals who responded to the conflict between the imperial and regional communities.

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