

**Women Versus The Counterrevolution: Relating Marcuse to
Contemporary Feminism**

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the thought of Herbert Marcuse and it relates aspects of this thought to contemporary feminism. It identifies Marcuse's Freudianism in order to explicate Marcuse's notion of domination and the "new sensibility". The thesis situates this exploration in the context of current technological developments. These notions of domination and the "new sensibility" are examined directly in chapter two, but are, as well, to be found throughout the thesis. Chapter three examines Marcuse's concept of the counterrevolution and shows how it is relevant to the various stages of the women's movement. Chapter four examines some of the changes that have taken place within feminism and discusses the shortcomings of identity politics. Chapter five examines how Marcuse's theory has been criticised by "object relations" theorist Nancy Chodorow. The sixth chapter relates Marcuse's work to the feminist theory of Julia Kristeva, illustrating their similarities.

The thesis concludes that in order for the women's movement to remain vital, it should engage in identity politics only as a political means with the ultimate goal being to completely transform society. Identity politics for its own sake is, in Marcuse's language, counterrevolutionary.

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Chapter I

Introduction

The Irrationality of a thing is no argument against its existence, rather a condition of it. - Nietzsche

This thesis explores the thought of Herbert Marcuse and relates aspects of this thought to contemporary feminism and society in general.

The purpose of the thesis is to better understand the irrationality upon which our present North American advanced capitalist society is based; for understanding is a necessary precursor to transcendence. Further it is an attempt to come to terms with the semi to unconscious panic that exists in contemporary society. This panic, if appropriately directed could accomplish what traditional Marxism has failed to do: make the masses conscious of their unfreedom.

This attempt is made by making specific reference to that grouping in society which has been historically marginalized, and thus has the revolutionary potential to invigorate the working class (which make up the overwhelming and ever-growing bulk of capitalist society) -- women; thus raising the collective consciousness of the population to the point where it

can at first recognize the irrationality of society, and then to overcome and replace it via Marcuse's "new Sensibility".

The panic just mentioned, I believe is manageable. But, at present, it is improperly directed. It consists of the seedlings of consciousness --- the feeling that something is wrong. Symptoms of some sort of disease (at present unidentifiable) are evident: racism, sexism, high crime rates, youth violence, war, suicide, etc.. People sense the irrationality daily and ask themselves "What's wrong?". Unfortunately the answers come in the form of the *counterrevolution* which diagnoses the many above-mentioned symptoms as diseases themselves instead of identifying the cancer as the very society itself.

The methodology I used for the thesis was chosen as a result of my personal strengths and weaknesses. The first chapter is merely an introduction to Marcuse and begins by discussing why he has been tacitly considered irrelevant due to the academic community's ignorance of his theory since his death. It discusses , what I feel is integral to his value, that North American capitalist society is an inherently bad society not due to the obvious ills that it breeds, but because of its affluence and apparent success. It is with the affluence that Marcuse begins. He recognized that the material comfort that we enjoy comes at the expense of our freedom and true happiness -- that which is the result of the freedom that constantly celebrates being alive.

The second chapter deals with domination and ends with what Marcuse called the "new sensibility". Basically, the old or present sensibility is that which exists in the consciousness of all of us today. It is that which, although irrational, forces us to confront the natural world and each other as objects. The old sensibility is based on the notion that in order to understand the natural world as well as each other, they must be controlled. It is a sensibility based on destruction (which is rooted in Freud's death instinct or thanatos). The new sensibility, quite simply, would be one based on a morality that seeks to fulfill life. Eros being the driving force, our existence would be pacified thus allowing for the amelioration of life with fulfillment being the result of living freely as opposed to gathering gadgets which simply keep us busy.

Chapter three deals mainly with the *counterrevolution*. Put simply, the counterrevolution is the anti-revolutionary consciousness that pervades not only the established order, but society in general. In fact it is much more than that: it is the forces (which are a culmination of repression, surplus-repression, the performance principle, the consumer society, etc.) that do not only negate revolutionary consciousness (for that implies that there is revolutionary consciousness to negate), but that offer a horizon of meanings and possibilities void of anything but a sparse and rather stratified potential for such radicalism.. It is not even in the realm of conception, except in minority pockets of society (such as, as this thesis

suggests, with women), that there exists a possibility that it is the society itself which is at fault (that actually causes the symptoms we can actually see, not to mention the more dangerous invisible ones) for our ultimate unhappiness. The counterrevolution is the maintenance of the status quo at all costs. It uses its superficial reason to convince society that the evils it sees (i.e. crime, poverty, unemployment, racism, high divorce rates, single mothers, etc.) are the result of a loosening of control that has let pockets of radicalism (socialism, feminism) to wreak havoc on the American way and the American family.

Chapter four discusses the various stages of the women's movement. It begins with liberal feminism concluding that, although essential in achieving the many gains women have come to enjoy within society (equal opportunity, equal pay), that the theory is lacking in that its ultimate goal is to merely have women become equal partners in a society that is still inherently destructive. The mere fact that a larger number of women have reached positions of power in business, government, and entertainment, has not changed the system itself. It is just as repressive as ever; in fact its controls are now even stronger for it appears to be even more "fair".

The chapter goes on to discuss more radical forms of feminism such as that advocated by Radicalesbians and cultural feminists. It concludes that although valuable in understanding better how women

have been marginalized, brutalized, oppressed and branded throughout history, as well as theorizing on what it means to be a women biologically and politically, engaging in identity politics for the sake of the identity alone, is counterproductive because, while it seeks transcendence from society, it does not seek to transform society. Further, it feeds the counterrevolution by adopting much of the exclusionary tactics it abhors in society at large. These are characteristics which the established order sees as a threat, and which are vulgarized by the establishment to look like a form of femi-fascism.

Chapter five takes a cursory look at the object relations theory of Nancy Chodorow to defend Marcuse's drive theory. It concludes that relationships are important to Marcuse's "new sensibility" and a transformed society, and that object relations theory is simply the 'next level' of drive theory. It hinges on the idea that there would be no relationships without individual fulfillment of the most basic erotic drives.

Chapter six relates Marcuse's work to the feminist theory of Julia Kristeva, illustrating their similarities. They are similar in that the feminism Kristeva advocates is one that seems to understand Marcuse's new sensibility. It is a feminism that would link our existence to a more monumental as opposed to linear time.

The major argument of the thesis is that feminism must seek to completely transform society instead of accepting equality within it, or by

rejecting it and forming smaller purist self-sufficient countersocieties. In order to have a successful revolution, the working class is essential. At present the working class has little to no revolutionary consciousness. It accepts, by and large, the terms of society and is quite comfortable playing with the gadgets it can afford. Feminism possesses the necessary radical, revolutionary consciousness, but does not possess the numbers. Feminist analysis must be coupled with class analysis to offer any hope of transcendence. Marcuse's work reminds us of the need to think dialectically of the potential that exists within our particular historical circumstances. The ability of feminism and the women's movement to formulate a strategy that will enable it to combat the counterrevolution will depend on its ability to reforge a connection with the left.

That the theory of Marcuse is currently experiencing a minor resuscitation in recent literature among political theorists is simultaneously both surprising and not so. It is surprising because Marcuse has been dead for almost twenty years, and also because, since his death, his theory has been largely forgotten. Political theorists of the last two decades, both conservative and radical, scarcely noted his ground-breaking thought. In a post and post-post-modern world, his work, perhaps because it does not provide an easy reference, has been largely ignored.

The recent emergence of Marcuse's thought is not surprising of

course, because of its critical value, insightfulness, and its commitment to an unfettered truth. It is easy to imagine why he is no longer considered relevant in the eyes of the general public and our political, entertainment, and business elites thirty years after Woodstock. Marcuse paints a truly scathing picture of our mindlessness, worldlessness, and stupidity.

Although his ideas brought him near celebrity status among the student movement of the New Left in the United States in the late 1960's and 70's, he has little to offer (in terms of what present society exalts as good and true, that is, material wealth and power) but freedom.

Herbert Marcuse has been attacked as a Marxist, an Heideggarian, an Hegelian, a Freudian; as too Marxist, too Heideggarian, too Hegelian, too Freudian; not Marxist enough, not Heideggarian enough, not Hegelian enough, and not Freudian enough. These indictments demonstrate the problem. People have too often tried to define him as something else, and then have critiqued him for his lack of consistency with his influences, or with his insistence on taking his influences too far. Marcuse is Marcusean. He belongs to none of the above categories. Indeed he is Marxist, he is Heideggarian, he is Hegelian, he is Freudian. He is not, however, a Marxist, a Heideggarian, an Hegelian, nor a Freudian singularly. His thought is original, foundational, hopeful, disillusional, and utopian. He does not toe any line other than his own, and he makes no apologies. He is idealistic in his goals, and realistic in this theory.

Unlike other radical and critical theorists, Marcuse did not just denounce capitalism for the obvious ills that it creates, such as ever-growing pockets of poverty, a 'black' market sub-society, rampant crime and youth violence. He attacked it with the most vigour where it is seemingly successful. He militated against the affluence of capitalism: the hypnotic role of money, leisure time, and a fair and just Bill of Rights. Instead of heralding a double car garage, a volvo 850, three television sets, an above ground pool in the suburbs, and an annual vacation in Disney world, as indicators of freedom and liberty, Marcuse was against the system in which some prosper while others perish. Affluence based on domination, planned obsolescence, manufactured needs, and manipulation is evil even if it brings most people 'happiness' and the freedom of speech (or the freedom to speak as the established order speaks). Comfort, for Marcuse, does not equal freedom.

One of Marcuse's major concerns deals with the ignorance of 'free' people. People believe they are fully conscious and, by and large, that they are free. Thus they think that all is well and are happy as a result. Happiness is the end to which we should direct our lives. We should want to be happy; anything short of such a goal would be masochism¹. The problem is that we are not truly happy; and that happiness needn't be an

¹Even masochism is a brand of happiness - people allow themselves to be dominated for it brings them some form of psychological satisfaction.

end, but a means as well. There exists in present society a 'happy consciousness'; "the belief that the real is rational and that the system delivers the goods" (Marcuse, 1964, p.84). Our present technological reality is itself an invention that was not intended for liberation (although it has that potential, and that is the reason we are given for its existence); rather, it is intended as a means to make money and as a means to dominate nature and humanity. Technological rationality has generated, with our permission and often with our enthusiasm, extremely conformist behaviour. This form of conformism is relatively new. Conformity has always existed, of course, but the kind we endure today is new because it is *heralded as being rational* to an unprecedented degree.

The confidence in the rationality of modern technology has completely swallowed our consciousness to the point where any reservations about 'giving in' to it and allowing it to take over and manipulate our lives, is absolved or pardoned in the name of scientific efficacy and productivity. Technology assimilates all. Everyone is *equal* in the eyes of the personal computer. This is the fallacy into which we all buy. Opposites are absorbed by technology; contradictions become one, and opposition disappears or is viewed as frivolous as compared to "the facts".

The dominant language of society is a testimonial to the unification of opposites and the promotion of positive thinking. Behaviouralism and

scientific analysis which expunge "metaphysical" consideration serves as an example of this new language. Present society marginalizes critical or *negative* thinking. "The elements of autonomy, discovery, demonstration, and critique recede before designation, assertion and imitation" (Marcuse, 1964, p.85). Our discourse contains no process of dialectical and critical evaluation. We no longer use concepts that take a perspective outside of the apparent reality, or which consider phenomena outside of their apparent context. There is no transcendence. There is just acceptance. Without linguistic representation of the critical, without the mediation involved in such negative analysis, language simply expresses and, thus, promotes the immediate identification of reason and fact, truth and established truth, essence and existence. Modern language means nothing, as concepts which looked at critically could not possibly be combined, are brought together. All talk is a cliché; it has no bearing on true essence. Sentences are formed as declarations, there is little demonstration of the tension of meaning. "The noun governs the sentence in an authoritarian and totalitarian fashion, and the sentence becomes a declaration to be accepted - it repels demonstration, qualification, negation of its codified and declared meaning" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 87).

We are tricked into believing the slogans of advertising executives because they have combined scientific truths with commercialism. Thus

knowing that the sun is the source of all light, and, hence, that if the sun's light were taken away there would be no *sunshine*, the marketer has us believe that his product - *Sunlight Dishwashing Soap* - brings us closer to nature and freedom. The simple use of the word *sunlight* to represent the product is the first step in the manipulation, but to add that 'without *Sunlight*, there is no shine', leads us to buy the metaphor by way of a given fact.

The unification of opposites, which characterizes the commercial and political convention, is but one of the many ways in which discourse and makes itself immune to the expression of protest and refusal. Because it renders its contradictions as a token of truth, the universe of discourse ignores any other critical discussion which is not on and in its own terms.

Hyphenation and abbreviation, common practice today, obliterate the meaning of words. These words, once stripped of their functions as touchstones of meaning, come to be used in the hands of the established order. The effect of hyphenation is mystical in that images which truly represent quite different spheres and qualities are brought together, conveying an irresistible unity and harmony of contradictions. For instance, a term such as 'military-science', "joins the efforts to reduce anxiety and suffering with the job of creating anxiety and suffering" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 93).

Abbreviation, used so commonly that many of us forget what is being abbreviated, take away the possibility of critically engaging the words being abbreviated. Using a term such as N.A.T.O. conjures up an image of a collectivity of countries who combined to become one force. The use of the word NATO takes away the possible critical analysis of the words being represented, an analysis which might question the use of the acronym and perhaps the existence of its referent. "North Atlantic", if used, might lead an individual into thinking critically of NATO's members; Greece is not in the northern hemisphere, and is nowhere near the Atlantic Ocean. By using the term NATO, such questions are never posed. Our language of images militates against attention to the facts to which the image is thought to refer. The image becomes "the truth", and the concept is cloaked. Today we speak freely in the form of simile. How often do we hear even the well-educated use the word *like* before every concrete thing said? 'Like, wow man'. It is not 'wow', it is *like* 'wow'. 'That guy like cut me off. Well, did he cut you off or did he do something resembling cutting you off - something *like* cutting you off? Operational usage is all we have now. There is no real referent. The concept comes simply to represent, not actually to refer. "Prior to its operational usage, the concept *denies* the identification of the thing with its function; it distinguishes that which the thing *is* from the contingent functions of the thing in the established reality" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 95).

A noun is supposed to denote something that can enter into certain relationships, but it is not identical with those relationships. Today, the noun simply is. Operational and behavioral language absorbs the negative, transcendental elements of reason, but it does so in a rational way so as to convince its users of this language's connection to truth. In this way, language and humanity become "one dimensional". The dimension that exists prior in time and space to the spoken word, the conceptual frame, is gone. Words spoken do not have an essential referent. "The other dimensions of thought appeared to be *historical* - the potentiality as historical possibility, its realization as historical event" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 97). This is strictly Orwellian, for the suppression of the historical dimension in the societal universe of operational rationality is a suppression of history. It supposes the future of society because the future is the negation of the past and present. Without this critical negation, there is nothing but the maintenance of the status quo. The language we use today is, in this sense, closed.

"Closed language not only reflects controls but becomes itself an instrument of control even where it does not transmit orders but information; where it demands not obedience but choice, not submission but freedom" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 103). It controls by reducing the horizon of meaning, the linguistic forms and symbols of reflection, abstraction, development, constitution. It substitutes images for concepts. It does not

seek out, but merely establishes and imposes truth and falsehood. Concepts are taken from an intellectual tradition and translated into *terms we can use* - operational terms. This translation has the effect of reducing and eliminating any tension between thought and reality (thought merely succumbs) by weakening the power of the critical. In society today, thought and expression, theory and practice, must toe the line of the existing "facts" with little if any room left for any conceptual critique of these "facts". In this way, the individual, and his or her views, are dealt with and analyzed in a therapeutic sense. Everything can be fixed; that is, everything can be assimilated.

It is in this counterrevolutionary atmosphere that a women's movement must work. Looked at through the critical eyes of a Marcusean, North American society seems to be completely irrational. Within the capitalist system, the above quotation from Nietzsche is compelling. But for society as a whole, and women in particular, this does not have to be the case.

There are four concepts that are central to Marcuse's work, and that are, thus, central to this thesis. These are *domination, surplus repression, freedom, and the "new sensibility"*.

Domination

According to Marcuse, there is a marked difference between domination and the rational exercising of authority. Authority is essential

and even inherent in any society, especially within the social division of labour. This rational exercise is necessary and "is derived from knowledge and confined to the administration of functions and arrangements necessary for the advancement of the whole" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 36). This implies logic, reason, and benevolence, for everyone understands that he or she cannot do all, and cannot possibly perform all of the tasks required in the division of labour.

In contrast to this, *domination* is exercised by a particular group or individual (or even class), in order to sustain and enhance itself in a privileged position. "Such domination does not exclude technical, material, and intellectual progress, but only as an unavoidable by-product while preserving irrational scarcity, want, and constraint"(Marcuse, 1966, pp. 36, 7). That is to say that in terms of material wealth, in the case of contemporary, capitalist society, most of the population can become better off. We can afford more luxuries, we are more literate, and better educated as a result of our particular organization of society. But, these "advances" are only incidental. In fact it is these advancements which make our domination more complete because while we are delivered the goods, and, thus, are offered a way of life that is better than before, we are still manipulated, and completely administered. We do not notice the totalitarian nature of this administration because we are too happy busying ourselves with the goods we have been delivered, and because

the system "seems" to be the embodiment of democracy and freedom.

Surplus Repression

There are various different styles or forms of domination (of both nature and human beings) that correspond to various historical stages or forms of Freud's "reality principle". That is to say that at different stages of history, there are differing levels of culture, technology, and accepted levels of human rights that result in , and are the result of, differing societal structures and world-views.

Put simply, Freud's reality principle is antagonistic to his pleasure principle which seeks constant, unlimited instinctual gratification at all costs. The reality principle is that level of consciousness that knows that constant gratification is far too dangerous, and, thus, must be controlled.

Marcuse bases his analysis mainly on modes of labour. "For example, a society in which all members normally work for a living requires other modes of repression than a society in which labour is the exclusive province of one specific group" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 37). In this sense, the repression necessary to maintain the level of civilization and control desired by a particular society (or by those within society who have the power to decide such things), will be quite different in direction and degree according to, as Marcuse states, "whether social production is oriented on individual consumption or on profit; whether a market

economy prevails or a planned economy; whether private or collective property" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 37). These types of differences make up the very content and direction of the reality principle itself. Every form of the reality principle is embodied in a system of social institutions and relationships, laws, mores, and values which reflect and enforce the required form and extent of modification or control of the instincts. While any particular form of the reality principle requires a certain degree and direction of instinctual repression (or control), the specific historical institutions of the reality principle and the specific interests of domination bring forth *additional* controls over and above those necessary for human association in a civilized societal form. "These additional controls", Marcuse points out, "arising from the specific institutions of domination are what we denote as *surplus-repression*" (1966, p. 37).

This surplus repression is carried out in our society through the present form of the reality principle which Marcuse denotes as the *performance principle*.

The performance principle, which is that of an acquisitive and antagonistic society in the process of constant expansion, presupposes a long development during which domination has been increasingly rationalized...For a long way, the interests of the whole coincide: the profitable utilization of the productive apparatus fulfils the needs and faculties of the individuals. For the vast majority of the population, the

scope and mode of satisfaction are determined by their own labour; but their labour is work for an apparatus they do not control, which operates as an independent power to which individuals must submit if they want to live...Men do not live their own lives but perform pre-established functions (1966, p. 45).

It is the performance principle through which surplus repression works, as will be discussed later, which represents the historical form of unfreedom that exists today. While some form of the reality principle, and hence repression, are rational in that they are necessary to sustain life in society, the performance principle and surplus repression become increasingly irrational with time. Much of the alienated labour that we perform throughout the majority of our lives could be done using the technological advancements that years of repression and redirection of erotic energy have made possible. This would imply a vast freeing of time to enhance life through creative activity. However, we do not have more time. We work just as long and hard as ever to maintain a system that tells us, using the reason of the reality principle and basic repression, but which demands the performance principle and surplus repression, that it is necessary to maintain the high level of affluence that this system has allowed us to achieve. In this way the performance principle has outgrown its rationality. We have reached the point we have been striving for, yet, the alienation, repression, and domination continue.

Freedom

To put it as simply as possible, freedom, for Marcuse, would be that state where one could live without surplus repression, and the performance principle. It would mean living for one's self, not having to work for an irrational maintenance of the present status quo. It would be a state of mind and body that allows for a better mixture of reason and passion which would be made possible by allowing for the gratification of erotic instincts and impulses resulting in the loosening of the repressive bonds of surplus repression. Freedom would mean not having to aggressively compete for scarce resources or the necessities of life. The kind of freedom which Marcuse advocates is, admittedly, not one that would have been possible at earlier stages of civilization, but that today is entirely possible due to the technology we now have. Basically, freedom would be the dialectical negation of the irrational surplus repressive controls that presently embody and are enforced by the performance principle.

The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but *what* can be chosen and what *is* chosen by the individual...Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear -- that is, if they

sustain alienation (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 7, 8).

New Sensibility

Even though he uses the term "new sensibility" throughout his An Essay On Liberation, Marcuse never fully defines precisely what he means by it beyond the use of glib terms such as "pacification of existence" and "true freedom". There are two reasons, I believe, for this. First, Marcuse is a dialectician. For him, concepts, as does history, evolve through critical analysis and careful negation. In this way, being not completely certain exactly what a new society would be like, and understanding the difficulty of having his readers comprehend totally a society that is completely different from the totalitarian one in which they live, the term "new sensibility" is, for Marcuse, a process. He does not pin-point its absolute meaning because it would only be completely understood in reaching it. Further, if a succinct definition were offered, because it would fly directly in the face of the status quo, it would be easily denied by the established order as subversive, and end up directly being attacked by the counterrevolution.

Finally, he is seemingly simplistic to the point of being somewhat vague because the term "new sensibility" really is meant to be as simple as it sounds. The "new sensibility" expresses the ascent of the life instincts over aggressiveness. Under it the life instinct (eros) would find

rational expression in planning the distribution of the socially necessary labour time within and among the various branches of production, thus setting the priorities of goals and choices. It is nothing more than a pacified, and entirely different worldview (lebenswelt). The "new sensibility" is a lebenswelt that we look and receive through which focuses on enhancing life as opposed to acquiring and conquering it.

The liberated consciousness would promote the development of a science and technology free to discover and realize the possibilities of things and men in the gratification and protection of life, playing with the potentialities of form and matter for the attainment of this goal. Technique would then tend to become art, and art would tend to form reality: the opposition between imagination and reason, higher and lower faculties, poetic and scientific thought, would be invalidated (Marcuse, 1969, p. 24).

Chapter II

From Domination to the New Sensibility

With the end of the Second World War came a period of unprecedented strength for western capitalism. Due to the affluence and stability that it then offered, some prominent social theorists proclaimed an 'end of ideology'. They recognized capitalism's seemingly inherent power not only to feed people and make them more comfortable than they had ever been on a general scale, but also its sponge-like ability to soak up all competing theory and to use the portions of those theories that would aid capitalism's growth. It became quite clear that Marxism, the doctrine that originally promised an end to domination and alienation, was in serious trouble, and, if it was to ever have the chance to make good on its theoretical promise of human emancipation, was in desperate need of some theoretical revision, rethinking. And, most importantly, it needed something (or someone) to act as a catalyst for its resurrection.

One of the most important of those who attempted to rejuvenate Marxism was Herbert Marcuse. In his writings from the 1950s until his death in 1979, Marcuse examined intellectual regions which had either been ignored or rejected by previous Marxist theory. He studied sexuality, art, play, and the psychological structure of capitalist culture to

develop a culturally radical Marxism which had a large impact on the new left and the counterculture of the 1960s and early 70s. Perhaps one of his most unorthodox characteristics was his dedication to utopian thought (although he did not devoutly conceive it as such, for he believed that the society he argued for was achievable). Although orthodox Marxism frowns upon utopian theory, Marcuse felt it was essential to maintain and even animate his vision of a real, non-repressive society.

At the centre of Marcuse's critical analysis of advanced industrial capitalism was his critique of the domination of nature (which ends in the domination of "man") and the instrumentalism which is its basis. He preferred a qualitatively (initially quantitatively) different relationship--a true *relationship*, for domination is merely one-sided--with the ecological environment and within society based on severe alterations in the psychic structure and subsequently (and consequently) in the perception of people.

The central contention of this thesis is that, given the ecological crisis and the irrational inequality (particularly as regards women) that exists within our society, Marcuse's thought not only remains relevant, as an inspiration to rid ourselves of our inherent (in the second-nature sense) instrumentality, but can act as a catalyst to subsequent radical and/or utopian thought. In particular, looking at the current state of feminist theory through Marcuse's "new sensibility" can contribute to reinvigorating

that movement while it reshapes our entire social structure. This, I contend it can achieve without undermining women's identity.

Although Marcuse did very little in the way of theorizing about women in particular, his general approach toward nature (both the natural world and human nature) proposes that we change the way we look at the world and human relations. This "new sensibility" toward all things, appropriately introjected, would entirely change the way life is perceived in general, and would specifically change how we treat each other, regardless of our differences. A more humane, feminist approach to nature would put the 'human' back into the term 'human being'. Marcuse's vision of a reconciliation with nature based on a new non-objectifying sensibility represents a viable alternative to capitalist ideology and a vehicle for feminist emancipation.

Marcuse and Freud

Using mostly the later Freudian metapsychology², Marcuse found the relevant psychological concepts he needed to decode the psychosocial roots of the dominating nature of human beings; both toward each other and toward the natural environment. He went further, however,

²This is where much psychological criticism of Marcuse is lodged. Freud based his psychological findings on clinical experiments with actual patients and thus his purely psychological findings can be considered valid. However his metapsychology, and hence that of Marcuse, are considered to be clinically unfounded and more speculative.

than the clinician Freud could by positing a non-repressive society that went beyond what Freud deemed as a necessary evil: that civilized life and any fruitful social progress depended on almost complete instinctual repression. Marcuse achieved this advancement by breaking the concept of repression that exists in contemporary society into two categories: 'basic' repression, which consists of the instinctual modifications that make the least amount of necessary work and cooperation which any society must demand of its members; and 'surplus repression', which consists of the enormous surplus controls imposed *on people by a* hierarchal elite in order to dominate and, more importantly, the exponentially augmented repression necessary to remain in this position of power, given its increasingly evident irrationality. In Marcuse's own words: "*Surplus-repression*: the restrictions necessitated by social domination. This is distinguished from (basic) *repression*: the 'modification' of the instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization" (1966, p. 35).

What makes any repression necessary is scarcity. Marcuse uses historical analysis to criticize Freud's view of repression as being a natural response to the characteristic material scarcity in human existence. Marcuse criticises Freud because of the latter's failure to distinguish the biological and the historical/social elements of repression in his belief that scarcity is natural. Scarcity, for Marcuse, is instead a social phenomenon.

He views Freud's analysis as having ignored the historical ordering of civilization into a series of complex social structures. Based on this realization, scarcity can be understood as neither necessary, nor inherent. It is organized as and imposed by a hierarchial pattern of distribution. Thus Freud's notion that in order to have civilization, repression is an absolutely necessary element is "...fallacious in so far as it applies to the brute *fact* of scarcity what actually is the consequence of a specific *organization* of scarcity, and of a specific existential attitude enforced by this organization" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 36).

The ideological legitimation of surplus-repression in advanced industrial capitalist society is the *performance principle* which Marcuse defines as "...the prevailing historical form of the *reality principle*" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 35). The performance principle defines the relationship between what is necessary to maintain in society and instinctual gratification and dictates the path of productivity, renunciation, and sacrifice, in a society capable of providing comfort and peace for all, but which instead skews the distribution of the goods. The performance principle reflects the social irrationality of domination.

Domination, for Marcuse, is a form of oppression that is distinguished by its totalitarian character and its virtual invisibility. It is "more total", more dangerous, and less obvious in that it operates not necessarily from above, but from within each of us. It has penetrated our

psyches to the extent that we could never convict anyone but ourselves for this repression in any court. Because the hierarchy of our society is sustained by the internalization and perpetual reproduction of the performance principle, we meet tyrannical demands without experiencing oppression overtly. We act "voluntarily" according to Marcuse:

"Domination is in effect whenever the individual's goals and purposes and the means of striving for and attaining them are prescribed to him and performed by him as something prescribed"(Marcuse, 1970, pp. 2-3).

The particular systemic form of domination that exists in contemporary capitalist society relies on an irrational logic that is evident in the uneven distribution of scarcity and in the imposed surplus-repression that supports it. It is irrational on two levels. First, in that the imposition of the surplus-repression serves to maintain an inegalitarian status-quo, an uneven distribution of scarcity (as well as the social product created by scarcity, that is, induced labour), the performance principle allows for the free development and satisfaction of needs only for a privileged minority. Further, to the extent that needs and modes of achieving and satisfying them are also defined by the privileged few, the historically - constituted potential of a given society and its particular mode of production, organization and level of performance do not jibe. Just as the difference between basic and surplus repression expresses the discrepancy between necessary repression and that required to maintain

systemic domination, so the performance principle expresses the discrepancy between hierarchically distributed scarcity as a poor historical solution to natural scarcity, and the same distribution of scarcity as an institution of social domination. This discrepancy exists because the results of the performance principle surpass its strictly required and justifiable purpose. Our society has the technological capacity to eliminate scarcity. Marcuse contends that prevailing scarcity is a man-made phenomenon and is deliberately perpetuated in the practice of domination. This irrationality is culturally introjected to colour completely individual experience. The goals, needs and desires of society are socially engineered cultural patterns that support a society based on unnecessary economic performance and unnecessary debilitating, stupefying labour. Women and men, based on these patterns, experience domination in the miserable poverty and unemployment generated by the constraints of so-called 'free enterprise'. These phenomena are not singularly economic, but psychological as well. Humanity is completely degraded to the level of cattle, prodded in the 'right' direction. This is most visible in the case in which we come to view our well-being and happiness in strictly instrumental terms. We are happy or alive only incidentally to our productive activity. We are firsts cogs, and persons next - if at all.

Underneath the material affluence of modern capitalism lies a

society that is poor in psychological freedom. The totalizing feature of the capitalist system, which imparts its own needs into the individuals that make it up, enables a perverse inversion of norms and expectations, and creates an introjected system of invisible surplus-repressive controls. Hence, the fact that the system is totally irrational, in that it promises freedom and happiness while delivering misery and toil, is not experienced as a failure of the system, but is viewed individually as evidence of personal failure and as a need for better discipline to 'get with the program'. In this system, "the winners" are those who make the rules and decide what is normal, while "the losers" are the rest of us. This form of total control requires that the distinction be made in the minds of the winners as well as the losers - between their performance and their inherent claims on the game itself. The logic of this system is totally circular. The relationship of performance and fulfilment disallows the connection of misery with its proper social origins. We constantly look for answers to problems. These answers necessarily come from within the prevailing system. We ignore the one common denominator to all problems - the system itself. We constantly look at ourselves to explain the wrongs that exist, instead of looking at the underlying logic of our society.

Under this irrational whole, opposites come together in ways that simply do not make sense. Advanced capitalism penetrates both public

and private life to such an extent that they are indistinguishable. The instrumentalization of personal experience produces a situation in which external and internal performance meld into one, and in which means tend to resemble ends. The individual is expected to perform similarly at work, play, and at home. We relate to ourselves as though we are relating to other people. We are just as emotionally estranged from ourselves as we are from others. This is a fatal twist of the Golden Rule. Doing unto others as we would have them do unto ourselves today means that we must ignore who people really are. We repress ourselves and others. All of our responses are calculated and come from the same formulas. There is a certain fixed set of reactions to stimuli which we always display; these formulae differ only very slightly over time. These factors accentuate the irrational nature of surplus-repression imposed under the performance principle. The technological achievements of advanced industrial capitalism are capable of enabling people to develop freely, yet they are constantly used to block freedom so that, "The very forces which rendered society capable of pacifying the struggle for existence served to repress in the individuals the need for such a liberation" (Marcuse, 1966, p. xi).

By positing that rigid controls imposed on inherent instincts toward the erotic, playful, and the aesthetic are not entirely necessary by the imperatives of material survival, but, rather, have been imposed by particular socio-historic institutions that are subject to change, Marcuse

gives us the possibility of a society not based on domination and toil, but on gratification and fulfilment. Put simply, technology and automation have the potential to minimize the labour time required to produce material necessities, and thus making possible the free expression of instinctual energy. Although the ruling order fights to maintain itself, the increasing abundance of resources and the development of technology capable of renewing these resources, as well as a new sensibility that would need considerable less of these resources, provides a material and intellectual foundation for a society beyond scarcity, toil, and domination. Further, Marcuse contends that only the liberated erotic instincts of human nature, that are currently unnecessarily surplus-repressed, can effectively counteract the aggressive and destructive impulses in human nature, impulses which assault the natural environment and threaten to destroy any adequate form of civilization.

Marcuse bases our society's violent treatment of nature and subsequently of each other, in Freud's death instinct. Surplus-repression has injured the life instinct, or eros to the point where it is unable to counter and neutralize the death instinct, or thanatos. While aggressive impulses are diverted from ego toward the external world via technology, since they are not sufficiently neutralized by eros, their essentially destructive character remains unmodified. Marcuse is not calling for the complete unleashing of the instincts; he does not advocate any attempt at

a return to some Hobbesian state of nature. He is merely positing the freedom from the repressive, externally imposed forms of sublimation characteristic of our capitalist, competitive, economic performance principle. A new, much greater reality principle based not on aggression but passivity, would allow for different forms of sublimation based on a soft diffusion of the erotic throughout the body, as opposed to forcing it into one or two erotogenic zones. In this way all areas of life could be erotically enjoyed (not in the sense of sexual orgasm) for the body would be a shrine of pleasure. Life would not resemble art - it would be art, and play.

Marcuse maintains that a liberation of eros is entirely possible as a result of the present (and future) levels of technological development. At present, the level of technology we not only have, but are readily capable of, and the material productivity at our disposal, completely undermine the logic behind alienated labour. He argues that the automation of stupefying work offers the possibility that material needs could be met with a drastic, almost complete, reduction of labour time. Reversing the relationship between time spent in labour and free time challenges the rationality of the performance principle, based as it is on the Protestant work ethic of hard work and super-productivity. The reduction of necessary labour time would "...release time and energy for the free play of human faculties *outside* the realm of alienated labour. The more

complete the alienation of labour, the greater the potential of freedom: total automation would be the optimum"(Marcuse, 1966, p. 156). The results of this freeing of time represent an enormous reorganization of human existence since the instinctual energy under the constant repressive forces of alienated labour would now be not only available for the satisfaction of desire and the fulfilment of human capacities but also to re-create the human body as an instrument of pleasure as opposed to a tool for work.

One of the central features of Marcuse's new reality principle is a radical reworking of our relationship with the natural world. The rationality behind "western civilization" which "undertook the rational transformation of the human and natural environment revealed itself as an essentially aggressive, offensive subject, whose thoughts and actions were designed for mastering objects. It was a subject against an object. This *a priori* antagonistic experience defined the ego cognitans as well as the ego agens. Nature (its own as well as the external worlds) were 'given' to the ego as something that had to be fought, conquered, and even violated - such was the precondition for self-preservation and self-development" (Marcuse, 1966, pp. 109-110). The mythological character used by Marcuse and the capitalist world to symbolize it is Prometheus, the creator and producer. Behind this image, Marcuse chooses Orpheus and Narcissus to symbolize his new orientation toward a pacified

relationship with nature. "They have not become the culture-heroes of the Western world: theirs is the image of joy and fulfilment; the voice which does not command but sings; the gesture which offers and receives; the deed which is peace and ends in the labour of conquest; the liberation from time which unites man with God, man with nature" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 162).

Prometheus represents relentless striving, unending labour to master the world, while Orpheus and Narcissus represent peaceful passivity, play sensuousness and the aesthetic. Prometheus is the symbol of the reality principle dominating nature - subverting it to his purposes. Orpheus and Narcissus symbolize the release of Eros that forms a sensual bond between nature and humanity. In this way nature exists not as an object to be formed to our needs, but it is seen as subject to be related to peacefully. In loving nature, instead of beating up on it, in...

Being spoken to, loved, and cared for, flowers and springs and animals appear as what they are - beautiful, not only for those who address and regard them, but for themselves, 'objectively'... In the Orphic and Narcissistic Eros, this tendency is released: the things of nature become free to be what they are (Marcuse, 1966, p. 166).

It is with this attitude that Marcuse argues that we should relate to the world and to each other. In such a world there is no need for a politics of identity, for who and what we are is immediately recognized. No one,

nothing exists merely as a tool for gratification or use. We simply are gratified.

Marcuse gets support for his interpretation of the Orphic and Narcissistic symbols as representing the erotic bond between humanity and nature by referring to Freud's concept of primary narcissism.

Marcuse's interpretation takes only from the symbol the experience of oneness with the world and not that of an egoistic withdrawal from reality.

Marcuse bases his theory of liberation on the potential he sees for creative leisure to come out of a society that actually uses its technology for its original end: to free much needed time. Because we have more time to allow our bodies to feel something other than toil, our newly strengthened Eros would be capable of pacifying Thanatos which has taken its form in the technological destruction of nature in contemporary society.

Pacification of Existence and a New Technology

Marcuse argues that scientific rationality, based as it is on instrumentality, is historically charged with culture. In our advanced industrial capitalist society, this means that it is charged with domination and operationalism. Science and technology is only such in our culture when it, "...experiences, comprehends, and shapes the world in terms of

calculable, predictable relationships among exactly identifiable units. In this project, universal quantifiability is a prerequisite for the *domination* of nature. Individual, non-quantifiable qualities stand in the way of an organization of men and things in accordance with the measurable power to be extracted from them" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 164). By virtue of its inherent instrumentation (which is its prerequisite - things must be used and in order to be used they must be quantified with that future use in mind), technology is inherently repressive. The term "inherently" is crucial in this context. One might think that the particular machines (PCs, microwave ovens, commercial jets, etc.), because they have no feelings (at least not yet), and are not alive in any biological sense, and because they do not possess consciousness, that these machines cannot possibly care who operates them, or even what use they are put.

Marcuse posits that we live within a certain worldview, or *lebenswelt*. We see the world from within this lebenswelt. The "seeing", in spite of its seemingly "objective", "pure", and disinterested character, is seeing within a purposive, practical context. It is anticipating and projecting. The technologies we live with everyday may appear to be neutral, but they were only discovered and invented from within our particular instrumentalist lebenswelt. We use the PC for a wide variety of tasks; however, each of these tasks has been anticipated by the lebenswelt.

If we lived under a different lebenswelt, the PC may never have been invented, or, perhaps, not in the form we know it today. Our PC is a tool to get things done: to perform within an aggressive, capitalist society that demands surplus repression of the erotic instincts so that we can perform our many prescribed tasks to maintain an unequal status quo. It is this inner repressiveness that Marcuse demonstrates as "...the *internal* instrumentalist character of this scientific rationality by virtue of which it is *a priori* technology, and the *a priori* of a specific technology - namely as a form of social control and domination" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 158). This instrumentalist scientific rationality has demonstrated to be very efficient (in terms of the totality of its ability to dominate nature) in controlling nature, and accordingly this efficient rationality and methodology have been applied to society, to people. Marcuse contends that this technological rationality exists as the specific force in the development of society as we know it now. All parts of society, even those in which we know nothing about the actual functioning or even use to which the major part of most technology is put, have been overtly manipulated and integrated into the totalitarian administration of society. We are comfortably controlled; our opinions, wants, and needs have been previously calculated, predicted, and manipulated. Even in the light of growing social unrest (which isn't due to a consciousness that the system itself is wrong, but is, rather, part of the undirected panic that I introduced

in the introduction), we are, more or less, comfortable with the system.

Although One Dimensional Man seemingly depresses us with a doomsday reading of our existence, Marcuse goes on to posit the possibility and absolute necessity (if we are ever to be free) of a radically new, pacified science and technology based on "envisaging a qualitatively new mode of 'seeing' and qualitatively new relations between man and nature"(165). The historical separation of values, means, goals, and ends are unnecessary. He envisions an integration of art, philosophy, and science through which the pacification of existence would be built on new scientific concepts and injected and introjected, that is, infused into real technological possibilities. Being much more open, the new science of liberation would allow for, "...the free play of thought and imagination," and thus it would assume, "a rational and directing function in the realization of a pacified existence of man and nature" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 234).

The pacification of existence has as its goal to reduce misery, toil, violence towards nature and towards each other. Instead of being based on domination, as it now is, our relationship with the natural world (and each other) would be based on gratification. Cultivation and careful extraction of resources instead of clear-cut destruction. A change in our standard of living would be immanent: a reduction (drastic) in the production and fickle consumption of superfluous consumer goods would

be replaced by an enjoyment of each other and of nature no longer overdeveloped and reduced to ecological squalor. This does not mean however that we would merely allow ourselves to exist at the potential ferocious whim of nature. Ecology that is unmeditated and unstudied by humanity, would be suicidal if not unnecessarily harsh. Merely because we protect ourselves against nature, and use it, does not mean we must destroy it.

All joy and all happiness derive from the ability to transcend Nature - a transcendence in which the mastery of Nature is itself subordinated to liberation and pacification of existence. All tranquillity, all delight is the result of conscious mediation of autonomy and contradiction. Glorification of the natural is part of the ideology which protects an unnatural society in its struggle against liberation...It is also natural that big fish eat little fish - though it may not seem natural to the little fish. Civilization produces the means for freeing Nature from its own brutality, its own insufficiency, its own blindness, by virtue of the cognitive and transforming power of Reason. And Reason can fulfil this function only as post-technological rationality, in which technics is itself the instrumentality of pacification organ of the 'art of life'. The function of Reason then converges with the function of Art (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 237-238).

In this sense, the struggle to articulate a reality principle based on gratification rather than sacrifice parallels artistic expression. The parallel lies in what Marcuse calls the power of negative thinking - the ability to

cut through the instrumental givens of society, and posit *another* existence. The articulation of this other existence has traditionally occurred in art: the aesthetic realm has been the place of expression for transcendent conceptions of freedom and enjoyment. Art gives us the realm where the possibility of reconciling the conflict between happiness and reason, of reconciling the claim of necessity and gratification. Further, art has the ability to capture non-distorted (that is, unchanged by reality, by a false reality) dimensions of human existence; to portray characteristics of humanity which, because of the given performance principle and instrumentalization of all 'rational' outcomes, are denied historical realization. In this way art preserves the promise of happiness.

Through a 'technology of pacification,' the productive machinery of society would reflect aesthetic categories and be organized to allow for the free play of human faculties. Marcuse wishes for science and technology to be oriented toward the reduction of disease, the elimination of poverty, and to provide a decent standard of living for everyone. However, he goes further, for conceivably that could be accomplished within the capitalist system. He envisions instead a new society in which automation has not only reduced necessary labour time. In having much more leisure time available, we would have the unprecedented opportunity to exercise our creative abilities and actually implement our imagination in the real world, and within the new technological realm.

Humanity would have the time and freedom from repression to experiment genuinely with technology in order to fill erotic and creative needs, promoting an aesthetically gratifying, life-enhancing environment.

In his Counterrevolution and Revolt Marcuse makes the final step in going beyond the objectification of nature for the purpose of human beings. He is concerned more than ever with the recognition of, "...nature as a subject in its own right - a subject with which to live in a common human universe" (1972, p. 60). He places emphasis, as he does with every concept, on the notion that nature is historical. Depending on the particular set of historical horizons of possibility, that is, in the way we look at the world and nature, nature's existence means different things. Under the instrumentalist technological horizon, nature is viewed as a deadly force to be controlled and dominated. But just as that is the case now, in history, there is a different, more gentle - even more Kantian - realm of possibilities. The world view that Marcuse advocates would generate a reciprocal relationship - one among equal partners - between humans and the natural world, where humans would realize that the way to fulfilment of their own nature, their self-realization, requires respect for the needs of nature, of ecology.

There is a connection for Marcuse between the repression of human nature (Eros) and the violence we wreak on the environment and each other. In overly repressing the drive that counteracts the forces

within us that seek to destroy life - Thanatos (the force which seeks complete peace in life by destroying it) - these destructive forces are not neutralized and are free aggressively to destroy the world. It was Freud's belief that it is Thanatos, the death instinct, that strives for the freedom from pain; thus the desire to destroy that which causes pain, life. This is the Nirvana principle. However, Marcuse challenges Freud in positing that perhaps Eros (the life instinct) also seeks freedom from pain, not through ending life, but by ameliorating it and making it an instinctually gratifying, peaceful life. If this is true then,

This wish for fulfilment would attain its goal not in the beginning of life, but in the flowering and maturity of life. It would serve, not as a wish to return, but as a wish to progress. It would serve to protect and enhance life itself. The drive for painlessness, for the pacification of existence, would then seek fulfilment in protective care for living things. It would find fulfilment in the recapture and restoration of our life environment, and in the restoration of nature, both eternal and within human beings ("Ecology and Critique of Modern Society". Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 1992, p. 36).

Being anesthetized by the affluence which the death instinct has brought us - materially our *life* is richer than ever. It is difficult for any radical thought to penetrate our social unconsciousness. In the same way that Thanatos has fostered our aggressive and ultra-competitive second nature, it has ended in a physical environment that will soon be unable to

sustain any sort of formidable life. We do not see nature as a subject in its own right, because we have completely introjected the false notion that in order not to live at its whim, nature must be destroyed. And this life seems to have worked so far. The majority of people in our society, compared to those living in under-developed nations, (though that number is decreasing) enjoy high levels of material affluence. However, because, as Marcuse argues, nature is a part of the historical process, its liberation does not mean a return to some pastoral, pre-technological age where fruits were gathered and flowers existed instead of cities. History always moves forward and thus we would preserve the achievements of industry, science, and technology while eliminating its destructiveness.

According to Marcuse, a non-exploitative relationship with nature is possible only through a profound transformation in human sensibility. A more receptive mode of perceiving the world is necessary in order to have the ability to see things as they exist in their own right. Only this way can we experience the erotic energy of nature. Marcuse is not arguing for a merely relaxed, contemplative appreciation of nature in the sense that we have now when we visit a national wildlife reserve or park. He advocates an erotic cathexis or a deeply felt empathetical relation of the Eros that gives life to both humans and nature.

In Counterrevolution and Revolt Marcuse looks to the young Marx and his ideas of the emancipation of the senses and the human

appropriation of nature. Human beings transform nature according to their needs and capacities. The environment, then, comes to reflect human sensibility. If we could be freed of the debilitating, stupefying imperatives that the capitalist system forces on us, the 'humanized' environment could provide a medium for the unfolding of human creative capacities. In this way, the natural environment would become a medium for human gratification only to the degree to which the gratifying forces of nature themselves are also released. Unlike capitalist rule, in which nature is 'appropriated' violently and destructively, this new system would be oriented toward aesthetic and life enhancing qualities for both humans and nature (Marcuse, 1972, pp. 63-77).

The Femalization of the "new sensibility"

Marcuse maintained that women, by virtue of their exclusion from the dehumanizing competition and aggressiveness of the performance principle, were able to retain, more so than men, the receptive, empathetic qualities that are essential features of his 'new sensibility' and that are necessary to create a non-exploitative relationship to the natural world and one another. He saw that individual, social, and ecological liberation required the ascendance of those qualities that were historically attributed to the female - tenderness, nurturance, passivity. Marcuse was careful not to ascribe these 'female' qualities to a biologically grounded female 'nature' for that is the very thought that led, and leads, to women

being marginalized and set off as weaker and different. Historically, those features attributed to women have been used against them to justify their exclusion and oppression. Being careful not to consider it as having been correct in any sense, Marcuse argues that the relegation of women to the home and the task of caring for and raising children, has allowed women to remain more sensuous and more in touch with life giving - with Eros. It is men who historically have developed Thanatos and created the dehumanizing, capitalist, competitive workplace. The life enhancing qualities of women have become a 'second nature' for women. Second-nature because they are not biological capacities of which only women are capable, but are the result of a skewed socialization process covering centuries. While it is true that women should be liberated from their relegation to the home, and foster an identity different from that 'role', the more important (for all humanity) potential of feminism goes far beyond mere equality. Marcuse argues that equality within the present system would be the demise not only of the feminine nature in women, but the loss of the hope of recovering those qualities for everyone. It would mean the adoption within women of the same aggressive, destructive second nature that exists in men. It is instead a new, non-patriarchal system that is required. Capitalism is patriarchal; women in position of power within this system would not change that. The "evil" remains. Patriarchal values, and capitalist institutions which are fuelled by them, must be transcended

by a psychic, political, and cultural revolution. "At stake is...the ascent of Eros over aggression in men and women; and this means, in a male-dominated civilization, the 'femalization' of the male. It would express the decisive change in the instinctual structure: the weakening of primary aggressiveness which, by a combination of biological and social factors, has governed the patriarchal culture" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 75).

Being acutely aware of the fact that any recognition of innate, female qualities have led to the marginalization of women, his notion of 'second-nature' allows him to argue that it is psycho-social, cultural conditioning that has led to this oppression, and that, by adopting much of this second-nature, we can produce a new sensibility for all that would end any and all such marginalization. The qualities that he identifies as historically embodied by women are nothing more than fundamental human qualities, and thus are accessible to men under non-capitalist social conditions. This same notion of second-nature allows for the appreciation of these female qualities, and the rejection of the formal equality that liberal feminism seeks within the existing system. He recognizes that, "...this equalization of male and female would be regressive: it would be a new form of female acceptance of a male principle" (1972, p. 78). Women are in the position, because of their marginality, to develop these qualities of empathy, mutuality, acceptance and peacefulness to make both the social and ecological world more

sensible and sensitive. This sensibility can be political as the solid foundation for a complex psychological, social, and ecological transformation.

At a time when social movements such as feminism, environmentalism, racial equality, and gay rights are suffering from infighting, fragmentation, and a lack of said theoretical continuity to form political lobbies, parties or coalitions, Marcuse's theory offers a unified, all-encompassing analysis that goes far beyond the differences of gender, race, sexual orientation to provide an argument that demonstrates the complex interrelationships that form domination in general. He offers a theoretical foundation to understand the psychological, social, political, economic, and ecological bases on which domination stands.

Chapter III

The Counterrevolution

The world of high industrial capitalism is under the siege of an ever-strengthening counterrevolution. The attack exists in the form of a seemingly non-violent pre-emptive strike. Non-violent, for the most part, because missiles and tanks are not the weapon of choice, but words and consciousness. It is pre-emptive because there exists no well-organized, efficient revolution to counter. "There is no recent revolution to be undone, and there is none in the offing" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 2). The goal of the counterrevolution is to take whatever measures are necessary to maintain an ultra-status quo, from engaging in all out war against factions that, although thousands of miles away, expose a potential threat to Western capital (Vietnam, Persian Gulf), to psychological manipulation and conditioning. The main weapons in the hands of the counterrevolutionaries are the media (most notably television) and affluence. The price of the counterrevolution is freedom and the victims are everyone.

Although we all stand to lose by the maintenance of the status quo, the biggest losers are the groups within society that have the smallest

amount of power; those groups which are marginalized such as racial minorities, the physically challenged, homosexuals and women. This thesis is concerned with only the latter.

The women's movement has gone through many stages and by no means consists of a homogeneous intellectual community. Each stage and each faction has had its own goals and intentions (Kristeva, 1986, p. 36). The first stage of feminism was liberal in nature and theoretically consisted of mostly middle class women seeking equality with men in society. Equal opportunity, equal pay, and equal rights were its very noble goals. Whether or not these goals have been completely met (to a certain extent they have been), logic is on the side of feminists. There are fewer and fewer people, male or female, in Canada and the United States (as well as Western Europe) who would argue that the sexes do not deserve these equal opportunities. Marcuse argues that although great strides have been made, that the battle should not end there. Equality within a bad system does not improve the system. In fact it makes it worse, for now it has the appearance of true democracy. Simply because women have been granted (or are on the way to have granted to them) the same status as men, the very same evils that made the system an alienating, domineering, Darwinian one in the first place, remain.

Another stage of feminism consists of those women who engage in a politics of identity. These are women who essentialize and extol the

virtués of womanhood. Identity politics seeks not to integrate persons into society, but to have them have nothing to do with it, to create instead what Julia Kristeva calls countersocieties (Kristeva, 1986, p. 45). There are, I believe, obvious problems with this form of politics, which are discussed later. However a few initial points can be made here. These countersocieties cannot help but be influenced by larger society for it is ubiquitous and very powerful. Moreover, these groups appear to shun any "other" who would like to identify and aid in the cause of resistance. This leads to the subsociety or countersociety adopting some of the negative identity producing implications of the larger society it wishes to escape. Finally, these groups can come, it appears, close to the use of power politics in implementing their goals.

The final stage in the development, or the faction of feminism to be discussed in this thesis is psychoanalytic feminism; in particular, I wish to consider object relations theory, as advocated by Nancy Chodorow. This portion of the thesis is quite important, for Chodorow directly criticises theories such as Marcuse's and in particular Marcuse's drive theory to contend that he ignores the importance of relationships in the psychological make-up of the individual and society. It is her contention that Marcuse's ignorance of relationships, and more specifically that between mother and child, has led him further to marginalize the importance of women, relegating this importance only in satisfying the

narcissistic needs of the male (Chodorow, 1985, pp. 298,9).

The next portion of the thesis discusses a kind of feminism that might use Marcusean categories. Such a theory is considered as it relates to the very similar theory of Julia Kristeva. I will argue that adopting Marcuse's new sensibility will not only end in a better life for women in a new society, but would have the effect of completely transforming society so that feminist politics would no longer be historically necessary. It is only necessary to fight to have one's voice heard when it is being ignored, or never given a chance to speak.

The Counterrevolution

Once a crime was as solitary as a cry of protest; now it is as universal as a science. Yesterday it was put on trial; today it determines the law.
(Camus, 1956, p. 3)

As was previously stated, the "counterrevolution" for Marcuse is a preventive one, for there is no real revolution happening at present, and there are no evident signals that one is gathering strength. The reason for there being no revolution in the offing, according to Marcuse, is that there is a prevalence of an anti-revolutionary consciousness amongst the majority of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries of North America. Revolutionary consciousness has only ever, and can really only

ever, express itself in revolutionary situations. North American high industrial capitalist society as we know it militates stronger than ever against the development of such a revolutionary consciousness within the dominated communities. The working class, which, although changing in terms of the tasks it is called upon to perform, is bigger than ever, and has been largely integrated into the capitalist society. The general public was better off, at least until recently, than it ever was due to the incredible affluence of society generally. This affluence managed to "trickle down", although in obscenely unequal ratios, to the average person/family. Society had made good on its promise to deliver the goods. Prior to, and especially since the Cold War, a permanent defense economy irrationally led to a situation where people had no need to be revolutionary. Why bite the hand that feeds one?

The stage of capitalism in which we presently find ourselves, a stage that has won the war with the 'communism' (if that is what it can be called) of the former Soviet Union, the particular capitalist enterprises are subordinated to the requirements of capital as a whole. This happened through the normal economic processes under monopolistic competition, and through the state management of capitalism. As a result, ever more members of the previously independent middle class become the direct servants of capital, and are completely occupied in the constant creation and maintenance of surplus value while at the same time being separated

from control of the means of production. The enlarging service sector hires vast numbers of salaried employees, while at the same time, the increasingly technological character of material production draws what Marcuse calls the *functional intelligentsia* into this process. The result is that the base of exploitation is enlarged well beyond factory and shop 'blue collar' workers. The potential for revolutionary consciousness raising is cut off at its roots as everyone is sucked into the hands of those in power, taking the bait of a salary and a mini-van. "The extended scope of exploitation, and the need to integrate into it additional populations at home and abroad, makes for the dominant tendency of monopoly capitalism: to organize the entire society in its interest and image" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 11).

The new and improved, not to mention greatly enlarged, universe of exploitation is a culmination of machines: human, economic, political, military, and educational. The control of these machines rests in the hands of a highly specialized hierarchy of professional managers, politicians, and generals who are concerned primarily with maintaining and augmenting their powerful domain.

At the base of this hierarchial pyramid there exists a prevailing atomization. The entire individual, in body and mind, is converted into a mere instrument, or even further, into a portion of an instrument. "Active or passive, productive or receptive, in working time and free time, he

serves the system" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 14). This highly technified structure of exploitation organizes a vast network of human instruments which work to produce and sustain an affluent society. Unless the individual belongs to the suppressed minorities, he or she benefits materially from society's richness. Capital now produces, for the majority of the population, not so much the material satisfaction that society has been metaphysically and physically seeking, but the governed or steered satisfaction of material needs. At the same time that it delivers the goods as well as the needs that these goods satisfy, it transforms the entire human being into an easily quantifiable, measurable, and manipulable and predictable object of total administration, an administration which is tuned to produce and reproduce not only the material prospects of society, but also the values and promises of the system. "Behind the technological veil, behind the political veil of democracy, appears the reality, the universal servitude, the loss of human dignity in a prefabricated freedom of choice" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 14).

Categories such as true and false, right and wrong, good and bad, come to have meaning only in politico-economic terms. They do not define whether or not action will be taken based on their merit as being just or unjust, only on the values of marketability of things. Everything, including, even especially, human beings, takes on a commodity form, while at the same time, with the disappearance of truly free competition,

the inherent or real quality of each commodity is no longer a decisive factor in its marketability. People are bought and sold like automobiles. It matters not whether a political candidate is virtuous, intelligent, or magnanimous; only that he can get votes and help others make money. He or she must be able to deliver the certainty that the status quo will flourish. The quality of any consumer good is measured not so much on its ability to perform well the task for which it has been produced, but by its potential margin of profit. A good example is the light bulb. There are light bulbs that can last for fifty years without requiring replacement. One would think that this is a product that is inherently good and should be sold to the average consumer. The inherent value of this product is very high. But the margin of profit on such light bulbs is millions of dollars less than on the light bulbs we buy that last two years, hence only the factories that produce the two year light bulbs are equipped with the fifty year variety.

As the working class grows, and women begin to make up a good part of it, the extension of exploitation to a larger part of the population is accompanied by a high standard of living and becomes the reality behind the facade of the consumer society. This is the reality which interprets and unifies the widely diversified classes of the underlying population.

This unifying bond is a force of disintegration for it exists in a system that creates needs it cannot possibly satisfy. The rising standard

of living which capitalism supplies has been capable of creating needs that can be satisfied on the open market. However, it now fosters needs that transcend the market and which cannot be satisfied without abolishing the capitalist mode of production itself. As the material needs of the society are created and satisfied, to a large extent, by the capitalist market, the door is opened for the feeling of real needs, for example, the need for freedom. All the gadgets and luxuries that capitalism has brought us have made life much easier; their production and consumption has made us affluent and rich. But these are merely incidentals. They are not the solace for which we stay alive. Technology has been created to make affluence, to make comfort. It has given us a peek at the possibility of transcending the capitalist mode and embarking on freedom.

Technology is the Frankenstein of the capitalist system which can only work by producing and consuming waste, by aggressively dominating nature and people. People must spend the greater part of their lives at stupefying, physically draining jobs. People must not have the time to think for themselves. Technology should give them that time; it gives them the space away from work. The established order cannot maintain the facade of the need for the "...the fragmentation of work, the necessity and productivity of stupid performance and stupid merchandise...the acquisitive bourgeois individual...", it cannot hide anymore, "...the servitude in the guise of technology, deprived in the guise of the good

life...[and] pollution as a way of life" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 17). People do understand that basic repression is necessary, but capitalism depends on the irrational surplus repression which makes no sense. The working class cannot stare at shadows forever. They have their true lives to gain. "To say that this class has much more to lose than its chains may be a vulgar statement but it is also correct" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 6).

Technology has brought society to the point where most work for the basic necessities of life is either done for us by machines (or could be), or could be done using a bare minimum of labour time. Because of this, and because of the fact that in order for capitalism to continue to exist, production and consumption must ever grow; what most of the working class engages in is what Marcuse called surplus work. It is work that is entirely unnecessary to sustain life. Marcuse looks to Marx to find support for this thesis:

The great historic role of capital is the creation of surplus labour which is superfluous from the standpoint of mere use value, mere subsistence. The historic role of capital is fulfilled as soon as (on the one hand) the level of needs has been developed to the degree where surplus labour over and above work for the necessities has itself become a universal need generated by the individual needs themselves, and (on the other hand) when the strict discipline of capital has schooled successive generations in industriousness and this quality has become the general property of the new generation (Karl Marx,

Grundrisse, quoted in Marcuse, 1972, pp. 17-18).

At the present and most advanced stage of capitalism, when work for the necessities is technically reducible to an absolute minimum, the need, therefore, to continue surplus work marks the point where a revolution is ripe. The established mode of production - capitalism - can only now sustain itself by the constant increase in the mass production of luxury goods and services well beyond the satisfaction of vital material needs, the fulfilment of which, as a result of high technology, requires an ever diminishing quantity of real labour time. This means the constant augmentation of the consumer population necessary to purchase these goods. The painful search for the fulfilment of vital needs could be over for a vast majority of the population. Destitute poverty is more or less contained among a minority, although a growing one, of the population. Technological advancement and the vast production and reproduction of 'luxury' items create, with the world of alienated labour, images of an easy life of enjoyment, peace, fulfilment and comfort which seems to apply to everyone.

Because capitalism must produce and reproduce these 'unnecessary' gadgets, luxuries, etc. to survive, nothing lasts anymore. That is not to say that they cannot last or are necessarily built not to last (although this is the case for many items, for example, automobiles). We

live in the age of the disposable society. Things are used infrequently then tossed aside for 'new and improved' items. Without even getting into the environmental devastation that results from this behaviour (and it is great), this leads to a situation where the acquisition of things produced is more important than the enjoyment of things living. The producers seem to recede behind the consumer.

Of course the enjoyment of things living presupposes their production, though not completely. Many of them already exist and merely await an equitable redistribution. The things needed for the satisfaction of material wants could be produced with a minimum of alienated labour. But it is the creation of adequate surplus value needed for capitalism to persist that necessitates not only the intensification and fragmentation of labour, but also very large commitments and investments in waste and profitable services, while neglecting and reducing non-profitable public services such as transportation, education, and welfare. In Canada's panic to remain capitalist, these are three areas of reform initiated to cut costs so that the profitable industries can persist. Still, monopoly capitalism is threatened by a saturated investment and commodity market. "Competitive competition must constantly be augmented - which means that the high standard of living perpetuates life in ever more senseless and dehumanizing forms, while the poor remain poor, and the number of victims of the *prosperitas Americana* is ever

growing" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 20).

For the majority of the population, the mind and body has experienced painful performances. Our entire culture (in particular, introjected religion and morality), has been built upon this fact of life. The rationality behind repression organized in the capitalist system was originally obvious and made sense: it was necessary to conquer scarcity and the mystery of nature. It was the driving force behind technological advancement. Today, repression has lost its rationality. Nature has been conquered; work is no longer necessary; the good life is in the realm of possibilities. Marcuse asks the question: "Can one not make a living without that stupid, exhausting, endless labour - living with less waste, fewer gadgets and plastic but with more time and more freedom?" (1972, p. 23). This question is not some futuristic, utopian, metaphysical wondering. It is not abstract. It is dangerously (dangerous for the established order) concrete and entirely realistic.

We live in a society that we call the 'consumer society'. But is this not a misnomer? Rarely has a society been so systematically organized in the interests of the few who control production. We do not need the gadgets of the producers. The producers are not responding to the general needs of the consumers. These producers create their products and, through very sophisticated marketing, make us need them. The powerful understand this as well as they understand the irrationality

behind it and the irrationality of the surplus repression it enforces upon us. The general public is becoming conscious and is seeking avenues to vent its frustration with the evils of society. They do not yet understand that the overtly apparent scars of society are merely symptoms of the disease of the capitalist system which no longer makes rational sense. They see high crime rates, a flourishing drug trade, conjugal violence, child prostitution, a runaway national debt, drive-by shootings, protests leading to riots, professional athletes making more money than the GNP of some small nations. They see that more and more women are killing, robbing and violating the values of society. They see these as the social "diseases". Indeed, they are encouraged to do so by the leaders of this system who profit by the system remaining. This is what the counterrevolution is all about. The powerful decide what is wrong and obscene in society, and through the media and the choice of consumer goods it allows to enter the market, imposes these values on us. And most of us fall for the lie, the play on words.

Obscenity is a moral concept in the arsenal of the Establishment, which abuses the term by applying it, not to expressions of its own morality but to those of another. Obscene is not the picture of a naked woman who exposes her pubic hair but that of a fully clad general who exposes his medals rewarded in a war of aggression; obscene is not the ritual of the Hippies, but the declaration of a high dignitary of the Church that war is

necessary for peace. (Marcuse, 1969, p. 8)

The discontent that the general public feels towards these apparent evils can go one of two ways: they can become consciously aware that it is the result of a capitalist system that ran its course twenty or thirty, even fifty years ago; or they can continue to be swayed by the counterrevolutionary tendencies of the Establishment and end up in a proto-fascist state.

The following is a true story of the reaction of one woman after the killing of four students at Kent State College in May 1970:

But no case of parental rejection equals that of a family living in a small town near the Kentucky border with three good-looking, well-behaved, moderate sons at the university. Without any record of participation in protest, the boys found themselves inadvertently involved at the vortex: the middle son ended up standing beside one of the students who was shot (at a great distance from the firing); the youngest was arrested for trespass and his picture appeared in the home town papers to the embarrassment of his family. When the family spoke to one of our researchers, the conversation was so startling that more than usual care was taken to get it exactly as delivered.

Mother: Anyone who appears on the streets of a city like Kent with long hair, dirty clothes or barefooted deserves to be shot.

Researcher: Have I your permission to quote that?

Mother: You sure do. It would have been better if the Guard had shot the whole lot of them that morning.

Researcher: But you had three sons there.

Mother: If they didn't do what the Guards told them, they should have been mowed down.

Professor of Psychology (listening in): Is long hair justification for shooting someone?

Mother: Yes. We have to clean up this nation. And we'll start with the long hairs.

Professor: Would you permit one of your sons to be shot simply because he went barefooted?

Mother: Yes.

Professor: Where do you get such ideas?

Mother: I teach at the local high school.

Professor: You mean you are teaching your students such things?

Mother: Yes. I teach them the truth. That the lazy, the dirty, the ones you see walking the streets and doing nothing ought all to be shot (1972, pp. 26-7).

The monopoly capitalist management of the population, high inflation, a brutal defence policy, the acceptance of war crimes (as long as they are committed by our side), the brutal treatment of a growing prison population, have created a terrifying repository of violence in everyday life. Entire portions of some of the North American cities have been abandoned to crime which the media can always sell. Much of the latent violence that is expressed in minor acts, is primarily directed against powerless (relative to the power of the Establishment) but conspicuous minorities who appear as disturbances or threats to the established way of doing things (the status quo), and who are doing things (or are

suspected of doing things) which those who accept the social order cannot afford to do. It is my contention that women in general, and the feminist movement in particular, are one of the prime targets of this counterrevolutionary force. So long as women do not advocate a change in the status quo, so long as they do not advocate changing the entire system - the very system that has kept women in a marginal position from the beginning - they are not safe from being targeted. "The whole complex of aggression and targets indicates a proto-fascist potential *par excellence*" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 28).

Chapter IV

The Women's Movement

The first stage of the women's movement consisted of theorists and activists dedicated to bringing women into society as equal partners with men in the public arena. Throughout western civilization, and even in many hunter/gatherer tribal societies, the woman's place has been the home - in the private sphere - where they made life comfortable for the men who, through public activity, created the world as we know it. Being disenchanted with, firstly, how the world turned out with men at the helm, and secondly, with being relegated to private affairs, the first feminists, liberal in nature, fought for the rights of women. One of the first philosophers to focus on women's rights was Mary Wollstonecraft.

It is somewhat tenuous to classify Wollstonecraft as a feminist, at least in any modern sense. She believed in the rights of women, but this belief was qualified by the limits of her liberal ideas. In arguing that public and private spheres of life should not be separated, Wollstonecraft shares similarities with Plato.

In the first chapter of Women in Political Theory, Diana Coole explains how the dualities concerning women may have come about. She

looks to Greek mythology to demonstrate how one culture and religion came to dominate another. Hesiod's legend of creation begins with an Earth goddess who represents the mother of creation. She gives birth to the Sky and Sea. When she mates with the Sky, she produces the line of Olympians who establish patriarchal rule under Zeus.

The *Theogyny* is of symbolic interest vis-a-vis its attitudes toward the female in two...ways: the generation of women and generation per se. Firstly, although its subject is divine creation, it also explains how woman appeared. Angry at Prometheus for stealing the secret of fire, Zeus contrives and 'evil' for all men that will destroy their sojourn in peace and plenty: he bids his co-deities create a 'modest' maiden out of clay and proceeds to parade her for all to see (Coole, 1988, p. 15)

Coole suggests that this legend reflects the process by which the male endeavors to gain control over procreation. The myth of Athena, who sprouts from the head of Zeus is meant to demonstrate that the male gender has the power to create life without the female. Since the male has taken all power away from the female, women are reduced to mere vessels who merely assist in the creation of life.

The association of women with the body has been solidified in much political philosophy and in culture. The identity of women has been tied to that of the bearer of children. This is a function that is hers, however, only incidentally for it first serves the needs of man. The

ascribed identity of women does not accord women with any privileges, only with duty. The woman is trapped in a role that is defined by her unique sexual and reproductive function.

It was this situation that Wollstonecraft seeks to change. Men were/are historically the only ones who acted and participated in the public realm. It was men who made the law and received the kind of education that prepared them to govern society. In the tradition of Aristotle, philosophers such as Rousseau depicted the benevolent, altruistic role of men as fathers and husbands who protect and provide for their women and children. Wollstonecraft viewed this as part of the degradation of women by the appetitive nature of men who could not control their passions (1993, p. 227). For her, it was men's lack of chastity that was the underlying reason for the moral decay of society and the degrading of women. Women were considered nothing more than the weak and sensuous playthings of men.

Plato viewed the public/private dichotomy by contrasting reason as opposed to passion. In order that the passions be controlled, they must be brought into the public realm where they can be subjected to reason. Since Plato believed that women were more susceptible to the passions than men, it followed that the former should be subordinate to the latter. "Comments are scattered throughout Plato's writing and suggest that he generally found them weak, emotional, complaining and lacking in virtue"

(Coole, 1988, p. 31). Plato does suggest that women could be part of the Guardian class, perhaps so that the faculty of reason could be cultivated in women as well as men. Moreover, allowing women into this highest of classes, was to allow the philosopher kings to be in control of procreation. Like Zeus who produces Athena from his head, the philosopher kings, through their heightened reason, would orchestrate the best specimens from the reproduction of the Guardian class. In this way, the major function of women as the producers of babies was again reinstated entirely by those who control the public realm - men.

In A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft offers a similar argument. She believes that the degradation of women has the effect of degrading society, for it is the women who are supposed to educate children. The role of women in the home (or the Household as the ancient Greeks would call it) must be controlled by reason, and thus, must be a part of the public realm. Like Plato, Wollstonecraft wishes that the role of women as mother become a civic duty.

Wollstonecraft does not attribute weakness and emotion exclusively to women. She points out that men are unable to control their sexual appetite: "For I will venture to assert, that all the causes of female weakness, as well as depravity, which I have already enlarged on, branch out of one grand cause - want of chastity in men" (1993, p. 227). Men make women their objects by demanding pretty, weak and frivolous

females who submit to their will - women who will love, honour, and *obey*. If women were educated and socialized to be the equals of men, argued Wollstonecraft, then they would be governed by reason. Men in such a circumstance would be charmed not by sexual attraction, but by the qualities of the mind.

Wollstonecraft would like to see emotions disassociated from sentimentality. The only worthwhile feelings, for her, are those with their basis in reason, because these feelings endure. Thus, solid friendship is superior to sexual passion. Marriage should be based on friendship in order to prevent the passions from corrupting society. Motherhood becomes a civic duty devoid of sentimental feelings.

Wollstonecraft was considered radical in her time, but in terms of modern radical thought, her ideas are in keeping with much traditional liberal thought and do not differ too greatly from the works of liberal theorists. Wollstonecraft essentially maintained that the relations between men and women should be based on reason rather than domination and subordination.

Although he takes the notion of women's rights a little further than Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill seems to borrow some of his ideas from her. It is in the thought of Mill and Harriet Taylor, that more radical ideas (although still within the realm of liberal feminism) concerning the rights of women were proposed. Wollstonecraft viewed women as dependant

upon men because of their confinement to the private sphere. Mill uses a utilitarian argument to demonstrate that the enforced ignorance of women had a negative influence on society. If women were given the opportunity to be educated as men were, society could only benefit. Mill argues that patriarchal marriage was an unjust institution. Instead he favoured marriage to be a legal, financial partnership. Taylor goes further, to argue that women should have the same choice as men to remain single and possess jobs outside of the household. Married women should also possess the right to work outside of the home, thereby guaranteeing that they can draw an independent income. "A woman who contributes materially to the support of the family cannot be treated in the same tyrannical manner as one who, however she may toil as a domestic drudge, is a dependant on the man for subsistence" (Mill, 1984, p. 464). This is to ensure that men do not use power over their wives and to ensure that women are not financially and materially dependant on men. Wollstonecraft hoped that in a society based on reason, men would not have as much opportunity to employ power. If women had an equal role in the public sphere, then their interests would find adequate representation Wollstonecraft believed. The problem, however, remained that those with financial clout and greater independence would still enjoy a distinct advantage.

Although Wollstonecraft wrote her theories over two hundred years

ago, and Mill and Taylor over one hundred years ago, the basic aspects of their theories still fuel liberal feminism. This means two things: first that women still have a way to go before enjoying complete equality with men in society; and second, that liberal feminism has not grown much theoretically. Liberal feminist theory, by and large, seeks to make women equal to men, it can be contended, by making women into men. Women must adopt masculine roles in order to enter the public, masculine world. They seek membership in a society that has always told them they did not belong. Is adopting the traits that one loathes about another really the answer? Does such an option not mean that one would loathe one's self? There will likely exist for some time yet a biological difference related to the physiology of the female anatomy that defines different familial roles. For this reason, women in liberal society will continue to be somewhat constrained by traditional roles of wife and mother, no matter how much equality they gain in a society that needs mothers. Men will always have advantages over women in liberal societies for masculine qualities are the most honoured in society, and are necessary for capitalist society to function. Women may be granted admission to the Guardian Class in the Republic, or to the political, business, and military echelons of modern society, but only at the expense of giving up part of their difference. Rather, following feminist criticism and Marcusean logic, in order for women to break free of their chains in this society, they must not seek as

their goal to adopt male characteristics to meet the capitalist societies' entrance and success requirements, but must seek instead to transform the society altogether. "In other words, the [women's] movement becomes radical to the degree to which it aims, not only at equality *within* the job and value structures of the *established* society (which would be the equality of dehumanization) but rather at a change in the structure itself" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 75).

Lesbianism, Radical Feminism, and Identity Politics

Feeling totally ill at ease with society's rules regarding sexuality, gender, and gender roles, lesbian feminists and cultural feminists in the early 1970s also became conscious of, and hence spoke out against, the lack of vision that existed within the predominantly liberal feminist Women's Liberation Movement. Liberal feminists who sought mere equality within the system, saw the radical nature of lesbianism and cultural feminism, which essentializes women, as a potential threat to the movement. For instance, the liberal feminists of the National Organization for Women were extremely uncomfortable with lesbian claims of and demands for solidarity. The opinion towards lesbians in the Women's Movement was summed up by Rita Mae Brown who resigned from NOW in January, 1970:

Lesbianism is one word that can cause the Executive

Committee a collective heart attack. This issue is dismissed as unimportant, too dangerous to contemplate, divisive or whatever excuse could be dredged up from their repression. The prevailing attitude is... 'Suppose they (notice the word, they) flock to us in droves? How horrible. After all, think of our image'. (Marotta, 1981, p.235).

In 1970, at the height of the debate within feminism over the 'lavender menace', a group calling themselves Radicalesbians wrote a paper discussing the implication of lesbianism for feminism entitled "The Woman-Identified Woman". The major argument in the paper is its answer to the question 'What is a lesbian?'

A lesbian is the rage of all women condensed to the point of explosion. She is the women who, often beginning at an extremely early age, acts in accordance with her inner compulsion to be a more complete and freer human being than her society - perhaps then, but certainly later - cares to allow her. These needs and actions, over a period of years, bring her into painful conflict with people, situations, the accepted ways of thinking, feeling and behaving, until she is in a state of continual war with everything around her, and usually with herself. She may not be fully conscious of the political implication of what for her began as personal necessity, but on some level she has not been able to accept the limitations and oppression laid on her by the most basic role of her society - the female role... To the extent that she cannot expel the heavy socialization that goes with being female, she can never truly find peace with herself. For she is

caught somewhere between accepting society's view of her - in which case she cannot accept herself - and coming to understand what this sexist society has done to her and why it is functional and necessary for it to do so (Radicalesbians, 1973, pp. 240-241)

In thus describing themselves, the members of Radicalesbians hoped to convince their audience of two points. The first is the need for political unity. They hoped to find a common ground within feminism for all women by providing a theoretical counter to accepted understandings of lesbianism.

The core of radical feminism is the idea that realizing the oppression of women is fundamental to an adequate social understanding. In contrast to those who analyze sexism or patriarchy as a product of capitalism or preliberal attitudes, radical feminists argue that the oppression of women by men is the root of all other oppression and inequalities. Radicalesbians used this analysis to suggest that the oppression of lesbians is the direct result of the oppression of women, and that it most clearly reveals the goal of that oppression, for the lesbian is the ultimate thorn in the side of male society. The lesbian is not only a woman, but a woman who loves women, a woman completely unattached to a man. A lesbian is constantly contrasted with a 'real woman' in the popular mind, and since the only apparent difference is one

of sexual orientation, the Radicalesbians concluded that in our society, **"..the essence of being a 'woman' is to get fucked by man" (1973, p. 242).** Thus the radical feminist focuses on gender and roles had added to it the issue of sexual preference to produce a common base for lesbians and radical heterosexual women.

The conclusion of "The Woman-Identified Woman" is that the basic source and structure for control over women is that of sexuality, and in particular, the requirement of heterosexuality. This is the structure that must be rejected if women are to become whole beings, in this critique.

All of us, but in particular lesbians, are faced with a society that exists to repress, with an authentic being fighting for freedom and recognition, defined in opposition to that society. This inner drive for freedom, and the society that prevents it, exist against a power and repression that attempts to silence that drive. Power works by quashing this authentic being.

The early analysis of radical feminism suggested that the oppression of women was ultimately related to their roles. This could be eliminated by the abolition of such roles through the abolition of gender; through the creation of androgyny. The androgynous being would be free from the arbitrary and stunting expectation and definitions of repressive society. As Alison Jaggar describes it, "Radical feminism argues that gender is not only the way in which women are differentiated socially

from men; they see it also as the way in which women are subordinated to men. The genders are not 'different but equal'. Instead, gender is an elaborate system of male domination. The theoretical task of radical feminism is to understand that system; its political task is to end it" (1983, p. 85). This analysis did not attack heterosexuality as an institution, but only the unnecessary divisions between women and men that makes a person's choice of sexual partner socially significant. Early radical feminists argued that sex roles themselves must be destroyed. If any portion of these role definitions remains, then oppression remains and will assert itself again and again in new or in the same old ways. There is the need of a new premise for society: the most basic right of an individual is to create the terms of his or her own definition. Freedom lies in being able to decide for one's self what and who one is and what choices were appropriate and fulfilling, rather than being told by society and culture what is meant by being a woman.

With the introduction of lesbianism as a central issue, radical feminism found itself under pressure. The agendas of lesbians and of heterosexual women are different. Lesbian feminists are not, by and large, content to assert that one's choice of sexual partner should be irrelevant to the quality of one's life or one's participation in society. Martha Shelley put this idea in such a way:

I am personally sick of liberals who say they don't care

who sleeps with whom, it's what you do outside the bed that counts. This is what homosexuals have been trying to get straights to understand for years. Well, it's too late for liberalism. Because what I do outside of my bed may have nothing to do with what I do inside - but my consciousness is branded, is permeated with homosexuality. For years I have been branded with your label for me (Shelley, quoted in Phelan, 1989, p. 44).

The result of the irrefutable fact of "branding" was the need for a theory that could posit some sort of ideal future, as well as deal with the scars from a branded past. There was need for a theory that would allow lesbians to feel comfortable in the present by explaining and openly representing their lesbianism, their difference, rather than ignoring it. The focus of radical feminism on sex roles seemed to address the experience of gays, but sexism on the part of homosexual men suggested to lesbians that the problem of sexism was much deeper than was previously assumed. "While most [lesbians] were reluctant to say that men per se were the problem, all agreed that men as constituted by hetero sexist society were indeed the enemy. Men - by nature, by convention, somehow - are the problem" (Phelan, 1989, p. 44). The man in contemporary society, as well as throughout history, is simply not the mere other half of women - the yin to their yang - but is in a totally dominant position over them. This is why radical lesbians could not

perceive any hope of working with men for change, and why some form of androgyny could not be the goal. Androgyny, with the 'cooperation' of men would simply mean women taking on masculine characteristics. Women would have to become men in order to be asexual. "Both masculinity and femininity may be distortions of the human personality, but they are distortions of very different kinds. Most notably, being masculine carries benefits that being feminine does not" (Jaggar, 1983, p. 88). Because, according to Jaggar, "...men derive concrete benefits from their oppression of women," the radical feminist movement eventually came to the conclusion that, "feminists must struggle against rather than with men in order to achieve liberation" (1983, p. 88).

Based on this logic, the priority for women, the revolutionary goal of feminism, must be for the unity of women. Instead of constantly looking over their shoulders, trying to incorporate men into their theory and practice, thus limiting their feminist activities to what will not destroy their relationships with men, women are called upon to focus exclusively on women. In this way, they should renounce any privileges that are part of involvement in the male-oriented culture of society, in favour of the freedom and new identity to be found in the company of only women.

This is the essence of identity politics. The goal is improvement, or complete revolution, for the particular grouping within which one identifies oneself most with, and ignore the troubles of society at large

that forced this type of circumstance. It is certainly radical, but it ends up as counterproductive, and leaves the particular grouping vulnerable to the attacks of the counterrevolution. It has the potential of transforming the particular group into a radically exclusive entity. Exclusion becomes the practice, thus the particular group adopts the features of society that it abhors and uses these features more efficiently than society at large. It is this kind of exclusionary attitude that forces Rita Mae Brown to theorize: "If you can't find it in yourself to love another woman, and that includes physical love, then how can you truly say you care about woman's liberation?" (1975, p. 70). This conclusion appears to fly in the face of lesbian theory that fought for years against the notion that lesbianism was not a natural state, but the result of some psychological mishap in a troubled childhood. If lesbianism is natural, then so too is heterosexuality. If a woman is not physically, sexually attracted to other women, Brown is saying she is not a 'real woman'. Brown says of 'straight' women that, "when push comes to shove, she will choose her man over other women; heterosexuality demands that she makes that choice...Straight women are confused by man, don't put women first, they betray lesbians and in its deepest form, they betray their own selves. You can't build a strong movement if your sisters are out there fucking the oppressor" (1975, pp. 72,74).

This exclusionary logic appears to have the existing status quo of

society remain. Ignoring the mass of society, and, in fact, hating it, will never be an adequate means of changing that society. The counterrevolution uses this type of identity politics as fuel for its fire. The counterrevolution enjoys the status quo. It knows that women have been, and continue to be oppressed. It is even willing to concede to liberal feminist goals of equal opportunity and participation within the status quo. Being much larger, much stronger, and much more massive, it will focus its aim on such movements who appear, and are, wholly exclusionary. It uses the logic of a surface, and entirely false rationality, but one the masses understand and use themselves, to demonstrate that these groups are oppressive. They easily get the masses to believe that they are fascist sub-societies that oppose anything but their own pure forms. This is not to say that these counterrevolutionary forces are right. It merely suggests that what these identity groups ultimately seek - a revolution that would completely alter society as we know it - will be undermined.

It is essential that society become conscious of how these groups, in this case women, have been oppressed and completely dominated throughout history. In this respect the kind of revolutionary consciousness that exists, in this way, is useful. But, in order to change society completely, the women's movement must enlist the mass of society, the working class, to make it consciously aware. The women's

movement must make the people understand the kind of oppression they have endured. It must be made explicit that it is the kind of oppression that cannot be changed within the present society, for it is that society that is the oppressor. The masses must come to understand, and the women's movement should use itself as the example, that they too have been completely oppressed and lied to. It may indeed be true that men might be the problem. But, only men in this society, be they heterosexual or gay. The common denominator to all oppression, however, is the present society. The masses must understand that everything they hold dear (the traditional family structure, the Protestant Work Ethic, their freedom of speech, assembly, and movement, their Bill of Rights, their two-car garages, their VCRs, their union card, their comfortable and easy way of life...their affluence) is built on corruption, domination, oppression, and lies.

Marcuse's writings, particularly in Counterrevolution and Revolt and An Essay on Liberation, are very useful in understanding the counterrevolution and in developing an effective theory and practice to combat it. Even though Marcuse made very few direct comments on feminism proper, his work offers an illuminating insight into the forces behind the counterrevolution aimed at women. In these two works, Marcuse makes a slight shift from the traditional Marxian, class-based analysis to the study of cultural factors that in many ways resembles an

identity politics of his own.

Unlike cultural feminism, which has made identity politics an end in itself, Marcuse's brand is merely a supplement or compliment to class struggle. The women's movement has used its radicalism to replace a comprehensive analysis of society in general, and has shifted its focus from changing society to creating an identity for women despite society. The radical possibilities of the women's movement concerning society need not be forgotten. If the women's movement can be reinvigorated and lead the way to revolutionizing society, it can rekindle a connection between its identity politics and a class-based analysis. Marcuse can aid in this rejuvenation and provide a sound outline for a possible theory that can respond to the counterrevolution.

Susan Faludi, in her account of the counterrevolution aimed at women, Backlash, agrees with Marcuse that the threats aimed at American women exist in a preventive manner, for "the antifeminist backlash has been set off not by women's achievement of full equality but by the increased possibility that they might win it" (1991, p. xx). For Faludi, who concedes that class analysis means little to most Americans (Canadians can be lumped in here), the counterrevolutionary forces shift their attention from some McCarthyian 'Red Scare' to a gender-based 'femi-Nazi' terror. Class differences seem to cut across the men involved in the counterrevolution as well as the women who suffer from it, and

who, by and large, accept it.

In very rich detail, Faludi describes the sheer power of the Establishment to use science, politics, language, psychology, philosophy, and religion to oppress women. Basing her study on the seemingly simple demands of liberal feminism, Faludi demonstrates that it is not that women seek equality that is the problem, but the inequality that diminishes women's emotional, psychological, physical, and financial reserves. The system uses the hypnotic power of the media to get women to believe that feminism is the enemy. It is feminism, especially in its radical forms, that threatens many aspects of the 'American Way' of life. The traditional family is at risk. There are children growing up with mothers too busy at work to properly care for them will lead to youth crime and psychological problems. The entire moral fibre of the nation is at stake. These are the stories that we read in the newspaper and see on television. And women are the blatant, and more often subtle, enemy of the people.

Faludi posits that:

Although the backlash is not an organized movement, that doesn't make it any less destructive. In fact, the lack of orchestration, the absence of a single string puller, only makes it harder to see -- and perhaps more effective. A backlash against women's rights succeeds to the degree that it appears *not* to be political, that it appears not to be a struggle at all. It is most powerful when it goes private,

when it lodges inside a woman's mind and turns her vision inward, until she imagines the pressure is all in her head, until she begins to enforce the backlash, too -- on herself (1991, p. xxii).

It is obvious that the ills that face women in our society cannot be cured or prevented merely by a class-based analysis. Gender-based problems need gender-based analysis and theory. It was a necessary first step for women to seek equality within the system in order to seek recognition as being equally stable, intelligent, productive, etc. as men. Without the work of the first suffragettes, the problem facing women today would be even more acute. Similarly, it was historically necessary for women to shift their focus from obtaining equality within a 'bad' system, to studying and formulating and constructing an identity of their own. In this way they could place their undivided attention on the problems women face and have faced forever. Women have been scarred, torn apart, and rebuilt to the specifications of a male-oriented, male-dominated society. Women embody the objects that men want them to be. Identity politics of radical and cultural feminism was necessary to redefine, on women's terms, and through women's eyes, what their true identity should be, and to demonstrate just how much male power has skewed their identity forever. This focus has led North American feminism completely away, to its detriment, from class-

analysis. Examining the work of Marcuse, particularly in An Essay on Liberation and Counterrevolution and Revolt, which make a subtle shift from complete class-analysis, to a brand of identity politics that does not completely dismiss class-analysis, allows one to understand the consequences of overemphasizing identity at the expense of class.

Pessimism With The Working Class

Marcuse's analysis based on identity politics was more flirtatious than exclusive. The shift came as a result of his pessimism towards the revolutionary potential of the American working class which has been "thwarted by the integration of the organized (and not only the organized) labouring class into the system of advanced capitalism" (Marcuse, 1969, p. 14). Although he never posited that a revolution is possible without the working class, and thus always maintained that it was necessary, he did conclude that it was absorbed by the counterrevolution. "By virtue of its basic position in the production process, by virtue of its numerical weight and the weight of exploitation, the working class is still the historical agent of revolution; by virtue of its sharing the stabilizing needs of the system, it has become a conservative, even counterrevolutionary force" (Marcuse, 1969, p. 16). Because of these two connected observations, Marcuse looked to identity politics in hopes that some groups --most notably for this thesis, women-- could provide the spark or catalytic component in re-

revolutionizing the working class. The working class is essential, for reasons to be discussed, but presently unconscious and apathetic toward any revolutionary consciousness. The feminist project, in incorporating the working class, can supply this consciousness.

Marcuse believes that this lack of consciousness is socially engineered and is perpetuated by the development and satisfaction of needs which perpetuate the servitude of the exploited. "A vested interest", Marcuse argues, "in the existing system is thus fostered in the instinctual structure of the exploited, and the rupture with the continuum of repression -- a necessary precondition of liberation -- does not occur" (1969, p. 16.) This notion was even evident in One Dimensional Man where Marcuse enumerates four ways in which the working classes today do not resemble the more potentially revolutionary working class of the past.

First, the amount of hard, physical energy required of labour has been drastically reduced.

The proletarian of the previous stages of capitalism was indeed the beast of burden by the labour of his body processing the necessities and luxuries of life while living in filth and poverty. Thus he was the living denial of his society. In contrast, the organized worker in the advanced areas of the technological society lives this denial less conspicuously and, like other human objects of the social division of labour, he is being incorporated into

the technological community of the administered population (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 25,6).

Second, in most areas of industrial capitalism, there is an inverse relationship between blue and white collar work. As the number of white collar workers increases, the number of those who 'work with their hands' decreases. This *quantitative* change is directly related to the qualitative changes in the work world; the *technification* of the work world.

To be sure, the former 'professional' autonomy of the labourer was rather his professional enslavement. But his *specific* mode of enslavement was at the same time the source of his specific, professional power of negation -- the power to stop the process which threatened him with annihilation as a human being. Now the labourer is losing the professional autonomy which made him a member of a class set off from the other occupational groups because it embodied the refutation of the established society (Marcuse, 1964, p. 28).

Now the Blue collar worker is part and parcel of the very society which formerly he/she existed to negate. What would be the purpose of refusing in the new society? The only outcome would be the loss of not only his or her livelihood and of a decent, comfortable, relatively affluent, and easy lifestyle.

Third, the above changes in the character of work that is now done compared with the previous stages of capitalism, along with the

'instrument' of production -- now largely computerized or technified -- have changed, and continue to change, the attitudes and consciousness of workers. "In some of the technically most advanced establishments, the workers even show a vested interest in the establishment -- a frequently observed effect of 'workers participation' in the capitalist enterprise" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 30). The workers have been co-opted by the Establishment. They no longer exist opposite the decision makers of society. Their only fight is for better pay and/or better representation within the existing system.

Fourth, "the new technological work would thus enforce the weakening of the negative position of the working class: the latter no longer appears to be the living contradiction to the established society" (Marcuse, 1964, p. 31). The voices of the workers are not remarkably different from those of the managers. Each has the same goals: to advance and spread the American way of life; to make the system (at least appear to be) more efficient; and to be the strongest country in the world. The catch is that the managers, or those in charge of the economic apparatus, are the ones who ultimately benefit. The owners are still in charge of other people's lives.

These arguments demonstrate Marcuse's pessimism towards the revolutionary potential of the working class, and its need of a revolutionary catalyst. The working class is larger, and better educated

than ever before, but it has become so seemingly at its own expense. It has become larger because many of the jobs of which it now consists include those previously considered white collar. The fact that the working class wears a white collar has made it even more counterrevolutionary. The workers today include bank managers, computer programmers, and even low and middle managers.

The Great Refusal

Because of his rejection of the working class, Marcuse turned to those groups in society who had gained less from its affluence, the very groups who were not or should not be satisfied with the status quo. He referred to these people as the 'Great Refusal'. The Great Refusal consists of two major components. The first consisted of a group with the requisite revolutionary consciousness and a sharp disdain for the way of life that was promoted and aggressively enforced by the Establishment. For Marcuse, it was mainly students and intellectuals who made up the largest portion of this group. Due to their existence on college campuses and outside of the mainstream of everyday capitalist enterprise, their minds are ripe for revolutionary consciousness raising. This distance from the Establishment allows them the freedom to study it from outside without (at least not as ubiquitously as within society) having to depend on it entirely for existence and intellectual challenge. Because students will

eventually leave university and enter the workforce, it is essential that a sound revolutionary consciousness be firmly fostered within them, for the pressure of a paycheque can turn revolution into counterrevolution very efficiently. The potential, however, is to take their revolutionary consciousness into the workplace and spread it throughout the working class. "The long-range process which, in large areas of material production, tends to replace heavy physical labour by technical, mental energy, increases the social need for scientifically trained, intelligent workers; a considerable part of the student population is prospective working class -- 'new working class', not only expendable, but vital for the growth of existing society" (Marcuse, 1969, p. 59). Students have a heightened ability and a better chance to develop Marcuse's new sensibility which constitutes a conscious break from the enforced second nature that consumer society and corporate capitalism have created which ties individuals libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form. "The second-nature of man militates against any change that would disrupt and perhaps even abolish this dependence of man on a market ever more densely filled with merchandise -- abolish his existence as a consumer consuming himself in buying and selling" (Marcuse, 1969, p. 11). Students have the ability, and, perhaps more importantly, the time and distance to change that second nature to find a need for freedom.

The second portion of the Great Refusal is concerned with those

groups who, by their marginalization from society, have been prevented from fully integrating into the system. It is with these groups that Marcuse makes his shift to identity politics. These groups have revolutionary potential, not due to a politically revolutionary consciousness, but as a result of their race or sex.

Marcuse argues that women, as a result of their marginalization, were free from much of the destructive, aggressive repression experienced by males. He argues that within the established structure of society, neither men nor women are free. The *dehumanization* of men may well be greater than that of women since the former suffer not only the monotony of the assembly line, but also the standards and ethics of the business community and public life. Women are more oppressed than men, but due to their marginalization, they have been spared some of the brutalization of the public world. It is in the nature of sexual relationships, Marcuse argues, that both males and females are objects and subjects at the same time. Each experiences both erotic and aggressive energy. Although there exists a semblance of equality in society, and although the reduction of the concrete individual faculties to abstract labour power has established an abstract equality between the sexes (equality before the machine), this abstraction was less complete in the case of women. Women were fully employed in the household, the family, which was supposed to be the sphere of realization for the bourgeois individual.

However, this sphere was isolated from the productive process and thus contributed to women's mutilation. And, yet, "this isolation (separation) from the alienated work world of capitalism enabled women to remain less brutalized by the performance principle, to remain closer to her sensibility: more human than men" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 77). Because the society in which we live now is a masculine one, embodying masculine categories of aggression, competition, and domination, it is not a free society. A society which is closer to being truly free, the complete negation of the existing society, would be a female society.

In this sense, it has nothing to do with matriarchy of any sort; the image of the woman as mother is itself repressive; it transforms a biological fact into an ethical and cultural value and thus it supports and justifies her repression. At stake is rather the ascent of Eros over aggression, in men *and* women; and this means, in a male dominated civilization, the 'femalization' of the male. It would express the decisive change in the instinctual structure: the weakening of primary aggressiveness which, by a combination of biological and social factors, has governed the patriarchal culture (Marcuse, 1972, p. 75).

Marcuse's account of women, and his brand of identity politics, becomes slightly problematic when discussing the revolutionary potential of the Women's Liberation Movement. Marcuse in essence essentializes women and accepts the identity of women formed in opposition to the

identity created by the Establishment for men. "That this image (and reality) of the woman has been determined by an aggressive, male-dominated society does not mean that this determination must be rejected, that the liberation of women must overcome the female 'nature'" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 75). Trudy Steuernagel, in her essay "Marcuse, the Women's Movement, and Women's Studies", points out that based on this essentialization and acceptance of identity, Marcuse feels that women are radical only to the extent that they accept the definition of *other*. "Marcuse...fails to see the problem that arises when, based on their personal experiences, women hold a different understanding of the effect of their gender on their lives" (Bokina, Lukes, eds., 1994, p. 93).

As previously noted, Marcuse intended identity politics to supplement class struggle. This, however, was not the direction taken by the women's movement. Liberal feminism, for all its achievements, remains committed to the system that radicals abhorred. Identity politics, although necessary and valuable in legitimating and giving power to (as well as raising consciousness of) an extremely oppressed group, has become completely preoccupied with constructing the meanings of identity for the members of this group. Marcuse did not fall into this trap, mainly because he, by and large, accepted the image of women created by bourgeois society.

There is certainly room for identity politics on the Left, but not as

replacement for radical class analysis. Marcuse implicitly suggests that identity politics can play a crucial role in raising the potential revolutionary consciousness of the working class. An alliance between feminism and the Left would reconnect identity politics to a radical political agenda, without drowning out the voice of feminism.

The changing social roles of women have unavoidably changed the lives of both men and women in society. More and more children grow up in a single parent environment, and it is likely that many children's mothers will be a part of the work force at some time during their childhood. There is a possibility that these changing roles of women and men as a result of women entering the work world on equal footing with men, will result in a more feminist consciousness in both men and women.

The ability of the feminist movement to avoid further attacks from the counterrevolution relies on its ability to work with the Left. Feminism can restore the revolutionary potential of the Left, and in so doing, enhance its own chances for required social transformation.

Chapter V

Marcuse and Relatedness

Although Marcuse called for a 'femalization' of society, and admonished the Establishment for its marginalization of women, it has been argued by some that in his essentializing of women and his emphasis on primary drive theory, he ignored the concept of human relatedness.

Object relations theorists, and in particular, psychoanalytical feminist Nancy Chodorow, claim, unlike Marcuse, that it is human relationships and not a pleasure seeking Eros that fulfils the self. In her essay, "Beyond Drive Theory", Chodorow accuses Marcuse of being a hyper-individual hedonist who ignores the importance of relationships.

Using the basic theories put forward by Sigmund Freud, Marcuse argues that humans are shaped by two primary drives: Eros and Thanatos. Whatever we do, we become, we feel, no matter what *second* natures, or subsequent drives we acquire, Eros and Thanatos are primary. We are born with these *inherent* drives. Eros represents our erotic energy -- our life force --the instinct to stay alive and do what is necessary for the maintenance and fulfilment of actually existing; actually being *alive*. Thanatos is our destructive energy; that which aggressively seeks to

annihilate life. Freud believed that these two drives are constantly in conflict with one another, each trying to gain ascendancy over the other. Basically this is where Freud left off, and where Marcuse began. Marcuse, the political philosopher, and not the psychiatrist, recognized that although Eros and Thanatos are innate, they are altered by the given social organization of society. If we understand this, and that in the present society, aggression and annihilation (Thanatos), are a way of life, then we could conceivably historically modify society so as to tip the balance in favour of Eros. A passive society would make life become more ruled by Eros than it is at the present where Thanatos reigns.

While Eros and Thanatos seem to be at opposite poles, their basic goals are the same. Both drives aim for nirvana. The nirvana principle is the drive for peace and tranquility -- eternal bliss --a world devoid of tension. In this sense, the death instinct comes frightfully close to the life instinct. "The death instinct is destructiveness not for its own sake, but for the relief of tension. The descent toward death is an unconscious flight from pain and want. It is an expression of the eternal struggle against suffering and repression" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 29).

Basically, repression is necessary in order to have culture -- to build civilization. The very dangerous primal energy of the erotic drive must be repressed and rechanneled into work/labour that builds culture. However, Eros is the only force that can counter Thanatos (a much more dangerous

force), so if we repress Eros too much, we weaken that force that builds life and culture in the first place. "The process of sublimation alters the balance in the instinctual structure. Life is the fusion of Eros and the death instinct; in this fusion, Eros has subdued its hostile partner. However, culture demands continuous sublimation; it thereby weakens Eros, the builder of culture. And desexualization, by weakening Eros, unbinds the destructive impulses. Civilization is thus threatened by the instinctual defusion, in which the death instinct strives to gain ascendance over the life instincts. Originating in renunciation and developing under progressive renunciation, civilization tends toward self-destruction" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 83).

Marcuse's Culture Heroes

Chodorow admonishes Marcuse for his choice of culture heroes. She claims that his connection with Narcissus and Orpheus leads to hyper-individuality, the need for relationships with others (particularly women) only as objects of pleasure, and because his only consideration of women is as a symbol of death and unfreedom:

The Nirvana principle and the desire for death and quiescence also imply the desire for merging with the mother; thus, women are also implicitly present as equivalent to death...for the consistency of the theory, women must be constrainers of freedom and objects: a

woman does not have the option to remain a child or to be constrained but must be the mother/woman who does not require separation but serves as a narcissistic mirror and extension or even as the life environment (Chodorow, 1985, pp. 300-303).

Marcuse viewed the typical mythic culture heroes such as Odysseus and Prometheus as embodying the performance principle. The fact that the performance principle is reasonable makes it difficult for Marcuse to negate it. Its basis is in our rationality and we define it and continue to live under its rubric by the virtue of our faculty of reason. Of course it is a reason that has been skewed by the very principle (reality and performance) that it continually, at the cost of our freedom, maintains. "Even at the beginning of Western Civilization, long before this principle was institutionalized, reason was defined as an instrument of constraint, of instinctual suppression: the domain of the instincts, sensuousness, was considered eternally hostile and detrimental to reason" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 159).

The experience of Orpheus and Narcissus negates the performance principle which insists that we work on the world and others. The performance principle insists that we treat it and them like objects of gratification and as tools for other endeavours: building civilization, culture, society, capitalistic empires, sweatshops, warehouse outlets,

dynasties, monarchies, garbage dumps, military industrial complexes, and nuclear weapons testing sites. It is the world of the performance principle as symbolized by Prometheus and Odysseus, and not Narcissus, which Chodorow would have us believe, make nature and women objects of gratification and pleasure. Narcissus and Orpheus symbolize relations and relationships with others and with nature. They are created by the same forces and have equal rights to enjoy, to become, to grow on earth, not to possess it. In this way, there becomes only one defining quality to be accorded to the creatures of the earth of which human beings are only one form: beauty. "In being spoken to, loved and cared for, flowers and springs and animals appear as what they are -- beautiful, not only for those who address and regard them, but for themselves, 'objectively'" (Marcuse, 1966, p. 166). They are beautiful as ends in themselves. They do not need humans or each other to be beautiful.

C. Fred Alford in his essay, "Marx, Marcuse, and Psychoanalysis: Do They Still Fit After All These Years?", urges us to look at the entire story of Marcuse's heroes to illustrate that certain qualities possessed by these mythic figures are far from admirable.

Narcissus rejects the erotic charms of Echo for the autoeroticism of his own image, finding it so attractive that he pines away and dies while admiring it in the still water. Orpheus...could charm wild beasts with his lyre. However, after striking a deal with Pluto to recover his

wife Eurydice from Hades, he could not control his own desire and anxiety sufficiently to lead her back to his world. Instead he seeks a reassuring glance of her, and she is snatched away from him forever. Thereafter, Orpheus held himself apart from women, dwelling on his lost opportunity. Thracian women sought to captivate him, but he resisted their charms, until one day they became so incensed that they drowned out the music of his lyre with their screams and tore him to pieces (Bokina, Lukes, eds., 1994, p. 137).

Alford goes on to ask us two questions: Is an erotic hero fixated unto death an image of fulfilment, and is someone who, through lack of control, fails to reach a genuinely desirable goal and thus spends the rest of his life in mourning and rejecting Eros completely, an ideal? The answer to these questions is *no*. But these are not the images and characteristics of the symbolic (and recall that these are only symbols) heroes which Marcuse intends for us. Alford is putting words into Marcuse's mouth. It is true that the above quotation outlines the other features of Marcuse's heroes, but because they are ignored by Marcuse, they are irrelevant to his theory. It is not a psychological, scientific fact that all who possess the qualities that Marcuse borrows from Narcissus and Orpheus will suffer the same fates as these two *mythic* heroes. Because their value is only meant to be symbolic, we are able to borrow from them the qualities that are noble, and ignore the others. Further, in these myths, it is not the fault of Narcissus' admiration of beauty alone

that killed him. The society in which he lived was, in the sense that Marcuse describes our society as being responsible for our aggressiveness, to blame. Alford is simply exaggerating a metaphor -- to the point of the ridiculous. Moreover, Marcuse's interpretation of Narcissus is as such: "His silence is not that of dead rigidity; and when he is contemptuous of the love of hunters and nymphs he rejects one Eros for another. He lives by an Eros of his own, and he does not love only himself. (He does not know that the image he admires is his own.)...And when he dies he continues to live as the flower that bears his name" (1966, p. 167).

Chodorow, in claiming that Marcuse's use of Narcissus as a culture hero..."amounts to an argument against relations with women", is doing two things: first, she is taking the image of Narcissus too far, and second, she is replacing the mythic character from literature, which Marcuse uses, with the Freudian concept of narcissism.

Following object relations theorist W.R.D. Fairbairn, who claimed that pleasure is not the object but the signpost to a relationship with the object, Chodorow claims that Marcuse's metaphoric connection with narcissism, and moreover his insistence on drive theory, forces him into theorizing hyper-individuality, hedonism, and the need for women only as objects of the gratification of pleasure. She states that "for Marcuse...all social relations hitherto have been based on domination, from those in the

primal-horde family to those under the performance principle of class society" (Chodorow, 1985, p. 282). She allows this statement to stand for any relationship, including those that would exist under Marcuse's "new sensibility". Simply by the fact that he is stating what he believes is an historical fact, Marcuse does not necessarily imply that he believes these relationships and relationships in general are evil. According to Marcuse, only the types of relationships that exist as a result of domination are wrong; and under the "new sensibility", these would be no more.

In An Essay On Liberation, Marcuse speaks of the solidarity that would exist after the cultural revolution. Solidarity, by definition, requires relationship. The term is empty without the notion of care for others who are equally entitled to pleasure and happiness. "These new relationships would be the result of a biological solidarity in work and purpose, expressive of a true harmony between social and individual needs and goals, between recognized necessity and free development -- the exact opposite of the administered and enforced harmony organized in the advanced capitalist (and socialist?) countries" (Marcuse, 1969, p. 88).

Chodorow implies that in being hyper-individualistic, Marcuse is merely theorizing nothing more than pure, individual, instinctual gratification. She assumes that this gratification is consciously bad, selfish, and self serving. "The Marcuse-Brown solution, then, frees individuals from concrete relationships so that each can individually

experience the world in body pleasure, play, unrepressed drive gratification, and artistic creativity" (Chodorow, 1985, p. 285).

Marcuse does not ignore concrete relationships or consider them meaningless. He does not replace human relatedness with neurotic narcissism (in the clinical sense). According to Marcuse, relationships are of seminal importance to his project. His drive theory merely goes one step deeper than Chodorow's object relations theory. Object relations theory has significant value and can offer certain insights into the new sensibility, but there would be no relationship if that bond did not gratify the instincts. If there existed no personal, instinctual pleasure in community with others, there would be no community with others. One can only feel pleasure or pain within oneself. One can sympathize, even empathize, with the pain of someone else -- one can even feel pain because of something that happened to someone else. I feel for the victims of Dachau. But the pain I feel *for* them is my own. I cannot possibly feel their pain. We can only have relationships with others because of the individual gratification it brings to our own instinctual drives. This does not make us selfish -- just members of the human race.

Chodorow's object relations theory does have value, but only as a possible next step to drive theory. In accusing Marcuse of being hyper-individualistic, and hence, as having no place for women other than as objects of male gratification, she is falling into the same trap as cultural

feminists who engage in a completely separated identity politics.

Chapter VI

"FATHER'S TIME, MOTHER'S SPECIES"

The feminism of Julia Kristeva is the kind for which Marcuse would find much affinity. Like Marcuse, and much more comprehensively, Kristeva seeks not merely a new more egalitarian place for women within the existing society, but something more of a mystical presence that, in the ways defined by our instrumentalist, defining, and strictly linear culture, is beyond time. She speaks of a *monumental place* for not only women, but for humanity, in which time as we know it is not as much a factor as is psychology. We are each (men and women) psychologically a part of all time and of no time. Possibilities are endless and beginningless. When one attempts to conceptualize the plight of women, or even the *everyday* of women, "one thinks more of the *space* generating and forming the human species than of *time*, becoming, or history" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 33).

Having said that, that when conceptualizing the subjectivity of women, especially in Western Civilization, one thinks of them in terms of *monumental* history (to use Nietzsche's term), as opposed to *linear* history which is that historically formed by, and hence relevant to, men. Linear history, or (again, using Nietzsche) *curvilinear* time, is the measurable path of history, science, scientific discovery, unfolding, teleology -- measurable

time. It is the time the clock tells us is ticking. The time in which things must be done. It is the time of power and the struggle for it; that time that links differing nations, cultures, and people of the world economically and politically. *Monumental* time is that of another history that combines supranatural and sociocultural entities within an entirely different temporality or *space*. When thinking of time and the masculine, one thinks of Prometheus, conquering new territories, making discoveries, fighting wars; one thinks politics, economics, law, and activity in the linear sense. Summed up by Tennyson who keeps the historical, linear time as his theme:

Though much is taken, much abides; and though
 We are not now that strength which in old days
 Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are:
 One equal temper of heroic hearts,
 Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
 To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield (Hunter, ed.,
 1991, p. 360).

As for the feminine or female, there seems to be something softer, less defined. It has been the place of women to fantasize, being not part of the 'One equal temper of heroic hearts'. Theirs is monumental temporality that is not divided by instrumentality, definitions, distinctions - not with prizes to be won, or lands to conquer. It has very little to do with linear time that actually passes with every tick of the clock. Kristeva argues that for the female "the very word 'temporality' hardly fits: All

encompassing and infinite like imaginary space...One is reminded of...Christianity, in which the Virgin Mother does not die but moves from one spaciality to another within the same time via dormition or via assumption" (1986, pp. 34, 5). Here too we can look to verse to be reminded of these beyond linear aspects of the feminine, this time by way of Emily Dickinson:

Because I could not stop for death --
 He kindly stopped for me --
 The carriage held but just Ourselves --
 And Immortality.

We slowly drove -- He knew no haste
 And I had put away
 My labour and my leisure too,
 For His Civility --

We passed the school, where Children strove --
 At recess -- in the Ring --
 We passed the fields of Gazing Grain --
 We passed the setting sun --

Or rather -- He passed Us --
 The dews drew quivering and chill --
 For only Gossamer, my gown --
 My tippet -- only Tulle --

We passed before a House that seemed
 A Swelling in the Ground --
 The Roof was scarcely visible --
 The Cornice -- in the Ground --

Since then -- 'tis centuries -- and yet
Feels shorter than the Day
I first surmised the Horses' Heads
Were toward Eternity -- (Hunter, ed., 1991, p. 400-401).

Just as Marcuse despairs against liberal feminism for only seeking equality within the system, so does Kristeva. She argues that the mere fact that the female subjectivity is generally located within monumental, meta-time, does not mean that certain currents of contemporary feminism do not render themselves fundamentally incompatible with *masculine* values. She posits that in giving up their monumental sensibility, they, as a result, become tied to a new conception of time: "time as project, teleology, linear and prospective unfolding; time as departure, progression, and arrival -- in other words, the time of history" (1986, p. 35). It is not simply that in joining the patriarchy, she loses much of her self, but the linear temporality she chooses is a painful one. It is that of logic and ontology which requires a separation from all other things in order that they be comprehended. Casting herself into society, she becomes a detached entity in a time that "makes explicit a rupture, an expectation, or an anguish which other temporalities work to conceal" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 35). This *first* generation of feminists demanded and struggled for equal pay for equal work, equal opportunities to achieve the very same positions of power as do men. They also, because they

adopted so many masculine characteristics, rejected many of the attributes that had traditionally been considered feminine. These suffragettes identified with the power structure and sought to be equal members of it, and they have achieved many things for women in many countries, such as abortion, contraception, almost equal pay, powerful positions in traditionally male professions, etc. These feminists, in believing that they speak for all women, and that are achieving goals they believe will be for the benefit of all, have a very universal, and universalizing approach.

A more radical, monumental phase of feminism, Kristeva posits, came after 1968 by women who refused not only equality within existing society, but who analyzed society as patriarchal and, thus, repressive toward women. This generation of the feminist movement almost completely rejects the linear temporality that the first generation sought membership within to posit, on aesthetic and psychoanalytic grounds, a monumental identity for women and extol the virtues of a matriarchal system. These women, although they feel the gains made by the previous generation were necessary, are more concerned with a specific female psychology and symbol. They seek to put into theory, art, and communicative language, the strictly female intrasubjectivity and experience that has been muted by linear history and culture. What they are demanding is recognition, not as tools for the perpetuation of the race

-- the race geared toward patriarchy --nor as equal partners, but as an irreducible entity that has no equal in the male sex. They seek not recognition of the similarities of the sexes, and thus the equality based on these, but they wish to demonstrate the purely unique, psychologically feminine aspects that only a woman can experience. They seek an essentiality beyond linear history that calls to a different force. They want their differences -- gender-based -- to be recognized and revered.

Castration or Penis Envy

Kristeva argues that, at least in Eastern European Socialist countries, The original goals of the first generation of feminism, that is, equality with men on most economic, political, and professional levels, were either achieved, or were on their way to being achieved -- or could conceivably be on the horizon of achievement. In terms of sexual equality, that aspect of egalitarianism that would allow for social acceptance and permissiveness in sexual relations which result in homosexuality, abortion, and contraception, there continue to be strict taboos on female behaviour. As a result of the earlier generation's gains, and in spite of them, the newer generation, more psychologically aware, concerned itself not with a quest for equality, but with theorizing difference and specificity. From that point onwards, the new generation was on a *symbolic* journey. "Sexual difference -- which is at once

biological, physiological, and relative to reproduction -- is translated by and translates a difference in the relationship of subjects to the symbolic contract which *is* the social contract: a difference, then, in the relationship to power, language and meaning" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 39).

Before getting into this *symbolic contract*, Kristeva wishes to clear up Freud's notion of castration in order to see how it relates to the psychology of society as a whole, and particularly to women. She points out firstly that Freud's notion is based strictly on a question of *fear* of castration. It is a question of *imaginary* formations that come to light in the syntax and language of neurotics, both female and male. This neurotic discourse in man and woman is only comprehensible in terms of its own logic when its fundamental causes are admitted as the fantasies of Freud's primal scene and castration, even if nothing renders them present in reality itself. In other words, "the reality of castration is no more real than the hypothesis of an explosion which, according to modern astrophysics, is at the origin of the universe: Nothing proves it, in a sense it is an article of faith, the only difference being that numerous phenomena of life in this 'big-bang' universe are explicable only through this initial hypothesis" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 40).

Much of Freud's writing implies that castration is "the imaginary construction of a radical operation which constitutes the symbolic field and all beings inscribed therein" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 41). In other words, it

is an imaginary process or a symbol for the separation that is at the basis of all social interaction and because men and women become socialised, unconsciously through this separation, the psychological balance is tipped one way or the other based on this fear of the imaginary separation from an integral part of what makes us -- the penis. It is this separation that binds language and syntax so that this can only be understood meaning in society when things other than ourselves are objectified. This is the common destiny of both men and women. "That certain biofamilial conditions and relationships cause women (and notably hysterics) to deny this separation and the language which ensues from it, whereas men (notably obsessionals) magnify both and, terrified, attempt to master them -- this is what Freud's discovery has to tell us on this issue" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 41).

Beginning, consciously or otherwise, with this psychological operation, it becomes evident how women can try to comprehend their sexual and symbolic difference within the framework of socio-cultural reality in order that they might fulfil their own experience, as a gender and individually, within society to the fullest or "but always starting from this point -- to go further and call into question the very apparatus itself" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 41).

The question women in our society face, according to Kristeva, and Marcuse, is that because they no longer wish to be excluded from the day

to day decisions of society (its directions, goals, and the like), and because they are no longer in acceptance with the role that they have been forced to fill traditionally, how can women reveal their place firstly as it has been handed to them , and then how they want to be different?

Feeling as though they have been left out of the sociosymbolic contract (and they have been), and that they are victims within it, women receive no life affirmation or identity affirmation. This is the essence of a new feminist ideology. This ideology is unlike previous generations of feminism which tried to take hold of the sociosymbolic contract in order to enjoy the fruits of it, or to subvert it. The new ideology is more self-analytical, and attempts to study the contract, its functioning and its impetus, not so much from the professional theory that has been accumulated regarding it anthropologically, psychoanalytically, or linguistically, but from the extremely personal standpoint as female subject that faces it on a daily and frustrating basis. "This leads to the active research, still rare, undoubtedly hesitant but always *dissident*, being carried out by women in the human sciences; particularly those attempts, in the wake of contemporary art, to break the code, to shatter language, to find a specific discourse closer to the body and emotions, to the unnameable repressed by the social contract" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 43).

Kristeva is not advocating a new 'women's language' which would reveal more the marginal status of women rather than any sociosymbolic

difference, nor is she speaking of aesthetic productions by women, which, by and large, are no more revealing than those of men. What she is trying to get across is that the new generation of women is trying to reveal and prove that, as it applies especially to women, the sociosymbolic contract is a contract which demands too many sacrifices from one party to the advantage of the other.

Women and Power

Under pressure from the feminist movements, women are being promoted to powerful positions in industry, government, and culture. This, according to Kristeva, does not mean that most inequality has been eradicated (even amongst those people in these positions of power), but at the very least, these inequalities are obvious enough to be understood, and, eventually, overcome. The major concern for women at the present time is to overcome the steadfast resistance to change that exists within our inherently conservative society. It must be demonstrated that although society seems to be 'working' (i.e. it has created the most prosperous nation on earth), it does so at the expense of marginalized groups such as women.

The mere arrival of women in high level industrial, governmental, and cultural positions of power has not in any way altered the nature or

direction of this power. It has not become more humane, feminine, or more in touch with nature. Once these women attain such power, and even before, they are seduced by it just as are men; they lose any gentle sensibility they may have at one time had. They have entered linear time where things must be done and objectives must be met as expediently as possible. Kristeva points out that in many totalitarian regimes around the world, and in modern history, such as Nazi Germany and in Chile, this use of power by women, at least as brutal and sometimes more so, is a feature these regimes have counted on. Because of the inferior role that has always plagued women, and because, as Marcuse would agree, of their historical lack of aggression, women in positions of power, at least initially, seem to garner more trust from the public, and even more from other women. This *counterinvestment*, as Kristeva calls it, in the sociosymbolic character of the latest generation of the feminist movement, retards the recognition that Kristeva and other feminists wish women to obtain. In its most acute form, the elevation to power positions, in totalitarian regimes, leads to terrorism and sheer brutality; at its most common levels, in many Western democracies, most notably the United States, it leads to a counterrevolutionary flattening of possibilities. Horizons of change are wiped out because the disease of power as Roberto Michels has shown, levels out radicalism and stabilizes, even strengthens, the status quo. "Political organization leads to power. But

power is always conservative" (Michels, 1962, p. 333). People end up conforming to the "way things are": things cannot be that bad for women for they do sit in Congress, Parliament, and even the Upper Houses.

On this point Kristeva's and Marcuse's ideas converge. If allowing women to reach positions of power in industry, government, and culture did not benefit the status quo of the existing power structure, it would not be allowed to happen. Women in powerful positions is nothing more than a bone that society is thrown to keep voices of radical dissent virtually inaudible. Kristeva states that "experience proves that too quickly even the protest or innovative initiatives on the part of women *inhaled* by power systems (when they do not submit to them right off) are soon credited to the system's account; and that the long-awaited democratization of institutions as a result of the entry of women most often comes down to fabricating a few 'chiefs' among them" (1986, p. 45 - italics mine). One would think that having women in powerful positions would be an ideal way to change things from the top down.

Opposed to these women are the more radical feminists who refuse all integration or identification with the existing power structure, no matter what that structure may be, who opt out of existing society to form subterranean *countersocieties*. "A 'female society' is then constituted as a sort of alter ego of the official society, in which all real or fantasized possibilities for *jouissance* take refuge" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 45). In contrast

to the sociosymbolic contract that these feminists rightly see as exclusionary, frustrating, and sacrificial, they view their own countersociety as a harmonious entity that is free, fulfilling, and without the prohibitions administered in the society at large. In comparison to modern society that can offer no true freedom or fulfilment, the countersociety offers transcendence because it exists outside of the law, culture, and mores of society.

The countersociety is pure in the sense that no counterrevolutionary potential is allowed entrance. In this sense it is very much like modern protest movements in general, such as the Black Panthers or the Black Islamic state of the early Malcolm X, which, although they have their genesis on rational grounds, purge any entrance to non-pure elements. These movements have "reiterated this logic, locating the guilty one -- in order to fend off criticism -- in the foreign, in capital alone, in the other religion, in the other sex. Does not feminism become a kind of inverted sexism when this logic is followed to its conclusion?" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 45).

Kristeva's answer to her own question is that this strain of feminism, like other protest movements, does not comprise of initially libertarian movements that eventually, by whatever reason, either internal disagreements, or external manipulations, regress into institutions as oppressive and archaic as the ones they originally sought to supersede.

Instead, the very rationality of counterpower that brings these countersocieties to fruition, is in essence the very same as that of the society they combat or merely of power itself. This is very similar to Marcusean theory which contends that only power is the result of some form of domination, and that domination can only lead to a society that is unfree in the sense that large portions therein, if in fact not all members, exist only by the grace of others.

The over-representation of women, Kristeva points out, in terrorist groups is mostly the product of a denial of the sociosymbolic contract and its counterinvestment. When a person, or group of people in society is brutally excluded from the sociosymbolic stratum, yet is called upon to play a brutal role and provide support for that system,

When, for example, a woman feels her affective life as a woman or her condition as a social being too brutally ignored by existing discourse or power (from her family to social institutions); she may, by counterinvesting the violence she has endured, make of herself a 'possessed' agent of this violence in order to combat what was experienced as frustration -- with arms which may seem disproportional, but which are not so in comparison with the subjective or more precisely narcissistic suffering from which they originate. Necessarily opposed to the bourgeois democratic regimes in power, this terrorist violence offers as a program of liberation an order which is even more oppressive, more sacrificial than those it combats (Kristeva, 1986, p. 46).

While Kristeva points out that no overtly positive or negative answer can be given to the question, 'Are women more apt than other social categories, notably the exploited classes, to invest in this implacable machine of terrorism?', she does qualify her answer. She argues that since the earliest stages of feminism, the political activity of what have been termed *exceptional* women, has taken the form of murder, conspiracy and crime. She demonstrates, however, the higher level of difficulty that the young girl has than does a young boy in detaching herself from her mother in order to accede to the order of signs as invested by the absence and separation constitutive of the patriarchal function. Society, from day one, puts little girls in pink rooms and calls them 'sweetheart', while boys are given the tools and skills to build the world. A girl can never reestablish the contact she had with her mother at birth, the very contact that a boy may one day find in a relationship with a woman. The only way she can reestablish such a bond is by becoming a mother herself, which is the role society wants her to play anyway. She is trapped -- she must prostitute herself to fulfil herself. "In sum, all of these considerations -- her eternal debt to the woman-mother -- make a woman more vulnerable within the symbolic order, more fragile when she suffers within it, more violent when she protects herself from it" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 47).

A New Generation?

Although the second generation of feminism saw the desire to be a mother not only alienating but reactionary, the refusal of maternity cannot be a mass policy, for the majority of women today see a possibility for fulfilment in bringing a child into the world. Kristeva asks the question: 'What does this desire for motherhood correspond to?' Freud affirmed that a woman's desire for a child is really the desire for a penis, a substitute for phallic and symbolic dominion. Kristeva states that this can only be partially true for it ignores the fact that the arrival of a child brings the mother a multitude of experiences that, without a child, she would very rarely experience, such as "the slow, difficult, and delightful apprenticeship in attentiveness, gentleness, forgetting oneself" (1986, p. 49).

Kristeva implies that a new, third generation of feminism is possible; although the term *generation* is less a measurement of a period of time than a *signifying space* (1986, p. 51). It is both something that exists in the physical world and psychologically. This new generation is the possible mixture in time and space of the previous two generations with a heightened awareness of the dichotomy between men and women as existing only in the realm of metaphysics. She is not advocating a hypothetical bisexuality or androgyny, for that would simply mean the aspiration toward the totality of one of the sexes and thus the other being

effectively won over. She posits the theoretical reduction of the importance that is placed on the problematic of *difference*. This implies the ridiculously upheld Darwinian notion of the fight to the death between rival groups and between men and women. For Kristeva, this means "that the struggle, the implacable difference, the violence be conceived in the very place where it operates with the maximum intransigence, in other words, in personal and sexual identity itself, so as to make it disintegrate in its very nucleus" (1986, p. 52).

Kristeva acknowledges the potential harm, or overloading of the psyche that may result from such an introjection. It places our personal and societal equilibrium at risk. But she posits, "is it not the insupportable situation of tension and explosive risk that the existing 'equilibrium' presupposes which leads some of those who suffer from it to divest it of its economy to detach themselves from it, and seek another means of regulating difference?" (1986, p. 52).

Kristeva takes her theory to a personal level in that she witnesses a 'relative indifference' toward the radical theory of feminism and a relaxing of any dedication to the feminist project as a retreat from sexism in general. She recognizes and warns that this apathy may be the result of, or may result in, a form of spiritualism, or "a form of repression ready to support all status quos" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 52). She posits that this process is going on in each individual and is simply the introjection of the

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the various media and communications dish out, but also to get behind and "demystify the identity of the symbolic bond itself, to demystify, therefore, the *community* of language as a universal and unifying tool, one which totalises and equalizes" (1986, p. 53). This equalization does not flatten the individual characteristics, sufferings or triumphs, it, instead brings out this particular singularity while at the same time it emphasizes where the particular person stands relatively to his/her symbolic and physical existence "according to the variation in his/her symbolic capacities" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 53). In this way, because everyone performs this interiorization, this equalization emphasizes the responsibility which we all face in placing this harmony against the ultimate threat -- death -- which we all face. This interiorization has individual as well as social stakes and, therefore, the aesthetic practices that Kristeva encourages are her modern reply to the question of morality. "At least, this is how we might understand an ethics which, conscious of the fact that its order is sacrificial, reserves part of the burden for each of its adherents, therefore declaring them guilty while immediately affording them the possibility for *jouissance*, for various productions, for a life made up of both challenges and differences" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 53).

What makes Kristeva important for this thesis is that she seems to understand Marcuse's "new sensibility". She acknowledges the achievements and importance of the agendas of the various stages and

forms of feminism, but advocates getting to a time and place beyond these. Kristeva attempts to go beyond what makes us different by taking the emphasis of that difference from gender or race or sexual orientation, and placing it within the individual self. She understands that whatever has happened in the past (in the linear sense), has created the world in which we live today, and that it is a place beyond this world that we should seek to find. We are all (or have been) both victim and executioner, some, of course, more one than the other, but we will never achieve a monumental society until we focus our efforts on that new society.

Chapter VII

Conclusion: The Rebel Finds Her Voice

Herbert Marcuse, throughout his writings, militated against the counterrevolutionary 'values' of American society. It was not up against an overtly tyrannical dictatorship that left the masses in abject poverty while the dictators lived in a palace fit for a king. It was the comfort, the easy life, the affluence that he admonished. He recognized that the majority of the people in capitalist society lived well. Most people enjoyed a material wealth unparalleled in history. But, he recognized that this was the case only at the expense of freedom. He recognized that without repression, the circumstances would not exist to allow the people to overcome and transcend that repression. However, he saw that repression had gone too far. It no longer makes sense, and that the limits on human freedom that it imposed were maintained only to benefit the few who were in power, and only incidentally the masses. He remained hopeful that the people, the masses within the growing working class would some day become conscious of their unfreedom and throw away their chains. He longed for the day when people would simply say 'no'. He was a true rebel, and one with the highest of causes - freedom.

He felt that most people lived a life of despair, but they did not even

know it; they were too busy (and that is how the Establishment keeps them silent) working or seeking comfort and rest within their consumer society to find their voice.

To remain silent is to give the impression that one has no opinions, that one wants nothing, and in certain cases it really amounts to wanting nothing. Despair, like the absurd, has opinions and desires about everything in general and nothing in particular. Silence expresses this attitude very well. But from the moment that the rebel finds his voice - even though he says nothing but 'no' - he begins to desire and to judge. The rebel, in the entymological sense, does a complete turnabout. He acted under the lash of his master's whip. Suddenly he turns and faces him. He opposes what is preferable to what is not. Not every value entails a rebellion, but every act of rebellion tacitly invokes a value (Camus, 1956, p. 14).

One problem that some political theorists have with Marcuse relates to agency. It is asked that why cannot reflective, thoughtful individuals not choose to get "real" pleasure out of the consumption of various consumer goods? It is this very enjoyment, identification, and pleasure that is one of the central tenets of Marcuse's disdain of consumer culture. Because we do not get enough life affirming, erotic pleasure from the living of our lives, due largely to the aggressive repression and redirection of our erotic instinct, we seek gratification and identification in a slick, sexy automobile, or a new pair of shoes. Further, we are not

"freely" choosing the goods we "pick", for they are offered to us by the Establishment because the Establishment approves of them and considers them safe for the maintenance of the status quo (any tabooed item must be clandestinely procured and kept from the public view), thus any "freedom" we feel is to a large extent false. We are only allowed to choose from the varieties decided for us. We are still *directed* to choose. Our choices are predictable and entirely manipulable.

With Marcuse, feminism may find its voice; and with feminism, the working class (the silent majority) may find its voice.

In chapter four we discussed the liberal feminism of Mary Wollstonecraft to the cultural feminism of identity politics. Each sub-community of feminism has its virtues in that each has attempted to address certain patterns that exist in society. Liberal feminism addressed the inequalities between men and women, and demonstrated that women still do not have the same opportunities as do men. Unfortunately what liberal feminists fail to recognize is that merely obtaining an equal say or in gaining access to the same high levels of governmental and business, will not change the system that created these vast inequalities in the first place. Everything else remaining equal, liberal feminists extol the otherwise egalitarian and admirable characteristics of the system. They are dedicated to the American way: they believe in the typical, traditional family structure, they believe in the virtues of capitalism. All they really

wish to gain is formal equality within a racist, class-stratified system. This is a formidable first step, but as the only true formal goal, it is counterrevolutionary, and although women will hopefully someday enjoy true, unqualified, equal status, a fundamentally bad society will remain. All the evils discussed in chapter one will, by and large, remain.

Radical feminism and cultural feminism evolved from the same rejection of patriarchy as liberal feminism did, however the two criticisms of patriarchy are essentially quite different. Radical feminism was initially a political movement dedicated to eliminating the sex-class system, whereas cultural feminism was a countercultural movement that took aim at reversing the cultural adoption of male characteristics while devaluing the female. Radical feminists sought to eliminate differences of gender while cultural feminists were generally essentialists who celebrated the female. Radical feminism originally advocated that feminism was an extension of leftist politics while cultural feminists felt that feminism could replace leftist strategy. Radical feminists were typically against capitalism, and cultural feminist believed that economic *class* struggle was invented by men, thus it was a male phenomenon that was irrelevant to women's issues.

At some point in the early seventies, radical feminism became eclipsed by cultural feminism. Alice Echols in her Daring to be Bad compares the cultural feminists with the rise of black nationalism to

demonstrate how the environment of the period led to such a shift. She argues that the government played a major role in the disintegration of many radical movements with the use of Draconian campaigns of counterrevolutionary activity. Government agents infiltrated many radical movements to spark and report on factionalism and infighting within these groups. Echols observes that even the women's liberation movement was infiltrated by FBI spies. "In fact, one civil liberties lawyer familiar with the FBI's subversion of dissident groups has argued that in terms of the amount of time, effort, and agents deployed, the FBI's surveillance and infiltration of the women's liberation movement was comparable to its campaign against the Socialist Workers Party, the Communist Party, and anti-war groups" (Echols, 1989, p. 8).

Echols suggests that at the same time that it was suppressing political dissent, the government was also making token concessions designed to silence protesters. "During this period the government enacted civil rights legislation, established anti-poverty programs, and lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen" (Echols, 1989, p. 8). Although radicals recognized these tactics as counterrevolutionary and would do little to eliminate the stratification and inequalities in the system, they found it more and more difficult to mobilize large numbers of people once the most obvious targets had been eliminated.

Radical feminists had a hard time countering the conservative

nature of the times. In some respects cultural feminism capitulated to cultural values and assumptions. Unlike radical feminists who fundamentally objected to any notion of opposing values and functions for men and women, cultural feminists treated differences of gender as though they demonstrated just how different are men and women.

The cultural feminist agenda, as well as sections of radical feminism such as Radicalesbians, of essentializing women and shying away from any form of support from outside of their particular identity, takes identity politics to the point of being counterproductive. Ultimately, the goal of these groups should be to revolutionize society. They believe that the present society is sexist, racist, and run by men for men. This much is true. However, in ignoring all other areas of political theory, and most importantly, in disengaging themselves from the mass of the population, the working class, they lose any hope of changing society.

In order to have a successful revolution, the working class is essential. At present the working class has little to no revolutionary consciousness. It accepts, by and large, the terms of the society and is quite comfortable playing with the gadgets it can afford. It does not recognize just how deep the stratifications and inequality, as well as the level of unfreedom, that exist within the present system. This class must be made conscious before any revolutionary action can be taken.

Feminists possess this consciousness, but do not possess the

numbers. A strategy of theorizing on a particular female identity that is noted as remarkably different from the male one existent at present, is important, but insufficient on its own.

The kind of society that would exist after Marcuse's cultural revolution would be one in which identity politics would no longer be necessary. This is not to say that particular identities would be flattened out, and that society would be made up of indistinct, androgynous people. On the contrary, particular identities would have the freedom to flourish without a constant battle to have themselves recognized by all other identities. In the present society, particular identity groups struggle and compete for recognition because unless they do so, their particular triumphs, as well as recognition of the atrocities they have endured will be forgotten. Because society would be pacified, leaving aggressive competition behind, there would be no need to defend constantly "This is who I am." There would be enormous amounts of time freed for all to study the past and come to understand one another. One of the major reasons that particular identities are not automatically recognized today is that the average person does not have the time nor the energy to care. Further, if the Establishment were to admit any wrong doing by officially recognizing how certain groups have been ignored, mistreated, brutalized, and marginalized, it fears it would fall. Thus it relies upon a counterrevolution to demonstrate that by and large, every group seeking

recognition is well off, and certainly better off than in the past.

This is not good enough, but the situation within modern society for identity politicians is somewhat of a "Catch - 22". For example, women are not recognized as being what they feel they are within society. To combat this, they focus on their identity instead of trying to revolutionize the system that forces them to focus on identity for recognition in the first place. In focussing on themselves, and ignoring all else, they are treated as exclusionary and 'prejudicial'. As a result of this, they come under intense fire from the counterrevolution. They are right back where they started.

Re-attaching itself with the Left, and adopting a Marcusean/Kristevan approach, feminism has a chance for change. Creating exclusive counter-societies within society is frivolous for so long as the status quo exists outside of the sub-culture, that small identity group will depend on society and exist only by its 'grace'. The decision by cultural feminists and Radicalesbians in placing all of their effort into focusing on what each believes is a suitable and *true* identity for women (this includes what each group feels is the correct identity for the particular sub-group as well as simply what it means to be a woman; as well as theorizing on how past and present societies have ignored and even militated against such an identity so that those who benefit from the status quo, typically white, wealthy men, can continue to do so), is

frivolous without an ultimate theoretical goal of altering, or revolutionizing the status quo. Statements such as those by Radicalesbians that conclude that unless a woman is a lesbian, she is sleeping with the enemy and, thus, is capitulating and settling for male-domination are, I've argued, mistaken. They are ridiculous, dangerous, and they fuel the status quo. The best possible result of such an intense identity politics is that such a group can set up a seemingly self-sufficient sub-society that has no room for men. This is a tacit acceptance of the strength of the status quo. These groups, in this way, implicitly concede victory.

These groups have studied society and concluded that its cultural functions have led women to this defensive stance. What they fail to see is that it has also led men to *adopt* an aggressive *offensive* stance. Society is run by the *second natures* of human beings, and only a revolution that frees up the life-enhancing, harmonious, life affirming instinct, will lead to a pacified society in which there will be no need for identity politics.

Unless the identity politics of society calls for, as Marcuse did, new categories for a *new society* -- moral, political, aesthetic -- the best it can achieve is a collection of very strictly defined sub-cultures that only interact with themselves. There will be no revolution otherwise; the basic cultural foundation will not be altered. The present foundation is not 'natural' in any scientific sense. It is the result of years of cultural

introjection to the point of the adoption of 'second nature'. To the degree to which this foundation is itself historical and the malleability of 'human nature' reaches into the depth of our instinctual structure, changes in morality may sink down into the *biological* dimension and modify organic behaviour. Once a specific morality is firmly established as a norm of social behaviour, it is not only introjected, it also operates as a norm of organic behaviour: "the organism receives and reacts to certain stimuli and *ignores* and repels others in accord with the introjected morality, which is thus prompting or impeding the function of the organism as a living cell in the respective society" (Marcuse, 1969, p. 11). In this way, a society continually re-creates patterns of behaviour and aspiration as part of the *nature* of its people, and unless revolt reaches into the *second nature*, into the adopted, in-grown patterns, social change will remain incomplete, and even self-defeating.

Our consumer society and corporate capitalism have created our second nature and they tie us to the commodity form. The need for having and consuming and constantly renewing the gadgets offered and imposed upon us, for using the devices at the danger of our own destruction, has become a *biological* need in the sense of second nature. Our second nature militates against any change that would potentially disrupt and perhaps overthrow this dependence on the market. The

needs generated by such a system are inherently stabilizing and conservative. This system has plenty of room for pockets of personal rebellion, and even feeds on it, for it retains a semblance of democracy and freedom. Groups whose identity politics ignores the system to focus on themselves are no threat to the system for they are divided and weak targets. Because these groups use the same exclusionary tactics, overtly, that society uses but 'hides' behind affluence, they are easily condemned by society as enemies of the American Way.

The women's movement is threatened by a counterrevolution. To fight this assault, feminism must reinvest in radical politics of the left. More than twenty years has passed since Marcuse wrote Counterrevolution and Revolt; the women's movement has gone through many changes and has achieved some significant accomplishments. At the same time, the working class remains detached from the left and is still, by and large, committed to the status quo. Marcuse's work reminds us of the need to think dialectically of the potential that exists within our particular historical circumstances. The ability of feminism and the women's movement to formulate a strategy that will enable it to combat the counterrevolution will depend on its ability to reforge a connection with the Left. Feminism definitely has the revolutionary consciousness necessary to reinvigorate the Left. Even though there is no substantial cultural revolution in the offing, feminism should still talk about it -- even if

it sounds more like a whisper.

Don't you know
They're talkin' 'bout a revolution
It sounds like a whisper...

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





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